(b) the provision of an explanation directed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, after a sentence is handed down and an appeal is lodged, risks conveying an impression that the Judge, whose decision has been appealed, is seeking to justify or to support it.
[10] An important function of a Report under s 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act is to inform the Court of Criminal Appeal of any problems which might have emerged during the trial, which either do not appear on the face of the record, or which are imperfectly or ambiguously recorded.
[11] Another permissible and relevant function of such a Report is its use, by a trial Judge, to raise any matters of irregularity or otherwise, which may give cause for significant doubt in relation to a guilty verdict, and which again are not apparent upon a bare reading of the record.
[12] A third permissible reason for such a Report is its provision, in response to a specific request from the Court of Criminal Appeal, in relation to any matter which may be of concern to it.
[13] Otherwise, in times where there is in existence an adequate system for Court reporting, occasion for the provision of a s11 Report should only arise in exceptional circumstances. Its use in order to justify, or to explain a decision for which reasons should have been provided, is not such a circumstance."
26 It is no function of a report under s11 of the Criminal Appeal Act to provide a reconsideration of a sentence. The report by his Honour in this case does not appear to meet any of the purposes for which s11 was enacted and accordingly I propose to disregard it.
27 In relation to ground of appeal 1, I agree that the principles in Pearce do not appear to have been followed. What his Honour needed to do was to consider the objective criminality of each offence together with factors in aggravation and mitigation and to then pass an appropriate sentence in respect of each - R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17. Having done that it was necessary for his Honour to consider the principles of totality and proportionality in deciding to what extent the sentences should be concurrent or cumulative. It is not apparent that his Honour carried out his formulation of the sentences in that way. No reasons were offered as to why the sentences should be the same and as to why they should be concurrent.
28 I do not agree with the submission of the applicant that had his Honour applied the principles in Pearce the result would have been significantly more favourable to the applicant than the sentence which was ultimately passed. The two principal offences were both serious. Both provided for significant maximum periods of imprisonment. Both involved violence. Both were committed while the applicant was at conditional liberty. In respect of the second offence in point of time (use offensive weapon to avoid apprehension), it was a particularly aggravating factor that having freed himself from the victim and the tourist, the applicant sought to stab the victim before departing the location.
29 Although the two offences occurred within a short space of time, they were quite distinct and separate. They ought not be regarded as a single episode of criminality. Applying the principles in Pearce, in particular those of totality and proportionality, not only would it have been necessary for two sentences to have been passed, but those sentences would have had to have been at least partially cumulative.
30 In respect of ground of appeal 2, I agree that his Honour should have made it clear in relation to which of the two principal offences he proposed to take the Form 1 matter into account. This is normally done in respect of the more serious of the two offences. As with ground of appeal 1, if his Honour had followed this approach it would not have greatly assisted the applicant.
31 In accordance with Attorney-General's Application under s37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 (2002) 56 NSWLR 146 account was to be taken of the Form 1 matter by giving greater weight to the need for personal deterrence which the commission of the offence indicated and by giving greater weight to "the community's entitlement to exact retribution for serious offences where there are other offences for which no punishment has in fact been imposed" (at [42]). The offence on the Form 1 was itself a serious one given the vulnerability of the victim.
32 Had his Honour properly applied the principles in Pearce, including some accumulation between the two sentences and had his Honour properly taken into account the Form 1 matter in respect of one of those sentences, the position of the applicant would not have been greatly improved. It would usually lead to some increase in the sentence for the offence to which the Form 1 matter was attached so as to have regard to the matters referred to in the Attorney-General's case.
33 I do not agree that the total effect of the sentences passed by his Honour was to produce a sentence that was manifestly excessive. Nevertheless, there is some force in the submission of the applicant that each sentence taken individually is manifestly excessive. If one assumes a 25% discount for an early plea of guilty, each sentence had a start point in the order of 8 years. Despite the fact that the applicant's poor record was "a manifestation of continuing disobedience of the law" and that "retribution, deterrence and protection of society may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted" (Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, such a start point for each sentence is outside the range of sentences appropriate for such offences..
34 Because of the errors identified above, I am of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to have sentences passed on him according to law and therefore needs to be re-sentenced.
35 In respect of count 1, taking into account the Form 1 matter, the sentence I propose is a non-parole period of imprisonment of 2 years with a balance of sentence of 2 years. In respect of the offence in count 2, involving the possession of the knife with intent to prevent lawful apprehension, I propose a sentence of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years with a balance of term of 2 years, such sentence to be partially concurrent and partially cumulative upon that passed in respect of count 1. The effect of the re-sentencing is a non-parole period of imprisonment of 2 years and 6 months with a parole period of 2 years.
36 The orders which I propose are: