Consideration
29 The provisions of s 178 have been the subject of consideration in numerous decisions of this Court. In Moore v Macks [2007] FCA 10 at [28] Besanko J helpfully summarised principles relevant to the interpretation of s 178 as:
1. Under the section, the court is fulfilling a supervisory role judicially, rather than an administrative role standing in the shoes of the trustee. As such, grounds for judicial review must be established by an applicant Re Wheeler; Ex parte Wheeler v Halse [1994] FCA 1348; (1994) 54 FCR 166 ('Wheeler') at 170 per Lee J, and the exercise of the court's power is wholly in its discretion. The court has the 'widest possible discretion as to the appropriate order which should be made in the particular case' (Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver [1977] FCA 15; (1977) 17 ALR 182 ('Re Tyndall') at 186 per Deane J).
2. The impugned act, omission or decision of the trustee in bankruptcy need not be absurd, unreasonable, or taken in bad faith before it is subject to review or a resultant order of the court under the section (Re Tyndall at 186 per Deane J). Indeed, the act, omission or decision of the trustee may be subject to review even though it was commercially sound at the time it was made: Macchia at 116 per French J. At the same time the trustee's opinion will be a relevant factor in the exercise of the court's discretion, and there is no presumption that the court will intervene in a given case. The fact that the court might have taken a different course to the trustee in bankruptcy at the relevant time is not, without more, a basis to disturb the trustee's decision: Re Tyndall at 186 per Deane J; Macchia at 116 per French J.
3. The court is able to take into account information which was not available to the trustee at the time of an impugned act, omission or decision (Gray v Clout (1990) 27 FCR 141, 144 per Pincus J).
4. The exercise of the discretion is subject to the principle that the court will not unduly interfere with the day-to-day administration of a bankrupt's estate by a trustee in bankruptcy: Re Tyndall at 186 per Deane J.
5. The section does not provide an avenue for a bankrupt to pursue his or her personal interests at the expense of creditors (Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 at 139 per Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) nor does it 'create a cause of action which sounds in damages', either in tort or under the general law (Macchia at 119). Both of these propositions reflect the purpose of the section which is to give the court a supervisory role with respect to a trustee in bankruptcy in the administration of the bankrupt's estate.
6. Ultimately the question is what result would be 'just and equitable' in the circumstances of the case.
(cf observations of Gordon J in Sopikiotis v Vince [2013] FCA 592 at [24]).
30 Expanding upon this summary, it is also useful to note that:
the applicant bears the onus of showing a ground on which the trustee's administration of the affairs of the bankrupt ought to be reviewed (Healey v Prentice (No 2) [2000] FCA 1598, cf McDonald, Henry & Meek, Australian Bankruptcy Law & Practice (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [178.1.10]).
an order can be made by the Court under s 178 in the absence of any allegation of error or misconduct by the trustee (Wilson v Commonwealth [1999] FCA 219 at [11]-[14]; Tyndall at [11]; Frost v Sheahan [2009] FCAFC 20 at [8]).
the Court should only interfere with the decision of the trustee if the applicant establishes that the impugned conduct of the trustee was either incorrect or that other conduct was or would be preferable, and that justice and equity require the court's intervention (re the Bankrupt Estate of Hudson [2004] FCA 172 at [17]; Healey v Prentice (No 2) at [21]; Sarkis v Moussa [2013] FCA 373 at [34]).
the travel restrictions in the Act are to ensure the proper administration of the bankruptcy law and of bankrupt estates pursuant to that law, and are not a penalty imposed on a bankrupt due to an inability to pay debts which resulted in bankruptcy (Tyndall at [25]; Groves v Robinson [2013] FCA 490 at [10]).
31 Taking into consideration these factors, the submissions of the parties and the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that the Court should, with minor modification, make the orders sought by Mr Wangelin.
