(1999) 197 CLR 269
State of New South Wales v Beck
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Catchwords
(1999) 197 CLR 269
State of New South Wales v Beck
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
[1]
INTRODUCTION
Patrick Wessell was forcefully arrested when evicted from his Housing Commission premises after falling behind on his rent. Proceedings against him for resisting a police officer in the execution of his duty were dismissed. He sues the State of New South Wales (pursuant to the Crown Proceedings Act 1988) for false arrest and unlawful imprisonment, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution. The State accepts that it is vicariously liable for the conduct of the police officers in accordance with the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 as amended.
At the close of Mr Wessell's case, the State made an application under r 29.9 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 for dismissal of the malicious prosecution cause of action. Mr Wessell declined to argue this question under r 29.9(3) and the State elected to make an application for judgment under r 29.10, in accordance with r 29.9(5)(b).
[2]
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
Rule 29.10 provides:
"29.10 Judgment for want of evidence
(1) An opposite party may apply to the court to give judgment for the opposite party, either generally or on any claim for relief in the proceedings, on the ground that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported.
(2) Such an application may be made at any time after the conclusion of the evidence for the beginning party in his or her case in chief.
(3) The court may not give judgment under this rule unless the opposite party satisfies the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported.
(4) If the opposite party fails to satisfy the court that, on the evidence given, a judgment for the beginning party could not be supported, the opposite party may not adduce evidence or further evidence in the proceedings generally or on the claim for relief concerned, as the case may be, except by leave of the court.
(5) If not all opposite parties apply to the court under subrule (1), the court must not deal with any such application before the conclusion of the evidence given for all parties."
No party took any issue about the application being made in respect of the cause of action for malicious prosecution only. Rule 29.10 applies to the proceedings generally and claims for relief, but not expressly in respect of causes of action. However, the statement of claim and the particulars of damage indicate a claim for damages for the tort of malicious prosecution separate from the claims for damages for assault and battery and unlawful imprisonment. Accordingly, it seems appropriate that I proceed with the application as propounded.
A judgment cannot be given in favour of the State unless a judgment for Mr Wessell "could not be supported" (r 29.10(3)). However, r 29.10 does not expressly state that judgment must be given if judgment in favour of Mr Wessell cannot be supported. Historically, a "non‑suit" dismissal, such as under r 29.9, was proper if a verdict could not reasonably be given for the plaintiff on the evidence adduced (see Hiddle v National Fire & Marine Insurance Co of New Zealand [1896] AC 372 at 375‑6), but no authority was cited to indicate that judgment is mandatory under r 29.10 if judgment for the plaintiff cannot be supported on the evidence. However, Jordan CJ stated in De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 at 3 that if the evidence "would be incapable of supporting a verdict for the plaintiff…it is [the judge's] duty to non-suit or, if the defendant does not go into evidence…to direct a verdict for the defendant". The discretion referred to in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 330‑331 appeared to apply to the Victorian practice of not giving a decision on a non-suit unless the defendant "announced that he did not intend to call evidence".
Rule 29.10 does not expressly indicate any discretion, unlike, for example, in r 13.4 (summary dismissal) and r 14.28 (strike out of pleadings). The plaintiff did not oppose a discretionary refusal of an order for judgment and leave for the State to call further evidence (cf Beazley P in State of New South Wales v Beck; Commissioner of Police v Beck [2013] NSWCA 437 at [2]) but the State submitted that judgment should be given in favour of the defendant on the malicious prosecution claim if judgment in favour of the plaintiff could not be supported. It relied upon the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, which provides that a just, quick and cheap resolution should guide the construction and application of r 29.10. That provision and the quoted passage in De Gioia persuade me that a judgment for the defendant should be given when an application under r 29.10 is made and a judgment for the plaintiff cannot be supported.
[3]
ISSUES
The issues in this application derive from the elements of the cause of action for malicious prosecution. Those elements are:
1. the institution of curial proceedings by the defendant;
2. the termination of the proceedings in favour of the plaintiff;
3. the defendant acting maliciously in initiating or maintaining the proceedings; and
4. the absence of reasonable and probable cause.
(See A v New South Wales [2007] HCA 10 at [1]).
