von Arnim v Federal Republic of Germany
[2005] FCA 662
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2005-06-03
Before
Finkelstein J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (9 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 On 1 September 1994 the Local Court in Stuttgart issued a warrant for the arrest of the applicant, Dr von Arnim, a medical practitioner, who was then living in the Philippines. It was alleged that Dr von Arnim had committed in aggregate 53 offences of fraud, attempted fraud and falsification of documents. The alleged offences were, in the case of fraud, against s 263 of the German Penal Code, in the case of attempted fraud against s 263 in combination with ss 22 and 23 of the Penal Code and in the case of falsification of documents against s 267 in combination with s 52 of the Penal Code. On application by Dr von Arnim to the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart the falsification of documents charges in the warrant were "revoked" on 29 September 1994. 2 In a note dated 20 February 1996 (the authenticity of which is challenged by the applicant) the German Embassy requested the extradition of Dr von Arnim. Following the delivery of the request, Germany obtained under s 12 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) a provisional warrant for the arrest of Dr von Arnim. The Attorney-General was notified immediately that the magistrate had issued the warrant. On 21 December 1998 Dr von Arnim was arrested on the authority of the warrant. Then on 10 May 1999 a magistrate determined under s 19 that Dr von Arnim was eligible for surrender to Germany. He was kept in prison for 2˝ years. On 11 July 2001 the German Embassy informed the Attorney-General's department that the German warrant of arrest against Dr von Arnim had been dismissed by the Stuttgart District Court. This brought the extradition request to an end requiring Dr von Arnim's release from prison. He was released on 12 July 2001. 3 In this proceeding Dr von Arnim contends that he was not liable to be extradited to Germany and that his arrest and imprisonment were wrongful. He contends that the Commonwealth and the Minister for Justice and Customs (whom it is alleged procured Dr von Arnim's imprisonment) are liable in damages for the tort of false imprisonment. The principal, but not the sole, basis for this claim is that Germany had not made a valid request for Dr von Arnim's extradition because the German arrest warrant had been revoked. There are also independent claims in negligence. It is alleged that the Commonwealth and the Minister were under a duty to determine whether Dr von Arnim was liable to be extradited and, in breach of that duty, failed to determine that he was not so liable. It is also alleged that both the Minister and the Commonwealth were under a duty to take the steps required by the Extradition Act with due diligence and that they failed in that duty. As a result, Dr von Arnim claims that he was unnecessarily imprisoned for two and a half years and that his health suffered as a result. He claims damages for personal injury. 4 With regard to the false imprisonment claim it is important to note that Dr von Arnim was arrested and imprisoned as a result of the execution of the two warrants issued by a magistrate. The first was the provisional arrest warrant issued under s 12 of the Extradition Act. The second was the surrender warrant issued under s 19(9) of the same Act following the Minister's determination under s 19(1) that Dr von Arnim was eligible for surrender to Germany. Each warrant appeared on its face to have been regularly issued. Moreover, neither warrant has been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, although Dr von Arnim made an application under s 21 of the Extradition Act to review the magistrate's decision: von Arnim v Federal Republic of Germany (1999) 107 A Crim R 529. 5 Notwithstanding the foregoing, this case has been argued on two potentially false assumptions. The first assumption is that it is permissible in this proceeding (a civil proceeding) to collaterally challenge the validity (and perhaps the legal effect) of the two warrants and, if the challenge be successful, to allege as unlawful what would otherwise be the lawful imprisonment of Dr von Arnim. It is sometimes possible to challenge an administrative decision in proceedings other than for judicial review: R v Wicks [1998] AC 92, 117; Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, 164. It does not automatically follow, however, that an administrative decision that is wrong in law is of no effect in the absence of an order that the decision be set aside: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, 616. In particular, it is by no means clear that a warrant which on its face appears to have been regularly issued can be disregarded. Indeed, the few cases I have looked at on this issue suggest that the opposite is likely to be true: Posner v Collector for Inter-State Destitute Persons (Victoria) (1946) 74 CLR 461, 483; Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285, 288; R v Oldham Justices; Ex parte Cawley [1997] QB 1, 13. 