32 I have formed this view for the following reasons.
33 First, I am satisfied that Mr Wangelin is a credible witness. His demeanour in the witness box was such that he impressed me favourably as a witness of truth. He certainly did not demonstrate any attempts to avoid questions - rather his answers were in my view sensible and as direct as possible in view of occasional language difficulties.
34 Second, and critically, I am unable to identify how the administration of Mr Wangelin's bankrupt estate will be assisted by the continuation of Mr Wangelin's enforced presence in Australia. Mr van der Velde in evidence yesterday emphasised that the main issue for the trustees was that Mr Wangelin had not produced key source material, namely bank statements in respect of his German bank account. Frankly, I am at a loss to understand how Mr Wangelin remaining in Australia can possibly assist the objective of the trustees to secure this source material. Indeed, it is perfectly clear to me that:
Mr Wangelin has tried to access his bank statements, but cannot do so remotely from Australia;
Mr Wangelin has approached his bank in Germany by telephone to allow him to access his bank account, and to obtain bank account statements, and the bank has refused to assist;
Mr Wangelin's bank has insisted that he present in person before it will "unfreeze" his bank account and allow him access to either the account or records associated with it;
Mr Wangelin's bank in Germany refuses to cooperate with the trustees; and
the trustees are aware of all of these points, but continue to insist that Mr Wangelin should somehow produce the bank statements they seek.
35 In this respect, an obvious solution to the conundrum facing the parties is to permit Mr Wangelin to return to Germany and attend the bank in person.
36 Counsel for the trustees put to Mr Wangelin that he should arrange for friends or relatives (including his brother-in-law in Germany) to search his flat and locate the source material (including historical bank records) possibly located there which the trustees want to examine. Mr Wangelin rejected this proposition. I accept Mr Wangelin's evidence in this respect. This is because:
I accept Mr Wangelin's evidence that it would be difficult for third parties to access the material in the secured room in his apartment building, given that only he and the landlord (who apparently also has private material stored there) have keys.
I am not satisfied that reproduction of the key to the storage room, being a secure facility, to a third party like Mr Wangelin's brother-in-law, is as simple as the trustees contend.
More relevantly, I am not persuaded that Mr Wangelin's brother-in-law, who may or may not be familiar with Mr Wangelin's business affairs, could locate the material the trustees required. The evidence before the Court is that Mr Wangelin returned to live permanently in Germany in 2014 after 30 years. During at least some of that time he lived in Australia. There is no material before the Court to indicate the extent of paperwork and other material there might be in Mr Wangelin's storage room - it may be 30 years' worth of records. To assume that a stranger could easily locate particular financial records of Mr Wangelin is, in my view, fanciful.
37 Third, I am not persuaded that Mr Wangelin has failed or refused to cooperate with the trustees as they claim. Both the submissions and evidence of the trustees evince their genuine frustration in dealing with Mr Wangelin, however in my view this frustration is bordering on unreasonable in that the trustees have sought detailed evidence and extensive source documentation of a person, all of whose material is located in a locked storage room and a bank half a world away.
38 In this light Counsel for the trustees repeatedly submitted yesterday that the trustees believe that Mr Wangelin has not made sufficient endeavours to cooperate with them, referring for example to the possibility of assistance from Mr Wangelin's brother-in-law (to which I have referred above), and to Mr Wangelin's inability to obtain a living allowance from Centrelink. In my view however the contentions of the trustees concerning Mr Wangelin's dealings with Centrelink are of minimal relevance. In any event, I am satisfied from Mr Wangelin's evidence yesterday that he did not press a claim with Centrelink because it was made clear to him in February 2016 when he approached Centrelink that he would not be successful.
39 That Mr Wangelin has not failed to cooperate with the trustees is, in my view, clear on the evidence. So:
The letter from the trustees to Mr Wangelin of 1 February 2016 appears to be the primary formal written communication between them and Mr Wangelin specifying the material the trustees need.
The trustees sought a completed statement of affairs from Mr Wangelin. At the hearing yesterday, Mr van der Velde conceded that Mr Wangelin had undertaken this task.
