CONTRACT
The applicants' case in contract generally
196 In order to succeed in the case in contract, the applicants must establish that the parties intended to make a binding agreement to the effect of one of those pleaded. In my opinion, the applicants have failed to do so.
197 I will turn later to the particular contracts alleged. In the meanwhile, I will make some general observations touching all of them.
198 First, Fraser's understanding was that the reaching of an agreement as to his fee as project architect was a pre-requisite to his being engaged as such. He made many concessions to this effect in the witness box, including the following:
"…Now Mr Fraser, you agree with me there was a risk Wedderlight-
Delmo would not accept your fee proposal?---Oh yes.
You agree with me there was a risk that if that happened they would
have to appoint another architect---Yes.
You knew that they were risks that you had been running since
November or December 1991 right up until September 1993?---As on
any other project.
In addition to that, there were risks that Wedderlight-Delmo might not
actually get permission to develop the Finger Wharf---Yes, that was
clearly discussed at the start too."
199 In this passage, Fraser accepted that there were two conditions precedent to his being project architect: success of W-D's tender and the reaching of agreement on his fee as project architect.
200 Second, Fraser knew or should have known from as early as February 1992 that W-D would not reach agreement on his or anyone else's fees as project architect until it obtained finance and knew the amount available to pay him.
201 Third, it is inherently unlikely in the case of a project of the size, complexity, duration and cost of the Project that a developer would intend to be bound at the early stage claimed by the applicants, to contractual terms of such a general nature as those on which they rely. No estimate of his fees as project architect was provided by Fraser to W-D until 29 March 1993, some sixteen months after the original contract is said to have been made. It is inherently unlikely that a developer would, at such an early stage, commit itself contractually, even to an architect of such high repute as Fraser, to pay his "usual" fee or a "reasonable" fee on such an unusual project.
202 Fourth, Fraser understood that he was not bound contractually to W-D. A telling passage is the following from Fraser's cross-examination:
"You also knew that there was a risk that if your proposed fee for the entire project given at a later date was not acceptable to Wedderlight & Delmo then they could engage another architect?---Oh, yes, you - that could work both ways, yes, that always is there." (emphasis supplied)
In my view, Fraser did not intend to be contractually bound until the amount of his fee was agreed to.
203 Fifth, after submitting his first fee proposal on 29 March 1993, Fraser recorded in numerous documents his understanding that he lacked an engagement by W-D. I will note some examples. On 14 April 1993, he recorded in his diary:
"how can [Shipton] expect anyone to proceed without even a sign of our engagement?"
204 On 27 April, Fraser wrote to W-D requesting immediate confirmation of his engagement as project architect. On 29 April, he wrote to W-D stating that before he undertook extra work he wanted a "clear understanding" from W-D about his "position on the project", and requesting a firm letter of engagement to make his position clear. On 7 May, he wrote to W-D, stating that if Sharpe's proposal as to a fee of 4.5 per cent was serious:
"I would have to believe that my engagement as your Architect is not going to continue beyond the schematic design stage now reached."
205 On 4 June, Fraser threatened that unless W-D immediately appointed him as project architect, he would not attend the then forthcoming meeting with Clover Moore. (His diary records Shipton as saying that W-D was not in a position to appoint consultants and records Fraser as saying that he understood this and wanted only a verbal indication.) On 10 June, Fraser wrote to W-D advising:
"What I have asked is your verbal assurance that if the project proceeds, that I will be your architect."
206 On 23 June, Fraser concluded his letter to W-D setting out his fee proposal by stating that he trusted that the clarifications in the letter would "allow us to reach agreement on my position".
207 (W-D also relies on Fraser's letter of 27 September 1993 in which he stated that he had been willing to "punt" his services, but, as noted earlier, I am not persuaded to accept that the reference to "punting" in this letter was a reference to anything more than the risk that W‑D would not be the successful tenderer.)
208 It can be suggested of all this evidence that Fraser was merely seeking confirmation of what he understood to be an existing contractual arrangement arising from conduct and the spoken word, or that he was seeking agreement merely as to the amount of that "usual" or "reasonable" fee to which an existing contract between the parties referred. But I think that the preferable view is that Fraser was seeking initial appointment in a situation in which he understood that he was at risk because he had no more than an expectation of appointment.
209 Sixth, in April 1993, Fraser recognised that he was at liberty, if W-D did not accept his fee proposal, to withdraw, that is, not to be project architect. He said so on 14 and 20 April 1993. It may be suggested that what he meant was that he was entitled to withdraw in response to a wrongful repudiation by W-D of an existing contract. This is an arguable view but it perhaps highlights the difficulty of readily accepting that W-D had committed itself to agree to pay Fraser's "usual" fee or a "reasonable" fee within the relevant RAIA band nominated by Fraser.
210 Seventh, I accept the evidence of David Burton Martin ("Martin"), the respondents' expert architect, that in the period 1991 to 1993 there was a recession in property development in Sydney; that there was keen competition between architects in Sydney for retainers of the kind in question here; that developers and architects negotiated over fees; that the chief concern of developers was the lump sum payable, as distinct from how an architect arrived at it or allocated it as between the various stages of architectural work; and that the scales set out in the RAIA Fee Guide had ceased to be a standard to which architects looked and which influenced the amounts charged by them. The approach taken by W-D in the present case is consistent with this evidence. Against this background, it is unlikely that W-D would have intended to contract to pay a "usual" fee or a "reasonable" fee and it would be unreasonable, in the absence of clear evidence, to find that it intended to do so.
The first contract - November 1991 to 10 February 1992
The principal claim in contract advanced by the applicants is based on an agreement said to have been concluded between Fraser on the one hand and Shipton and Vega as individuals on the other in December 1991, by which, subject to their obtaining the right to undertake the Project, Shipton and Vega retained Fraser or VFA as project architect for the Project at a reasonable fee. It is said to have been an implied term of the contract that Shipton and Vega "would do all things reasonably necessary to bring about agreement on Fraser's fee" and would negotiate in good faith with Fraser to reach agreement with him. According to the applicants' submissions, it was an express oral term (not pleaded) of the contract that the fee was to be determined according to certain criteria; that it would not exceed the "scale" published by the RAIA; that it would be expressed as a percentage of construction cost; and that it would involve a low initial payment which would cover only Fraser's costs and overheads, and that the full fee would be paid when the project was won. The applicants submit that that there was a novation on 10 February 1992, when W-D was substituted for Shipton and Vega as the client.
211 For their part, the respondents submit that Fraser was engaged to perform architectural services under two contracts. The first was a contract constituted by an offer by Fraser contained in a letter dated 21 January 1992 and accepted by a letter from Shipton dated 22 January 1992. (Although the letter of acceptance was signed by Shipton alone and was on the letterhead of the "WJ Shipton Group", it referred to a meeting between Fraser on the one hand and Shipton and Vegaon the other and said "[w]e accept your fee proposal".) Fraser's letter had identified particular drawings which he undertook to prepare within approximately six weeks for a fee of $70,000.
212 Fraser claims that the first contract, at least prior to any variation of it and prior to the novation on 10 February 1992, was made at meetings between himself, Shipton and Vega on Thursday 12, Friday 13 and Tuesday 17 December 1991. I recounted the parties' evidence in this respect earlier.
213 The propounded first contract involved, relevantly, three elements: that Fraser or VFA was to be project architect for the Project; that the project architect's fees would be the amount "usually" charged by Fraser or alternatively "reasonable" in amount; and that Shipton and Vega or their company (in the event W-D) would negotiate in good faith with Fraser or VFA, as the case might be, to fix the amount.
214 In my view, the background facts make it improbable that Fraser on the one hand, and Shipton and Vega on the other, would have intended at the time to make binding mutual commitments to such an effect. I have earlier referred to the background facts in general. In November 1991 - January 1992, in particular, the Project was an unidentified redevelopment of the old and derelict timber Finger Wharf. This would inevitably be a large, complex, lengthy, costly and politically sensitive undertaking.
215 The Project was "special" and, depending on how precisely it is defined, "unique". Shipton and Vega would be most unlikely to agree to pay Fraser's "usual" fee for such a project, whatever that notion may signify in the present context. The precise nature of the redevelopment, and therefore of the architectural services required, was unknown. Very different views might reasonably be held as to what was "reasonable" remuneration for a project architect on such a project. Different views might be held, for example, as to the extent of architectural involvement in different elements of the Project. Indeed, this was a feature of the present case: Fraser would apply the one rate (he would not come below 5.42 per cent) to all parts of the Project cost, while Peddle Thorp applied 1 per cent to the piling and FF & E elements and 4.8 per cent to the remainder. Again, there might reasonably be a difference of view according to the extent to which an award winning architect like Fraser would be personally involved in providing the services in question. Finally, there might reasonably be a difference of view as to whether a "premium" should be payable for the name and involvement of an architect highly regarded for his achievement in a generally similar project characterised by heritage considerations.
216 The evidence of the expert architects, Gilling and Martin, was that what was a reasonable fee could not be derived simply by application of RAIA Guide. (Gilling was influenced to some extent by the Guide and Martin was not). Both experts approached the matter by addressing the contemporary competitive market in which architects were tendering for projects. There was a wide range of fee levels that might arguably be "reasonable" for a project of the kind in question.
217 The considerations to which I have just referred, together with those identified earlier, create a disposition against finding, in effect, that in November 1991 - January 1992, Shipton and Vega intended to become bound to pay whatever amount a court might find was either the "usual" fee charged by VFA in respect of such a project, or a "reasonable" fee for it to charge for the Project. I think that Shipton and Vega would have wanted to retain control over the amount of the fee for which liability was to be incurred and that Fraser should have understood that they wanted to do so.