6 The second assumption upon which this case has proceeded is that if Dr von Arnim is able to show that the two warrants should not have been issued, that will make good his claim that his imprisonment was unlawful. This assumption is probably false. According to the authorities there can be no action for false imprisonment if the imprisonment is in execution of an order which appears to have been regularly made by a judicial officer, even if the order is without jurisdiction: City of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239, 263; Ward v Murphy (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 85, 97. See also Andrew v Marris (1841) 1 QB 3, 16 per Lord Denman CJ: ("There would therefore be something very unreasonable in the law if it placed him in the position of being punishable by the court for disobedience, and at the same time suable by the party for obedience to the warrant"). The proper remedy in that situation is an action for malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of legal process: Lock v Ashton (1848) 12 QB 871, 876-877 [116 ER 1097, 1099]; Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534, 540; Mock Sing v Dat (1902) 2 SR(NSW) 333, 340; Posner v Collector for Inter-State Destitute Persons (Victoria) (1946) 74 CLR 461, 476. 7 The attack on the warrants arises in the following way. By reg 4 of the Extradition (Federal Republic of Germany) Regulations 1990, Germany is declared to be an "extradition country" for the purposes of the Extradition Act and by reg 5 the Extradition Act "applies in relation to [Germany] subject to the Treaty between Australia and [Germany] concerning Extradition done at Bonn on 14 April 1987". Several articles in the Treaty should be noted. Article 9(1) provides that a request for extradition "shall be in writing". Article 9(2) states that the request shall be accompanied by certain information, including a copy of the relevant provisions of the statute or a statement of the relevant law (if any) creating the extraditable offence as well as with "a statement of the punishment that can be imposed". 8 The magistrate who issued the provisional warrant for Dr von Arnim's arrest had to be satisfied that Dr von Arnim was an "extraditable person": s 12(1)(b). The definition of an "extraditable person" is found in s 6. One requirement is that there is in force at the time of the application for the provisional arrest warrant "a warrant … for the arrest of [the] person in relation to an offence or offences against the law of a country that the person is accused of having committed": s 6(a)(i). Dr von Arnim contends that this requirement was not satisfied and, as a result, the process that was put in train was unlawful. 9 According to Dr von Arnim the requirement was not satisfied because there was no warrant for his arrest in Germany. It is not in dispute that in September 1994 the Stuttgart Local Court had issued a warrant for his arrest in relation to 15 charges of fraudulent representation, 34 charges of attempting fraudulent representation and 4 charges of fabricating false documents. Nor is it in dispute that on 29 December 1994 the Higher Regional Court "revoked" the arrest warrant in relation to one of the falsification charges. Dr von Arnim contends that as a result of the revocation order, the original arrest warrant no longer remained in force. It is on this basis that Dr von Arnim contends that he did not meet the criteria of being an "extraditable person". 10 Even if the submission about the German warrant is correct, it is not clear how it assists Dr von Arnim's case. According to s 12(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, a magistrate is entitled to issue a provisional arrest warrant if "the magistrate is satisfied, on the basis of information given by affidavit, that the person [the subject of the application] is an extraditable person …". That is to say, the power to issue a provisional warrant is dependent on the Magistrate being "satisfied" that the requested person is an "extraditable person" and not on the fact of the requested person being an "extraditable person". Decisions as to "satisfaction" can only be challenged on limited grounds. For example, the decision may be challenged if the magistrate has misdirected himself in law, has failed to consider relevant matters, has taken into account irrelevant matters or if his decision is irrational: Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, 118-119. No attempt has been made to attack the magistrate's decision on any of these grounds. 11 There is, in any event, no substance to Dr von Arnim's claim that the Local Court warrant had been revoked. To make good this point, which is wholly dependent upon the content of German law, requires expert evidence on German law regarding this topic. During the hearing I pointed out that in the absence of such evidence, Dr von Arnim would not be able to substantiate his assertion. Nevertheless, some documents (including a certified translation of the decision of the Higher Regional Court) were tendered without objection and I have been asked to rule on the issue. What the evidence shows is that Dr von Arnim had lodged an appeal with the Higher Regional Court in relation to the charges laid against him. On 29 December 1994 that complaint was upheld in part by the revocation of one charge relating to the falsification of a document; the falsification charge was "revoked" because the Higher Regional Court was of the view that the elements of the offence could not be made out. In respect of the other changes, the Higher Regional Court dismissed the appeal. There is nothing in the decision of the Higher Regional Court which supports the argument that the arrest warrant ceased to have effect. Indeed the final paragraph of the court's decision states that "[w]ith regard to the reason for arrest, the same continues to apply as was stated in the order of the Criminal Division dated 9th December 1994." To the extent that I am required to apply local law to resolve this issue (as to which see The Parchim [1918] AC 157, 161 where the Privy Council said that "unless the contrary be proved the general law of a foreign country is the same as the English Law") there is no local rule that supports Dr von Arnim's case. 12 The next attack arises in the following