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[2018] FCA 1194
Federal Court of Australia
2018-08-10
Perry J
Original judgment source is linked above.
3.1 Prescribed conditions for making a determination that no native title exists 13 The conditions for making an approved determination that no native title exists in the application area are that: (1) the application has been advertised in accordance with s 66 of the NT Act; (2) the application area is not covered by an application for a determination that native title does exist; (3) the prescribed notification period under subs 66(10)(c) has come to an end and there are no persons who oppose the application; and (4) an order in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the applicant is within the Court's power. See e.g. Mudgee Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of NSW [2013] FCA 668 (Mudgee) at [8] (Jagot J). 14 The affidavit evidence of Ms Sharp affirmed on 31 May 2017 establishes that on 25 October 2016, the Registrar notified the first respondent and the second respondent of the application (as required by subs 66(2) and (2A) of the NT Act). Further, on 23 November 2016, the Registrar notified the persons and bodies required to be notified under subs 66(3). The Registrar also arranged for the publication of a notice in the Koori Mail and Condoblin Argus on 16 November 2016 in accordance with subss 66(3)(d) and (10) of the NT Act and reg 6(1) of the Native Title (Notices) Determination 2011 (No 1). The evidence therefore establishes that the first of the conditions set out above has been satisfied. 15 On 3 March 2017, the delegate of the Registrar advised that, following the end of the notification period on 28 February 2017, there were no other native title determination applications (including any claimant applications within the meaning of s 253 of the NT Act) and no relevant entries on either the National Native Title Register or the Register of National Native Title Claims in respect of the application area. Furthermore, the notice period came to an end on 28 February 2017 and there are no persons who oppose the application (as defined by subs 86G(2) of the NT Act). As such, the second and third conditions are met. 16 This Court also has power to make a determination that native title does not exist: see CG v Western Australia [2016] FCAFC 67; (2016) 240 FCR 466. The fourth condition is therefore also met. 17 In addition, I am satisfied that the operation and effect of the provisions of the ALR Act to which I earlier referred make it clear that the issue sought to be raised by this application is not a moot one and must be determined by this Court: see also by analogy e.g. Lightning Ridge Local Aboriginal Land Council v Premier of New South Wales [2012] FCA 792 at [25] (Perram J). As Jagot J observed in Jerringa Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of the State of NSW [2013] FCA 562 at [2], the interactions between the ALR Act and the NT Act mean that land councils have no option other than to seek an approved determination of native title in the Federal Court.
3.2 Has the Land Council established that no native title exists? 18 The remaining question is, therefore, whether I am satisfied on the evidence that the negative proposition that native title does not exist has been established on the balance of probabilities. In this regard, the Court must bear in mind that a determination that no native title exists has force and effect as against the whole world and, by virtue of subs 61(1) of the NT Act, may be varied relevantly only upon an application by the Commonwealth or relevant State Minister or the Native Title Registrar upon the limited grounds prescribed by subs 13(5) of the NT Act. Thus as Collier J explained in Anderson on behalf of the Wulli Wulli People v State of Queensland (No 3) [2015] FCA 821 at [153] in the context of a consent determination: • The Court must exercise caution where any declaratory order involving property rights is sought. • Orders that have particular public interest elements require closer examination by the Court than orders which operate solely inter partes. A determination of native title operates against the entire world and has public interest elements. (See also Munn at [22] (Emmett J)). 19 Native title is defined in subs 233(1) of the NT Act as follows: The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: (a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and (b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and (c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 20 As, by way of brief elucidation, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ held in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58; (2002) 214 CLR 422 at [75], "…Mabo [No 2] decided that certain rights and interests relating to land, and rooted in traditional law and custom, survived the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty and radical title in Australia. It was this native title that was then 'recognised and protected' in accordance with the Native Title Act …" (emphasis in the original): see also Callinan J at [180]. 21 The onus of proving that no native title exists in the application area lies upon the Land Council, as it accepted: Mudgee at [9] (Jagot J); Worimi at [67] and [74] (the Court). In this regard, in upholding the approach of the primary judge in deciding whether the onus of proof had been discharged, the Full Court held in Worimi that: 80. … It is obviously a difficult task to prove a negative proposition: Darling Island Stevedoring & Light Ridge Company Ltd v Jacobsen (1945) 70 CLR 635 at 641-642. It may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, by inference or by a combination of these things. It must nevertheless be more than a scintilla… It may be determined having regard to the power of the respective parties to adduce relevant evidence, and the extent to which they do so. In this matter, it was mainly a combination of the direct evidence of the Aboriginal witnesses and the inference drawn from the absence of a cogent assertion of native title by a competent application under s 61 of the NT Act, after the notification process, which supported the conclusion of the primary judge. 22 Similarly, in this case the Court has the benefit of the direct and uncontradicted evidence of local indigenous witnesses, including two elders who are charged with protecting and maintaining cultural heritage, and are regarded as knowledgeable about the cultural and traditional uses of the application area. Such evidence is critical: see also e.g. Mudgee at [9] (Jagot J). 23 Ms Hampton who has lived in the area for 42 years and gives evidence of her family's long ancestral connection to the West Wyalong area, attests to her belief that the land is not culturally significant or important under the traditional laws or customs of the Wiradjuri People - a belief, as I have said, which is based on oral stories told to her by family members, her research, and her long-standing membership of the Land Council. While the absence of sites of significance does not conclusively establish that native title does not exist, it is highly significant that neither Ms Hampton nor the local elders who gave evidence identify themselves or any other person as having any connection to the application area under traditional laws and customs (see by analogy Mudgee at [10] (Jagot J)). Nor is there any evidence of occupation or use of the land under traditional laws and customs. The evidence also establishes that the local Aboriginal Community is aware of the application, has resolved to support it, does not believe that a claimant application is likely to be made in respect of the application area, and does not believe that the application area is of cultural significance. Finally, there is no evidence of any other person asserting native title rights and interests in the land, including in response to publication of the native title determination application by the Registrar. 24 In my view, this evidence is sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities that there is no native title group holding native title rights and interests in the application area.
West Wyalong Local Aboriginal Land Council
Attorney-General of New South Wales
(2016) 240 FCR 466
(2002) 214 CLR 422
(2001) 115 FCR 109
(2010) 181 FCR 320
(1945) 70 CLR 635