NATIVE TITLE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
69. The Native Title Act sets out the requirements of a determination of native title. Section 225 provides:
225. A determination of native title is a determination whether or not native title exists in relation to a particular area (the determination area) of land and waters and, if it does exist, a determination of:
(a) who the persons, or each group of persons, holding the common or group rights comprising the native title are; and
(b) the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the determination area; and
(c) the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; and
(d) the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) and (c) (taking into account the effect of this Act); and
(e) to the extent that the land or waters in the determination area are not covered by a non-exclusive agricultural lease or a non-exclusive pastoral lease - whether the native title rights and interests confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of that land or waters on the native title holders to the exclusion of all others.
70. The conclusion of the High Court in Mabo (No 2) was that:
the Miriam people are entitled against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands.
It is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive statement of rights and interests in land.
71. It is said in the applicants' final submissions on native title (paragraph 9.4) that in essence, as in Mabo (No 2), the applicants claim that they are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the land and waters the subject of the application, a submission which is substantially, but not entirely reflected in the applicants' draft determination.
72. Whilst it is true that the first step in determining the native title rights and interests in land and waters is to ascertain the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests that existed at the time that sovereignty was first exercised over the area in question, in a practical sense, much of the debate which takes place in that context is of only marginal relevance in the final analysis as it is the nature and extent of the rights and interests which exist at the time the determination is made that must find expression in the Court's determination.
73. The evidence provides an adequate basis upon which to infer that prior to sovereignty the claim area was occupied, used and enjoyed, and in that sense was possessed, by the forebears of the present claimants and further that by their traditions and customs the original inhabitants exercised control over access to their country by those who did not belong there. If the issue were being judged at a point in time immediately prior to the exercise of sovereignty in 1788 a determination of the type made in Mabo (No 2) would no doubt be appropriate. But that case is not this case.
74. The evidence of the applicants' anthropologists, as expressed in the claim book, is that prior to European contact only the Mingirringgi, Junggayi and Darlnyin (and other close relations) had a traditional right to enter their country. Other persons could only enter if invited for a funeral, ceremony business or to share food sources. Permission had to be obtained by smoke signal or letter stick. The letter stick sent to different groups specified where and when a ceremony was to be held and who was invited. Strangers would announce their arrival by creating a large smoke signal. Thus the traditional owners would be notified and would go out to meet the visitors. The traditional owners would determine what the visitors required and would grant or refuse permission to enter. As most visitors were classified as close "relations", permission was seldom refused. Whilst much of the actual contact with the visitors may have been with the Junggayi, the Junggayi were advised by the Mingirringgi. If senior Mingirringgi were unavailable Darlnyin or Junggayi would make decisions about entry and the use of a country's resources. The claim book provides a helpful explanation of the social organisation and land tenure system of the applicants as understood by its authors but it is not a complete substitute for the evidence of the claimants in relation to these matters. It is however unnecessary to examine every aspect of the evidence of all the witnesses; rather it is fair to say that the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and particularly that of the senior members of the land holding groups supports the assertions made by the authors of the claim book.
75. The debate as to whether the right to exclude strangers extended to the exclusion of Europeans is an arid one. Prior to European settlement the question would never have arisen. Subsequent to settlement, whilst on occasions resistance was encountered, exploration and settlement proceeded uninhibited. Whatever may have been the rights claimed and exercised by the original inhabitants prior to the arrival of the common law, those rights are now subjected to constraints imposed not only by subsequent statute law and executive acts, but by the common law itself.
76. It is fair to say that in accordance with Aboriginal traditional laws and customs, the rights enjoyed by the original inhabitants prior to colonisation were probably in the nature of exclusive rights, but for present purposes it is necessary to have regard to the common law principles previously discussed and to the general question of extinguishment of native title rights before any assessment can be made of the current native title rights and interests of the claimant groups in relation to the claim area. However, the specific rights set out in paragraph 5 of the applicants' draft determination appear to adequately describe the nature of the rights and interests in relation to the claim area enjoyed by the ancestors of the claimant group prior to the advent of non-Aboriginal contact. It will be noted that in paragraph (iii) of the respondents' draft determination no reference is made either to the claimed right to speak for and make decisions about the use and enjoyment of the determination area (applicants' draft determination para 5(b)) or the claimed right to reside upon and otherwise to have access to the determination area (para 5(c)). These latter claimed rights are merely a more specific expression of some of the general rights covered by paragraphs 5(a) and 5(c) of the applicants' draft determination and for that reason it is appropriate that reference be made to them in the event of the Court making a determination of native title.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF NATIVE TITLE
77. Native title rights and interests may be extinguished either by operation of the common law or by valid legislative or executive act. In Mabo (No 2) (at p 15) Mason CJ and McHugh J limited the common law recognition of native title to "cases where it has not been extinguished". In the same case Brennan J observed (at p 68) that:
A Crown grant which vests in the grantee an interest in land which is inconsistent with the continued right to enjoya native title in respect of the same land necessarily extinguishes the native title.