way. The steps that lead to the issue of a warrant under s 19 are these. First, the Attorney-General must receive a request in writing from an extradition country for the surrender of a person to that country: see s 16(1) and the definition of "extradition request" in s 5. Second, the Attorney-General must form the opinion that (1) the requested person is an "extraditable person" in relation to the extradition country and (2) if the conduct of the person constituting the extradition offence had taken place in Australia, it would have constituted an extradition offence. The Attorney-General must also be satisfied that there is no "extradition objection" in relation to the extradition offence to which surrender is sought: s 16(2). Third, the Attorney-General must give notice to the magistrate that the extradition request has been received: s 16(1). Fourth, a magistrate must resolve any dispute as to whether the person is eligible for surrender: s 19(1). A person is only eligible for surrender if the conditions in s 19(2) are satisfied. Fifth, if the magistrate determines that the person is eligible for surrender, the magistrate must "by warrant in the statutory form, order that the [requested] person be committed to prison to await surrender … or release" pursuant to an order under sub-section 22(5): s 19(9)(a). Section 22 requires the Attorney-General, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the person becomes an "eligible person", to determine whether the person is to be surrendered. If for any reason the Attorney-General decides that the person should not be surrendered, s 22(5) provides that the Attorney-General must order the release of the person. 13 Dr von Arnim says that the first step in this process did not occur. He contends that the Attorney-General did not receive a request for his surrender from Germany. Consequently, he says that (1) the Attorney-General could not give a notice under s 16 and (2) there was no legal basis for an enquiry before a magistrate to determine whether he was eligible for surrender. 14 Dr von Arnim developed this argument in the following way. He concedes that the Attorney-General received what appeared to be an extradition request from Germany. However, he calls into question the authenticity of the document and, more importantly, challenges the document on the basis that it does not constitute a valid extradition request for the purposes of either the Extradition Act or the Treaty between Australia and Germany. 15 I am bound to say that the challenge to the authenticity of the request is nothing short of hopeless. I suppose the argument was in some way encouraged by the fact that the Commonwealth was unable to produce the original request until midway through the trial; it was still however a bold argument to say the least. In any event, as soon as the original was produced Dr von Arnim made no attempt to establish that it was either a forgery or written by a person who lacked the requisite authority. 16 The main attack on the validity of the request was that in order for it to be valid it should have been under seal. Apart from mere assertion, no authority was cited for this proposition. In my view it has no foundation. In the first place the only requirement as to form imposed by the Extradition Act and the Treaty is that the request be in writing. I do not understand this requirement to carry the further obligation that the request be signed or sealed. Second, according to Lord Gore Booth (ed) Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (5th ed, 1979) official communications between representatives of States need not be signed. Such communications have various component parts, the last being a "la courtoisie" or a complimentary phrase: Satow's Guide at [7.11]. The concluding paragraph of the request for Dr von Arnim's extradition reads: "The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade the assurances of its highest consideration." Satow's Guide (at [7.13]) says that with this style of conclusion, "a signature is unnecessary". 17 In any event beneath the concluding paragraph appear in manuscript the letters "L.S.". There is little doubt that this is the abbreviation for "locus sigilli" - the place of the seal. According to the Director of the Administrative and Domestic Law Group in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Germany on occasion uses the letters "L.S." in diplomatic notes in place of a seal or stamp. So, if a seal were necessary for the request to be valid, the seal was probably supplied. Finally, there is the evidence of several officers from both the Attorney-General's Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that it was appropriate and reasonable for the request in the form it was received to be treated as valid. All of these factors lead to the indisputable conclusion that Germany had made a valid request for the extradition of Dr von Arnim and that the Australian authorities were required to deal with it. 18 The next point that Dr von Arnim makes is concerned with the documents that accompanied the formal request for extradition. It will be recalled that according to Art 9 of the Treaty the request must be accompanied by "a statement of the relevant law [under which the requested person was charged] and … a statement of the punishment that can be imposed". Dr von Arnim contends that a full statement of the punishment he faced in Germany was not provided to the Australian government. As a result he says that the extradition process was flawed and the warrants illegal. 