WAJB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

The Tribunal's Findings and Reasons 10 The Tribunal accepted that there had been an incident in 1983 when the applicant had become lost while returning from his leave and that he was questioned about what he was doing and why he was where he was. It did not consider that he was thought to be an Israeli spy for any significant period of time. His account to the Syrian military and intelligence would have been easy to verify. It did not make sense to the Tribunal that the intelligence people would beat and torture the applicant as a result of a suspicion that he was an Israeli spy without making checks first which would have verified his account. It also did not make sense to the Tribunal that having shifted their focus from his being a spy to being anti-government, they would then have detained him for a period of two years. The Tribunal found the applicant to have exaggerated his period of detention. However, even if it were wrong in that respect it was noted that he was able, at the end of his detention, to set up his business and work without any problems for the next fifteen years. This did not indicate to the Tribunal that he was considered by the authorities to be either an Israeli spy or anti-government. 11 The Tribunal did not consider that it would have taken two weeks for the authorities to check the applicant's claimed reason for being in the vicinity of the Military Officers' Club. It would not have been necessary to beat and torture him. The Tribunal did not accept that this had occurred. It considered that even if the applicant had been detained by a patrol checking identities in 2000, it was the first time that such an event had occurred. When compared to his previous fifteen years without problems, it seemed to the Tribunal to have been a one off incident. This incident did not support any proposition that there was a real chance the applicant would face persecution on his return to Syria. 12 The Tribunal did not accept that he would be seriously considered as an Israeli spy or even that some anti-government attitude in 1983 would cause him problems now particularly given his long work history. The Tribunal found that if the applicant were returned now the events of 1983 would not lead him to face a real chance of persecution. Similar reasoning was applied in relation to his alleged detention in October 2000. Even if detained, he had been released and the Tribunal considered that the circumstances he had related of being in the wrong place, at the wrong time, would not lead to authorities having any ongoing interest in him. The Tribunal concluded that there was no real chance that the applicant would face persecution simply for being a Palestinian if returned to Syria.

The Amended Application 13 The grounds of review as set out in the amended application are as follows: "1. The Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to make the decision: s 476(1)(b). Particulars (a) In determining whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution the Tribunal ignored and/or failed to make findings on significant events pertaining to the Applicant's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Syria, being significant events which the Tribunal was bound to take into account, namely:- (i) his long period of detention commencing in 1983 on accusations of being an Israeli spy, and then, of being against the governing regime in Syria; (ii) his arrest and detention in October 2000 while a demonstration outside the US Embassy was being dispersed; (iii) the means of his release from detention in October 2000; (iv) his file record with Syrian security authorities; (v) his departure from Syria with the assistance of a smuggler; (vi) his application for asylum in Australia. (b) The Tribunal erred in law in determining whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and whether Australia had a protection obligation to the Applicant. The particulars at paragraph 1(a) above and paragraph 2 below are relied on in support of this. (c) Further to 1(a) and 1(b) above, the Tribunal's exercise of power was thereby affected, its statutory power exceeded, it did not have jurisdiction to make the decision. 2. The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal: s 476(1)(e). Particulars (a) The Tribunal did not correctly interpret and apply the law that requires the Tribunal to consider past events in determining whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Syria. The Tribunal excluded past events from consideration on the basis of fragile and unreasoned assumptions and inclinations unsupported by probative material and made no clear findings that permitted the Tribunal to disregard the Applicant's claims of: (i) his long period of detention commencing in 1983 on accusations of being an Israeli spy, and then, of being against the governing regime in Syria; (ii) his arrest and detention in October 2000 while a demonstration outside the US Embassy was being dispersed; (iii) the means of his release from detention in October 2000; (iv) his file record with Syrian security authorities; (v) his departure from Syria with the assistance of a smuggler; (vi) his application for asylum in Australia. (b) The Tribunal did not correctly interpret and apply the law that requires the Tribunal, where there is uncertainty about the occurrence of events, to consider whether the Applicant faced a real chance of Convention based persecution on return to Syria and to evaluate that chance:- (i) on the whole of the Applicant's claims; (ii) on the cumulative effect of all relevant circumstances; (iii) without excluding all speculation as to the likelihood of future persecution. (c) Further and alternatively, the Tribunal made a finding that the Applicant was covered by UNRWA and does not receive any services from UNRWA, but did not correctly interpret and apply paragraph 2 of Article 1D of the Convention, which provides that departure from the UNRWA area of operation automatically entitled the Applicant to Convention protection as a refugee under Article 1A of the Convention. 3. The decision was not authorised by the Act or the Regulations: s 476(1)(c). Particulars The particulars at paragraphs 1 and 2 above are repeated in support of this ground."