In his nine point summary of what he held to be the common law of Australia with reference to land titles Brennan J said (at pp 69-70) in numbered paragraphs 3 - 5:
3. Native title to land survived the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty and radical title. The rights and privileges conferred by native title were unaffected by the Crown's acquisition of radical title but the acquisition of sovereignty exposed native title to extinguishment by a valid exercise of sovereign power inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy native title.
4. Where the Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest that is wholly or partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been extinguished by grants of estates of freehold or of leases but not necessarily by the grant of lesser interests (e.g., authorities to prospect for minerals).
5. Where the Crown has validly and effectively appropriated land to itself and the appropriation is wholly or partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been extinguished to parcels of the waste lands of the Crown that have been validly appropriated for use (whether by dedication, setting aside, reservation or other valid means) and used for roads, railways, post offices and other permanent public works which preclude the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title. Native title continues where the waste lands of the Crown have not been so appropriated or used or where the appropriation and use is consistent with the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title over the land (e.g., land set aside as a national park).
Similar opinions were expressed by Deane and Gaudron JJ (at pp 89-90), and in Wik Peoples v Queensland 187 CLR 1 (Wik) at p 135 Toohey J speaking for the majority Judges said:
So far as the extinguishment of native title rights is concerned, the answer given is that there was no necessary extinguishment of those rights by reason of the grant of pastoral leases under the Acts in question. Whether there was extinguishment can only be determined by reference to such particular rights and interests as may be asserted and established. If inconsistency is held to exist between the rights and interests conferred by native title and the rights conferred under the statutory grants, those rights and interests must yield, to that extent, to the rights of the grantees.
78. The Native Title Act deals with the extinguishment of native title rights in a number of different contexts. For present purposes it is appropriate to refer initially to Division 2B of Part 2 of the Act, the provisions of which have application in the Northern Territory by operation of the Validation (Native Title) Act (NT) (the Validation Act). The relevant sections and schedule are repeated in the Northern Territory legislation and except where otherwise indicated it will be more convenient to refer to the section numbers as contained in the Commonwealth legislation. Central to much of the discussion which follows is the definition of the expression "previous exclusive possession act" which is set out in s 23B of the Native Title Act and replicated in clause 1 of Schedule 1 of the Validation Act. The definition is quite long but as several aspects of it have relevance the whole section is set out below:
23B (1) This section defines previous exclusive possession act.
(2) An act is a previous exclusive possession act if:
(a) it is valid (including because of Division 2 or 2A of Part 2); and
(b) it took place on or before 23 December 1996; and
(c) it consists of the grant or vesting of any of the following:
i) a Scheduled interest (see section 249C);
ii) a freehold estate;
iii) a commercial lease that is neither an agricultural lease nor a pastoral lease;
iv) an exclusive agricultural lease (see section 247A) or an exclusive pastoral lease (see section 248A);
v) a residential lease;
vi) a community purposes lease (see section 249A);
vii) what is taken by subsection 245(3) (which deals with the dissection of mining leases into certain other leases) to be a separate lease in respect of land or waters mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection, assuming that the reference in subsection 245(2) to "1 January 1994" was instead a reference to "24 December 1996";
viii) any lease (other than a mining lease) that confers a right of exclusive possession over particular land or waters.
(3) If:
(a) by or under legislation of a State or Territory, particular land or waters are vested in any person; and
(b) a right of exclusive possession of the land or waters is expressly or impliedly conferred on the person by or under the legislation;
the vesting is taken for the purposes of paragraph (2)(c) to be the vesting of a freehold estate over the land or waters.
[Note: The section does not contain subsections (4), (5) or (6)]
(7) An act is a previous exclusive possession act if:
(a) it is valid (including because of Division 2 or 2A); and
(b) it consists of the construction or establishment of any public work that commenced to be constructed or established on or before 23 December 1996.
(9) An act is not a previous exclusive possession act if it is:
(a) the grant or vesting of any thing that is made or done by or under legislation that makes provision for the grant or vesting of such things only to, in or for the benefit of, Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; or
(b) the grant or vesting of any thing expressly for the benefit of, or to or in a person to hold on trust expressly for the benefit of, Aboriginal peoples or Torrs Strait Islanders; or
(c) the grant or vesting or any thing over particular land or waters, if at the time a thing covered by paragraph (a) or (b) is in effect in relation to the land or waters.
(9A) An act is not a previous exclusive possession act if the grant or vesting concerned involves the establishment of an area, such as a national, State or Territory park, for the purpose of preserving the natural environment of the area.
(9B) An act is not a previous exclusive possession act if it is done by or under legislation that expressly provides that the act does not extinguish native title.
(9C) If an act is the grant or vesting of an interest in relation to land or waters to or in the Crown in any capacity or a statutory authority, the act is not a previous exclusive possession act:
(a) unless, apart from this Act, the grant or vesting extinguishes native title in relation to the land or waters; or
(b) if the grant or vesting does not, apart from this Act, extinguish native title in relation to the land or waters - unless and until the land or waters are (whether before or after 23 December 1996) used to any extent in a way that, apart from this Act, extinguishes native title in relation to the land or waters.