19 The two documents that accompanied the request were the German warrant of arrest and a document from the Public Prosecutor of Stuttgart which certifies Dr von Arnim's identity and describes the offences for which his extradition was sought. These documents provided the details of the particular provisions said to have been contravened by Dr von Arnim, as well as the penalty that could be imposed for those contraventions. The warrant details the charges, identifies and quotes the sections of the German Penal Code said to have been contravened and describes the applicable penalty, which in each case is "a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or to a fine". The certificate states that the extradition of Dr von Arnim is sought in respect of all the charges contained in the warrant apart from the falsification charges which had been "revoked" by the Higher Regional Court. The certificate by reference to specific sections provides an explanation of how punishment is imposed for contraventions or attempted contraventions of the Penal Code. It also explains how "compound punishment" is meted out. Compound punishment deals with the situation where penalties are imposed for related offences. 20 Dr von Arnim does not suggest that the information in these documents fails to satisfy the requirements of the Treaty. The problem comes about because another document, dated 4 November 1999 (which also emanates from the Public Prosecutor's office) provides further information about the penalties that Dr von Arnim faced. This document is addressed to the Regional Court in Stuttgart. It states that in respect of several identified charges "representing aggravated instances, on the basis of which [Dr von Arnim] is to be prohibited from practising his profession as [a] general practitioner". Later the following appears: "According to the charge, the accused is answerable before the Court in relation to 16 offences of fraud and 32 offences of attempted fraud pursuant to Section 263 para 1, para 2, 22, 23, para 1.53 "StGB", with four cases representing aggravated cases of fraud (cases 45-48). The severity of these latter cases is caused by the amount of pecuniary benefit that the accused obtained or attempted to obtain as well as by the sophistication, and even professionalism, of his fraudulent acts by using falsified facsimiles and photocopies, which however do not constitute the offence of falsification of documents. The prerequisites for prohibiting the accused from practising his profession are given pursuant to Section 70 "StGB"." 21 As I have already said in another context, no attempt was made to prove the contents of German law. Nevertheless I was provided with a copy of the German Penal Code as in force in November 1998 and it was not suggested that I should ignore it. Having read the Code, s 70 appears to be the only relevant provision. It provides: "If someone is convicted of an unlawful act, which he committed in abuse of his profession or trade or in gross violation of the duties associated therewith, … then the court may prohibit him from engaging in the profession … for a period of from one year to five years … The order of prohibition of engagement in a profession may be permanent if it can be expected that the statutory maximum term will not suffice to avert the danger posed by the perpetrator." 22 The charges that were laid against Dr von Arnim arose out of his dealings with his patients. In effect it was alleged that he billed his clients excessive amounts, and that he sometimes made claims for services that he did not perform. The fraud charges were laid when his patients paid the bill. The attempt charges were laid when the fraud was discovered before payment. In these circumstances it seems that the original specification of the penalties was incomplete. There was at least the possibility that Dr von Arnim would be dealt with more severely than the warrant and the Public Prosecutor's certificate suggested. The question is what follows from that incompleteness. 23 According to Dr von Arnim two things follow. First he says that he was at risk of being charged with an offence other than the offence for which extradition was sought. I will explain the significance of this. It is universally accepted that, subject to limited exceptions, a fugitive should not be surrendered if he is to be tried for an offence other than an offence for which his extradition is sought. So, before extradition is ordered the requesting country's adherence to the principal, usually referred to as the speciality rule, must be established. Often it is established by the requesting country providing a speciality assurance. It may be established in other ways. In Australia the matter is dealt with by ss 22(1)(d)(ii) and 22(3)(d) of the Extradition Act. I think the point that Dr von Arnim makes is that even if, as a result of the operation of s 22(3)(d), Germany is taken to have given a speciality assurance, the inference to be drawn is that Germany would not honour the assurance. 24 It is, I think, apparent that this argument proceeds upon a false premise. If punishment were to be imposed under s 70 of the German Penal Code it would be punishment for offences in respect of which Dr von Arnim's extradition was sought. Put another way, s 70 would come into operation upon Dr von Arnim's conviction for one of the surrender offences. It is the seriousness of the offence that would bring the section into play. That possibility does not attract the speciality rule which is confined in its operation to ensuring no new charges are laid against an extradited person. 