Conclusion and findings
32Having regard to the evidence and particularly the site view, I agree that the loss of the casuarina tree has resulted in adverse amenity impacts to all of the adjoining neighbouring properties and that there is a need to replace that loss as quickly as possible. Accordingly, I accept the evidence of Mr Paroissien that two trees, 400 litres and at least 3.8m in height should be planted in the locations recommended.
33The issue of the legality of the tree removal is not relevant to these proceedings. My decision must focus on the modification application as lodged.
34It is clear that the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the Act) contemplates the determination of a development application involving works that have been carried out in breach of that Act. Section 124 provides for that to occur. This is made clear by Jago J in Sahade v The Owners - Strata plan No. 62022 & Ors [2006] NSWLEC 770 where her Honour states:
10 In my view, s 124(3) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 is an important provision disclosing part of the legislative scheme that underlies the statute. That is, there is a clear intention disclosed by s 124(3) that, where the relevant breach of this Act is the carrying out of development without development consent, in circumstances where development consent can be obtained for the development, there should be an opportunity for prospective respondents to proceedings or actual respondents to proceedings to make application to adjourn proceedings to enable a development application to be made and determined under Pt 4. I consider that s 124(3) has an important role to play in achieving the objects of the Act, as set out in s 5, because it is through a process of assessment and determination of a development application that all relevant matters under s 79C of the Act can be weighed, assessed and determined.
35The path described in Sahade is similar to the path the applicant has taken in these proceedings, however has lodged an application to modify the consent rather than a fresh development application. I do not consider that this distinguishes the decision of Her Honour. I also have regard to the fact that the council has also commenced proceedings under Class 5 of the LECAct. In this case, it is important to consider the merits of the application and not consider the legal implications of that work having been undertaken. That is a matter for another day and is made clear by Bignold J in Taipan Holdings Pty Ltd V Sutherland Shire Council [1999] NSWLEC 276 where his Honour at [115 to 117] states:
115. The contrasting decision of the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court in Kouflidis v City of Salisbury (1982) 29 SASR 321, (decided 20 years later) was next noted, with citation of an extended passage from the judgment of King CJ at 323-324. I do not here repeat that passage, it perhaps being sufficient to extract from it the following three brief sentences (which encapsulate the relevant line of reasoning):
Although an applicant for consent should derive no advantage, direct or indirect, from the unlawful use, I do not think that it should be an impediment to the consideration of his application on its planning merits. If on the merits a planning consent should be given, it is desirable in the public interest that it should be given irrespective of the past conduct of the applicant. It is desirable that the position should be regularised leaving the past unlawful conduct to be punished by penal sanctions.
116. In Ireland I noted (at par 87) that the approach taken in Kouflidis has been consistently applied in this Court in the exercise of its comprehensive appellate jurisdiction embracing (i) planning appeals, (ii) building appeals, (iii) demolition order appeals and (iv) building certificate appeals (being a comprehensive jurisdiction that was never vested in the former Land and Valuation Court, and its absence may go far in explaining the decision in Ellmoos).
117. I adhere to the views expressed in Ireland, noting that I did not understand the Council in the present proceedings to question those views.
36I am not satisfied, from the available evidence that the casuarina tree would have provided the level of privacy protection to No 14 said to be provided by the proposed privacy screen. It is apparent that any protection would be filtered views at best. The same effect can be obtained through replacement planting. The council approved the upper floor balcony in the approximate location that it now exists. No privacy screens were considered necessary to protect the overlooking from that balcony to the two private open space areas of the immediately adjoining properties on either side of the site at the time the application was determined. Those areas are in much closer proximity than the open space areas within No 14. Ms Drinan says that the privacy concerns are primarily in relation to the views into No 14 as those views are direct views whereas the views to the adjoining properties are oblique views and are not available from within the bedroom. I do not agree, the site view confirms that both yards can be observed from the balcony.
37Similarly, the council did not require any privacy screen to be installed on the upper floor balcony to the rear of the property adjoining the site to its north. That balcony would also overlook premises to the rear and would have similar views into the yards of adjoining properties as that available from the subject balcony including the subject site. I am satisfied that the 24m separation distance, when considered with the fact that the view is obtained from a small balcony off a bedroom, is adequate provision in relation to privacy and satisfies the objectives and performance criteria contained within the LEP and DCP and reflects similar decisions made by the council for similar developments adjacent to the site. A separation distance of 24m far exceeds accepted good planning practice for development within low density residential areas.
38For that reason, I do not consider that the provision of a privacy screen in these circumstances is necessary, acknowledging that there will be some overlooking to adjoining properties including No 14 however those impacts are from a balcony that complies with the council's planning controls, that balcony is narrow and off a bedroom as acknowledged in the DCP as being not as significant a concern. The planting required as detailed in [32] will mitigate those impacts and is an important element of my findings, particularly in terms of amenity that was available within the locality.
39Mr Johnson, for the council, submits that it is necessary to impose a restriction to user on the title to ensure the trees are protected and maintained during the life of the development. That is because the trees could be removed under the provisions of SEPPECDC in the event that a complying development application for a shed or similar outbuilding including tree removal was proposed within the area in which the trees are required. He makes reference to the need for the applicant to prepare other similar restriction-to-user provisions on title in relation to the rainwater re-use system (condition 30) so says the matter can be dealt with at the same time and therefore not result in any additional imposition or costs.
40Mr Johnson acknowledges that in the ordinary course of imposing planning controls, a positive covenant would not be necessary to protect a tree from removal however, what is proposed here is a positive covenant to maintain the trees and replace them if they die, which requires positive action from the owner from time to time. This does not duplicate the restrictions on removal of a tree which are commonly known and understood by the public. It is an obligation not often imposed on a single domestic dwelling and requires positive steps of dealing with pests for example.
41Dr Berverling, for the applicant, says the restriction is unnecessary and contrary to the practice of the Court in a number of cases cited including MacDonald v Mosman Municipal Council [1999] NSWLEC 215. He submits the consent conditions are sufficient to ensure the retention of the tree, particularly if condition 44C was amended to require the maintenance and retention of the tree for the life of the development.
42I distinguish this case from the guidance of Lloyd C in MacDonald and agree, that under other environmental planning instruments, there is a real possibility that the trees required could be removed without the need for development consent from the council. Accordingly, the condition for the restriction to user should be imposed to ensure the development satisfies the objectives of the zone, in particular to maintain and enhance residential amenity, including.....landscape quality.
43The Orders of the Court are:
(1)The appeal is upheld in part.
(2)Development Consent DA-2010/245 is modified by amending the conditions in accordance with Annexure A.
(3)The exhibits, other than Exhibits A, B, C and 2, can be returned.
Sue Morris
Commissioner of the Court
ANNEXURE A
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 22 April 2013