(10) The regulations may provide that an act is not a previous exclusive possession act.
(11) To avoid doubt, the fact that an act is, because of any of the previous subsections, not a previous exclusive possession act does not imply that the act is not valid.
79. The significance of a previous exclusive possession act is the extinguishing effect it has on native title. Section 23C (ss 9H and 9J of the Validation Act) provides:
23C (1) If an act is a previous exclusive possession act under subsection 23B(2) (including because of subsection 23B(3)) and is attributable to the Commonwealth:
(a) the act extinguishes any native title in relation to the land or waters covered by the freehold estate, Scheduled interest or lease concerned; and
(b) the extinguishment is taken to have happened when the act was done
(2) If an act is a previous exclusive possession act under subsection 23B(7) (which deals with public works) and is attributable to the Commonwealth:
(a) the act extinguishes native title in relation to the land or waters on which the public work concerned (on completion of its construction or establishment) was or is situated; and
(b) the extinguishment is taken to have happened when the construction or establishment of the public work began.
(3) If this section applies to the act, sections 15 and 22B do not apply to the act.
80. The respondents assert that CLP 346 is a previous exclusive possession act that had the effect of extinguishing any native title that may have remained in relation to the land covered by the lease at the time the lease was granted. This assertion is based upon the claim that CLP 346 is both a commercial lease which is neither an agricultural lease nor a pastoral lease and a lease (other than a mining lease) that confers a right of exclusive possession over particular land or waters. It is also said that CLP 346 is a scheduled interest. The applicants dispute that CLP 346 is valid (hence it fails the test of s 23B(2)(a)), and further say that even if it is valid, it does not have any of the characteristics of a previous exclusive possession act, and in any event (even if valid and otherwise within the scope of s 23B(2)) it is not an exclusive possession act by reason of s 23B(9C).
VALIDITY OF CLP 346
81. The challenge to the validity of CLP 346 initially raises an issue involving the construction of s 15 of the Crown Lands Act (NT). At the relevant time s 15 provided:
15. (1)Subject to this Act, the Minister shall not -
(a) grant a pastoral lease of Crown land except upon application; or
(b) grant an estate in fee simple in, or a lease other than a pastoral lease of, Crown land unless he has first -
(i) invited applications for that estate or lease, as the case may be, in that land; or
(iii) offered that estate or lease, as the case may be in that land for sale by auction, tender or ballot.
(2) . . .where the Minister, by instrument in writing, so determines, he may grant an estate in fee simple in, or a lease other than a pastoral lease of, Crown land without complying with subsection (1)(b) in relation to that land.
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
(5) The Minister shall cause notice of each determination made for the purposes of subsection (2) to be published in the Gazette within 60 days after the date on which the determination was made.
(6) . . .
82. The applicants contend that in a case to which s 15(2) applies the Minister must first execute an instrument expressing his determination to grant (in this case) a lease of Crown land without complying with subsection (1)(b) in relation to that land; and then cause a separate notice of the determination to be published in the Gazette within the time specified in ss (5). It is said that there must be two documents namely, the instrument of determination and a separate notice of the determination.
83. On 3 October 1984 the relevant Minister signed a document which is reproduced below:
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Crown Lands Act
NOTICE OF DETERMINATION
I, JAMES MURRAY ROBERTSON, Attorney-General, acting for and on behalf of the Minister for Lands pursuant to section 15(5) of the Crown Lands Act, hereby give notice of a determination made for the purposes of section 15(2) of the Act and being more particularly described in the Schedule.
Dated this 3rd day of October, 1984
(Sgd) Jim Robertson
Attorney-General, acting for and on behalf
of the Minister for Lands
SCHEDULE
Particulars of Determination of grant of Crown Land
Date of determination -
Type of grant made - Crown Lease Perpetual
Proposed Development - For the purpose of carrying out the functions of the Northern Territory Development Corporation in accordance with the Territory Development Act subject to the Crown Lands Act.
Price - Nil (Subject to surrender of Pastoral Lease No 700)
Person to whom grant made - Northern Territory Development Land Corporation
Description of Crown Land the subject of the grant - Portion 819 containing an area of 6581 km˛ or thereabouts
A copy of this document was published in The Northern Territory Government Gazette G43, on 31 October 1984. In the Gazette the heading "Northern Territory of Australia" is not reproduced and in the Schedule the date 3 October 1984 appears beside Date of Determination, a particular which is absent from the copy of the signed document produced in evidence. In all other respects what was published in the Gazette corresponds with the document which bears the Minister's signature.