218 Against the above background, I turn to consider the evidence on which the applicants rely and of which I gave a detailed account earlier. The three men were enthusiastic about the Project. For Fraser it no doubt posed a particular challenge and professional opportunity: to repeat his widely praised achievement on Wharves 4/5, Walsh Bay. Fraser was the only architect involved and he was heavily involved. Obviously, he would have the "inside running" in relation to the opportunity to be appointed as project architect. Fraser expected to be appointed. It is difficult to identify with confidence the state of mind of Shipton and Vega on the subject. They knew that a process of negotiation with Fraser would be involved - something to which Fraser does not appear to have given much thought until he was forced to do so. I think that in so far as they thought about the matter at all Shipton and Vega hoped to appoint Fraser and thought that he would be flexible over the amount of his fee and would be appointed.
219 Shipton and Vega were anxious to keep the fee for the design and presentation drawings for which liability had, inevitably, to be incurred immediately, down to a minimum. Indeed, from start to finish, they attempted to cut costs. In my opinion, they would not have agreed, in November 1991 - January 1992, to pay a "reasonable" amount for even the design and presentation drawing stage for reasons of the same kind mentioned above in relation to the "project architect's fee". It could not be known as early as November 1991 - January 1992 how much developer's profit there would be in the Project and therefore how much Shipton and Vega could sensibly agree to pay Fraser for design and presentation drawing work over and above the sum of $70,000.
220 In my view, if Fraser had said to Shipton and Vega that he would undertake the design and presentation drawing work for $70,000 only on the basis that if they were awarded the opportunity to undertake the Project, they would retain him as project architect at a fee of 5.42 per cent of project cost or, alternatively, that a fee of some $840,000 or $656,279 be paid to him for the design and presentation drawing work, in either case credit being given for the sum of $70,000 paid, Shipton and Vega would not have agreed. They would either have declined outright to deal with him further or would have set in train inquiries of the kind that were in fact ultimately made on their behalf. They would have found that they could do better than agree to pay a project architect's fee of 5.42 per cent of project cost.
221 I also accept Martin's evidence that for design and presentation drawing work alone, and as a stand alone service, the sum of $70,000 was not unreasonable. Martin gave evidence, which I accept, that at the time with which we are concerned:
· developers who engaged architects for an entire project were concerned with the overall amount of the fee payable, not with how it had been arrived at and, in particular, not with the part of the total which the architect might have allocated to the schematic design stage (Martin accepted that some architects may well have allocated twelve per cent to seventeen per cent to that stage as the RAIA Guide did); and
· that where architects were requested to undertake design and presentation drawing work without appointment as architect for the project as a whole, a variety of agreements were negotiated but that a charge of 12 per cent - 17 per cent of project cost was far above the market.
Martin distinguished situations in which it might be agreed that if the project was won, the architect would definitely be appointed as project architect, but at a stipulated fee of which a stipulated sum or proportion would be for the design and presentation drawing work and would become payable on the winning of the tender, the (smaller) amount in fact paid in advance being treated as a payment on account.
222 I turn now to the alleged conversations on which the applicants rely. The first was that on Thursday 12 December 1991 in the Macquarie Street coffee shop. I doubt that this conversation took place in the terms deposed to by Fraser. And even if it did, in my opinion it does not do for the applicants the work that they suggest. Fraser said that he could not say how much his fee for the design and presentation drawing stage would be. When he said, "I will charge now to cover costs and overheads, and adjust my payments as part of my full fees when the project goes ahead" and Vega replied "[t]hat sounds OK to me", the parties did not intend to make a binding agreement but were merely engaging in a preliminary discussion. This is borne out by Shipton's statement, "[f]ine, will you prepare a proposal and get it to us quickly". In my view, Shipton and Vega were expecting the arrangement to be the subject of a written agreement.
223 It is not in dispute that a conversation occurred on Friday 13 December, but, as noted earlier, Shipton and Vega dispute some aspects of Fraser's version of it. The terms of the conversation suggest that the three men did not consider that they had concluded an agreement the preceding day (12 December) but were still engaged in negotiations precedent to the making of a written proposal by Fraser. Fraser states, but Shipton denies, that Shipton (a) said that the three men would "make a lot of money out of [the Project]" and (b) asked Fraser "for now" to keep his costs as low as possible. Even if Fraser is correct in both respects, his case is not advanced, in my opinion. I do not think that the prediction was somehow a contractual promise to Fraser. Nor, in my view, would the words "for now" signify that a further amount would be payable for the schematic design stage or that Fraser was or would be definitely appointed as architect for subsequent stages. Rather, all that would have been meant is that special strictures affected the schematic design stage arising from the possibility that that work might prove to have been wasted. Similarly, the statement "I won't charge you the scale rate at this stage" is consistent with the meaning that Fraser reserved the right, if engaged for later stages, to seek "the scale rate" in the negotiations.
224 Fraser's facsimile transmission dated Friday 13 December 1991 is important, not only for its qualified quoting of the fee of $70,000 for the design and presentation sketches, but also because of the period which it said the work would take to complete. This was five to six weeks commencing on 15 January 1992. A six week period from 15 January would expire on 26 February 1992. On its face, Fraser's offer of 13 December was to do design work and to prepare seven presentation sketches over some six weeks expiring at the end of February 1992 for $70,000. On the basis of a five day working week and an eight hour day, the rate would be $291.66 per hour. Fraser had working for him at the time his daughter and a draftsman. Nonetheless, the amount of $70,000 is not obviously unreasonably low. We know that at a later time, Fraser calculated a fee based on $150 per hour for himself. If he used the same rate in arriving at his figure of $70,000, on the basis of six five-day weeks of eight hours per day, $141.66 per hour would be charged for the other two employees. On the basis of a five-week, rather than a six-week period, the amount becomes $350 per hour in all, which might have comprised $150 per hour for Fraser and $100 per hour for each of the employees. The evidence does not reveal how Fraser arrived at the fee of $70,000; it suffices to say that in my view it is not shown to be unreasonably low for the work for which it was charged.
225 Fraser alleges, and Shipton and Vega deny, that there was a further conversation four days later on Tuesday 17 December in Shipton's office. I set out that alleged conversation earlier. According to Fraser, Shipton asked him whether he could reduce the sum of $70,000 and he (Fraser) said:
"Bill, I understand the position. That's why I have agreed to just cover my bare costs for the time being to do the work necessary to produce a scheme to get us the job."
226 According to Fraser, Shipton replied that he and Vega were not expecting Fraser to be "out of pocket".
227 The alleged conversation is consistent with Fraser's undertaking the schematic design work for $70,000 and absence of a commitment to him for later stages. The reference to "bare costs" is consistent with the reference to "costs and overheads" in the alleged conversation on 12 December. According to the three conversations alleged by Fraser and the fax of 13 December, he informed Shipton and Vega that $70,000 would not see him out of pocket.
228 On 21 January 1992, Fraser again wrote to Shipton and Vega. By this time the three men had met with Mr Baird and Ms Moore and had some inkling of the procedure which the government might follow. In substance, Fraser's proposal of 21 January was the same as that described in the fax of 13 December. Fraser introduced mention of a "model" which he is careful to note is not covered by his fee of $70,000; the time for production of the drawings becomes "approximately six weeks" (apparently from the time of acceptance); and a time for payment is stipulated, namely, $50,000 during the production time and the remaining $20,000 on 1 June 1992. Since the work covered by the proposal would be completed once the presentation drawings were completed (within "approximately six weeks") it is not obvious why payment of the sum of $20,000 was to be delayed until 1 June.
229 By fax the next day, 22 January, Wedderlight and Delmo accepted Fraser's fee proposal. The terms of the fax were set out earlier. They were "formal" and manifested an intention to bring to a conclusion a contractual negotiation. They introduced a new term, however: that Fraser should not do work beyond a level of $10,000 until he had his clients' confirmation that they had bank approval for the funding to cover the balance ($60,000) of his fees. This new term apparently caused no difficulty for Fraser. It does have significance, however, in lending support to the view that Shipton and Vega did not intend, and Fraser could not reasonably have understood them to intend, to be committing themselves to engage him as project architect for whatever fee might be determined by someone other than themselves and their bank to be a reasonable fee. Shipton and Vega made it clear to Fraser that the amount they could outlay depended on the amount of bank finance available to pay it.
230 Throughout their negotiations down to 22 January 1992, Shipton and Vega had sought to confine their liability to Fraser: at the meeting on 13 December 1991, they had asked him whether they could use the drawings that he had done for earlier clients interested in developing the Finger Wharf and had asked him to keep his fees low; according to Fraser, on 17 December they asked him if he could reduce the amount of $70,000; and in the letter of 22 January they introduced the $10,000 stricture just described. Of course, Fraser's case is that this constrictive approach was temporary and was to be compensated for, if and when the Project was won. But I do not find this explanation satisfactory. Certainly Shipton and Vega did not want to waste money on a project that did not go ahead. But it appeared that even after the winning of the Project, their dependence on bank finance would continue. Fraser should have been on notice that they were not the kind of clients who were either disposed or able to be open-handed and easygoing on the question of his fees.
231 On 4 February, Fraser billed Wedderlight and Delmo for $10,000 by reference, implicitly, to their request of 22 January. On 10 February, they paid this first account for $10,000; asked to be informed when the next $10,000 was reached; confirmed that Shipton and Vega would be meeting with their bankers that week; and asked Fraser to note that W-D was now his client. The parties appear to have treated this novation as effective.
