Plaintiffs' contentions
11The plaintiffs' first complaint is that neither report is in reply. The material in Mr Roche's 11 February 2011 report concerning the point of origin of the fire is not new evidence but is itself evidence in reply to Mr Smith's 30 September 2009 report. It does no more than confirm Mr Roche's earlier opinion that the point of origin of the fire was to the east of the Hall Ridge track. Mr Smith was critical in his 30 September 2009 report of Mr Roche's opinion that the track was to the west of the point of origin of the fire. The difference between these two was evident from 2009 and certainly by no later that February 2011. The plaintiffs contended that if the defendants intended to rely upon them, reports from Mr Woods and Mr Hehir could and should have been served as early as September 2009 but at least prior to February 2011.
12The plaintiffs emphasise that their complaint that the latest reports from Mr Woods and Mr Hehir are not in reply is underscored by the terms of the correspondence that preceded the 12 April 2011 orders that were made by consent. It is apparent from a letter written by the first defendant's solicitor to the plaintiffs' solicitor on the previous day that the plaintiffs were under the impression that any response to Mr Roche's report that the defendants were then contemplating would be limited to matters related to the allocation to the fire of two helicopters and a fixed wing aircraft, with an added caveat that some witnesses may be difficult to locate or to persuade to give statements. Mr Woods and Mr Hehir have produced reports that fall outside and go beyond both of those areas of concern. Even if they did not, the statements were not provided within the time frame contemplated by the order.
13The plaintiffs rely upon UCPR 31.28, which is in the following relevant terms:
" 31.28 Disclosure of experts' reports and hospital reports
(1) Each party must serve experts' reports ... on each other active party:
(a) in accordance with any order of the court, or
(b) if no such order is in force, in accordance with any relevant practice note, or
(c) if no such order or practice note is in force, not later than 28 days before the date of the hearing at which the report is to be used.
(2) ...
(3) Except by leave of the court, or by consent of the parties:
(a) an expert's report ... is not admissible unless it has been served in accordance with this rule, and
(b) without limiting paragraph (a), an expert's report ..., when tendered under section 63, 64 or 69 of the Evidence Act 1995, is not admissible unless it has been served in accordance with this rule, and
(c) the oral expert evidence in chief of any expert is not admissible unless an expert's report ... served in accordance with this rule contains the substance of the matters sought to be adduced in evidence.
(4) Leave is not to be given as referred to in subrule (3) unless the court is satisfied:
(a) that there are exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of leave, or
(b) that the report concerned merely updates an earlier version of a report that has been served in accordance with subrule (1)."
14According to this rule, taking the defendants' position at its highest, the reports of Mr Woods and Mr Hehir should have been served no later than 10 June 2011. In the face of the plaintiffs' opposition to the use of these reports, the defendants therefore require the leave of the Court, which is not to be granted, " unless the court is satisfied... that there are exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of leave ". That expression was considered by Campbell JA in State of NSW v Tyszyk [2008] NSWCA 107 at [206] as follows:
"[206] I venture to repeat what I said (with the agreement of Tobias JA and Handley AJA) in Yacoub v Pilkington (Australia) Ltd [2007] NSWCA 290 at [66]-[67]:
'Another question of construction concerned "exceptional circumstances" in rule 31.18(4). In San v Rumble (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 259 at [59]-[69], I gave consideration to the expression "exceptional circumstances" in a different statutory context to the present. Without repeating that discussion in full, I shall state such of the conclusions as seem to me applicable in the construction of rule 31.18(4).
(a) Exceptional circumstances are out of the ordinary course or unusual, or special, or uncommon. They need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare, but they cannot be circumstances that are regularly, routinely or normally encountered: R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] 1 QB 198 (at 208).
(b) Exceptional circumstances can exist not only by reference to quantitative matters concerning relative frequency of occurrence, but also by reference to qualitative factors: R v Buckland [2000] 1 WLR 1262; [2000] 1 All ER 907 (at 1268; 912-913).
(c) Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional: Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388 (at [26]).
(d) In deciding whether circumstances are exceptional within the meaning of a particular statutory provision, one must keep in mind the rationale of that particular statutory provision: R v Buckland (at 1268; 912-913).
(e) Beyond these general guidelines, whether exceptional circumstances exist depends upon a careful consideration of the facts of the individual case: Awa v Independent News Auckland [1996] 2 NZLR 184 (at 186).
In the context of rule 31.18(4) UCP Rules, any decision about whether there are exceptional circumstances would need to bear in mind the explicit statement of objectives of a court in the management of litigation contained in sections 56-59 Civil Procedure Act 2005.'"
15The plaintiffs assert that the defendants have offered no explanation for the late service of the reports or any reasoned proposition that characterises them as " in reply ". Moreover, the reports deal with a significant issue in the proceedings and one that has been on the table from the earliest days of the litigation. Nothing approaching exceptional circumstances has been established so as to warrant the grant of leave to admit the reports.
16The plaintiffs contend further that if the reports were admitted, and they were required at this stage of the proceedings to respond to them, they will suffer considerable prejudice because the plaintiffs will necessarily be forced to divert their limited resources to obtaining evidence to meet the reports at a time when they are in the throes of final preparation for a long and difficult trial. The plaintiffs contend in these circumstances that, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the late service of these reports, and where, on the plaintiffs' case, there has been previous default in compliance with orders for the service of reports, the defendants' conduct amounts to "relevant delinquency" and "unreasonable conduct" of the sort that would justify the making of an order that costs be paid forthwith on an indemnity basis: Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [44]; Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 432; (2002) 55 NSWLR 1.