28 Much of Mr Ludeman's case depended on the assertion that, given the lengthy history of the restructure process and the permit applicant's diligence in assembling the land in accordance with the restructure plan, then there was a reasonable expectation that a permit to develop a house on each of the restructured lots would follow.
29 We disagree with this proposition. Notwithstanding the 1994 Panel member's reference to a "building right", the subsequent amendment to the planning scheme provided for a discretion, and for that discretion to be exercised having regard to certain specified guidelines. Clearly, compliance with those guidelines can only be assessed at the time the applications have been lodged. That assessment, in our opinion, constitutes the extent of the applicant's "reasonable expectations".
30 It needs to be borne firmly in mind that the Restructure Overlay was introduced 11 years ago. The public interest requires that planning decisions are made in accordance with current planning principles and knowledge. If Mr Ludeman's assertions are correct, then the erection of dwellings in the restructure area could have been made "as of right" at the time the amended controls were introduced into the planning scheme.
31 We also disagree with the proposition that the Restructure Overlay "supersedes" or "overrides" all other relevant planning scheme provisions. The underlying zoning of the review site and all surrounding land is Rural. Again this zone has its own guidelines and, the integrity of rural land is critical to both the State and national economies. We do not believe that notions based on "expectations" can be elevated to the exclusion of all other considerations.
32 That is not to say that the history of these applications can be disregarded. On the contrary, the restructure process, the Overlay and the diligence of the permit applicant in pursing its agenda are all highly relevant considerations, involving notions of "fairness". In the end result, the weight that should be given to what is essentially a "private" v "public" dichotomy is necessarily subjective.
33 It is timely to repeat the provisions of Clause 31.01-2 of the planning scheme in relation to Section 2 uses which, we believe, reinforces our previous comments:-