232 A period of "approximately six weeks" from 22 January expired about 4 March 1992. By 21 February 1992, Fraser had billed for half ($35,000) of the amount of his fee. In his covering letter, he stated that he was into the "fifth week of production" and that he was hoping "to have the full presentation drawings complete in the next 3 to 4 weeks". On 11 March, he billed for a further $15,000. In his account he referred to the "total agreed fee" as $50,000, no doubt because his letter of 21 January had stipulated that only $50,000 of the total of $70,000 was to be paid progressively during production time, the remaining $20,000 being payable on 1 June. He also referred to the amount already paid as being $35,000. It seems, therefore, that the production of the seven presentation drawings was completed on or about 11 March and that Fraser had, by that time, earned the whole $70,000 but had to wait until 1 June for payment of the remaining $20,000.
233 The various considerations which I have identified lead me to conclude that the parties did not intend to make a contractual commitment beyond that in respect of the design and presentation drawings and that their contract for that work was made in Fraser's letter of 21 January, and Shipton's reply on behalf of Wedderlight and Delmo dated 22 January, supplemented by the novation arrangement made on or about 10 February.
234 The question arises what is to be made of the numerous references which the respondents made to Fraser as their "architect" or "project architect" or as a part of their "team". There is no doubt that they sought to exploit to their advantage their association with Fraser and the high regard in which he was held. Are such statements to be construed as "admissions against interest" that Fraser had, indeed, been retained as architect for the entire Project? I think not.
235 In the present context (admissions against interest) the question is, what was the (subjective) intention of the maker of the statement? I do not think that the statements can be fairly understood as admissions that a contract of retainer had already been entered into. Such a construction of statements made so long before the Project had been won is, to my mind, an unrealistic and improbable one. Rather, I think that the statements were intended to convey to those to whom they were addressed that Fraser was the architect who was "on board" or "advising" at the time in relation to the Project. Similarly, the last paragraph of Shipton's letter dated 22 January to Fraser himself ("we look forward to working with you on this exciting project") is properly to be regarded as a general reference to the architectural work to be done, at that stage only the design and presentation drawing work. But even if that paragraph were properly understood to refer to the whole of the substantive Project, I do not think that a "looking forward to working with [Fraser] on this exciting project" is necessarily an admission that Fraser had already been engaged for the whole of the Project. As indicated earlier, I think that in so far as they may have thought about it at all, Shipton and Vega would have hoped in the period November 1991 to January 1992 that if they won, with Fraser's design, the right to undertake the Project, they would reach agreement with him for the retainer of him as project architect.
236 If, contrary to what I have said above, the respondents meant by the statements to convey to others that Fraser had been retained as the project architect for the entirety of the Project, the statements would have to be taken into account against the respondents as admissions by them. But they would not be determinative of the present issue. In fact, they would still not persuade me to conclude that Fraser had in fact been retained for the entirety of the Project. Rather, I would conclude that the statements were false.
237 It remains to consider three paragraphs of the third further amended statement of claim. The first is para 6 which is as follows:
"6. It was a further term of the Retainer [the agreement made in November/December 1991] that the Developer [W-D] would negotiate with [the applicant which performed the work as project architect] in good faith to fix reasonable fees for the work."
238 There is still uncertainty surrounding the question whether an agreement to negotiate in good faith is enforceable at all (the literature on the question is voluminous: recent illustrations are J W Carter and M P Furmston, "Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts" (1994) 8 JCL 1 and I B Stewart, "Good Faith in Contractual Performance and in Negotiation" (1998) 72 ALJ 370). The question is distinct from the question whether a duty of good faith in performing contractual obligations and exercising contractual rights may be imposed upon parties as part of their contract, as to which, see the helpful recent review of the law by Sheller JA in Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 (CA) at 363-369. If an obligation to negotiate in good faith is enforceable, it must be "clear and part of an undoubted agreement between the parties": Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1 (CA) per Kirby P at 26 (Waddell A-JA agreeing). In this case, as I have said above, I do not think that there was "an undoubted agreement between the parties". The following caution, sounded by E A Farnsworth in a discussion of the American law in this area in "Pre-contractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations" (1987) 87 Columbia L Rev 217 at 264, is apposite in my view:
"A few courts have gone to considerable lengths in spelling out an obligation to negotiate from unclear language and suggestive circumstances. There have been intimations that such an obligation might be implied in law in the absence of any actual assent by the parties. One may doubt the wisdom of those courts that have strained to find an agreement to negotiate in the absence of a clear indication of assent, for if carried to an extreme this would enable courts to impose a general obligation of fair dealing."
239 While the author considered that courts should uphold "an explicit agreement to negotiate" which the parties clearly intend to be enforceable, I do not find such an agreement or intention here.
240 The second paragraph referred to is para 8 which, omitting particulars, is as follows:
"8. The said fee for design and drawing work [$70,000] was at a reduced rate from the minimum rate recommended by the Royal Australian Institute of Architects ('RAIA'), which was the applicant's usual minimum fee for such work and was less than the reasonable value of such work."
241 The reference to the RAIA Scale deposed to by Fraser was allegedly made at the meeting on Friday 13 December 1991 as follows:
Fraser: "Then I will keep my time down as much as possible and charge you only for my time and for office time until then. I won't charge you the scale rate at this stage."
Shipton: "OK." (emphasis supplied)
242 Fraser says his reference to "the scale rate" was to the percentage scales which formed part of the RAIA Fee Guide. Shipton agrees that Fraser said the first sentence but denies that he (Fraser) said the second sentence in this passage.
243 Assuming that the conversation took place as deposed to by Fraser, I make two observations about it. First, it is consistent with Fraser's indicating that at the stage in question he would not charge by reference to the RAIA scale rate but that when the question of the making of agreements in the future arose, he would, or at least would reserve the right to, call in aid that rate. Second, I do not accept that Shipton's reply "OK" was intended to express his assent to Fraser's charging the RAIA scale rate in the future. Rather, it was, in my view, an assent to the proposition that Fraser would keep his fee as low as possible at that stage but reserved the right to seek a fee by reference to the RAIA scale once the Project was won, and, indeed, reserved the right to insist upon it, if he saw fit to do so, as a condition of his accepting an engagement at that stage.
244 The third paragraph of the third further amended statement of claim to which I referred is para 9 which is as follows:
"9. The applicants' agreement to do this work at a reduced rate was in consideration of one of them being formally engaged as the project architect and receiving reasonable fees as project architect if the Project was won, or, alternatively, on the condition that these things occurred."
245 According to Fraser (but not Shipton or Vega) he said at the coffee shop meeting on Thursday 12 December 1991:
"I will charge now to cover costs and overheads, and adjust my payments as part of my full fees when the project goes ahead",
and Vega replied:
"That sounds OK to me."
246 Fraser said, first, that he would charge at the initial stage of design and presentation drawing, only enough to cover his costs and overheads rather than, implicitly, an amount to cover his costs and overheads and some unidentified further amount for "profit". He said, second, that he would "adjust [his] payments as part of [his] full fees when the project [went] ahead". This seems to mean that if and when the Project went ahead, he would credit the payments he would by then have received off the full amount of his fees as project architect, which would include the previously omitted "profit" element on the design and presentation drawing work.
247 The applicants also rely on Fraser's reference at the meeting on 13 December 1991 to his not charging the scale rate "at this stage" and to Shipton's reference at this meeting to their all making a "lot of money" out of the Project "if it works".
248 I do not accept that these passages, if they were spoken, were intended by Shipton and Vega, or should reasonably have been understood by Fraser to have been intended by them, to be a binding promise either to engage him for the entire Project or to pay anything more than the amount on which they might (and were to) agree for the design and presentation drawing work. Fraser was, according to his version of the conversations, representing to Shipton and Vega that his present charge would cover his costs and overheads only and that he was content to rely on the chance of his being engaged as project architect to make his "profit".
249 In the result, Fraser has not shown that any contract as pleaded by him was formed in the period November 1991 - 10 February 1992.
250 There are two alternative grounds on which the applicants' claim in contract fails. The first is that by reason of the absence of agreement in November 1991 to 10 February 1992 (and, for that matter, on the occasion of the making of the second contract in October 1992) on the vital term of the amount of Fraser's fee for his services as project architect, any agreement for his retainer in that capacity was unenforceable: cf May & Butcher Ltd v R [1934] 2 KB 17n. The pleaded contract for the retainer of Fraser as project architect is one that was executory on both sides. It is therefore distinguishable from contracts of which there has been full or partial performance on one side where, as a result, the call of justice for the finding of an implied undertaking to pay a reasonable amount is strong: cf Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 KB 1; Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 503 and the discussion in Carter and Harland, Contract Law in Australia (3rd ed, 1996) at pars [268], [269].
251 The second alternative ground on which the applicants' claim in contract fails is that I do not accept that the fee on which Fraser insisted (5.42 per cent of total project cost) was reasonable and that that which W-D offered him was unreasonable. The course of the parties' negotiation is discussed both above and below. Paragraph 18 of the third further amended statement of claim is to the effect that it was a term of the first contract or the second contract or both, that in consideration of VFA's performing the work for the tender documents "for the reduced fee" (of $70,000 and $15,000) VFA's "full fee (reasonably demanded) as the project architect would be accepted by [W-D] once the tender was won". The expression "full fee (reasonably demanded)" is problematical and highlights the difficulty confronted by the applicants. Clearly, the pleader did not intend to refer to the reasonableness of "the manner of demanding". Did the pleader intend to refer to "the full fee demanded" or "a reasonable fee" or "the full fee demanded provided it was within a reasonable range"? Probably the last. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say what is reasonable in the present respect other than by reference to the market at the time. Perhaps a developer would have been prepared to pay a "premium" above the lowest fee available in the market in order to have the benefit of Fraser's name and his ongoing personal attention. Whether it would have been reasonable to do so and, if so, how much would be a reasonable premium to pay are difficult, if not insoluble issues.