84. To avoid the need to comply with s 15(1)(b) of the Crown Lands Act in respect of the proposed grant of a perpetual lease in relation to NT Portion 819 it was necessary first for the Minister to determine in writing to make a grant without complying with that subsection. In the body of the document signed by the Minister reference is made to "a determination made for the purposes of section 15(2) of the Act" which determination is "more particularly described in the Schedule". The document signed by the Minister satisfies the description of an "instrument in writing"; it indicates that a determination has been made for the purposes of s 15(2) of the Crown Lands Act; and it particularises other details which identify the type of grant to be made and the land to be the subject of the grant. It would seem that the other particulars in the Schedule, i.e. proposed development, price and person to whom grant made, were unnecessary to strictly comply with s 15(2). Be that as it may, the document taken as a whole is an instrument in writing which expresses a determination made by the Minister to grant a lease other than a pastoral lease in the circumstances referred to in s 15(2), namely, without complying with subsection 1(b) in relation to the land in question. By causing a copy of the document to be published in the Gazette within the time prescribed, the Minister has clearly satisfied the requirements of s 15(5). There is no substance in the applicants' argument that CLP 346 is invalid by reason of a failure to comply with s 15 of the Crown Lands Act.
85. At paragraph 2.6 of their written submission concerning the validity of CLP 346 the applicants say:
2.6 If however contrary to the above submissions, this Court accepts that the notice of determination dated 3 October 1984 evidences the existence of a determination made pursuant to s 15(2), it is submitted that the Minister did not have power under s 15(2) of the Crown Lands Act to make a determination to grant a lease subject to a contingent event, namely, the subsequent surrender of PL 700. Accordingly, the notice of determination was either of no effect and therefore it was necessary for the Minister to comply with the requirements of s 15(1)(b) of the Act or the notice of determination is to be read as requiring the surrender of PL 700 prior to the grant of CLP 346.
86. The assertion that the Minister did not have power under s 15(2) of the Crown Lands Act to make a determination to grant a lease subject to a contingent event misrepresents both the provisions of the section and the context of the determination. Section 15(2) does not confer on the Minister the power to grant a lease; that power is conferred by s 14 and it is a power to grant, inter alia, a lease of Crown land. The only express restriction applying to the making of a determination under s 15(2) is that it must relate to Crown land, a term defined in s 3 as all land of the Northern Territory other than reserved or dedicated lands. As at 3 October 1984, NT Portion 819 was the subject of PL 700. It was not reserved or dedicated land. It was Crown land. There is nothing in s 15 to suggest that a determination cannot be made in anticipation that an existing interest will cease to exist. Furthermore, the determination is not expressed to be contingent on the surrender of PL 700. What the particulars show is that the price to be paid for the proposed lease will be "nil", provided PL 700 is surrendered. If any relevant meaning can be attached to the words "(Subject to the surrender of Pastoral Lease 700)" it is not that the determination was made conditional upon the surrender but that there would be no free grant of a perpetual lease unless PL 700 is surrendered. It must be remembered that a determination under s 15(2) is a determination to make a grant without complying with ss (1)(b); it presupposes that a decision to grant the land has preceded the making of the determination. The subsequent grant of CLP 346 was not invalid by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of s 15 of the Crown Lands Act.
87. It appears from the documents produced in evidence that CLP 346 was executed by the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation (the name by which the second respondent was formerly known) on 5 July 1985 and by a delegate of the Minister on 22 July 1985. The lease is expressed to commence on 22 July 1985. It was registered under the Real Property Act on 21 August 1985 as Volume 197 Folio 22 in the Register of Crown Leases. A surrender of PL 700, executed by the Corporation on 12 August 1985, was lodged at the Office of the Registrar-General on 20 August 1985 and was registered on 21 August 1985, the same day as CLP 346 was registered.
88. The applicants say, by way of alternative argument, that by making a grant of CLP 346 (on 22 July 1985) prior to the registration of the surrender of PL 700 (on 21 August 1985) the Minister failed to comply with the terms of the determination made under s 15(2) of the Crown Lands Act and that in the circumstances he had no power to grant the lease without complying with a 15(1)(b). There is no substance in this argument, which seems to treat the determination to make the grant and the grant itself as being one. The determination was not conditional upon the surrender of PL 700. It simply expresses the future intention of the Minister to grant a lease of the land without complying with s 15(1)(b).
89. The applicants further say that the validity of the grant of a Crown lease is to be determined at the date of the grant, which they say, in the case of CLP 346, was the date on which it was executed on behalf of the Minister, being prior to the surrender of PL 700. Assuming for present purposes that this proposition is correct, the applicants' case is however dependent upon the acceptance of a second proposition namely, that the Minister had no power to grant a further lease over land held under an existing pastoral lease, and that therefore the grant of CLP 346 was invalid and of no effect.
90. It is true that at the date execution of CLP 346 by the Minister's delegate the land described in the lease was held under an existing pastoral lease, PL 700. At that time the Northern Territory had an interest in remainder in the land expectant upon the termination of the lessee's interest under PL 700; and the land, by definition, was Crown land. Pursuant to s 14 and s 15(2) of the Crown Lands Act the Minister was authorised to enter into a further lease of the Territory's interest in the land. As in each case the Northern Territory was the lessor and the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation was the lessee the execution of CLP 346 did not purport to affect the rights of any third party. It is sufficient to say that CLP 346 was a valid grant of a lease of the Territory's interest in the land to which it related as at the date of its execution on behalf of the Minister. The lease was subsequently registered under the Real Property Act and thereupon, by virtue of s 69 of that Act, the title of the registered proprietor was absolute and indefeasible.
