28 The plaintiff in the instant proceedings submitted that a strict construction of the warrant on its face would only permit the objective reader to conclude that the premises to be searched were those at 4/438 High Street and, that since the plaintiff's premises were at another suite or building at that street address altogether, the warrant was invalidly issued. Were the warrant to have identified the premises only by reference to a suite/building number at the street address, it may be that by parity of reasoning with the decision in Gassy, the error in nomination of the suite/building would have been fatal. In this case, however, the warrant did not describe the premises merely by that limited means. Consistent with the fact that the Search Warrants Act provided no formula by which the premises to be searched must be described, (save only for the prescribed form making provision for an address being a description of the premises) the plaintiffs' premises were further described as 'retail premises' by the name of the retail business, namely, 'Way Out West an 'Adult/Sex' type shop'; and by the location of the premises in the complex at 438 High Street namely 'the upper part of a larger building with entry to shop by stairs leading up at the front'. I am satisfied that when read in combination, these additional details more than sufficiently describe the premises to be searched and resolve what the plaintiff contends is an internal inconsistency in the address of the premises. I am also satisfied that the description was capable of enabling the authorised officer to validly issue the warrant and for police to validly execute it and that this is so irrespective of the error in nomination of the suite/building number and without the need for recourse to Senior Constable Kraus's own knowledge of the premises and their location.
29 For these reasons the plaintiff's claim as to invalidity must fail.
Was the notification of seizure sent to the Magistrate on 18 October 2005 in accordance with s 56 of the Classification Act?
30 Where Part 2 of the Classification Act provides criminal sanctions for the sale, delivery or public exhibition of a film classified RC or X18+ or unclassified films, Part 7 of the Act provides a procedure for the forfeiture of items seized under warrant in circumstances where no criminal charges are laid but where the person from whom the items were seized fails to satisfy the Local Court that the item is not in any way connected with an offence under the Act.
31 Section 56 provides as follows:
56 Forfeiture following seizure
(1) A thing that has been seized pursuant to a search warrant issued under section 55 must be returned to the premises in or on which it was seized unless, not later than 90 days after the seizure:
(a) proceedings are brought against a person for an offence under this Act in connection with the thing, or
(b) a police officer reports the seizure to a Magistrate.
(2) If such a report is made, the Magistrate is to issue a summons calling on the person who, at the time of the seizure of the thing, was occupying or using the premises entered under the authority of the search warrant to appear before a Local Court to show cause why the thing or other things seized should not be forfeited to the Crown.
(3) If the person summoned (or some other person) claims any of the things to which the summons relates, the person must, in order for the thing to be returned to the person, satisfy the Local Court that the thing is not in any way connected with an offence under this Act.
(4) The Local Court before which the summons is returned may order that there be forfeited to the Crown:
(a) such of the things to which the summons relates as are not claimed by the person summoned or by some other person, or
(b) such of the things as, in the opinion of the Court, should be so forfeited.
(5) A Local Court is to order the return of a thing seized pursuant to a search warrant issued under section 55:
(a) if the Court dismisses the proceedings for an offence under this Act with respect to the thing, or
(b) if, on the return before it of a summons issued under this section with respect to the thing, it does not form the opinion referred to in subsection (4)(b).
32 It is clear that the jurisdiction to both issue the summons and to order forfeiture of the seized items is dependent upon a police officer reporting the seizure to a Magistrate within the statutory period. Since the Act does not prescribe the form or content of any such report, it is necessary to consider whether the document forwarded by fax to Magistrate McRae on 18 October 2005 is a "report" for the purposes of s 56(2) by reference to the relevant principles of statutory construction in the context of the statutory purposes to which the making of a report are directed.
33 In Lollback v Skarchewski (Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 July 1996, unreported) a similar question presented for determination by way of a case stated. The legislation under analysis in that case was the statutory predecessor to s 56 of the Classification Act, namely s 41 of the Film and Video Tape Classification Act 1984 (since repealed). Save for the requirement that the report under the Classification Act must be made to a Magistrate and not a justice (as was the case with the Film and Video Tape Classification Act, a distinction which I am satisfied has no material bearing on the operation of the section), the two provisions are identical. In Lollback's case, the report under s 41 of the Film and Video Tape Classification Act was furnished in the form then provided for in the Search Warrant Regulations for a report under s 21 of the Search Warrants Act. The report was in the following terms:
"Warrant executed on 11 May 1994, 750 videos confiscated from the premises at 303 Beamish Street, Campsie and the upstairs unit. Offenders to be summonsed."
34 The first instance judge took the view that being a report under the Search Warrants Act it was not, and was not capable of being, a report that fulfilled the requirements of the Film and Video Tape Classification Act since the Acts are intended to achieve two distinct and separate purposes each requiring separate compliance if the process to which they refer is to be carried out. The Court of Criminal Appeal came to a different view. Grove J, with whom McInerney J agreed, was satisfied that there was no information required by s 41 of the Film and Video Tape Classification Act that the report in its furnished terms did not provide, and further that the report manifestly fulfilled the requirements of that section, namely a report to a justice of the seizure of things pursuant to a search warrant. His Honour was satisfied that there was a sufficient congruity of purpose between the two statutes that in the absence of a prescribed form for a report under the Film and Video Tape Classification Act, and provided the document contained all the requisite information, there was no reason why a report in the form provided for in the Search Warrants Act might not comply with requirements under the related Act. Hulme J, who agreed with the answers to the case stated and the orders proposed, expressed the view that because of the multiplicity of legislation in New South Wales, and the obligation imposed on the justice to whom the report is made under s 41 of the Act, namely to issue a summons to show cause (the identical obligation imposed on a Magistrate under s 56(2) of the Classification Act), the report must be in terms or furnished in circumstances calculated to direct the justice's mind to either the duty cast upon him or at least the statutory regime which imposes that duty.
35 Both the plaintiff and the defendant sought to rely on the decision.