252 Gilling, Fraser's expert, considered that a reasonable fee "assessed on a commercial basis" would be 4.25 per cent of construction cost for the "conventional" buildings and 5.05 per cent of construction cost for the Finger Wharf section. Applying these percentages to a total construction cost of $106,200,000, he suggested that a reasonable fee would be $5,156,852 which amounts to 4.86 per cent of total construction cost. Fraser's proposed 5.42 per cent, however, on the basis of a construction cost of $106,200,000, would have given a fee of $5,756,040, nearly $600,000 or 11.6 per cent more than Gilling's reasonable fee. Moreover, while Gilling is a highly qualified and experienced architect, eminent in his profession, he did not, in my view, give adequate weight to the "fee bargaining" that had been a feature of the market for architectural services in the period 1991-1993, although he acknowledged that price competition between architects had become keen by that time. Martin supported the fee charged by Peddle Thorp as reasonable. That was a substantially lower level of fee which was the product of negotiation between a firm which enjoyed the economic efficiencies associated with size, and a client negotiating for the lowest price possible.
253 It is not necessary or appropriate for me to attempt to identify a particular amount as a reasonable fee for Fraser to be paid as project architect. It would be difficult if not impossible to do so. If Fraser had done the work on the basis that he was to be paid but without agreement on fees, a similar task would have been unavoidable. But that is not this case.
254 It suffices to say that I think that the figure supported by Gilling was itself above or at least at the upper end of a "reasonable range" and that in the circumstances, therefore, Fraser has not shown that the fee proposed by him was within a reasonable range.
The period between completion on or about 11 March 1992 of performance of the first contract and the making of the second contract on 15 October 1992
255 According to the view I have formed as to the first contract, Fraser had fully performed it by about 11 March 1992. It is clear, however, that he continued to act in W-D's interest after that date. The first contract had not required him to "attend meetings" (except, no doubt, meetings with Shipton and Vega for the purpose of taking instructions from them) but his memos of fees dated 14 and 21 February and 11 March, though not his first memo of 4 February, were expressed to be for, inter alia, "attending meetings". Apparently these meetings were, indeed, with persons other than Shipton and Vega alone, since the three memos (and, indeed, the first dated 4 February) had expressly mentioned "taking instructions" as a separate item of work.
256 From completion of the seven presentation drawings on or about 11 March 1992 to the making of the second contract by the parties on or about 12 October 1992, Fraser continued to attend meetings, write letters and do the other things described earlier, all in the interests of W-D's winning the Project. He did not do so in performance of a contract. He did so, at least partly, in the expectation of one. I will say more of this later. Fraser's acts in this period were not all of a kind, however. While some were directed to assisting W-D to win the support of the authorities for its scheme, others, such as the calculation of fees which he would charge as project architect, he did in his own interests exclusively.
257 In this period, Shipton and Vega had no hesitation in calling on Fraser to provide services to advance their cause with those that mattered.
258 I will return to the question of these services when dealing with the applicants' "unjust enrichment" and "quantum meruit" claims.
The second contract - 15 October 1992
259 In September 1992, the MSB issued an "invitation to tender" document and Shipton gave Fraser a copy. It was voluminous. It stipulated requirements which a tender by W-D would have to satisfy. As well, and independently of the MSB requirements, W-D had decided upon certain design changes. All this would call for amendment of the existing drawings. I will refer to all the architectural work required as "upgrading", without implying that the existing drawings were deficient by reference to the first contract pursuant to which Fraser had produced them.
260 There were negotiations between Fraser, Shipton and Vega over the related topics of the content of the upgrading work to be undertaken and Fraser's fee for undertaking it. It is common ground that agreement was reached on 12 October 1992 that Fraser would undertake the upgrading work finally agreed upon for $15,000. Fraser again pleads that the fee of $15,000 was less than the minimum rate recommended by the RAIA Fee Guide and "hence" below the fee usually charged by him for such work. Fraser again pleads that his agreement to do the upgrading work for such a "low" amount as $15,000 was in consideration of his being formally engaged as project architect and of his being paid such fees as he should reasonably demand as project architect for the whole of the Project, or, alternatively, that his agreement to do the upgrading work for that amount was "on condition that this would occur". (According to the alternative, the non-occurrence of the events mentioned has the effect that Fraser did not agree to accept "only" $15,000 for the upgrading work and he is free to recover for that work on a quantum meruit basis.)
261 In my opinion, Fraser has also failed to establish the case pleaded in relation to the second contract. The position is relatively straight-forward. On 24 September, Fraser wrote to W-D outlining "design changes" and the upgrading work called for by the MSB's "tender document requirements" and advising that the work would take about six weeks and that his fee was $25,000, payable as to 50 per cent after three weeks and the balance on completion. On 12 October, Shipton and Vega met with Fraser and said that they could not pay $25,000 and could spend only $15,000. They requested him to "try to contain" his fee to $15,000 accordingly.
262 On Thursday 15 October, Fraser wrote to W-D again advising that work of a reduced scope specified in the letter could be done by Friday 13 November, a reduced period of four weeks, for $15,000 payable as to 50 per cent after two weeks (by 29 October) and as to the remaining 50 per cent on completion (13 November).
263 Shipton accepted this offer by telephone.
264 Fraser billed $7,500 on 2 November and the remaining $7,500 on 19 November. Apparently, then, the upgrading work was completed on or about 19 November. On 23 November, W-D forwarded its tender to the MSB.
265 Fraser states that in fact he did all the upgrading work described in his letters of 24 September and 15 October in the belief that he would be appointed project architect and that his "full fee would be accepted". Whether he did more than the reduced scope of work that he contracted to perform, and if so, whether he did so by reason of his having the belief mentioned, is an irrelevancy. The contract was clear and self contained, in my view. The agreed scope of work was reduced in order to match the figure of $15,000. When giving the chronological account of the facts earlier, I gave my reasons for not accepting Fraser's evidence that if W-D won the tender, it would accept Fraser's full project fee without argument. If, however, Vega did say the words which Fraser attributes to him, the promise expressed in them would have been made otherwise than for valuable consideration and would be unenforceable for this reason. The second contract was for a reduced scope of work commensurate with a fee of $15,000. Fraser did not agree to confer a benefit on W-D or incur a detriment in return for the supposed promise by Shipton and Vega. If he did in fact subsequently perform services worth more than $15,000, the benefit (to the extent of the excess) gratuitously conferred by Fraser on W-D was not sought by Shipton and Vega as consideration for their supposed promise.
266 I do not find the contractual promise or the contractual condition relied on by the applicants in respect of the second contract.
The period from completion of performance on or about 19 November 1992 of the second contract to 24 September 1993
267 In the period from completion on or about 19 November 1992 of performance of the second contract to the award of the Project to W-D on or about 22 March 1993, Fraser continued to do various acts in the interests of ensuring the success of W-D's tender. For example, on 4 December he played a significant role at the "presentation meeting" at the MSB described earlier. Also as noted earlier, W-D referred to VFA as its architect for the project and made much of Fraser's repute and experience in its tender.
268 From the award of the Project to W-D on or about 22 March 1993 down to 24 September 1993 when W-D wrote to Fraser finally rejecting his fee proposal, much, though not all, of Fraser's activity in connection with the Project related to the dispute over the amount of his proposed fee. However, he did further work also in this period in the interests of W-D. For example, at W-D's request he met with and spoke to Clover Moore on 10 June and 6 August 1993, attended a meeting of the local branch of the Liberal Party on 29 July 1993 with Vega and examined the consultant team's fee proposals and made recommendations in relation to them. Otherwise, understandably, Fraser was insisting that the issue of his retainer as project architect be resolved before he would do further work for W-D. Yet Shipton and Vega, who, unbeknown to Fraser, were having discussions with Peddle Thorp, accused him of reprehensible conduct when he declined to accompany them to the meeting with Clover Moore on Tuesday 8 June 1993!
The third alleged contract - 22 June 1993
269 The applicants plead that on 22 June 1993, W-D accepted Fraser's proposal of a fee of $5,669,000 when Shipton said "Okay". In the course of the chronological account of the facts given earlier, I rejected this aspect of the applicants' case in contract for the reasons there given.
MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT
270 Fraser alleges that W-D, Shipton and Vega made numerous representations to him that he was already, or definitely would be, the project architect for the Project, subject only to W-D's winning the right to undertake it. Moreover, it is said that after 22 March 1993, when the tender was in fact won by W-D, such representations were repeated free of that condition. Fraser submits, however, that Shipton and Vega knew of his fee range from their previous dealings with him on "The Maltings" project and knew that they would never agree to a fee in that range. Fraser therefore submits that Shipton and Vega knew that he would never be appointed as project architect and that their representations to the contrary were misleading or deceptive. According to the claim, Shipton and Vega simply "led Fraser on" so that he would perform work at a reduced fee and act as their spokesman at public meetings and with members of Parliament and others whose support was important in W-D's winning the tender.