91. The preceding discussion deals only with the validity of CLP 346 in terms of the Crown Lands Act. To the extent that the lease was invalid to any extent because of native title, it has been validated by s 4 of the Validation Act. Whether the lease is a previous exclusive possession act is a question which must now be addressed. The answer will depend upon a number of factors including whether the lease is "a commercial lease that is neither an agricultural lease nor a pastoral lease", a "lease (other than a mining lease) that confers a right of exclusive possession over particular land or waters"; or a "Scheduled interest"; and whether the lessee is "the Crown in any capacity or a statutory authority".
COMMERCIAL LEASE
92. The terms mining lease, commercial lease, agricultural lease and pastoral lease are respectively defined in ss 245, 246, 247 and 248 of the Native Title Act. There is no suggestion that CLP 346 is either a mining lease, an agricultural lease or a pastoral lease. Nor is it a residential lease. Subsection 246(1) defines commercial lease as a lease (other than a mining lease) that permits the lessee to use the land or waters covered by the lease solely or primarily for business or commercial purposes. In order to apply this definition to CLP 346 it is necessary to determine the nature of the activity which the lease permits.
93. CLP 346 does not identify any specific activity but rather states a purpose for which it was granted namely the purpose of carrying out the functions of the Northern Territory Development Corporation in accordance with the Territory Development Act subject to the Crown Lands Act. This necessarily invites further inquiry as to the functions of the Northern Territory Development Corporation. To do this involves consideration of a somewhat complex legislative history.
94. The Territory Development Ordinance 1978was assented to on 29 June 1978 and came into operation on 1 July 1978, the day that self-government came to the Northern Territory. Thereupon the Ordinance became an Act. By section 5, a corporation by the name of the Northern Territory Development Corporation was established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common sea, capable, in its corporate name, of acquiring, holding and disposing of real, leasehold and personal property and of suing and being sued. The functions and powers of the Corporation are set out in Part III of the Act (ss 15-25). In 1979 and again in 1984 minor amendments were made to Part III so that by the time CLP 346 was granted the relevant provisions of the Part, namely ss 15 and 16, provided:
15. The function of the Corporation is to assist in the development of industry and small business in the Territory by the provision of money, resources and advice.
16.(1) Subject to this Act, the Corporation has power to do all things that are necessary or convenient to be done for or in connexion with or incidental to the performance of its function and the exercise of its powers.
(2) Without limiting the generality of sub-section (1), the Corporation may, for the purpose of carrying out its function or exercising its powers, including the powers conferred on it elsewhere in this Ordinance:
(a) provide assistance in the performance of a function conferred on another person or body under another law of the Territory;
(b) investigate any matter referred to it by the Minister and report to the Minister thereon;
(c) administer such schemes, including schemes of assistance, as the Minister refers to it;
(d) make assessments from time to time as required by the Minister of the needs of industry in the Territory;
(e) enter into contracts (contracts for the acquisition or disposition of any estate or interest in land excepted);
(f) acquire, hold and dispose of real or personal property, rights, privileges, permits, licences and authorities;
(g) participate in the formation of companies;
(h) give guarantees;
(i) improve any real or personal property owned by or under the control of the Corporation;
(j) appoint receivers, agents and attorneys;
(k) act as agents; and
(l) do anything incidental to any of its powers.
(3) Nothing in this section prevents the acquisition, holding or disposition of any estate or interest in real property only as security for a debt owed to the Corporation.
The terms industry and small business were defined thus:
industry means a trade, business, branch of productive labour or other activity carried on in the Territory that has for its object -
(a) the production of food, marketable products or things; or
(b) the provision of services.
small business means a business in which one or two persons are required to make the critical management decisions without the aid of internal specialists and which, in the case of a manufacturing business, has less than 100 employees and, in any other case, has less than 20 employees.
The Corporation also had power to lend money (s 18), guarantee loans by others (s 19), supply property to applicants for assistance (s 20), waive debts (s 21), administer schemes (s 22), employ staff (s 23), engage consultants (s 24) and provide managerial advice and assistance to a person or body engaged in industry (s 25).
95. In 1979 the Territory Development Act was amended by the addition of a new Part IIIA (Sections 25A-25P) pursuant to which a body corporate to be known as the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation was established (s 25B). Section 25D provided:
25D (1) The Land Corporation is not an authority or instrumentality of the Crown and is not, for the purposes of the Interpretation Act and the Financial Administration and Audit Act, a statutory corporation.
(2) The Land Corporation is not subject to the control and direction of the Minister or the Crown.
The primary function of the new body, as expressed in s 25N(1), was "to acquire, hold and dispose of real property (including any estate or interest in real property) in accordance with this Act and it may acquire and hold such property notwithstanding any other law in force in the Territory which would restrict or otherwise limit the capacity of the Land Corporation to acquire and hold such property".
Subsection 25N(6) provided:
(6) The Corporation has the care, control and management of all land
acquired by the Land Corporation.
(By definition "the Corporation" was the Northern Territory Development Corporation).