The first two elements are admitted on the pleadings, the other two elements are in issue.
Accordingly, to succeed on the application, the State must satisfy the Court that either a finding that the police officer initiated or maintained the proceedings maliciously or a finding that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause cannot be supported on the evidence. These matters constitute the issues to be determined.
The State submitted that there was no evidence that Leading Senior Constable Jay Maleckas maintained the proceedings as distinct from having initiated them. That is immaterial since the element of the cause of action is the institution or maintenance of the proceedings: either is sufficient. The application is not to strike out parts of a pleading or particulars, but is an application for judgment on a cause of action.
Moreover, whether by reason of the presumption of continuity or otherwise, evidence that a person initiated proceedings which continued leaves open and available an inference that the person continued those proceedings.
[4]
REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The High Court in A's case at [58] stated:
"[T]o decide whether the prosecutor did not have reasonable and probable cause for commencing or maintaining the prosecution, the material available to the prosecutor must be assessed in two ways. What did the prosecutor make of it? What should the prosecutor have made of it?"
The Court referred to these two questions as indicating the "subjective and objective elements" of "the absence of reasonable and probable cause" (at [61], also [70]).
Notwithstanding the use of the mandatory term "must" by the High Court in determining what is assessed, and the reference to "elements", it would be wrong to conclude that the High Court identified these two questions as representing two necessary components of proof for an absence of reasonable and probable cause. Rather:
"[The] proposition [that the prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause] may be established in either or both of two ways: the defendant prosecutor did not 'honestly believe' the case that was instituted or maintained, or the defendant prosecutor had no sufficient basis for such an honest belief." (A's case at [77]).
I shall refer to these "two ways" as, respectively, the subjective element and the objective element identified in A's case.
To put the matter another way, "reasonable and probable cause" involves proof of two components: a subjective component (that the prosecutor believed that there was a proper case for prosecution) and an objective component (that there was sufficient basis for a prosecution). It follows that proof of an absence of reasonable and probable cause means proof that it is not the case that those two components exist, that is, proof that either is (or both are) absent. Otherwise the law, if it required proof of the absence of both these subjective and objective components:
"would deny relief to the person acquitted of a crime prosecuted by a person who not only acted maliciously, but who is shown to have acted without forming the view that the material warranted prosecution of the offences"
and conversely would "favour the incompetent or careless prosecutor over the competent and careful" (A's case at [58]).
Accordingly, the plaintiff is able to establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause by proof of either the subjective or the objective elements identified in A's case and the failure to prove one of these elements is not fatal to the plaintiff's case. A conclusion that "the inference that [the prosecutor] did not have such a belief is simply untenable" is not then "reason alone [that] the defendant's application for judgment in its favour must succeed" (contra Clyne v State of New South Wales (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 629 at [51]), for the absence of reasonable and probable cause could still be established by proving the objective element identified in A's case.
In an application for judgment under r 29.10, the Court must "[take] the plaintiff's evidence at its highest" (see Naxakis v Western General Hospital [1999] HCA 22; (1999) 197 CLR 269, Clyne v State of New South Wales (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 629 at [6]). Nevertheless, the State submitted that the Court should on this application take into account factors affecting Mr Wessell's credit, including past offences of dishonesty. This submission must be rejected. Taking the plaintiff's evidence at its highest does not allow diluting or diminishing the plaintiff's case by challenges to credit.
The focus must be on the plaintiff's evidence and any other evidence which supports his claim against the police in respect of malicious prosecution. Adopting this approach, the Court must then consider whether the objective element or the subjective element, and whether malice, could be supported by the evidence. If they are not, a judgment for Mr Wessell in respect of malicious prosecution "could not be supported". The Court is not precluded from giving judgment under r 29.10(3), and judgment in favour of the defendant should then be granted.
[5]
MR WESSELL'S CASE AT ITS HIGHEST
Mr Wessell was charged with resisting Officer Maleckas in the execution of his duty. Mr Wessell's evidence of the events is as follows:
1. Mr Wessell came to his front door at 11am on 21 November 2013 to find two Sheriff's officers, two police officers and others outside his doorway. Mr Wessell remained at the door with the Sheriff's officers for ten seconds. The Sheriff's officers were not rude.