271 As explained earlier, in my view Fraser knew that his appointment was subject not only to W-D's winning the right to undertake the Project but also to the reaching of agreement on his fee. However, there were certainly indications that Fraser would be the project architect if agreement could be reached. Implicit in such a representation is a representation that Shipton and Vega did not believe that agreement on fees would not be reached, and therefore did not know of any reason why Fraser would not be engaged for the entire Project.
272 Representations to the effect that Fraser was the "project architect" or part of the "project team" were made almost from the beginning. The applicants particularise them in no less than twenty three paragraphs. For example, as early as 28 November 1991, Edwards of ITT Sheraton wrote to Shipton and Vega advising, inter alia, that he would arrange for Sheraton's Director of Technical Services to meet with "the Project Architect, Vivian Fraser" and Shipton sent a copy of that letter to Fraser shortly afterwards. Similarly, on 3 December 1991, Shipton and Vega sent letters to the Premier of New South Wales and the Minister for Tourism and State Development, advising "[a] Project Team is in place ready to commence work on the project immediately the Lease Agreement is signed … The Architect will be Vivian Fraser". Again, Shipton gave copies to Fraser. There are many other illustrations of the respondents' promoting the Project by stating, to their intended advantage, that Fraser was or would be the project architect for the Project, and of their causing Fraser to be aware of the making of the statements. Many, if not all, of the statements have been referred to in the chronological account of the facts given earlier.
273 The respondents submit that the numerous statements to which I have referred, properly construed, were true when they were made: that is, that at the time Fraser was the project architect in the sense that he was the only architect who had been engaged in relation to the Project, whether or not he would occupy that position for the whole life of the Project.
274 However, this understanding of the statements is not universally available. The letter dated 23 November 1992 from W-D to the Chief Executive of the MSB enclosing W-D's tender document contained the following sentence:
"Should Wedderlight-Delmo be successful with their offer the same team will ensure the project is brought to a successful completion." (emphasis supplied)
275 I infer that Fraser received a copy of this letter from W-D's office soon after its date in accordance with the usual practice in relation to documents such as this relating to the Project.
276 Moreover, while such bare expressions as "project architect" and "member of the project team" can be read in the sense of "the architect working on the Project at the moment", doubt is sometimes cast on this interpretation by the context in which the expression in question was used. For example, in a letter from Shipton and Vega to The Hon Bruce Baird, Minister for Transport, dated 19 February 1992, a copy of which was faxed to Fraser, the "Project Team" was said to include Fraser as "Project Architect", and the "Project Programme" was said to involve construction over a period from October 1992 to July 1994.
277 In the present context (misleading or deceptive conduct) the question is, what meaning was conveyed to Fraser? On the view that I have taken, Fraser knew that he had not in fact been engaged as project architect for the entire Project. This creates insuperable difficulty for a cause of action based on a suggested construction to the effect that Fraser had already been appointed.
278 But the applicants rely on the pleaded representation that Fraser "would be" the project architect. This was a "representation with respect to [a] future matter" for the purposes of s 51A of the TP Act. Accordingly, and as a result of the operation of that section, W-D is liable if it did not have reasonable grounds for making the representation. W-D did adduce some evidence that it had reasonable grounds for making the representation. The case was argued therefore on the basis that the decisive issue was whether the applicants established that W-D did not have reasonable grounds for making the representation . Similar considerations to those just outlined apply to the case against Shipton and Vega under ss 41 and 42 of the FT Act.
279 Fraser submits that Shipton and Vega did know of a reason why he would not be engaged as project architect because they knew that he would insist on a fee by reference to the RAIA Fee Guide to which they knew they would not agree.
280 Vega conceded that he and Shipton were never going to agree to a fee as high as 5.42 per cent of construction cost which he said was "way too high". The issue then resolves itself into whether they knew from the start or at any time when one of the statements was made that Fraser would be proposing a fee of that order and would refuse to come down to a fee to which the respondents would agree. If so, they knew that Fraser would not be the project architect and misled him by representing that he would be.
281 In my view, the evidence falls short of showing that Shipton and Vega knew that agreement on fees would not be reached. The following exchange occurred in Shipton's cross-examination:
"But if [Fraser's fees] were reasonable you had an obligation did you not to find them acceptable, is that how you understood it? --- No if they were reasonable and were in the scope of percentages that we were expecting, that was going around at the time, which was somewhere around 2 to 3 per cent, that was a sort of fee we had in the back of our minds that the job was worth."
282 A few lines later, Shipton said: "If we could agree on the fees he was going to be the architect." Although, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that the parties were always unlikely to agree on fees (Fraser considered 4.5 per cent "arbitrary" and refused to move below 5.42 per cent), I think that Shipton and Vega did not believe this to be the case. They had managed to persuade Fraser to agree to what he perceived to be a low fee of $70,000 for the first contract and of $15,000 for the second contract. I think that in so far as they thought about the amount to be paid for project architect's fee if W-D won the Project, they assumed that they would be able to persuade Fraser to come down to an acceptable level as they had done on the first and second contracts.
283 The evidence relating to The Maltings project, even if it had been admitted as relevant to this substantive issue as well as to credit, would not have gone far enough for Fraser's purposes. It would have needed to show, but would not have shown, that Fraser would have preferred to forego appointment as project architect for the Project than to reduce his fee to a level acceptable to W-D.
284 In cross-examination, Vega conceded that his experience of fee agreements in the period 1991-1993 in relation to projects of the size of the Project was limited to The Maltings project in relation to which Fraser was in fact also the project architect. He agreed that it "would [have been] a good idea" when considering what level of fee could be expected in relation to the Finger Wharf to look at the fee agreement on which he had been negotiating with Fraser in relation to The Maltings.
285 Fraser's fee proposal on The Maltings had been contained in a letter dated 27 May 1991, six months prior to the commencement of discussions about the Finger Wharf, addressed to "Wedderlight Pty Ltd and Delmo Pty Ltd" and marked "Attention: Messrs WJ Shipton and J de la Vega". After setting out the work to be performed, the letter continued as follows:
"Architectural Fees:
For hotel work of this scale, and working within the existing buildings, the Royal Australian Institute of Architects fee is listed at 7.25% for full services. However, I am prepared to reduce this fee by 20% to 5.8%.
The fee is divided into the following stages:
a) Sketch design
13% of full fee
b) Design development
12% of full fee
c) Documentation
40% of full fee
d) Contract Administration
35% of full fee
The work to December this year would proceed to mid way through the documentation period, which would represent a fee of 45% of 5.8%, or 2.16% of the building cost. From this fee I would subtract the fees previously paid to me, in the amount of $60,000.00.
The fees would be payable on a monthly basis."
286 Vega gave evidence that the sum of $60,000 was for design. In a letter dated 8 August 1991, addressed to "Wedderlight Pty Ltd and Delmo Pty Ltd - WJ Shipton Group" and marked to Shipton's attention only, Fraser discussed certain payments for preparing drawings and elevations and continued:
"This interim stage of my work, which is basically to provide an updated set of presentation sketch documents to DA standard, forms part of the tasks as set out in my letter to you dated 27 May 1991, and the lump sum fee for this first step will be part of the percentage fee proposal as scheduled in that letter."
287 Fraser confirmed that his intention was to charge by reference to the RAIA Fee Guide in a letter dated 14 May 1992, addressed to "Wedderlight - Delmo Pty Ltd - C/- WJ Shipton" and marked "Attention: Messrs Shipton and de la Vega". Fraser discussed difficulties in obtaining Development Approval and continued:
"The $93,000 paid to date is for 2 presentation sets of documents, and represents a specially reduced charge against the minimum RAIA fee which will be charged when the project proceeds. I pointed out in my letter dated 08 August 1991, that the interim fees will form part of the proper fee which was set out in detail to you on 27 May 1991."
288 From this evidence, it appears that Shipton and Vega might reasonably have expected that Fraser would seek to charge a fee above five per cent of construction cost. However, The Maltings project did not proceed and an agreement on Fraser's fee in respect of it was never reached. It is therefore not shown that Shipton and Vega should have known that Fraser would refuse to come down to a fee of the order of 4.5 per cent of construction cost on either The Maltings or the Project. Accordingly, the evidence does not establish that Shipton and Vega knew at all relevant times that they would not reach agreement on fees with Fraser and so misled him by the representations mentioned earlier.
289 It is arguable that the situation changed following 29 March and 27 April 1993 when Fraser put his original and revised fee proposals and, in particular, when, on 7 May 1993, he flatly rejected what he described as W-D's "arbitrary fee" of 4.5 per cent of the cost of construction of the building alone. Shipton's evidence is that Fraser had told him as early as 14 April that if he did not accept Fraser's fee proposal, Fraser would "walk away" and would not be his architect.
290 Fraser submits that the respondents continued to use his services from April to September 1993, despite knowing that they would in all probability accept the proposal from Peddle Thorp, their negotiations with whom they had hidden from Fraser. I do not accept the submission.
291 I do not find it necessary to seek to identify the time when Shipton and Fraser first formed the view that agreement would not be reached with Fraser, but note that they continued until the last to reconsider his position. The point is that Fraser ought to have known from the same time, no sooner and no later, that agreement was unlikely to be reached. This precludes a finding of detrimental reliance by the applicants after that time had arrived, whenever it was.