96. The Territory Development Act as amended was repealed by s 4 of the Territory Loans Management Corporation Act 1986, ss 6 and 14 of which provided:
6. (1) Notwithstanding the repeals effected by section 4, the Northern Territory Development Corporation that was, immediately before the commencement date, in existence by virtue of the Territory Development Act as then in force is continued in existence and shall be known as the Territory Loans Management Corporation.
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
14. (1) The function of the Corporation is to administer the loans and guarantees of or to which the Corporation was a party immediately before the commencement date, to enforce agreements relating to those loans and guarantees and to continue the agency or other arrangements relating to other loans and guarantees being carried out by the Corporation immediately before the commencement date.
(2) Subject to this Act, the Corporation has such of the powers it had immediately before the commencement date as are necessary or convenient to enable it to perform its functions or exercise its powers.
Section 3 of the Territory Loans Management Corporation Act 1986 provided:
3(1) This Act shall expire on a date to be fixed by the Administrator by notice in the Gazette;
(2) The Administrator shall not cause a notice under subsection (1) to be published in the Gazette unless he is satisfied that all the functions of the Corporation have been discharged.
97. Upon the repeal of the Territory Development Act the Northern Territory Land Corporation Act 1986 came into operation. Section 4(1) of the new Act provides:
4(1) Notwithstanding the repeals effected by section 4 of the Territory Loans Management Corporation Act 1986, the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation that was, immediately before the commencement of this Act (other than sections 1 and 2), in existence by virtue of the Territory Development Act as then in force, is continued in existence and shall be known as the Northern Territory Land Corporation.
The provisions of Part III A of the repealed Act are substantially re-enacted in the new Act. Section 6 re-enacted in the same terms as the former s 25D. The only significant departure from the previous regime is that in the new Act the equivalent provisions to the former s 25N(6) (i.e. s 15(6) and (7)) provide:
(6) The Corporation may enter into such arrangements as it thinks fit with the Territory or any other person in relation to the care, control and management of and or an interest in land held by the Corporation.
(7) Subject to subsection (6), the Minister has the care, control and management of all land and interests in land held by the Corporation.
Section 16 provides for the amendment of the name of the Corporation on any official register or record of real property vested in the Corporation before the commencement of the Act.
98. On 1 February 1994 the following notice was published in The Northern Territory Government Gazette No 57:
Territory Loans Management Corporation Act
NOTICE OF EXPIRATION
I, KEITH JOHN AUSTIN ASCHE, the Administrator of the Northern Territory of Australia, acting with the advice of the Executive Council, in pursuance of section 3(1) of the Territory Loans Management Corporation Act, being satisfied that all the functions of the Corporation have been discharged, fix 1 February 1994 as the date on which the Territory Loans Management Corporation Act shall expire.
Dated 31st January 1994.
K.J.A. ASCHE
ADMINISTRATOR
99. The legislative history of the Northern Territory Development Corporation is not such as to lead to the conclusion that a lease granted for the purpose of carrying out the functions of that body in accordance with the Territory Development Act is a lease "that permits the lessee to use the land or waters covered by the lease solely or primarily for business or commercial purposes". The ordinary meaning of commercial suggests an involvement in business or trade. None of the functions of the former Development Corporation appears to contemplate it engaging in such activities. Rather its object was to assist others in the development of industry and small business by the provision of money, resources and advice. It was not contemplated that the Corporation itself would engage in industry. CLP 346 cannot properly be regarded as a commercial lease.
EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION LEASE
100. The leases considered by the High Court in Wik, which were granted for pastoral purposes, were held not to have conferred a right of exclusive possession. Factors which influenced the majority of the Court in reaching that conclusion included the purpose for which the leases were granted and the general nature of the land, namely vast areas in a remote location which were known to be inhabited by Aboriginals. The latter factors, namely the large area granted, its remoteness and the presence of a substantial Aboriginal population are present in relation to CLP 346. The purpose for which CLP 346 is hard to characterise. Whilst the lease does not contain any express reservation in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants, the presence of a substantial Aboriginal population on the land would have been known. There is no suggestion that the Land Corporation would ever use the land; rather, its function was to hold it, possibly, as turned out to be the case, with a view to parts of it being granted to third parties for business or commercial purposes. At least since 1 February 1994 and probably since before 1986, there has existed no relevant function to carry out within the scope of the purpose for which the lease was granted. Given the overall context in which the lease was granted it is not possible to discern an intention to confer on the lessee a right of exclusive possession. Indeed, exclusive possession rights were only subsequently granted following the surrender of portions of the original grant and the creation of freehold and leasehold estates in the surrendered areas by fresh grants from the Crown.
SCHEDULED INTEREST
101. The term scheduled interest is defined in s 249C(1) of the Native Title Act as follows:
249C(1) A Scheduled interest is:
(a) anything set out in Schedule 1, other than a mining lease or anything whose grant or vesting is covered by subsection 23B(9), (9A), (9B), (9C) or (10) (which provide that certain acts are not previous exclusive possession acts); or
(b) an interest, in relation to land or waters, of a type declared by a regulation for the purposes of this paragraph to be a Scheduled interest.
