Wilkshire v Registrar of Trade Marks

The Present Case 5 It is not the case that because a person is a lay litigant he or she is for that reason immune to an order for indemnity costs: see Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275 at [41]-[47]; Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCA 223 at [55]-[60]. This said, there is an understandable reluctance to make such orders unless clear and compelling reasons for doing so are present notwithstanding the litigant's lack of legal representation. 6 I have set out at length in my reasons in the principal proceeding, the long history of the dispute between Mr Wilkshire and the Council. They have near identical trade marks differentiated in appearance for practical purposes by the language on them. They do relate to different classes of use. For whatever reason, Mr Wilkshire is of the view that the Council's registration of its mark was wrongly obtained. When the Council applied for registration of its mark in 2003 he opposed that application unsuccessfully. He then appealed to the Federal Court alleging, as he had before to the delegate, that those who had given evidence for the Council had colluded and fabricated evidence for the purposes of the application. Mr Wilkshire had legal advice in making his application to the Federal Court. His counsel provided advice that his appeal was unlikely to succeed. Subsequently consent orders were made which, amongst other things, noted a contractual arrangement between Mr Wilkshire and the Council which was designed to end their dispute over the Council's mark then and thereafter. He in effect agreed not to initiate any form of action against the Council in relation to the use of the respondent's mark. 7 Shortly before the consent orders, Mr Wilkshire filed five new trade mark applications all similar in character to his original marks. The Council became aware of this and opposed their registration. Before the opposition hearing Mr Wilkshire commenced the present proceeding. The delegate, in refusing to register Mr Wilkshire's five applications accepted that for s 62A of the Trade Marks Act the application was made in bad faith. 8 As I have indicated, Mr Wilkshire's application to this Court for cancellation of the mark under s 88 of the Act asserted that registration had been obtained as a result of fraud, false suggestion and misrepresentation by the Council and the delegate of the Registrar. In ordering summary dismissal I did so on a variety of grounds. The first was that he was not "a person aggrieved" for s 88 purposes. The second was that in any event his application did not on its face enliven a ground upon which an order could be made under s 88. The third was that in any event his contractual undertakings with the Council as part of the consent orders was a complete answer to his application. 9 In my reasons I observed that (at [41]) that: Mr Wilkshire's affidavits are replete with speculations about, and assertions and allegations of, impropriety, be it of the Delegate, the Council's witnesses, or both parties' lawyers. While accepting he may be able to point to inconsistencies in evidence relating to events long prior to the preparation of the declarations of witnesses for the Council, or to the non-production of documents created over a decade earlier, he has provided no plausible justification at all for the regularly made and, at first flush, seemingly preposterous consequential allegations of impropriety. I note in passing the standard of proof s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides for such allegations: see Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69 at [123]-[139].

10 There clearly is evidence before me of a refusal by Mr Wilkshire to accept the Council's entitlement to have and to use its mark. There equally is evidence that notwithstanding he was an unrepresented litigant, save in his appeal to the Federal Court, he has received advice or information from a variety of sources which would have communicated to a reasonable person that the present proceeding had no reasonable chance of success. I refer both to the decisions of the two delegates in the opposition hearings, albeit these were proceedings of a quasi summary nature, to his counsel's advice before the Federal Court appeal and, as well, to the terms of the offer of compromise made to him by the Council to the extent that it attempted to explain why his cancellation application was bound to fail. Importantly, that letter drew attention to the contractual undertakings to which I have referred. It also indicated that his allegations of deliberate dishonesty by the Council's witnesses required strong evidence for their proof and that his evidence fell well short of that. 11 Mr Wilkshire's intent to prosecute his proceeding, such advice notwithstanding is manifest in his attempt to disavow his contractual undertaking not to initiate legal proceedings against the Council. 12 When one turns to ask the question whether there are unusual circumstances in this matter which would justify an award of indemnity costs in relation to the motion for summary dismissal, I am satisfied such is the case. Notwithstanding the considerable latitude to be given to a lay litigant, I consider Mr Wilkshire has transgressed the borders of indulgence. He has without restraint over quite some period of time made allegations of impropriety against all who appear to support the Council or whose actions or advice stand in the way of his securing his ends. Further, as I indicated in the passage quoted above, he has provided no plausible justification at all for seemingly preposterous allegations of impropriety. He has been unprepared to honour the undertaking he gave to the Council not to initiate litigation in respect of its use of its registered mark. 13 It is difficult to resist the conclusion that he will continue to vex the Council unless the Court's disapproval of his conduct of litigation such as the present is brought home to him. In the circumstances I consider that an award of indemnity costs is appropriate accordingly. 14 Having dismissed Mr Wilkshire's application, I will order that the he pay the second respondent's costs on an indemnity costs basis (including its costs of the motions of 19 June 2009 and of 21 September 2009). I certify that the preceding fourteen (14) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.

Associate: Dated: 15 December 2009 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person.

Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear.

Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr N R Murray

Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mallesons Stephen Jaques