2. One of the Sheriff's officers said to him, "You need to leave the property, we are going to give you [20 minutes or ten minutes, or a few minutes] to get out, get your personal things and get out." Mr Wessell assumed that they were there to evict him.
3. Mr Wessell responded, "I am not going anywhere, I am going to make a phone call." Mr Wessell shut the door immediately because they were telling him to get out. He was shocked, upset and proceeded to call his local member of Parliament.
4. About three seconds after Mr Wessell had closed the door, the police officers began talking to him and pushing on the door saying, "[O]pen the door I'm going to break it down". The door was flexing at the top and the bottom.
5. Mr Wessell asked, "What for?" And Officer Maleckas said he was here for an eviction (a matter initially disputed but ultimately accepted by Mr Wessell).
6. Mr Wessell may have said some flustered words like, "I wasn't told. I haven't been given any paperwork. This is bullshit and I'm not going anywhere", and he may have said, "Fuck off. I'm not going anywhere." Mr Wessell did not recall exactly what he said, but he was shocked and in disbelief. He did not want to leave.
7. After the door had been shut [less than 10 seconds, shortly after, 10 to 15 seconds], Mr Wessell opened the door again and was capsicum sprayed by the police. The police officers grabbed his head and pulled him out the front door, forcing him from the house against his will.
8. Mr Wessell moved down two steps towards the front fence. The police said, "Get on the ground." Mr Wessell said, "I can't, I'm allergic to grass…I'm not resisting arrest." He put his hands on his head and said, "[Y]ou can chain me to the gate but I'm not getting on the ground because I'm allergic to grass."
9. Mr Wessell was then struck on the back of his legs with a police baton and told, "Get on the ground cunt." He did not get on the ground. He was repeatedly capsicum sprayed, hit with a police baton and eventually went to the ground face down on the grass. He was then handcuffed and "they shut their batons on my arse".
10. Mr Wessell told the police, "[T]his is not right and I have got it all on camera". Then both police officers went inside the residence and Mr Wessell heard the words, "Where is the box, where is the box?" The police emerged with a box. Mr Wessell said, "You can't take that, that is my property, you are stealing ". The police said, "We are taking it for fucking evidence." Mr Wessell was told he was to be charged with resisting police.
11. There were photographs taken the next day of reddish bruising and some swelling on the back of Mr Wessell's legs and a red mark on his torso.
12. Mr Wessell was taken to Blacktown Police Station. He was given a Court Attendance Notice and released at 1.45pm. He successfully defended the charge which was dismissed on 16 July 2014.
The plaintiff's case also included two items of video footage of the incident, one from Mr Wessell's house and one from his neighbour's security system. In general terms, viewing the video footage caused Mr Wessell to reduce the number of times he said he was hit with a baton, but otherwise did not cause him to alter his evidence.
To the extent that the video footage may conflict with Mr Wessell's testimony, but does not otherwise cause Mr Wessell to change his account, I regard it as not representing the plaintiff's evidence taken at its highest and so I should not prefer it to Mr Wessell for the purposes of this application.
The plaintiff also tendered the facts sheet outlining the police case in the criminal proceedings. As with the video footage, to the extent that the facts sheet is inconsistent with the testimony of Mr Wessell, I must prefer the testimony of Mr Wessell since I am taking his case at its highest. To the extent that the facts sheet contains material beyond the ambit of evidence given by Mr Wessell, it may indicate evidence or material available to the police.
[6]
THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENT
The objective element is concerned with "[t]he objective sufficiency of the material considered by the prosecutor" (A's case at [87]). The evidence of Mr Wessell, his neighbour, Patricia Gluvic, the video footage and the facts sheet establish that about nine people were at the door or in front of Mr Wessell's residence at the time the incident began: two police officers, two Sheriff's officers, two Department of Housing staff, two Blacktown council rangers or dog handlers (to deal with two dogs on the premises) and a locksmith.
Mr Wessell's case provided no evidence of the material or statements provided to the prosecutor by those nine persons who were participants or observers of what had occurred. There is no reason proffered as to why the plaintiff could not have ascertained that material by the usual pre‑trial mechanisms, including discovery, nor is any reason suggested as to why the absence of that material might reflect only on the defendant's case.