Part 7 of Schedule 1 (paragraphs 42 to 46) deals with a large variety of leasehold interests affecting the Northern Territory and is reproduced in its entirety as Schedule 2 to the Validation Act.
102. Paragraph 46(7) of Schedule 1 specifies:
(7) A lease under paragraph 23(b) or 23(c) of the Crown Lands Act 1931-1991 of the Northern Territory, or a Crown lease under paragraph 26(a) or (b) of the Crown Lands Act of the Northern Territory, that permits the lessee to use the land or waters covered by the lease solely or primarily for any of the following purposes:
. . . industrial development . . . industrial purposes . . .
Having regard to the purpose for which CLP 346 was granted and the function of the Northern Territory Development Corporation as expressed in s 15 of the Territory Development Act as it applied at the time of the grant, it cannot be said that the lease permitted the use of the land for industrial purposes but it is fair conclude that the lease permits the lessee to use the land and waters covered by the lease solely or primarily for the purpose of industrial development and is therefore a scheduled interest. This being so, subject to subsections 23B(9), (9A), (9B), (9C) or (10), CLP 346 comes within the ambit of the definition of previous exclusive possession act. In the present context only subsection 23B(9C) has any relevance.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
103. The effect of subsection 23B(9C) is to deny a grant of an interest in land the status of a previous exclusive possession act if it is a grant of an interest in relation to land or waters to "the Crown in any capacity or a statutory authority" unless apart from the Native Title Act, the grant extinguishes native title in relation to the land or waters. It is not open in this Court to argue that the Land Corporation (or its predecessor) is the Crown or that it is an emanation of the Crown. To do so would contradict the express provisions of s 6 of the Northern Territory Land Corporation Act and the decision of the High Court in R v Kearney; ex parte Japanangka (1984) 158 CLR 395. Whilst there can be no doubt that the Land Corporation is an authority created by the statute law of the Northern Territory, the question remains as to whether it is, for the purposes of s 23B(9C) of the Native Title Act, a statutory authority.
104. Section 23B was inserted in the Native Title Act by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998. Prior to the amendment the Act contained a reference to "a statutory authority of the Crown in any capacity" in ss 229 and 230, and s 253 contained the following definition:
statutory authority, in relation to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, means any authority or body (including a corporation sole) established by a law of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory other than a general law allowing incorporation as a company or body corporate.
But for the definition, there would be no question of the Land Corporation being regarded as a statutory authority of the Crown for the purposes of either s 229 or s 230. To do so would fly in the face of High Court authority. But the definition, which appears to have been drafted precisely to meet the needs of ss 229 and 230, extends the meaning of the terms used in those sections to include "any authority or body … established by a law of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory". It has been suggested in argument that as the Land Corporation is not a statutory authority of the Crown, the definition has no application to it but that cannot be so. The purpose of the definition is to explain the intended meaning of the words used in the statute. It clearly intends that all statutory authorities be encompassed. This would include the Land Corporation. It is not to the point that the ordinary meaning of those words does not encompass the Land Corporation.
105. A number of new sections added by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 use the term "statutory authority" but in each case without the addition of the words "of the Crown". Subsection 23B(9C) contains one such reference. Others can be found in ss 47, 47A and 47B. Whether or not the absence of the descriptive words "of the Crown" in the new sections was deliberate does not seem to be a matter of importance. With or without the additional words, for the purposes of s 23B(9C), the Land Corporation is covered either by the ordinary meaning of statutory authority or by the definition.
PREVIOUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION ACT
106. One of the elements of the definition of previous exclusive possession act is that the act must be valid (s 23B(2)(a)). Acts which took place before 1 January 1994 that were invalid because of native title have been validated, in the case of acts attributable to the Northern Territory, by s 4 of the Validation Act. However, for a grant to a statutory authority which would otherwise be a previous exclusive possession act to escape the effect of s 23B(9C), it is necessary that apart from the Act, the grant would have extinguished native title. An act which but for the Act would be invalid because of native title does not fit this description; nor does the grant of a non-exclusive possession lease, albeit a lease which is a scheduled interest.
107. As CLP 346 was granted subsequent to the passing of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, but for the validating provisions of the Native Title Act and the Validation Act, it would not be valid. Further, it not being an exclusive possession lease, it would not, apart from any statutory provision, have the effect of extinguishing native title. The effect of s 23B(9C) is to deny CLP 346 the status of a previous exclusive possession act. Accordingly s 23C has no application to CLP 346.
PAST ACT
108. The term act as used in the Native Title Act includes, inter alia, the creation of any interest in relation to land or waters (s 226(2)(c)). It follows that the grant of a lease is an act for the purposes of the legislation. The grant of a lease is a past act if the grant took place before 1 January 1994 when native title existed in relation to the particular land and waters and apart from the Native Title Act, the act was invalid to any extent, but it would have been valid to that extent if the native title did not exist (s 228(2)). Assuming the existence of native title in relation to the land in question at the relevant time, CLP 346, which was granted before 1 January 1994 but after the Racial Discrimination Act came into force, is a past act.