The trustees sought details of Mr Wangelin's assets, including their current location. At the hearing yesterday, after some hesitation Mr van der Velde conceded that the trustees could not point to any problem in relation to Mr Wangelin's conduct.
The trustees sought production of Mr Wangelin's passport. At the hearing Mr Wangelin gave evidence to the effect that his reluctance to deliver the passport to the trustees arose from the fact that the passport includes a statement that the passport belongs to the state of Germany. In any event, I note that the passport has now been delivered to Mr Wangelin's solicitors.
The trustees sought bank statements for the period 1 January 2014 to 1 February 2016. I note that there were also emails from Mr Adam Kersey of SVPartners - the firm of the trustees - to Mr Wangelin in early February requiring details of the disbursement of moneys from the sale of the Moorooka property. Further, the trustees wrote to Mr Wangelin on 10 February 2016 stipulating that they required Mr Wangelin to produce bank statements for the period 1 July 2014 to date. I have already examined the endeavours made by Mr Wangelin to obtain copies of relevant bank statements, and the refusal of his German bank to assist, which refusal is conceded by the trustees.
The trustees sought cheque book stubs for a Westpac bank account. Mr Wangelin's evidence was that this material was with his previous accountant.
The trustees sought records regarding the construction of a unit complex at Moorooka. Mr Wangelin's evidence was that these records were in Germany.
The trustees sought details regarding the use of funds received from the sale of Mrs Wangelin's 1/8th interest in a property at Moorooka. Mr Wangelin has given detailed evidence in his affidavits as to the use of those funds. I am satisfied that this evidence was given to the best of Mr Wangelin's ability, given that his records are located in Germany.
40 Fourth, I am satisfied that Mr Wangelin's current personal circumstances, in being forced to remain in Australia, are particularly dire. I note his evidence that he is at serious risk of losing his flat in Germany, that his flat has been entered and apparently ransacked, that he is dependent on his stepson (who is himself of limited means) for financial support in Australia, and that he is currently unable to work in Australia because his building licence has been suspended. I do not accept the submission of Counsel for the trustees that Australia presently poses a more profitable financial prospect for Mr Wangelin than anywhere else in the world.
41 Finally however I note the serious and genuine concerns of the trustees that Mr Wangelin is a flight risk, and that should the Court grant him the orders he seeks he will, in effect, abscond. In my view that is a risk, however in the circumstances I consider that it is an acceptable risk. This is because:
I have formed a favourable view of Mr Wangelin's character from both his written and oral evidence. At the hearing yesterday Mr Wangelin claimed that he had never avoided tax or cheated anyone. The position in respect of Mr Wangelin's alleged tax debts and debt to ABW has not yet been adjudicated, however I note that:
o Mr Wangelin became a bankrupt as a result of substituted service, and his uncontradicted evidence was that he was unaware that he had been made a bankrupt for some time;
o there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that Mr Wangelin had at any time endeavoured to avoid his obligations, or had tried to flee the jurisdiction;
o Mr Wangelin gave evidence that he had repaid his wife's family for the moneys they had advanced to assist his wife in respect of her medical bills;
o irrespective of the legal position concerning Mr Wangelin's payment of moneys in relation to carpets in a property at Moorooka, being an obligation actually residing in the company ABW - it appears that Mr Wangelin is a person who endeavours to pay his debts.
Mr Wangelin gave detailed evidence at the hearing yesterday as to his strong ties of family and friendship with people in Australia. In the circumstances I consider it likely that he would wish to return to Australia, and would prefer to avoid a situation where he was, in effect, prevented from so doing.
Mr Wangelin gave evidence yesterday that he wished to resolve the circumstances of his bankruptcy.
42 Further in this respect I note that the evidence of the trustees concerning Mr Wangelin's possible debts to the Australian Tax Department and ABW appeared of little relevance to Mr van der Velde at the hearing yesterday. In my view those possible debts are of little actual importance to the trustees in respect of their decision to refuse to permit Mr Wangelin to leave Australia.