Statutory Framework 14 The application for review having been filed on 30 August 2001, the Court's jurisdiction arises from s 486 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as it stood then and prior to the significant amendments effected by the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) which came into effect on 2 October 2001. The grounds of review available at the time were those defined in s 476 of the Act which relevantly provided: "476(1) Subject to subsection (2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially-reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the decision; (c) that the decision was not authorised by this Act or the regulations; . . . (e) that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;"

Want of Jurisdiction to Make the Decision 15 It was submitted that the Tribunal had made no clear findings about the claimed occurrence of the 1983 and 2000 detentions and no finding on the claimed means of release from the latter detention. Its findings on the alleged retention of a file record on the applicant by the Syrian authorities were said to be based on inclinations and assumptions and not on probative evidence. The Tribunal was also said to have made no findings about the applicant's departure from Syria and the effect of his application for asylum in Australia. 16 The passage from the Tribunal's reasons relating to the first detention, relied upon by the applicant and set out in the submissions filed on his behalf, was in the following terms: "The Tribunal accepts that in 1983 the applicant was returning from twenty four hours leave when he missed the bus at 7am and had to catch the civilian bus. The Tribunal accepts that he left this bus to walk for forty five minutes to the top of the mountain where his base was but became lost on the way. The Tribunal accepts that he stumbled on a Syrian post after he lost his way. It is plausible in such circumstances that the applicant would be questioned as to what he was doing and why he was where he was. However the applicant's account would have been easy to verify. As a result the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was considered to be an Israeli spy for any significant period of time. Whilst the Tribunal notes that the applicant claimed it was twelve or thirteen days before the authorities shifted their focus from his being a spy to being anti government, the Tribunal does not accept it would have taken such a period of time to verify his account. It also does not make sense to the Tribunal that they would beat and torture him as a result of a suspicion that he was an Israeli spy without making checks first which checks would have verified his account. It also does not make sense to the Tribunal that having shifted their focus from his being a spy to being anti-government that he would then be detained for a period of two years. As a result the Tribunal considers that the applicant has exaggerated his period of detention. The Tribunal would have expected from his account that he would have been detained for a short period only. However even if the Tribunal is wrong about its finding in relation to his period of detention, the applicant was able at the end of it to set up a business and work without any problems for the next fifteen years. His ability to do this does not indicate to the Tribunal that the applicant was considered by the authorities to be either an Israeli spy or anti-government." 17 It is plain enough from the preceding passage that the Tribunal did not accept the applicant's account of the sequelae of what it called the 1983 incident. It did not accept that he was beaten and tortured or that he was detained for two years. The Tribunal was not obliged to make positive findings about this detention and the reason it occurred. The Tribunal had not accepted those aspects of the applicant's account of this incident which might have supported the existence of an ongoing well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal. Such uncertainties as emerged from its reasons in this respect were subsumed by its conclusion that, in any event, having regard to the applicant's subsequent and problem free fifteen years operating a business in Syria, he was not considered to be either an Israeli spy or anti-government. 18 The mode of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in respect of the first claimed detention, is unexceptional. It is open to the Tribunal to determine, without accepting a claim advanced by an applicant, that even if accepted it would not support a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. 