Appeal No. 32/83 raises two questions. The first is whether it was right for the Court of Appeal to hold that further proceedings under order No. 3 of its order of 24 February 1981 would be a futility. Miss Wentworth now claims that the action of Messrs. Kladis in erecting the building as they did gave her a cause of action against them in negligence and nuisance and that the Council was also guilty of negligence in the manner in which it performed its functions. She claims that the fact that she no longer owns the house at Bellevue Hill is irrelevant since the question of her right to damages must be determined at the date at which the action was commenced. An insurmountable obstacle to the acceptance of Miss Wentworth's argument is, however, that no claims based on negligence or nuisance were made in the pleadings or otherwise in the proceedings before Powell J. or when the matter first came before the Court of Appeal and this Court. The action was, in its inception, a relator action brought by the Attorney-General. Such an action is brought to enforce a public right and in such an action the relator (unless she was joined as a plaintiff in her own right) could not make a claim for damages for negligence or nuisance. Miss Wentworth was substituted for the Attorney-General as plaintiff on the footing that she might have had a special interest in the subject of the action, being an interest over and above that enjoyed by the public generally: see Day v. Pinglen Pty. Ltd. [3] . If she had such a special interest, she would, on proof of her case, have been entitled to an injunction. It was also contemplated (wrongly as we now know) that she might obtain equitable damages under s. 68 of the Supreme Court Act in addition to or in lieu of an injunction. If she had sought to reform the action by adding claims based on negligence and nuisance it would have been necessary to amend the pleadings, but this was not done. When, thereafter, her house was sold, the consequence was that she could no longer successfully ask for an injunction or for a declaration since, except as to damages, the matter had then become a dead issue so far as she was concerned. When the matter came before this Court this was recognized by her counsel, Mr. Beaumont, who expressly confined his claim for relief to damages under s. 68. The Court, however, decided that s. 68 did not confer power to award damages for a breach of a public duty imposed by a statute unless the statute, according to its true construction, created a private right of action. This decision inevitably meant not only that the claim for damages for the alleged breach of cl. 43 must fail, but also that damages could not be awarded under s. 68 for the alleged breaches of s. 311 of the Local Government Act. The necessary consequence of the Court's decision was that Miss Wentworth could not obtain any damages in the action. Order No. 3 of the order of the Court of Appeal should have been set aside, but this Court did not take that course because of the failure of the respondents to cross-appeal. The Court of Appeal was therefore correct in concluding that further proceedings in the action would be futile and that order No. 3 should be set aside.