Accordingly, while Mr Wessell's evidence must be accepted as to what occurred at the premises because his case must be taken at its highest, his case provides no evidence of what material, statements or observations were provided to the prosecutor by other witnesses. This is not a case like Beck's case where statements of other witnesses, other police officers, were tendered (see State of New South Wales v Beck; Commissioner of Police v Beck [2013] NSWCA 437, and Beck v State of New South Wales; Beck v Commissioner of Police New South Wales [2012] NSWSC 1483).
It may be that other statements were obtained by the police. The facts sheet, because it gives an account different from Mr Wessell's and identifies other witnesses (although not by name), tends to support an inference that other information was provided.
As an example, the facts sheet refers to an earlier eviction attempt and a phone call by Mr Wessell to the Department of Housing. As Mr Wessell had denied an earlier eviction attempt, taking his evidence at its highest, I must, on this application, assume that there was no earlier eviction attempt of which he was aware. But Mr Wessell was not asked about and gave no evidence concerning the phone call to the Department of Housing. Leaving aside the contents of that phone call, the only inference available is that information was provided by the Department of Housing about a call.
Mr Wessell submits that the material considered by the prosecutor was objectively insufficient. In order to determine that, there must be evidence of the material considered by the prosecutor, especially when the existence of such material is indicated by the evidence. How can the objective sufficiency of the material be determined without proof of that material? There is no evidence or submission that Mr Wessell's testimony constituted the whole of the material, or even part of the material, considered by Officer Maleckas.
Whilst a Jones v Dunkel inference would be available to allow the Court more comfortably to accept Mr Wessell's version of events (see Beck's case (NSWCA) at [66], Jones v Dunkel at 331-332), that may be unnecessary on this application where Mr Wessell's case is to be taken at its highest.
Mr Wessell's evidence is only about what happened at his place of residence, not about what information was available to the prosecutor. To draw an inference in the face of the facts sheet that every other witness observed matters the same as Mr Wessell or provided no information to Officer Maleckas seems perverse. It was not an inference I was asked to draw. While "proof will often be a matter of inference [nevertheless] it is proof that is required, not conjecture or suspicion" (A's case at [93]). Taking the plaintiff's case at its highest does not enable me to infer every speculative possibility that may be in favour of Mr Wessell, no matter how grievous or extreme, and to ignore the Briginshaw standard of proof (cf Beck's case (NSWCA) at [32] where the Court referred to "an honest but mistaken belief by the police officers").
Accordingly, there is no evidence of the material before the prosecutor, let alone evidence that the material before the prosecutor was insufficient to establish a proper basis for the proceedings.
Even were I able to infer that Mr Wessell's evidence of what occurred was available to the police and was the only material available to the police (which I do not accept), Mr Wessell's account nevertheless provides evidence of the elements of the charge of resisting police in the execution of their duty. That tends to deny the objective element identified in A's case. Mr Wessell's evidence is to the effect that he was told he needed to leave the property and get out but he refused saying he was not going anywhere, he closed the door on the Sheriff's officers, he refused initially to open the door when Officer Maleckas said, "Open the door. I'm going to break it down", he was told by Officer Maleckas about the eviction, he may have said, "I wasn't told, I haven't been given any paperwork, this is bullshit and I'm not going anywhere" and "Fuck off. I'm not going anywhere", he did not want to leave when he opened the door and he did not leave voluntarily but was forced to leave.
Further, it was not disputed, and it was evidenced by the facts sheet that a warrant had been issued for enforcement of an order for possession, which authorised the eviction of Mr Wessell, including authorising the police "to use such force as is reasonably necessary to enforce the order for possession".
By the steps taken by Mr Wessell identified above, on his own highest case, he has resisted the police in the execution of their duty. He has directly and expressly rejected the directions of the sheriff's officers and the police to leave the property pursuant to the eviction, and would not voluntarily leave. This alone is sufficient to establish the objective component of reasonable and probable cause of resisting police in the execution of their duty to obtain possession. These matters arose before any asserted failure to satisfy the obligations under s 202 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 ("LEPRA"), and so LEPRA requirements could not impact on the police conduct (see State of NSW v McCarthy [2015] NSWCA 153 at [78] and [79]).
