Williams v Boambee Bay Time Share Resort Pty Limited & Anor

Respondents' submissions 19 On behalf of the first respondent Mr Watson SC submitted that his Honour was correct to reject the claim for weekly payments and that, properly understood, albeit concise, his reasons were adequately stated. The applicant could be in no doubt that her claim failed because the judge was not satisfied that the amount she was able to earn after the first injury was less than that earned before. The issue under s 40 was whether the applicant's post-injury ability to earn was less than her pre-injury earnings and so much was made clear in exchanges between his Honour and the applicant's counsel during his address. 20 Mr Watson SC submitted that reading the judgment as a whole, and in the context of the way the case was run, the reasons given were sufficient. 21 Counsel added one further submission which should be promptly dealt with. Without filing a cross-appeal or contention, Mr Watson submitted that the overall apportionment by his Honour was erroneous and no miscarriage of justice would occur if the apportionment was set aside. It may also be noted that no such submission was made in the written submissions of the first respondent. 22 On behalf of the second respondent Mr McIntyre SC opposed the application pointing out that his Honour found, and was entitled to find, that both injuries were relevant. 23 I do not think that the first respondent should be entitled to raise this issue at this stage in the absence of any cross-appeal or other indication or notice. 24 Mr McIntyre also supported Mr Watson's submission that there was no breach of s 40 in his Honour's approach, nor were his reasons inadequate. His Honour was not required to detail all of the steps in his reasoning, and a broad outline is sufficient. He also submitted that the applicant failed to prove the remuneration she could have earned in the jobs she could perform. In other words, she failed to prove what she could have earned, or for that matter, what she would have earned if she had not been injured. 25 In this latter respect it is clear that no such point was taken below. 26 Finally, Mr McIntyre submitted that it was clear to anyone in the Court what his Honour's thinking was on the issue and there was no need to give detailed reasons. In effect the judge was saying that the applicant had a substantial capacity to earn.

Consideration 27 In my opinion, the applicant's challenge to his Honour's judgment should be upheld. 28 What his Honour said in para 42 was simply not enough to satisfy s 40 of the Act. His Honour did not address the weekly amount the worker would probably have been earning if uninjured, s 40(2)(a), nor what the worker would be able to earn in suitable employment after the injury, s 40(2)(b). It is no answer to say that the evidence was lacking because his Honour did not say so. 29 It is instructive to examine the few sentences in his Honour's reasons in para 42 of the judgment. 30 The first sentence that the applicant has "considerable experience and talent" says nothing by itself. The second sentence is factual. 31 The third sentence is the most problematic, while the last sentence is the decision to reject the claim. In the third sentence his Honour said:- "I find that there are many jobs that she could do despite her impairments." 32 This acknowledges the applicant's partial incapacity but tells us nothing of the "many jobs that she could do". Not only does his Honour fail to inform the reader of what these jobs are, we know nothing of what his Honour believed that the applicant would be likely to earn in the jobs, nor whether she would have suffered a reduction in her ability to earn in the general labour market reasonably accessible to her. In other words, there was no attempt to come to grips with the requirements of s 40. 33 Further, in my opinion, the reasons given are plainly inadequate. I say that while deprecating a tendency of many judges today to give overly long (and sometimes rambling) reasons. Brevity in reasons is to be admired but they must still pass the tests enunciated in the authorities. 34 It was acknowledged by Mahoney JA in Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1987] 10 NSWLR 247 at 271-273 that a judge is not required to make a finding in respect of every fact leading to the final conclusion of fact, nor reason from one fact to the next along the chain of reasoning to that conclusion. Nevertheless, a judge must distinguish between the essentials and the peripherals. This is so particularly where there is a right of appeal to be exercised. Reasons are necessary as an incident to a judicial decision to provide a sufficient explanation of why an order is made. The judge is to apprise the parties of the broad outline and constituent facts of the reasoning upon which he or she has acted. 35 As McHugh JA said at 280, lengthy or elaborate reasons are not required. However, it is necessary that the essential ground(s) upon which the decision rests should be articulated. The parties (and the Courts) are entitled to see what matters were considered and what the view reached by the judge was on fact and law. 36 While his opinion was a dissenting one, Kirby P said (at 259):- "This decision does not require of trial judges a tedious examination of detailed evidence or a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process that leads to the judge's conclusion. But the judicial obligation to give reasons, and not to frustrate the legislative facility of appeal on questions of law, at least obliges a judge to state generally and briefly the grounds which have led him or her to the conclusions reached concerning disputed factual questions and to list the findings on the principal contested issues. Only if this is done can this Court discharge its functions, if an appeal is brought to it. Where nothing exists but an assertion of satisfaction on undifferentiated evidence the judicial obligation has not been discharged. Justice has not been done and it has not been seen to be done. Where it is necessary, for default of reasons, to resort to inferences which point to a reason for the decision of highly dubious relevance to the statute being applied, the result is that an error of law has occurred which this Court can and should correct. To adapt the words of Chilwell J in Connell v Auckland City Council [1977] 1 NZLR 630 at 634 the failure of a court to afford reasons in such a case may, in a modern community, result in a litigant who is not only "disappointed" but "disturbed". Such a result would be unacceptable precisely because of the statutory limitation on appeals to this Court. It would be doubly so because of the strict approach taken by the Court to that limitation. The corollary of the Court's strict approach is the obligation of the judge of the Compensation Court, by his reasons, to demonstrate, in his determination of relevant factual disputes, that his conclusion amounts to a proper application of the statute. That was not done here." 37 Unfortunately, the reasons given by his Honour fail to address the applicant's claim for weekly payments or give adequate reasons for its rejection. They are legally inadequate reasons and there is no dispute that inadequate reasons may constitute an error of law. 38 Accordingly, the appeal should be allowed. I propose the following orders:- 1. Appeal upheld with costs.

2. Order making no award for weekly payments set aside.

3. Matter remitted to the Compensation Court as now constituted by the District Court of New South Wales for the hearing and determination of the appellant's entitlement to weekly payments of compensation under ss 36, 37 and 40 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.

4. The respondents to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act if otherwise entitled. ****************************

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