292 In the result, the claim of misleading or deceptive conduct also fails.
ESTOPPEL
293 The applicants plead that as a result of the numerous statements referred to under the heading "Misleading or deceptive conduct" earlier in these Reasons to the effect that Fraser or VFA was or would be the project architect and that his or its full fee as project architect would be accepted by W-D if and when it won the Project, and Fraser's and VFA's acting to their detriment in reliance on the statements, W-D is estopped from denying that VFA is the project architect and entitled to act as such and to earn its reasonable fee as such.
294 I accept that Fraser was confident that he or his company would be appointed as project architect. I also accept that without that confidence he would not have provided all the time, energy and expertise which he undoubtedly gave in the pursuit of the interests of W-D. It is readily understandable that Fraser would have been bitterly disappointed at the ultimate turn of events.
295 In making the numerous statements that they made to Fraser at the times when they made them, Shipton and Vega were not, however, representing to him that he already was or certainly would be project architect. What they were representing to him is to be assessed against the background of what he and they knew on the subject of his retainer which was that there was no agreement on the fundamental matters of the content of the architectural work to be done in respect of the Project or the fee to be paid for it. What was represented to Fraser was largely the subject of the preceding section of these Reasons.
296 The representations, in so far as they were made to Fraser, can be formulated in one or more of various ways, such as, that Fraser was currently the architect who was providing services in connection with the Project; that the respondents were hoping to appoint Fraser as project architect for the entirety of the Project; that they had reasonable grounds for thinking that he would come to a fee level acceptable to them and so be appointed; that they did not know of any obstacle to their engaging him as project architect; that subject to agreement being reached on fees, their intentions were that he would be their project architect. But representations so formulated are not shown to have been false or falsified. In fact, representations so formulated were true.
297 An alternative way of resolving the present aspect of the applicants' case is to say that if, contrary to what I have said above, the respondents represented that Fraser was already or definitely would be their project architect, he did not rely on any representation so formulated.
298 For the above reasons, in my view W-D is not estopped from denying that VFA was the project architect for the Project and was entitled to act as such and to earn its reasonable fee as such.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
299 The case in unjust enrichment is pleaded on various bases. It is pleaded that W-D has been unjustly enriched to the extent of a difference between VFA's "usual fee" or "reasonable fee" for the design and drawing work and the sum of $85,000 which was in fact paid. On the "VFA's usual fee" basis, the amount claimed, by reference to the scales in the RAIA Fee Guide which Fraser said he usually used for the purpose of calculating his fees, is as follows:
Usual fee $840,000
Amount Paid 85,000
Balance claimed $755,000
300 On the "reasonable fee" basis, the amount claimed, based on the evidence of the applicants' expert, Gilling, is as follows:
Reasonable fee $656,279
Amount Paid 85,000
Balance claimed $571,279
301 Alternatively, it is pleaded that W-D has saved the fee which it would otherwise have had to pay to another architect for the work and has been unjustly enriched to the same extent. On this basis, the amount claimed is again $755,000, or, in the alternative, $571,279.
302 No material facts are pleaded establishing the basis of the "unjust enrichment". It does not constitute an unjust enrichment of A that A has been provided with services by B for which A has paid to B a sum less (even much less) than the fee that B usually charges for such services, or less (even much less) than the "reasonable" fee for the services provided the amount paid is, as it was in the present case, contractually agreed upon.
303 Moreover, I am not satisfied that the sum of $85,000 was less than a reasonable remuneration for the services the subject of the first and second contracts.
QUANTUM MERUIT
304 The case for remuneration on a quantum meruit basis for the services the subject of the first and second contracts must overcome the obstacle presented by the existence of those contracts. The pleading seeks to set aside the first contract (November 1991 - 10 February 1992) which stipulated the fee of $70,000 for design and preparation of presentation drawings, but not the second contract (12 October 1992) which fixed a fee of $15,000 for upgrading of the presentation drawings to reflect design changes and to comply with the MSB tender requirements. The applicants plead that the first contract "is liable to be set aside by the Court for reason of the misrepresentation by [W-D]" or, alternatively, that the first contract "determined for failure of condition".
305 The misrepresentation is not pleaded but the "particulars" to the relevant paragraph say "As described under the heading 'False and Misleading Statements'". Thus, the representation in question is that Fraser or VFA "was or would be the project architect" and the "condition" in question is that Fraser or VFA "be formally engaged as project architect and receive reasonable fees as such". According to the pleading, the contract to be set aside is that evidenced by Fraser's letter dated 21 January 1992. Accordingly, any operative misrepresentation would have to precede that date.
306 For reasons given earlier in these Reasons under the headings "Misleading or Deceptive Conduct" and "Estoppel", in my opinion it was not represented prior to that date (or subsequently for that matter) that Fraser or VFA already was or definitely would be the project architect if the right to carry out the Project was won by W‑D. Similarly, and for similar reasons, I do not think that it was an agreed condition of Fraser's or VFA's agreement to accept $70,000 that Fraser or VFA be so appointed.
307 An important plank of the applicants' case is that the value of services rendered far exceeded the sum of $85,000 paid. On this issue there was a conflict between the evidence of the applicants' expert, Gilling, and that of the respondents' expert, Martin. Their qualifications to express the opinions which they gave were not in question.
308 Gilling said that, in the period from late 1991 to late 1993, the scales in the RAIA Fee Guide were "little more than a reference point for architects bidding for projects of this nature". He added that the period mentioned embraced a period of deep recession in the building industry and that "many major architectural firms accepted commissions below cost in order to keep their office structures intact". He stated as follows:
"6.9 With the competitive atmosphere prevailing amongst architects at this time, I do not agree that a reasonable fee for this project should have been based on the RAIA recommended scale.
6.10 This is not to say, however, that elements of the scale, such as the margins for degrees of difficulty for various projects, or the proportionate amount applicable for a given stage of service, should not be taken into account. Matters such as these have been formulated over years of experience and are still accepted by practising architects as being reliable economic guidelines when formulating their fee offers. Accordingly, it is my view that these factors must be considered in determining the reasonable fee for Fraser's work."
309 By a course of reasoning which I need not detail, but which made some use of the RAIA Fee Guide as a reference point, Gilling concluded that a reasonable fee for the preparation of the schematic drawings was $643,279.00. He added this:
"... for attending meetings, providing promotional material and attending upon regulatory authorities, institutions and the like, charges should be based on an hourly rate basis for the time spent in such activities. If Fraser had been commissioned to provide full architectural services, these services would normally have been absorbed into the overall percentage fee. In my opinion, $100 per hour would be a reasonable hourly rate for this work."
310 Taking Fraser's estimate that he had spent some 130 hours on such work, Gilling arrived at an amount of $13,000 for it. Accordingly, the total "reasonable fee" according to Gilling became:
Preparation of schematic drawings $643,279.00
Attending meetings, etc - 130 hours @ $100 per hour 13,000.00
TOTAL $656,279.00
311 Martin put the RAIA Fee Guide entirely to one side, saying that the Australian property industry was in deep recession from 1990, particularly from 1991 to 1994, and that for this reason, but also for others, fees were negotiated in that period commercially between architect and client and without any reference to RAIA publications. He described negotiations of fees in which he was involved in the period from 1992 to 1996 when he was a director of Davenport Campbell companies, associated with the architectural and interior design practice of Davenport Campbell ("DC").
312 From the examples given, Martin drew the following conclusion:
"- Fees negotiated between architects and clients do not relate to any RAIA published guides
- Fees negotiated generally reflect hours calculated to be committed, then adjusted up or down sometimes very substantially based on the circumstances of each case
- Fees for DA stage even on quite complex projects range from nil (in expectation of an ongoing role) to amounts significantly less than the percentages suggested by Fraser and Gilling."
313 Martin rejected any approach to the question of reasonable remuneration of a project architect or to the question of reasonable remuneration for the work in fact performed by Fraser, based on the scales contained in the RAIA Fee Guide.
314 On the question of the role played (or not played) by the RAIA Fee Guide, on one view the evidence of Gilling and Martin is not at odds. Where they differ on this issue, I prefer that of Martin. He had had a considerable experience in negotiating over architects' fees on both the architect's and the developer's side. He gave seven detailed examples. My finding is that competitiveness and individual negotiation so dominated the market that the RAIA Fee Guide had virtually lost all influence in respect of the fixing of architects' fees for projects of the present kind. This is not to say that a consideration mentioned in the Guide might not have a role to play in the market, but it is to say that if it did, its influence was not attributable to the Guide.
315 In relation to Fraser's description of work additional to design and drawing carried out by him, Martin said this:
"A project of this nature would be expected to involve activities of the type described by Fraser which an experienced architect would anticipate and have regard to in calculating time commitment and hence a total fee. This would not generally be compensated additionally."
316 I will return to this subject later.
317 Martin went on to outline DC's practice when DC was asked to do work of a preliminary nature and when there was no certainty that the project would proceed or that if it did DC would be retained as project architect. He said this:
"58 Whenever requested to participate in such a situation, we would have to make a judgement about likelihood of success before committing either to participate or to our remuneration.
59 Frequently we would be, as Fraser claims to be, discounting an initial fee on the basis that our ongoing involvement in the project was certain or likely. In that event and in line with normal practice, we would document that commitment up front. Therefore, if our situation was as Fraser asserts his to be at the time of his initial fee letter (…) we would have most likely written along the lines of 'Our total fee for the project is ........... Our initial fee of $70,000 for the initial services described below will be credited against the total fee if or when the project proceeds'.
60 Alternatively, if that were unacceptable we may have said 'Our fee for the initial design and associated services is $840,000, however we will accept $70,000 as an initial payment. In the event that the project does not proceed, no further amounts will be payable by you. In the event that the project does proceed the fee paid will be credited against the balance of the total fee'.