[7]
THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT
Proof of the subjective element (thus proving an absence of reasonable and probable cause) may be established "by demonstrating that the prosecutor had no positive belief that the accused person was, or was probably, guilty" (cf A's case at [76]). The critical question is, "what does the plaintiff demonstrate about what the defendant prosecutor made of the material that he or she had available when deciding whether to prosecute or maintain the prosecution?" (A's case at [77]).
Mr Wessell submits that an absence of belief in Officer Maleckas must be inferred because even if he did not have available the account of Mr Wessell, he was present at the incident and knew what had occurred. The plurality of the High Court in A's case at [71] stated:
"If the facts of the particular case are such that the prosecutor may be supposed to know where the truth lies…the relevant state of persuasion will necessarily entail a conclusion (a belief of the prosecutor) about guilt."
I have found that the case of Mr Wessell at its highest shows that he resisted Officer Maleckas in his duty to assist the Sheriff's officers to take all reasonable steps to obtain possession of the premises. It is difficult to draw an inference of a belief of an absence of guilt from material that establishes guilt.
The belief of Officer Maleckas might be inferred from what is contained in the facts sheet. The plaintiff asserts that the account given in the facts sheet is false because it conflicts with Mr Wessell's case. In my view, for the purpose of this application, it must be inferred that Officer Maleckas (holding a belief consistent with the facts sheet) was mistaken to the extent that his belief conflicts with Mr Wessell's testimony. But that says nothing about the existence of that belief. It does not follow from the facts sheet or from its differences with Mr Wessell's testimony that I could infer that Officer Maleckas had a belief contrary to the facts sheet merely because of his presence at the incident and Mr Wessell's testimony of what had occurred. Officer Maleckas and Mr Wessell necessarily came to the eviction incident with different life experiences, concerns and information. That they were both present at the same incident does not imply that both held the same belief about what had occurred. To conclude otherwise is to conclude that whenever witnesses recount an event differently, one of them is lying (rather than the more common circumstance that the difference is due to a difference in recollection and belief).
Moreover, the Court cannot infer what Officer Maleckas made of the material available when deciding whether to prosecute (see A's case at [77]) without any of the evidence of the material available. The evidence of the facts sheet, and that Officer Maleckas commenced proceedings, without more, lead to an inference that the proceedings were commenced with the belief of facts indicated in the facts sheet. In my view, the account of Mr Wessell of what occurred is insufficient to support a belief in Officer Maleckas wholly different from that indicated by the facts sheet.
The plaintiff relies, in respect to the subjective element and also in respect of malice, upon inferences that can be drawn from the differences between the facts sheet and the evidence of Mr Wessell. I turn to whether a finding that Officer Maleckas acted maliciously in instituting the proceedings cannot be supported.
[8]
MALICE
Malice:
"is an element that focuses upon the dominant purpose of the prosecutor and requires the identification of a purpose other than the proper invocation of the criminal law." (A's case at [93]). (Underlining added).
Mr Wessell did not identify the dominant improper purpose of the prosecutor. A number of improper purposes were alleged in the statement of claim, including that Officer Maleckas intended to cause embarrassment, harassment, injury, harm or loss, or was motivated by ill‑will or spite or that the proceedings were used to justify the assaults on the plaintiff or conceal improper conduct. Mr Wessell asserted in submissions that at this stage on an application under r 29.10, the improper purpose need not be identified. However, if an improper purpose is possibly to be "supported" by the evidence, in the manner required by r 29.10, it seems to me necessary that the purpose be identified.
Mr Wessell referred to the divergence between his account and the facts sheet to justify an inference of malice in Officer Maleckas. When comparing the facts sheet with Mr Wessell's account, a number of matters are agreed: the time and date; two Sheriff's officers approaching the door and meeting Mr Wessell; the police initially standing nearby; discussion between the Sheriff's officers and Mr Wessell; Mr Wessell refusing to leave the premises; Mr Wessell closing the door and refusing to open it for a time; the police intervening; Mr Wessell eventually opening the door but still refusing to vacate the premises; the police pulling Mr Wessell from the front door; Mr Wessell being "away" from the police; the police using capsicum spray; Mr Wessell remaining on his feet; the police giving him repeated directions, Mr Wessell refusing; Mr Wessell being struck with a baton and eventually going to the ground and being handcuffed; an ambulance arriving and Mr Wessell being taken to the Blacktown Police Station.
