The Injunction
10That leads me to the grounds relied upon for the injunction restraining Allens from acting for the plaintiff in these proceedings. The basis for such intrusive relief was said to be the requirements of the 'proper administration of justice'. Counsel for the second defendant referred me to many general statements of principle but the issue is essentially pragmatic and the relief is discretionary. This is particularly so having regard to the fact that the jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor acting for his or her client is exceptional and must be exercised with caution: Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [76].
11This is not a case where the plaintiff's solicitors have any confidential information about or belonging to the defendants. Nor is it a case in which the plaintiff's solicitors have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome. Nor is it possible to see that the defendants will suffer any prejudice at all if Allens continue to act for the plaintiff. None was identified. And although it was initially contended that a member of the firm of Allens would be a material witness, senior counsel for the plaintiff categorically disclaimed any need or intention to call the relevant member of the firm - except in the unlikely event of evidence from the defendants of a conversation with him that required a response.
12The factual basis for the second defendant's application was more nebulous. It was submitted that Allens must have an interest in justifying its own conduct; that Allens might theoretically be exposed to a claim by the plaintiff for loss suffered by it if this suit fails; that the proceedings will involve an evaluation of Allens' conduct; and that, in some way, an invisible line had been crossed. The plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that there is no real and sensible possibility of conflict between itself and its solicitors.
13I do not think that the second defendant's submissions sufficiently grasp the practical commercial reality. To start with, although it is obviously not determinative, the plaintiff itself does not perceive any conflict with Allens. In the circumstances of this case, it has no concern that Allens' supposed self-interest will detract from the firm's ability to faithfully, independently and objectively represent it in the proceedings. It is therefore a little difficult to understand why a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that Allens should be restrained from acting for the plaintiff 'in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process'.
14An appreciation of the limited ambit of the rectification dispute and an understanding of the anticipated conduct of the hearing, serve to reinforce this perspective. I have already adverted to some of the documents and correspondence which preceded the finalisation of the deeds. Prima facie, they appear to indicate that the parties were unlikely to have intended that the agreed restraint should be limited to claims against Westpac by former employees of St George whose employment was or is terminated by Westpac, and not also by St George.
15All that has happened to give rise to the dispute is that the drafter did not explicitly import into the deeds the definition of 'Westpac' that appeared in the prior correspondence. As I have observed, it is arguable whether it was necessary to do so - as the cause of action for a declaration as to the proper construction of Clause 1(d) presupposes. But the supposed 'mistake' by the drafter, if it were a mistake, is of a very low order. And a rectification suit such as this does not involve any attribution of fault. The court is only interested in whether the words used accorded with the proved actual intentions of the parties. No question of blame arises. It may be that in some other cases, such considerations may possibly be relevant. But this case is straightforward.
16Not only is there no need for evidence from the solicitor at Allens who drafted the deeds, but there is nothing in his conduct to 'defend'. He drafted what he drafted. At the hearing, the words he utilised in the deeds he drafted will be compared with the evidence of the parties' actual intentions. The most reliable evidence of those intentions is contained in the contemporaneous communications between the parties. The plaintiff currently proposes to elicit evidence of its intention from a Mr Johnston, its Head of Employee Relations, something that may or may not be necessary. But what is significant is that this is not a case which requires a detailed examination of the drafter's conduct. There is no need for any rumination over his instructions or his advice, if any. The plaintiff's intention appears to be reasonably clear, with or without the evidence of Mr Johnston. The real issues for dispute are whether Gillis Delaney shared that intention and, if so, whether the words in Clause 1(d) of each deed reflected it.
17The submissions for the second defendant heaped speculation on speculation, none of which I found convincing. Apart from the false contention that the solicitor would be placed in the predicament of having to defend himself, which I have already addressed, it was said that Allens must have an indirect financial interest in the outcome of the litigation and 'might' be exposed to suit. That was said to be because, if the plaintiff's claim failed, Allens 'could be expected' to face a claim from the plaintiff for the costs of the proceedings, and possibly for some indistinct and unquantifiable loss arising from the fact that the Clause 1(d) restraint against Gillis Delaney only operated in relation to claimants whose employment is or was terminated by Westpac, and not by St George.
18The submissions were not assisted by the repeated mantra that everything was 'manifestly obvious'. In fact, most of it was opaque. Quite how, for example, the plaintiff would suffer loss if Gillis Delaney were not restrained from acting for certain claimants, was a mystery, which counsel was unable rationally to explain. And the prospect of the plaintiff holding Allens liable for the costs of these proceedings in the event that they failed, was too hypothetical to warrant serious consideration. Naturally, there was no evidence to support such an inference.
19Even if such an inference were available, the question remains whether, given the nature of the issues and the ambit of the dispute, it should make any difference to the reasonable man's perception of the integrity of the judicial process. I do not think so. It is not unusual for solicitors, for a variety of reasons, to have a financial investment in litigation, knowing that if the case fails, they will not recover their fees and may even be held liable by their client for the successful party's costs. There is no threat to the integrity of the judicial process when this occurs.
20As I have said, the 'propriety' of the drafter's conduct will not come under scrutiny. And it is extravagant - indeed inaccurate - to suggest that his interest, his client's interest and his obligation to the court will be in conflict. Allens is not in a 'difficult' or even an embarrassing position. Mistakes happen. They are an every day aspect of commercial practice. And if there were any mistake here, it was minor. From the perspective of an informed and reasonable observer, there could be no serious reputational risk to Allens; no reason to think that they could not bring an objective and dispassionate mind to the case; and no reason to think that the proper administration of justice would be, or be seen to be, affected: cf Gamgemi Pty Ltd v Luppino Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 168 at [20] - [26].