INTRODUCTION
1 The applicant, Mr Raffaele Webb, seeks orders for Court approval of the proposed settlement of this securities class action under s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act).
2 The proceeding relates to a scandalous episode of corporate misconduct. The first respondent, GetSwift Limited (now in liquidation) was an early stage "tech" company that operated a software platform that was promoted as enabling businesses to automate dispatching and tracking of deliveries of goods to customers. It was listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in December 2016 with an issue price of 20 cents per share, and by December 2017 it had risen to over $4 per share, at which point GetSwift raised another $75 million from investors.
3 How that occurred is sufficiently clear from the witness statements filed in this proceeding and the judgment of Justice Lee in the related civil penalty proceeding, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GetSwift (Liability Hearing) [2021] FCA 1384 (the ASIC proceeding). For the purpose of this application, it is plain enough that GetSwift's managing director, the second respondent Mr Joel Macdonald, and its executive chairman and chief executive officer Mr Bane Hunter, embarked on a systematic program to pump up the GetSwift share price through misleadingly positive announcements to the ASX and the media. They caused announcements to be made to the ASX regarding GetSwift's entry into enterprise agreements with national and multi-national clients, marked the announcements as price-sensitive, orchestrated simultaneous media coverage and purposefully drove the GetSwift share price up. Numerous of those announcements were found to be to be misleading in the ASIC proceeding, including because, for example, the announcement was based on an optimistic view as to the value of the enterprise agreements for GetSwift when: the enterprise agreement did not in fact deliver any financial benefit for GetSwift; the announcement did not disclose that the enterprise agreement was only for a trial period; that the trial period was provided without charge; that the trial period had not yet commenced or had been delayed; or the announcement did not disclose that the enterprise agreement could be terminated at short notice during the trial period, and if so, no revenue would flow.
4 Inevitably, the orchestrated mirage of revenue growth and business success dissipated. By 7 December 2018, GetSwift's share price had dropped to 52 cents, a percentage reduction of more than 90 per cent on its all-time high of $4.30 a share on 4 December 2017.
5 The share price plunge led to aggrieved investors bringing this and two other class actions, each making similar allegations. I briefly explain this background because, in my view, the class action enjoyed a high prospect of success on liability. In basketball vernacular it might be called a "slam dunk". It is also sufficiently clear for the purposes of the application that shareholders suffered substantial losses as a result of the conduct of GetSwift and Mr Macdonald. Dr Ramsay Zein, the expert forensic economist engaged by the applicant, estimated shareholder losses at $42.833 million on a "Last In, First Out" (LIFO) basis. Allowing for some exuberance in that estimate and for the exigencies of litigation, it might be that the case has a settlement value in the region of $25 to $30 million.
6 Yet, the proposed settlement for which Court approval is sought totals only $1 million. One can readily understand why group members might question how the applicant and his lawyers could conscientiously support a settlement for such an amount. The short answer is that when the true financial position of GetSwift became known to the market its business began to collapse and its share price plummeted. On 29 July 2022 GetSwift was placed into voluntary liquidation. A few days later, on 2 August 2022, GetSwift's Canadian-domiciled parent company, GetSwift Technologies Limited (GTL), and its United States subsidiary, GetSwift Inc (GS Inc), commenced voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the United States. Both GetSwift and GTL have liabilities to secured and unsecured creditors that substantially exceed their assets. Mr Macdonald's financial position is similarly parlous. GetSwift and Mr Macdonald were brought to financial collapse by their own misconduct and were not in a financial position to pay substantial damages.
7 GetSwift had only $5 million in Directors & Officers liability insurance, an amount that was seriously inadequate for a company of its size. Further, following the liability judgment in the ASIC proceeding, the insurer denied liability on the basis that the breaches of the continuous disclosure regime were wilful. At the time of the settlement approval hearing, the penalty phase of the ASIC proceeding had been heard, and judgment was reserved. ASIC sought a civil penalty of $15 million against GetSwift and $1 million against Mr Macdonald. Any penalties imposed would further damage GetSwift's and Mr Macdonald's already poor financial position. The chances of group members receiving any more than the proposed $1 million by way of judgment or through further negotiations are vanishingly small. That is the essential reason why the applicant and his lawyers are recommending that the Court approve settlement in the amount of $1 million when apart from the respondents' insolvency, the case is worth much more than that.
8 Many thousands of shareholders, both retail and institutional, including mum and dad investors looking after their own superannuation nest eggs and large corporate superannuation trustees looking after the superannuation of millions, have been failed by GetSwift's and Mr Macdonald's serious non-compliance with the continuous disclosure regime. Under the proposed settlement shareholders will recover only a tiny proportion of their losses. In the criticisms that are sometimes made of securities class actions it is often forgotten that non-compliance with continuous disclosure obligations can have devastating real-world consequences. Here, one former shareholder, an objector to the proposed settlement, objects on the basis that the proposed settlement is inadequate to recompense him for his substantial losses which have meant that he was forced to sell his home in Australia and has had move back to Ukraine, where he now lives in straitened circumstances.
9 One can also readily understand why group members might think that the proposed settlement indicates that something has gone terribly wrong with the operation of the class action regime under Part IVA of the FCA Act, and infer that this settlement is one in which the only winners are the lawyers and litigation funders. But the relatively small settlement and consequent low recovery by group members has nothing to do with the utility of the class action regime, and nothing to do with the conduct of the applicant's lawyers and the litigation funder. There are no winners here.
10 The applicant's solicitors, Phi Finney McDonald (PFM), and the litigation funder, Therium Finance A IC have taken a commendable approach having regard to the low recovery by group members. Upon approval of the settlement PFM will be left with approximately $3 million in unpaid costs and disbursements, and except for $100,000 in costs and disbursements associated with the settlement approval application, the firm does not seek any part of the $1 million proposed settlement. For its part, Therium has paid $5.5 million in legal costs and disbursements over the course of the proceeding and it does not seek recovery of any of that amount. It only seeks to recoup part of the contingent premium it must pay to the insurer, Amtrust, for the After-the-Event (ATE) insurance Therium took out in relation to adverse costs orders.
11 Under the proposed settlement distribution scheme (SDS), the $1 million settlement will be disbursed in the following proportions:
(a) $500,000 to the applicant and group members on a pro rata basis pursuant to a Court-approved settlement distribution scheme;
(b) $100,000 to PFM for costs associated with the settlement approval application;
(c) $393,870 to Therium, for payment to Amtrust; and
(d) $6,130 to Mr Webb in reimbursement for the time and expense he incurred in representing group members' interests.
12 In the circumstances it is appropriate to approve the settlement. I now turn to explain my reasons in more detail.