19 It is said that the Tribunal did not make a clear finding on the basis of probative evidence rejecting this significant past event and that it was required to put the event in the balance with others in assessing the risk of persecution on return to Syria. This kind of criticism invites the Court to engage in merits review. The same is true of the suggestion that the Tribunal has disregarded country information about detention without trial for long periods for political reasons in Syria. This appears to have been a reference to country information submitted by the applicant's advisers in a letter dated 12 July 2001. That letter referred to an Amnesty International Report of 1999 which indicated that thousands of Palestinians have been held in Syria since the 1960s for political reasons, albeit the majority were released in Presidential amnesties in 1991-92. It was referred to by the Tribunal when it said: "The applicant's adviser provided the Tribunal with a detailed submission setting out the applicant's claims and referring in detail to a report from Amnesty International about Palestinians in Syria. Amnesty's report refers to thousands of Palestinians being held in Syria for political reasons from the 1960s with most being released in amnesties in 1991/1992." The Tribunal went on to refer to more recent information about the country situation provided by the applicant's advisers and further country information apparently derived from its own sources. That was a United States Department of State Country Report for 2000 and advices from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Reference was also made to a report from Reuters News Service of 15 January 2001. The fact that the Tribunal did not specifically refer to that aspect of the country information in its findings and reasons, does not expose any jurisdictional error. 20 In relation to the second incident of detention in 2000, the submissions on behalf of the applicant cited the following passage from the Tribunal's reasons: "The applicant claimed that in October 2000 whilst going to do some work at the Officers Club he was detained. It is possible that the applicant was in the wrong place at the wrong time and was detained. However again the Tribunal considers it would not have taken two weeks for the authorities to check his account and check that he had a contract at the Officers Club where he was heading. Again the Tribunal considers that checks would have revealed his bona fides which means that it would not be necessary to beat and torture him and so the Tribunal does not accept that this would have occurred. The Tribunal also does not accept that on this occasion the authorities would have taken any particular notice of his prior detention in 1983, if this occurred, as it was so long ago. More importantly the Tribunal considers that even if the applicant was detained at a patrol checking identities in 2000 this was the first time that such an event had occurred and when compared to his previous fifteen years without problems appears to the Tribunal to have been a one off incident. Indeed when this was suggested to the applicant at the hearing he appeared to agree with it. So even if the applicant was unfortunate enough to be detained at an identity check in October 2000, the Tribunal considers that the circumstances in which it arose and the fact that he had not been detained in this way before indicates that it was a once only incident, albeit an unfortunate one. As a result, even if the applicant was detained in 2000 near a demonstration, the Tribunal does not accept that it indicates there is any real chance the applicant will face persecution should he now return to Syria." 21 It was said not to be clear from this statement what was the Tribunal's finding on the 2000 detention and whether it had accepted or rejected the claim that the applicant was detained by the Syrian security authorities. The Tribunal again approached this aspect of the applicant's claims on the basis that even if his apprehension and detention had occurred as claimed, it was an isolated incident which would not support the inference that there was any real chance that he would face persecution should he now return to Syria. This is an approach the Tribunal was entitled to take. 22 In relation to the applicant's release from the asserted detention in 2000 it was said that the Tribunal made no finding. It was submitted for the applicant that the claim he had obtained release from detention by procuring a member of Syrian intelligence to engage in subterfuge and manipulation of the system was clearly a significant one in determining whether he was at risk of persecution on his return to Syria. The Tribunal's failure to make a finding on the matter was said to be indicative of its failure to properly understand its task and the application of the law on a well-founded fear of persecution which would require it either to clearly reject a past event on the basis of probative evidence or to consider it "in the balance with others" in assessing risk of persecution on return to Syria. It was not explained from these submissions how the circumstances of the applicant's release would support an inference of a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. This aspect of the grounds of review discloses no error. 