.................................................................................................................
61 I have used Fraser's figures above not because I necessarily accept them but to illustrate an appropriate way of making a clear arrangement with a client in accordance with common practice.
62 From time to time we chose to carry out initial design work for a discounted fee without an ongoing commitment. We would do this if, for example, we were dealing with a prospective client and wished to build a relationship or demonstrate our expertise. In that event, the discount was a calculated bet. From time to time, the bet did not pay off."
318 Finally, Martin expressed the view that the amounts of $70,000 and $15,000 charged by Fraser were not unreasonable levels of remuneration for, apparently, the work covered by the contractual arrangements.
319 In giving the chronological account of the background facts set out earlier, I have sought to emphasise what seem to me to be relevant aspects of the first and second contracts. The first contract was for approximately six weeks' design and presentation drawing work which was apparently completed by about 11 March 1992. In my view, on the evidence, the fee of $70,000 is not shown to have been unreasonably low for that work. The second contract was for some four weeks' upgrading work. Again, in my view, the fee of $25,000 initially proposed is not shown to have been unreasonably low for the work originally contemplated and the actual fee of $15,000 is not shown to have been unreasonably low for the upgrading work which was provided for in the second contract dated 15 October 1992 and which was completed on or about 19 November 1992.
GENERAL
320 In my view, a question remains as to whether W-D is liable to pay, on a quantum meruit basis, for the services provided by the applicants outside those covered by the first contract and the second contract.
321 The quantum meruit claim as pleaded seeks a setting aside of the first contract and remuneration for all the work that Fraser did, allowing credit for the sum of $85,000 received. The claim is for $656,279 less $85,000, that is, $571,279. I will return to the question of the pleading later.
322 As noted earlier, the last of the services covered by the first contract for which $70,000 was charged were provided on or about 11 March 1992 and the last of the upgrading work for which the second contract provided and for which $15,000 was charged was done on or about 19 November 1992. But between 11 March 1992 and the making of the second contract on 15 October 1992, and between 19 November 1992 and the parting of the ways on or about 24 September 1993, Fraser rendered to W-D at its request other services based on Fraser's professional expertise from which W-D benefited.
323 The services in question are not covered by the two written contracts on which the respondents rely (successfully as I have held). Those contracts provided ultimately for the production of drawings over six week and four week periods and performance took, in each case, only a little longer The accounts which Fraser rendered pursuant to those contracts totalling $70,000 and $15,000 did not, of course, include any charge for the services provided in the other periods to which I have referred. This other work included, but was not limited to, explaining and promoting the Project to a wide variety of people, drafting and assisting in drafting letters, attending meetings, contributing to discussions and analysing consultants' fee proposals. I exclude from the services with which I am presently concerned correspondence, meetings and discussions associated with negotiation over Fraser's fees since Fraser's activity of those kinds was in his own interests alone.
324 The kind of quantum meruit obligation with which I am presently concerned is not one arising out of a contract for the performance of work which contains an express or implied contractual promise to pay reasonable remuneration for the services to be supplied. Rather, it is the kind that the law imposes outside contract in situations which share a unifying concept of "unjust enrichment" and which are often dealt with under the name "restitution": cf Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 and, for example, Brenner v First Artists' Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 (Byrne J).
325 In determining whether W-D is liable to pay a reasonable sum to Fraser for this other work to which I have referred, I find it convenient to consider three issues: first, whether W‑D received a benefit at Fraser's expense; second, whether it is unjust that W-D should be able to retain that benefit without payment of a reasonable sum; and third, whether Fraser assumed the risk that, if W-D won the right to undertake the Project but the parties did not reach agreement on his fees or otherwise on his appointment as project architect, he would not receive any remuneration for the work. The third issue is perhaps simply an aspect of the second (if Fraser assumed the risk described, it would not be unjust for him to remain unpaid) but in the present case it assumes sufficient importance to merit separate consideration: see Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (5th ed, 1998), pp 664-665.
(a) Benefit
326 The work was requested and accepted by W-D. Therefore, W-D cannot be heard to say, for present purposes, that the work was of no benefit to it: Planche v Colburn (1831) 8 Bing 14 (131 ER 305); Brenner v First Artists' Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 (Byrne J) at 258-259. In any event, it could hardly be disputed that the work was in fact of benefit to W-D. Fraser's work, particularly in explaining and promoting W-D's proposal, was an integral part of its activity in support of its successful tender.
(b) Unjustness
327 There is considerable uncertainty regarding the question what circumstances will make it unjust for a person, having received the benefit of services supplied in circumstances where the parties had in prospect the making of a contract which would ensure to the benefit of the supplier of the services, not to pay a reasonable amount for the services supplied where the contract does not eventuate. In Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880, Sheppard J found that no agreement was reached because the Council decided to abandon a project under which the plaintiff would have been lessee (from the Council) and developer of a valuable site. The Council was held obliged to pay a reasonable amount for the services it had requested and accepted from the plaintiff and which had been provided in the interests of the project. By contrast, in the present case the failure of the parties to reach agreement was neither party's "fault" in my opinion.
328 I do not accept Fraser's submission that W-D knew at an early stage that it would not engage him yet "strung him along" to think that he had a chance of being appointed, in order that he would continue to assist W-D. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the two parties approached the question of Fraser's fee from very different starting points, as noted earlier. Fraser's was based on the scales in the RAIA Fee Guide and on views that his continued involvement in the Project was essential and that a premium should be payable for that involvement as well as for the "fast track" method of project administration. W-D's approach was based on the competitive market in which architectural services were bought and sold, a willingness to favour Fraser to only a minor extent and the view that there was nothing very unusual about the project administration that would be called for.
329 That W-D was negotiating in good faith is indicated by Sharpe's letter of 7 May 1993 conveying to Fraser W-D's proposal of a fee of 4.5 per cent of the nominated builder's gross costs paid by W-D excluding certain items, the most substantial of which was piling. In cross-examination, Fraser agreed that the question of payment of some fee in respect of piling was not closed off by Sharpe's letter and was a matter for negotiation. Yet Fraser's response to Sharpe's letter was to assert in a letter of the same date simply that his 5.42 per cent already represented a 20 per cent reduction below the level of fee recommended in the RAIA Fee Guide for a "conventional" building contract rather than a "fast track" one; that he had no alternative but to reject the "arbitrary" fee put by Sharpe; that there was, on the other side, a "seeming lack of acknowledgment of the extent and quality of the Architectural services which [would] be required on [the] complex and highly controversial project" which gave Fraser "serious cause for concern"; and that if the proposal conveyed by Sharpe was "serious", he (Fraser) would have to believe that his engagement as W-D's architect would not continue.
330 In making its offer of 7 May 1993, W-D was indicating a willingness to agree to a percentage fee rather than its preferred lump sum. There is room for argument as to the amount which the percentage would have given. But certainly if Fraser's predicted cost level was correct, and perhaps even if W-D's was correct, the amount that W-D was offering Fraser would have exceeded the amount later agreed upon with Peddle Thorp. It is true that the offer in Sharpe's letter of 7 May was expressed to be made "without prejudice", subject to further documentation and subject to approval by W-D's financiers, but I think that it was a bona fide offer which, subject to a little further negotiation, could well have led to the retainer of Fraser as project architect. But Fraser would have none of it. Of course, he was he entitled, as a matter of negotiation, to take this stance. Whether his criticisms of the offer had substance is beside the point. I think that W-D was negotiating in good faith hoping that Fraser would reduce his level of expectation and accept its offer. Further evidence of W-D's good faith is to be found in the fact that it "kept the door open" for such a long time during which it expressly gave Fraser the chance more than once to reduce his fee.
331 Fault, however, is not the only element of "injustice" which will give rise to a liability to pay a reasonable sum for services received. In William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932, the plaintiff tendered for the rebuilding of the defendant's war damaged premises. The plaintiff's tender was the lowest and the defendant led it to believe that it would receive the contract. At the defendant's request, the plaintiff performed calculations, submitted successive estimates and provided particulars, in large part to support the defendant's claim on the War Damage Commission for compensation under the War Damage Act 1943 (UK). This work was extensive and it assisted the defendant to obtain an increased amount from the Commission. The defendant then decided to employ another builder to do the work. Subsequently, however, he sold the premises rather than having them rebuilt.
332 The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of a contract for the reconstruction, or, in the alternative, remuneration, as on a quantum meruit, for the work done, with the exception of that done on the plaintiff's original tender. Barry J held that no contract had been concluded but that the quantum meruit claim succeeded. His Lordship thought that the work fell outside that which a builder normally performs gratuitously when invited to tender. He noted the defendant's submission that
"[t]he existence ... of a common expectation that a contract would ultimately come into being and that the plaintiffs' services would be rewarded by the profits of that contract, leaves no room ... and, indeed, wholly negatives any suggestion, that the parties impliedly agreed that these services would be paid for in any other way". (at 936)
333 His Lordship then noted that the modern form of action called "quasi-contract" is not dependent on "the actual views or intentions of the parties at the time when the work was done or the services rendered". He referred to Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403, a case of a purported appointment of a person as managing director of a company, ineffective because both the plaintiff and the directors who represented the company had not obtained their share qualification, in which the plaintiff nonetheless recovered on a quantum meruit basis for services rendered, then added (at 939):
"I am unable to see any valid distinction between work done which was to be paid for under the terms of a contract erroneously believed to be in existence, and work done which was to be paid for out of the proceeds of a contract which both parties erroneously believed was about to be made. In neither case was the work to be done gratuitously, and in both cases the party from whom payment was sought requested the work and obtained the benefit of it. In neither case did the parties actually intend to pay for the work otherwise than under the supposed contract, or as part of the total price which would become payable when the expected contract was made. In both cases, when the beliefs of the parties were falsified, the law implied an obligation - and, in this case, I think the law should imply an obligation - to pay a reasonable price for the services which had been obtained. I am, of course, fully aware that in different circumstances it might be held that work was done gratuitously merely in the hope that the building scheme would be carried out and that the person who did the work would obtain the contract. That, I am satisfied, is not the position here. In my judgment, the proper inference from the facts proved in this case is not that this work was done in the hope that this building might possibly be reconstructed and that the plaintiff company might obtain the contract, but that it was done under a mutual belief and understanding that this building was being reconstructed and that the plaintiff company was obtaining the contract."