Nevertheless, there are differences. Mr Wessell said he was upset, not angry; that the police rather than the Sheriff's officers spoke of eviction; that the use by the police of capsicum spray occurred when Mr Wessell reopened the door; that there was an absence of use of the words required under LEPRA (at least at the time indicated in the facts sheet); that Mr Wessell was first grabbed by the wrist unsuccessfully; that Mr Wessell pulled away from the police at the doorway and that there were more than three strikes with a police baton.
While these differences are not minor, of themselves I do not think they can give rise to an inference of an unidentified but improper motive.
In Beck's case (NSWCA) at [32], the Court of Appeal identified how the trial judge utilised the statement of the prosecutor which was inconsistent with the plaintiff's own evidence to find fabrication:
"His Honour rejected the application by the State for judgment under Rule 29.10. He did so on the basis that, assuming for the purposes of the 'no case' application that Mr Beck's evidence was true, the statement of Sergeant Sullivan was fundamentally contradicted by Mr Beck's evidence. His Honour concluded that the police prosecutor could not honestly have believed the case that was instituted or maintained when it was based on a fabrication. In other words, taking Mr Beck's evidence at its highest, his Honour concluded that the police officer prosecuting the case had fabricated evidence against Mr Beck. In so doing, his Honour thus excluded (or had no regard to) the possibility that the contradiction between the police statements and the evidence called for Mr Beck could have been the product of something other than fabrication (such as, for example, an honest but mistaken belief by the police officers who made the statements on which the decision to prosecute Mr Beck was based)."
The decision on the appeal in that case concerned a judgment in favour of the plaintiff. It appears the Court of Appeal was not required to determine the appropriateness of the dismissal of the no case submission. However, the parenthetical example leaves open whether the decision on the r 29.10 application was endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
In any event, this case is not, as was found by the trial judge in Beck's case (see Court of Appeal decision at [34]), one where the facts sheet was "false 'in every crucial respect'", nor was it a case where the Court was provided with the statements of evidence of other witnesses. Nor was there here, as there was there, identification of and direct evidence going to the ulterior purpose in instituting and maintaining the proceedings.
It must be supposed that on many, if not most, occasions, when an accused person is acquitted, the account given by the accused person differs from that advanced by the prosecutor, just as it did here as indicated by the differences between Mr Wessell's account and those in the facts sheet. That difference alone cannot lead to an inference of malice of some indefinite form, or to an inference of a lack of belief in the prosecutor of the case advanced, at least when the difference is not of such a magnitude as to displace the obvious inference that persons have different recollections, sometimes correct and sometimes incorrect, of what occurred.
This case is no different from that usual case. It contains no relevant feature additional to a disagreement as to the facts between the accused and the prosecutor (as indicated in the facts sheet), and evidence of the acquittal. There is no basis alleged for an inference of malice (and for an inference of an absence of belief of the prosecutor in the case instituted) other than that the plaintiff's case at its highest differed in some non‑minor respects from the police's case. The offence alleged against Mr Wessell involved interaction with the police - perhaps not a feature present in the usual prosecution ‑ but that difference cannot overcome the deficiencies in proof. In my view, a submission of malice can rise no higher than conjecture, suspicion or speculation (see A's case at [93]). The differences between the facts sheet and the evidence of Mr Wessell could not allow the necessary inferences to the Briginshaw standard of either the absence of belief in the prosecutor or of a malicious maintaining or initiating of the proceedings. A finding of malice must be able to be made in order to preclude judgment under r 29.10(3) and, in my view, such a finding cannot be supported on the plaintiff's case.
There is nothing to preclude judgment under the rule.
[9]
ORDERS
Judgment in favour of the defendant on the claim for malicious prosecution, pursuant to the application under r 29.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005.
[10]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 30 August 2017