23 The applicant's submissions on the file held on him by Syrian security authorities referred to the Tribunal's finding in this respect which was in the following terms: "The Tribunal notes that the applicant has claimed that his return will mean that his file will be opened and this will lead to problems. Firstly the country information above indicates that Syria will accept the return of Syrian Palestinians. In this regard the Tribunal notes that the applicant is covered by UNRWA even though he does not live in a refugee camp and does not receive any services. He agreed in the hearing that the Syrian authorities would not stand in the way of his return. In relation to his file being opened and his past discovered, the Tribunal does not accept that any of the events of 1983 would lead to the authorities having an interest in him. The Tribunal does not accept that they would seriously consider him an Israeli spy. The Tribunal also does not accept that some anti-government attitude in 1983 would cause him problems now particularly given his long work history. The Tribunal finds if he returns now the events of 1983 will not lead to him facing a real chance of persecution. The Tribunal also considers that similar reasoning applies in relation to his alleged detention in October 2000. Even if he was detained, he was released, and the Tribunal considers that the circumstances he has related of being in the wrong place at the wrong time and his explanation for being there, that is to go to work at the Officer's Club, would not lead to the authorities having any ongoing interest in him. Even if his return causes the authorities to look at his past, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is no real chance he will face persecution for a Convention reason should he now return." 24 The criticism here is made that the findings are based on inclinations and assumptions and not probative evidence. The observation that, even if the applicant were detained he was released, is said completely to ignore the claims of how he obtained release. Having regard to the Tribunal's views of the lack of significance of the events of 1983 and 2000 in relation to a contemporary well-founded fear of persecution it is not surprising that it did not accept that if his file were opened the events of 1983 or 2000 would lead to the authorities having an interest in him. This again is a finding of fact and does not disclose jurisdictional error or error of law. 25 Further it was said there was no basis upon which the Tribunal could logically disregard and not make findings about the applicant's departure from Syria and the impact of his application for asylum in Australia. The applicant did not advance a contention that by seeking asylum he would be exposed to persecution on return to Syria. No country information was put before the Tribunal in relation to the fate of asylum seekers in Syria. There was no obligation therefore on the Tribunal to specifically address the hypothesis of a sur place claim. The same is true in relation to the fact of the applicant's departure from Syria. 26 None of the matters relied upon in relation to want of jurisdiction, in my opinion, disclose a failure by the Tribunal to carry out its function and any competent want of authority to make the decision that it did.

Error of Law 27 The contention that the Tribunal committed an error of law was based upon the same particulars as the contention that it lacked authority. For the reasons that I have already indicated, those particulars disclose no error of law. As to the second limb of the error of law ground I do not accept that the Tribunal's failure expressly to address the "whole of the applicant's claims" and "the cumulative effect of all relevant circumstances" discloses any error having regard to the findings that it made as to the significance of the incidents relied upon.

Error of Law - Article 1D of the Refugee Convention - The 'Ipso Facto' Clause 28 This leaves the final ground upon which error of law is asserted. That is the Tribunal's failure to hold that, notwithstanding he was entitled to UNRWA protection and assistance and had removed himself from that protection and assistance, he was automatically entitled to Convention protection as a refugee under Article 1A. 29 In its reasons the Tribunal said: "The Tribunal notes that the applicant has claimed that his return will mean that his file will be opened and this will lead to problems. Firstly the country information above indicates that Syria will accept the return of Syrian Palestinians. In this regard the Tribunal notes that the applicant is covered by UNRWA even though he does not live in a refugee camp and does not receive any services." 30 Counsel for the applicant argued that, on the proper construction of the second paragraph of Article 1D of the Convention, any entitlement the applicant might have had to protection or assistance from UNRWA ceased on his departure from its area of operation. The effect is, therefore, that he is not receiving and is not entitled to receive the protection or assistance of the agency. On that basis it is said he is not excluded from the protection of the Convention and falls automatically for Convention protection without screening under Article 1A(2). This construction of paragraph 2 of Article 1D is said to be supported by academic commentators - Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, 1966 Vol 1 at 141-142 and 264-265; Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 1996 Vol 1 at 1592. 