334 This decision was followed by Robert Goff J (as his Lordship then was) in British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504 in which a contractor issued a "letter of intent" to a proposed subcontractor and requested it to commence the subject work immediately. The subcontractor did so and had all but performed all of the manufacturing for which the subcontract was to provide when negotiations over the subcontract broke down. His Lordship analysed the position in the following terms (at 511):
"Both parties confidently expected a formal contract to eventuate. In these circumstances, to expedite performance under that anticipated contract, one requested the other to commence contract work, and the other complied with that request. If thereafter, as anticipated, a contract was entered into, the work done as requested will be treated as having been performed under that contract; if, contrary to their expectation, no contract was entered into, then the performance of the work is not referable to any contract the terms of which can be ascertained, and the law simply imposes an obligation on the party who made the request to pay a reasonable sum for such work as has been done pursuant to that request, such an obligation sounding in quasi contract or, as we now say, in restitution."
335 In that case, unlike the William Lacey case, the work was done in actual performance of the envisaged contract. In the William Lacey case,like the present one, the work done lay outside the proposed contract but in each case the provider of the services may be taken to have thought that the profit under the expected contract would amply "cover" the extraneous work in question. In the present case, the reasonable value of the work would represent a very small fraction of the profit which VFA would have made from the work as project architect.
336 The supplier of services was also permitted to recover remuneration on a quantum meruit basis where an expected contract which would have benefited it failed to materialise, albeit without wrongful conduct by the other party, in Independent Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Noble Lowndes Superannuation Consultants Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 525 (FC).
337 In the present case, in so far as they thought about the matter, both parties made a general assumption that they would enter into a contract of retainer, subject always to W-D's tender being successful. This is not to say that their state of belief was that a contract would definitely materialise. They knew that it might not. Moreover, Fraser's confidence that it would was probably stronger than W-D's. Fraser was confident that his undoubted eminence would carry the day and he did not recognise that W-D's approach was so strongly market-driven. But W-D also hoped and expected that a deal would be struck with Fraser. To find otherwise would be to say that Shipton and Vega's representation that Fraser was the "project architect" for the life of the Project was made with no belief that he probably would be. The fact that Shipton and Vega treated Fraser as though he was in some sense bound (not legally but morally) to undertake the additional work suggests that they believed their relationship with him was or would probably be an ongoing one.
338 Again, the services with which I am presently concerned were not in the nature of work carried out by a person to enable him or her to tender for a contract. Rather, the tender was to benefit W-D. To paraphrase Barry J in William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis at 935, Fraser was carrying on a business and, in normal circumstances, if asked to render services of the kind in question, the obvious inference would be that he would expect to be paid for so doing. No one could expect a business person or business firm to do this sort of work for nothing, and again, in normal circumstances the law would imply a promise to pay on the part of the person who requested the services.
339 In saying that Fraser would have expected to be paid for the work if the tender was won, I do not mean to say, or think it necessary to say, that the terms of the contract would have reflected an allocation of a charge to that work. In fact, in this case Fraser did, in his fee proposal, apportion part of his proposed fee to work done before acceptance of W-D's tender and his engagement. But W-D was interested in only "the bottom line". In any event, I think it is a fair reflection of the situation to say that Fraser should be taken to have had in mind in doing this work that his retainer as project architect would compensate him not only for the work done after it was concluded, but also for the subject work and that a reasonable person in the respondents' position would have understood this to be the case.
(c) The assumption of risk
340 Fraser should not be entitled to a reasonable fee for the work done by him not covered by the two contracts if he is properly to be seen as having assumed the risk, not only that W-D would not win the tender but also, if it did, that the parties would not reach agreement on the terms of his retainer as project architect. In William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis, Barry J noted (at 939) that he was
"fully aware that in different circumstances it might be held that work was done gratuitously merely in the hope that the building scheme would be carried out and that the person who did the work would obtain the contract".
On the facts of that case his Lordship was not satisfied that the plaintiff who had done the work had accepted the risk that a contract would not materialise. In this case the respondents submit that I should reach the opposite conclusion. In the Independent Grocers case, Duggan J dissented precisely on the ground that the plaintiff superannuation consultants had accepted the risk that the superannuation fund might not be established with the result that their services might prove abortive, just as Fraser accepted the analogous risk if W-D's tender was unsuccessful.
341 I think it clear that Fraser understood and accepted that he was not to be remunerated for the additional work if W-D did not win the tender. In that case all his work would prove to have been of no benefit to W-D. Moreover, if he was to be paid irrespective of the success of W-D's tender, one would expect the parties not to have waited until after the result of the tender was known before negotiating over the amount of his fee. Finally, Fraser knew that W-D was borrowing to finance the tender and that if the tender did not succeed, it would simply have no money with which to pay him for the work.
342 I do not think it at all clear, however, that Fraser also accepted the risk that agreement might not reached on his appointment as project architect. There was no obvious reason for him to do so: he was entitled to assume that, if the project was won, W-D would be able to obtain sufficient funds to pay him the amount in question, which is obviously relatively small. I do not think that Fraser's numerous concessions in cross examination that his being retained as project architect was contingent upon successful conclusion of a negotiation over his fee amount to a concession that if that did not occur, he was not to be remunerated for the services with which I am presently concerned. Indeed, if that negotiation had been successful, that work would have lost its separate significance and would have been treated as encompassed by the much larger project architect's fee.
343 The parties simply did not turn their minds to the question whether Fraser should be paid for this work if the tender was won but Fraser was not engaged. Given that the work was, as I have said, requested and accepted by W-D and of benefit to it and work for which Fraser would normally be expected to be remunerated, I see no reason to conclude that Fraser accepted the risk that he would not be paid even if W-D won the tender.
344 Martin gave evidence that DC sometimes discounted a fee for initial work on the basis of their assessment that they would certainly, or probably, be retained to do further work in connection with the project. He said that in such cases DC sometimes secured a commitment that if the project went ahead they would be retained, while at other times they did not do so, and in the latter "calculated bet" situation it sometimes transpired that they were not retained.
345 This generalised evidence of what one firm sometimes did is not of much assistance in relation to the present issue. In any event, as I have held earlier, in the present case the sums of $70,000 and $15,000 were not fees of the kind contemplated by Martin's evidence. They were not charges for all the work done by Fraser. Rather, they were charges for much more limited work carried out over quite a short period of time. So regarded, they appear to have represented little if any discount but left untouched the other work performed by Fraser, no doubt at a less intensive level of activity but over a much longer period. I am not persuaded that Fraser accepted the risk, if W-D's tender was successful, of his not being remunerated for those professional services, excluding always those covered by the first and second contracts and by his accounts totalling $85,000, that W-D requested of Fraser and accepted from him. Some support for the view that he should not be understood to have undertaken this risk is to be found in the fact that both the first and second contracts were the result of close negotiation - a consideration that suggests that Fraser should not lightly be taken to have "ventured" these other services even if the Project was won.
346 The present case is distinguishable from Regalian Properties plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212. In that case, a developer sought reimbursement from a landowner of amounts which the developer had paid to various professional firms. It had paid those amounts in connection with its attempt to satisfy conditions imposed by the landowner, both as landowner and as planning authority, in order to put itself in a position to obtain a building lease from the landowner. Both parties proceeded on the assumption that "subject to contract" the lease would be granted. Ultimately, through the fault of neither party, they were unable to reach agreement with the result that the developer's expenditures were wasted.
347 The case is distinguishable from the present one because the landowner did not request the developer to engage the firms for its benefit or "accept" their services, and the developer's action, whether regarded as the procurement or the provision of the services, did not in fact benefit the landowner. In the present case, Fraser did not undertake the work in question in order to qualify himself for appointment as project architect; rather, W-D requested him to provide his services for its benefit; W-D accepted the services; and the services did in fact benefit W-D.
348 It is necessary now to return to the third further amended statement of claim. As noted earlier, the quantum meruit claim as pleaded was for, or included, the work done pursuant to the first contract, and therefore necessarily sought a setting aside of that contract. Neither the pleading nor submissions addressed the possibility of an entitlement to remuneration on a quantum meruit basis only for work not covered by the first and second contracts. It would be inappropriate for me to enter judgment for the applicants without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard on the question discussed in this section, including such issues as whether an amendment to the pleading is necessary and, if so, whether it should be allowed at this late stage.
349 Another matter is that the evidence does not permit me to fix the amount of the applicants' entitlement on the basis described. On any reckoning, it seems that the amount would not be large. Perhaps the parties could agree on the amount.
CONCLUSION
350 At present I will make no order other than to stand over the proceeding to a date for mention.
I certify that the preceding three hundred and fifty (350) paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Lindgren