109. The Native Title Act makes provision for four categories of past acts, namely categories A, B, C and D. The definitions of category A and category B past acts expressly exclude acts which are the grant of a lease to a statutory authority, and for reasons expressed earlier, CLP 346 does not come within the scope of either of those categories. Nor is it a category C past act, not being a mining lease. It follows that CLP 346 is a category D past act, being a "past act that is neither a category A past act, or a category B past act or a category C past act" (s 232). The non-extinguishment principle (as described in s 238) applies to all category D past acts (Validation Act, s 8). Accordingly, CLP 346 did not extinguish any native title that existed in relation to the leased land at the date of its grant.
PASTORAL LEASES
110. Most of the land which is now identified as NT Portion 819 was included in pastoral leases issued between 1881 and 1883. From 1896 a number of further pastoral leases were issued over the claim area but there were two areas not covered by the early pastoral leases. Part of the north-western area of NT Portion 819 and the stock route area were the subject of an annual pastoral lease issued in 1901; and an area in the south-eastern corner was free of any tenure until the issuing of a grazing licence in 1923. From 1908 to 1964 (when PL 700 was granted) the claim area was predominantly covered by grazing licences. PL 700 covered the whole of the land component of the claim area other than the stock route area and included the roads which were later excluded from the area covered by CLP 346.
111. All of the pastoral leases granted over the claim area contained reservations in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants. In pastoral leases granted prior to PL 700, the reservations, although variously expressed, were substantially the same in content. The rights so reserved were the right to enter on the leased land, to have access to its springs and natural surface water, to erect and make wurlies and other dwellings and take and use for food birds and animals ferae naturae. The reservations were expressed to be in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants generally rather than those Aboriginals inhabiting the leased areas. In the case of PL 700 the lease was expressed as being "subject to a reservation in favour of the Aboriginal natives of the Northern Territory", an expression which at the time the lease was granted was, by virtue of s 24(e) of the Crown Lands Act, required to be read as a reservation permitting Aborigines to enter and be on the leased land, to use the natural waters and springs on the leased land and to kill upon the leased land and use for food birds and animals ferae naturae.
Section 6 of the Crown Lands Act (No 3) 1978 repealed s 24(e) and substituted the following new subsections:
(2) Subject to sub-section (3), in any lease under this Ordinance a reservation in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Territory shall be read as a reservation permitting the Aboriginal inhabitants of the leased land and the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Territory who in accordance with Aboriginal tradition are entitled to inhabit the leased land -
(a) to enter and be on the leased land;
(b) to take and use the natural waters and springs on the leased land;
(c) subject to any other law in force in the Northern Territory, to take or kill for food or for ceremonial purposes animals ferae naturae on the leased land; and
(d) subject to any other law in force in the Northern Territory, to take for food or for ceremonial purposes any vegetable matter growing naturally on the leased land.
(3) Subject to sub-section (4), a reservation in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Territory in any lease under this Ordinance does not apply to that part of the leased land which is within 2 kilometres of a homestead.
(4) Where an Aboriginal or a group of Aboriginals was at the date of commencement of the Aboriginal Land Ordinance 1978 residing within 2 kilometres of a homestead and was entitled to use educational, medical or other facilities provided for his or their use within that area, the Aboriginal or group of Aboriginals may reside within 2 kilometres of the homestead and use the educational, medical and other facilities provided for him or them until the Aboriginal or group of Aboriginals ceases to reside permanently within 2 kilometres of the homestead or until adequate facilities of a similar nature are provided on a site suitable to the Aboriginal or group of Aboriginals.
(5) For the purposes of sub-section (3), "homestead" means a group of buildings and other facilities of a substantial nature built for residential, administrative and management purposes and used for residential, administrative and management purposes connected with the legitimate use of the leased land.
(6) Where a lease under this Ordinance contains a reservation in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Territory a person shall not, without just cause, interfere with the full and free exercise, by the persons thereby entitled, of the rights reserved to them.
Penalty: 2,000 dollars
Subsection (2) was repealed by the Crown Lands Amendment Act (No 2) 1985 and replaced by a new subsection (2) as follows:
(2) In a lease under this Act, a reservation in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Territory shall be read as a reservation permitting those Aboriginals -
(a) who ordinarily reside on the leased land;
(b) who ordinarily reside on an area of land which at any time after 1 January 1979 was within the boundaries of the land that then comprised the leased land and which area of land has since that date been excised from that leased land as a living area or part of a living area for those Aboriginals; or
(c) who, by Aboriginal tradition, are entitled to use or occupy the leased land,
subject to subsection (3) -
(d) to enter and be on the leased land;
(e) to take and use the water from the natural waters and springs on the leased land; and
(f) subject to any other law in force in the Territory -
(i) to take or kill for food or for ceremonial purposes animals ferae naturae; and
(ii) to take for food or for ceremonial purposes vegetable matter growing naturally,
on the leased land,
but not permitting -
(g) those Aboriginals referred to in paragraph (a) to reside on the leased land other than at the place on the leased land where they ordinarily reside; or
(h) those Aboriginals referred to in paragraph (b) or (c) to reside on the leased land.