31 It was submitted that it was the intention of those who drafted the Convention that Palestinians entitled to UN protection or assistance and individual Palestinians who might find themselves beyond the area of the UN agency's jurisdiction were to have the heightened protection of automatic refugee status under the Convention. This did not mean that benefits would go to those who did not need them. The argument, which was based on travaux preparatoires, is that Palestinians who have no state and are without repatriation and compensation for the loss of homelands were considered a special case for heightened protection at the time that the Convention was drafted. In the Australian context, s 36 of the Migration Act and the requirement that a person be without effective protection elsewhere before the Article 33 non-refoulement obligation is engaged, prevent individual Palestinians from gaining an unwarranted protection obligation from Australia. It was put that the decision to the contrary of Carr J in Al-Khateeb v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 67 ALD 46 should not be followed. No judgments have adopted the propounded construction of paragraph 2. 32 It is useful in this context to review the relevant terms of the Refugee Convention. Article 1A of the Convention provides: "1A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who: (1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization. Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section; (2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national." 33 Article 1D provides: "This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitely settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention." 34 The non-refoulement obligation is created by Article 33 which provides: "1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country." 35 In a previous decision unrelated to the present matter, I held that Article 1D does not exclude from the protection of the Convention a Palestinian entitled to protection and assistance from UNRWA who is nevertheless at risk of persecution if returned to his or her home region even if that region is within the territorial competence of UNRWA. That decision was appealed to the Full Court which, at the time of the hearing of this application, had reserved its decision. In this case, the arguments put for the applicant also assert that the applicant, no longer being under the protection of UNRWA, is automatically entitled to be treated as a refugee under the Convention. This contention is based upon the second paragraph of Article 1D. As will be seen below that matter was in fact dealt with by the Full Court on the appeal to which I have referred. 36 The Full Court delivered judgment in the matter to which I have referred on 8 November 2002 - Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v WABQ [2002] FCAFC 329. The principal question raised before the Full Court related to the construction of the first paragraph of Article 1D and its interaction with historical facts as to which certain findings had been made (erroneously, as the Full Court held) by the Tribunal. 37 The Court also addressed the operation of the second paragraph of Article 1D. As to that, Hill J said at [69 subpar 6.]: "It can be accepted that the Latin 'ipso facto' conveys the meaning 'by the very fact'. That is the meaning attributed to it in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition. But the question is rather what, by the very fact of protection or assistance ceasing, is contemplated to happen. The answer which the second paragraph gives to the question is that the person becomes entitled to 'the benefits' of the Convention. It is not that the person is deemed to be a refugee. The benefits of the Convention are those benefits, such as the non-expulsion provisions of Article 32 and the non-refoulement provisions of Article 33. But those benefits are available only to those persons who are refugees. They are not available to anyone else." Moore J found it unnecessary to decide the question given that the appeal turned on the first limb of Article 1D. Tamberlin J said at [172]: "A further question in relation to the second paragraph is the meaning of the expression 'ipso facto' being entitled to the benefit of the Convention. I agree with the conclusion of Carr J in Jaber [Jaber v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1878] that the better view is that the expression 'ipso facto' does not require a conclusion that upon cessation of protection or assistance, an applicant becomes automatically entitled to protection as a 'refugee' without satisfying the definition of 'refugee' under the Convention. Essentially, the protection of the Convention is provided in Article 33 which refers to a 'refugee'. The entitlement of a refugee is not to be sent to a country where he or she would be persecuted for a Convention reason. In this case because the respondent has established that he is a 'refugee' within the definition, it follows that if he comes within the second paragraph he is entitled to the protection of the Convention." The views expressed by Hill and Tamberlin JJ on the second paragraph of Article 1D were applied by all of their Honours, sitting as the Full Court, in a number of other judgments handed down on 8 November 2002; WACG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002] FCAFC 332; WAED v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 333; WAEI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 334 and WACH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 338. 