25 Dr von Arnim's second submission is that the extradition request is invalid if the information that is required by the Treaty is not provided by the extraditing country. No case was cited in support of this proposition and I must say that if I were to accept it, it would lead to substantial difficulties between Australia and the States with which it has extradition treaties. Be that as it may, I do not accept that upon a proper construction of the Treaty the provision of insufficient information under Art 9 will invalidate an extradition request. For present purposes it may be accepted, though it may not be correct, that certain kinds of information are so critical to an extradition request that their absence could lead to the conclusion that there has been no request. For instance, if the fugitive is not identified in the extradition request it is difficult to see how there could be a request for the extradition of a person. It does not follow, however, that the request will be invalid if there is a deficiency in the information that is provided about potential penalties. First, the Treaty does not say that this will be the result. Second, Art 11(1) should be noted. This article provides that "[i]f the Requested State considers that the information furnished in support of the request for the extradition of a person claimed is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of its law with respect to extradition, that State may request that additional information be furnished within such time as that State specifies". This suggests that incomplete information by reference to local laws dealing with extradition does not lead to the invalidity of the request. It is but a short step to conclude that incompleteness measured against the requirements of the Treaty itself will not result in invalidity. To the contrary, when incomplete information has been provided it is implicit that the requested State need not act on the extradition request until the omitted information has been provided. That is a far cry from holding that incomplete information results in the invalidity of the request itself. 26 There is yet another basis upon which Dr von Arnim rests his claim that his imprisonment was unlawful. Section 22(2) provides that the Attorney-General must "as soon as is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances, after a person becomes an eligible person, determine whether the person is to be surrendered". The expression "eligible person" is defined in s 22(1) to mean for present purposes a person who has been committed to prison by a magistrate under s 19(9). Dr von Arnim says that the lawfulness of his detention under the warrant issued under s 19(9)(a) was subject to a limitation that the Attorney-General was required "as soon as it is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances" to determine whether he should be surrendered. He argues that this requirement was breached because the Attorney-General did not make her determination as soon as was reasonably practicable and that consequently his detention became unlawful. 27 There are two answers to this submission. The first is that even if the Attorney-General failed to act with due expedition, the warrant issued under s 19(9) did not cease to have effect. A warrant issued under the section continues in force until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction (for example on an application to review the magistrate's order under s 21) or the warrant is spent following the extradition of the requested person or an order made by the Attorney-General under s 22(5). The remedy for a failure by the Attorney-General to act with due expedition is mandamus. 28 More importantly, however, and this is the second answer to the submission, while consideration of Dr von Arnim's position had gone on for some fourteen months, the cause of the delay rests solely with Dr von Arnim. During the period, Dr von Arnim's solicitor engaged in voluminous correspondence with the Attorney-General's Department in a sustained attempt to ensure that her client was not extradited to Germany. As things turned out she was successful in her endeavours. But her client remained in prison because no decision on his extradition could be made. The reason is this. The solicitor put forward numerous reasons why Dr von Arnim should not be extradited. There were assertions that the extradition process was flawed, questions about the nature and status of legal proceedings involving Dr von Arnim in Germany and whether they will effect Germany's request for extradition, the health of her client, the difficulties faced by Dr von Arnim's wife in gaining German residency, whether the German authorities would provide a doctor to accompany Dr von Arnim to Germany if he were extradited and so on and so forth. Each reason had to be considered. This process was made all the more difficult because Dr von Arnim's solicitor provided inaccurate translations of German documents. On many occasions enquiries had to be made of the German authorities. This all took time. I have prepared a chronology setting out the communications which will appear in an appendix to these reasons. The chronology shows that there was no unreasonable delay in the consideration of Dr von Arnim's eligibility for surrender. It may be true that the consideration of his case took more time than usual. That was the result of the many points raised by Dr von Arnim through his solicitor. 29 The findings made thus far should dispose of the case in the respondents' favour. Nevertheless I am concerned that there may be an outstanding issue, or an outstanding cause of action, which has not been dealt with or not been disposed of by my findings. My uncertainty arises from the complexity of the Statement of Claim and Dr von Arnim's submissions, which, in no small measure, depart from the pleadings. I will leave it to Dr von Arnim's counsel to raise any outstanding issues before I pronounce final orders. I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finkelstein.