36 An analysis of what constituted an unreasonable failure to settle was considered by a Full Bench of this Commission in Bankstown City Council v Paris. The relevant passage is found at page 219:
"Construing the relevant part of s 181(2)(c) in its overall statutory context, we conclude that the evident purpose of the provision is to encourage the settlement of proceedings to which it applies. The criterion set out in the provision is to be applied objectively and requires a consideration of the whole of the conduct of the party against whom the order is sought, or some discrete part of the party's conduct, with a view to ascertaining whether it unreasonably failed to agree to a settlement of the claim. We also consider that on the proper construction of the provision, an affirmative conclusion may be reached on at least two bases. First, where there was a proposal put by a party which could be described as a reasonable settlement of the claim and that was not agreed by the other party. The second situation in which the criterion could be satisfied is where the course of conduct of the party over a relevant period could be said to amount to conduct inconsistent with an intention to settle the proceedings on any basis that could be considered reasonable.
We emphasise that, although the legislature has clearly intended that there be strict limits on the power of the Commission to award costs in unfair dismissal proceedings, the legislature has also evinced a clear intention that costs orders be available in circumstances where there has been a failure on the part of a party to properly conciliate proceedings to the extent that they have failed reasonably to facilitate a potential settlement of them. Further, the Commission is obliged to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether such failure has occurred. Once the statutory criterion has been met, the Commission's broad powers and discretions under s 181(1) are available for exercise."
37 This Full Bench decision sets out authoritative guidelines on the approach to be adopted to the consideration of any alleged unreasonable failure to agree to a settlement. Those guidelines require the Commission to consider whether:
(a) there was a rejection by a party of a reasonable offer to settle the claim; or
(b) there was conduct by a party (over a relevant period) that is found to be inconsistent with an intention to settle the unfair dismissal claim.
38 It is also clear that the Commission is required to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether there has been an unreasonable failure to agree to a settlement.
CONSIDERATION
39 Costs do not follow the event in unfair dismissal proceedings. This was made clear in the Full Bench decision in Copperart v Martin(1996) 68 IR 58 at 64: "It is clear, that in a scheme where costs are not the usual regime, the part of the Act contemplates and apprehends two distinct propositions:
· that costs are not the automatic outcome of a refusal to settle;
· that under certain circumstances costs are appropriate."
40 The fact that the amount of compensation ordered in the substantive proceedings is more than the amount that was put forward in the negotiation and settlement discussions does not automatically mean that a costs order should be made.
41 As to that point, the Commission relies on the following extract of a decision of Deputy President Sams in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union, on behalf of Mark Harrison and Keith Donaldson, and Australian Co-Operative Foods Limited [2001] NSWIRComm 29:
15 "The Union submitted that the offers of settlement were unreasonable when tested against the orders made by the Commission. In considering this submission, I have had regard to the comments of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Blagojevch v Australian Industrial Relations Commission , 98 IR 32 at 42-43, where Marshall and Lehane JJ said:
Certainly there is no reason to give primacy to the result of a mechanical comparison between an amount offered and the amount of compensation ultimately awarded; although, if an applicant offers to settle for a particular amount and the arbitration results in the award of a substantially lesser amount by way of compensation, it would no doubt be only in unusual circumstances that the respondent would be held to have acted unreasonably in rejecting the offer.
16 I have also had regard for the conclusions of Stanley J of the Industrial Commission of South Australia in Krajewska and University of Adelaide , 50 IR 63, where his Honour said:
The question of whether a person clearly acts unreasonably in failing to discontinue or settle the matter before trial must be judged in the light of all the circumstances known, or which reasonably should have been known, before the trial commences."
42 It follows then that the amount of any offers of settlement when compared to the amount of compensation ultimately awarded by the Commission, should not be given primacy in deciding whether the offers made during settlement negotiations were reasonable and whether or not a costs order should be made against a party. It also follows that in determining what was a reasonable offer of settlement, the position of the parties at the time the offer was made should be examined rather than a mechanical comparison of the offers of settlement and the amount of compensation awarded by the Commission. Lastly, costs are not the automatic outcome of a failure to settle a matter.
43 Having considered the decision of Johnson Joseph (a decision that was referred to by both parties to these costs proceedings) I am of the view that there is no absolute requirement that an employer agree to negotiate the settlement of an unfair dismissal claim in isolation from other claims, especially when the 'other claims' are reliant to one degree or another on whether a case in the unfair dismissal proceedings is made out.
44 In Weisser's Case, the Full Bench of the Commission (Wright J President, Walton J Vice-President and Ritchie C) said that parties should not be discouraged from settling any or all claims with respect to the employment relationship. This, the Respondent sought to do. The Full Bench went on to say that where a comprehensive offer (to settle all claims, including the unfair dismissal) is made by a party, it is possible to consider the reasonableness of that offer as it pertains to the unfair dismissal component of that comprehensive offer, by deducting the value of the other component(s) to the comprehensive offer. In the circumstances before the Full Bench, it was said that the reasonableness of the amount offered by the respondent, could be assessed by deducting the leave components from the amount offered (paragraph 42 of the Full Bench Decision). In that case, one of the components in the comprehensive package was pro rata long service leave.
45 So, the approach then in considering the reasonableness of a comprehensive offer is to place a value on the components such as annual leave, long service leave, redundancy pay, shares etc and deduct those known values from the comprehensive offer, in order to assess the value of the unfair dismissal component itself - and hence the reasonableness of the comprehensive offer.
46 That approach of assessing the components of the Respondent's comprehensive offer in the case before myself, was not possible. The component that made up the comprehensive offer, apart from the unfair dismissal component, was a claim by the Applicant for pro rata long service leave. However, this long service component was not agreed between the parties as being an entitlement due to the Applicant. This was so, because the Respondent had summarily dismissed the Applicant and, as is the case for summary dismissals, the Applicant was not entitled, at law, to payment of her pro rata long service accrual.
47 Accordingly, it is not possible to deduct the long service leave component because it was not an entitlement, at law, due to the Applicant. By contrast, in Weisser's case, the dismissed employee had been dismissed with notice (as opposed to summary dismissal) and was entitled, at law, to pro rata long service leave - and hence, a dollar value could be put against that component of a comprehensive package.
48 As that long service leave component could not be deducted in the matter before myself, then the approach put by the Full Bench in Weisser's case for putting a value against the component(s) of a comprehensive offer, could not take place in the matter before myself.
49 That conclusion rejects the submission of Mr Jaloussis, that a comparison can be made between the Applicant's offer of $3000 to settle the long service leave component and the pro rata long service leave payout of $4000, eventually paid to the Applicant. True it is, that the Applicant was paid out pro rata long service leave (and that the payout was higher than that sought by the Applicant), but this payout only came about because of my Decision that the Respondent had not made out its onus to prove that the Applicant's conduct (for which she was dismissed), did indeed constitute serious and wilful misconduct. Mr Jaloussis' submission is rejected, because at the time of the negotiations to settle, the Commission had not yet made its Decision which found that the Respondent's onus of serious and wilful misconduct had not been made out and only then (because of that Decision) did the Applicant become entitled, at law, to claim pro rata long service leave.
50 The Commission's conclusion that the long service leave component cannot be given a value, leaves the Commission to consider the Applicant's lowest offer to settle (15 weeks at $770/week and $3000 for pro rata long service leave), against the Respondent's highest offer to settle ($12,000 as comprehensive package). The $12,000 approximates 15.5 weeks pay.