38 I am bound to apply the construction of the second paragraph of Article 1D enunciated in those recent decisions of the Full Court. In the result, the last particular of error of law relied upon, depending as it does upon the contrary construction of the second limb of Article 1D must fail. The Applicant's Written Submission to the Tribunal 39 An affidavit filed by counsel for the applicant in these proceedings exhibited a transcript of portion of the proceedings before the Tribunal and a written submission which, the applicant told counsel he had prepared and addressed to the Tribunal. The applicant told counsel that he sent a copy of the submission to the Court because although he had forwarded the document to his migration agent about ten days before the Tribunal hearing it was evidently not sent to the Tribunal as it did not appear in the Court Book. Counsel said she had been unable to make contact with the migration agent who had acted for the applicant in the Tribunal proceedings. The question was whether the document was on the Tribunal's file and before the Tribunal. 40 At the end of the hearing I made a direction that: "The Australian Migration Program and Investments do inform the Court on Affidavit on or before 1 July 2002 whether a copy of any submission prepared by the Applicant and sent to them prior to the Tribunal hearing of his application was provided to the Tribunal." 41 An affidavit was sent to the Court on 28 June 2002 sworn by Florin Burhala, the migration agent who had prepared a typed thirteen page submission to the Tribunal on 12 July 2001. The migration agent said: "2. I cannot remember this file in particular given the time that has passed since handling this file. To the best of my knowledge, from reviewing the file, the applicant's hand written submission would have been attached to the typed submission and sent to the Tribunal and a copy to the client. 3. According to the mail book of AMPI Australian Migration Program and Investments this submission was sent to the Tribunal on the 17th July 2001. Annexed hereto and marked exhibit FB1 is a true copy of the AMPI mail book extract." The agent could not however remember sending the submission of the particular client with the typed submission but said, "… given the procedures in place at that time, which were followed very strictly I can say that it is very likely that the applicant's submission was sent together with the one prepared by me". 42 A copy of this affidavit was not seen by the Australian Government Solicitor's office until 4 October 2002. An affidavit was then sworn by Ms Ling, a solicitor employed by the Australian Government Solicitor. She was informed by her instructor from the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and believed that a search of the Refugee Review Tribunal file had been conducted and that her instructor had not been able to locate the applicant's hand written submissions. Ms Ling said she had also conducted a similar search of the Tribunal file with the same result. 43 On 10 October 2002, she faxed a copy of the submissions to the Tribunal and requested that a search be undertaken to ascertain whether they had been received by the Tribunal and if they were, the date they were received and whether they were provided to the Tribunal member prior to the making of the decision. On 11 October she was informed by a legal and litigation officer from the Tribunal that a search of the Tribunal files had not yielded a copy of the submissions. Moreover there was no record in the Tribunal's inward mail register book of the submissions having been received by the Tribunal. 44 It was submitted on behalf of the Minister, by way of supplementary submission, that the Court should find that the handwritten submissions were not received by the Tribunal. Counsel for the applicant, Ms Price noted that the affidavit of Mr Burhala was inconclusive on whether the handwritten submission was received by the migration agent and forwarded to the Tribunal. The applicant said he had sent it from Curtin Detention Centre to the migration agent about ten days before the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal hearing was on 17 August so this would have put the date of forwarding of the written submission at 7 August. The migration agent's typed submission was sent to the Tribunal on 17 July and received there on 19 July 2001. Counsel for the applicant accepted that evidently the applicant's handwritten submission despatched to the migration agent on or about 7 August 2001 had gone astray and did not find its way to the Tribunal either before or after the hearing and was not available for consideration by the Tribunal member at the time he made his decision. She accepted that as a result no question of reviewable error by the Tribunal would arise for determination by the Court in relation to the handwritten submission. 45 I agree that it appears that if the handwritten submission did not reach the Tribunal then it was the fault of either the applicant or the applicant's migration agent. In the event there is no reviewable error arising out of a failure to consider the handwritten submission. Conclusion 46 For the preceding reasons, the application will be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice French .

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms LB Price (pro bono)

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing: 10 June 2002 Last Supplementary Submissions: 24 October 2002