5 The third objection is that under O 16 r 1(2) an application for summary judgment shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts upon which the application is made, and by subrule (4), the summons and the copy of the affidavit in support and annexures shall be served on the plaintiff not less than seven days before the return date of the summons. All this was not done. The principal affidavit in support of the first defendant, although sworn on 21 March, was filed on 30 March and served at that time or shortly afterwards on the plaintiffs' solicitors. That is clearly a breach of O 16 r 1(2) and (4). I am also told that two further affidavits in support have been prepared and they are in the process of being served on the plaintiffs' solicitors. I think draft copies of those affidavits have already been served. These are serious omissions but are not necessarily fatal to the progress of this application: see Lill v Merchant (WA) Ltd (1996) 15 WAR 536 at 550 per Ipp J, with whom Franklyn J agreed. Is it just to overlook these deficiencies and allow this application to be heard on the merits? As far as I can see, and I have not seen the two new affidavits, it is not unjust to let it proceed. The chamber summons sets out the grounds for the application, namely that the written statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action by the first plaintiff against the first and second defendants, is frivolous and vexatious and the first and second defendants have a good defence on the merits of the claims against the first plaintiff and the action of the first plaintiff ought to be disposed of summarily. I suspect that there is a fair overlap between the matters to be raised here and the matters raised on the strike-out application. I note that by the statement of claim the causes of action are misleading and deceptive conduct and fraud and they both arise out of certain representations made by the first defendant to a representative of the second plaintiff. It is not alleged that those representations were made to the first plaintiff or to an agent of the first plaintiff. Those representations are said to have induced the second plaintiff to enter into a contract of sale to purchase the defendants' property. The first plaintiff is not a party to that contract of sale, although it is said that she paid the deposit and borrowed a large sum of money to finance the purchase. The affidavit in support, already mentioned, will not take the plaintiffs by surprise. It says little apart from annexing a number of documents which are common to the parties. On the present papers I do not consider that the hearing of this summary judgment application will take up much additional time on the hearing of the defendants' strike-out application. I therefore propose to allow this application to proceed to be heard at the special appointment fixed on 9 May.