14 It appears that well after the approval in October 1996 the Council exhibited a draft Local Environmental Plan which related to its Heritage Study. This was in February to April 1997. (Blue AB 560) At the most, therefore, amendments were proposed to the Council's Local Environmental Plan 1984 to give effect to its Heritage Study. There was, however, no evidence before Lloyd J, that as at the date of the approval in question, the subject land had been identified or was in the vicinity of land in the Heritage Study referred to in the Local Approvals Policy. The Heritage Study itself was not put into evidence. The onus of proof was on the appellants and they failed to discharge it. Cases can only be determined on evidence adduced in court.
15 In any event, as his Honour said, condition 30 of the approval appears to provide permission to the construction of the section of the retaining wall in issue.
16 I have considered each of the matters relied on by the appellants but am unable to discern any error in his Honour's treatment of their case that the building approval had not been complied with by the second and third respondents.
17 The Wallins have filed affidavits, 'narratives' and other documents in support of the appeal, which I have read, but nothing in them lends any support for their contention that Lloyd J's decision on validity or breach was erroneous. Likewise the written submissions and photographs filed in reply on 24 August 1999. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
18 Since receipt of the appellants' written submissions in reply (24 August) they have filed a Notice of Motion seeking leave to admit further evidence said not to have been included in the Blue Appeal Books. I have considered this motion and the affidavit of Graham Wallin, sworn 25 August 1999, in support.
19 In my view, the motion should be peremptorily dismissed with costs as an abuse of process. The material already before the court is more than adequate to address the issues raised by the appellants on the appeal. It must be recalled that the case of the appellants depends upon establishing an error of law rather than upon fine points of evidence. Accordingly, it will not be necessary for the respondents to appear at court on 6 September 1999 to answer the motion.