Both parties were then interviewed together where they confirmed that they have a defacto relationship and intended to continue that in Australia.
Ablim was then advised that I intended to cancel his visa under
s 116(1)(A) as he had failed to disclose his relationship with Viola.
Chiorny was also advised that I intended to cancel her visa under
s116(1)(A) as the circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer exist.
Both were given the opportunity to provide any reason why their visas should not be cancelled. Neither could provide any valid reason why I should not take this course of action although both were concerned about their immediate prospects of entering Australia.
Both were then advised that I would consider an application for a border visa for a short term stay in Australia which would allow them the opportunity to make an application for residence together should they decide to do so.
Both granted border visas class 773 valid for stay until 291096. Both were advised that if they decide to do so they must make an application to remain permanently prior to expiry of this visa.
In her evidence-in-chief at the hearing of the application Ms Cooper said that after interviewing the couple separately she had interviewed them together and put to the applicant the information that Ablim had provided namely that Ablim had said that she (the applicant) could learn English in Australia and resume her nursing studies in Australia and if she likes Australia they would register their marriage and apply for her to stay permanently. She further says that she put to the applicant at the outset of her initial interview what Ablim's sister had told her which according to the report was that the sister knew that Ablim was travelling with a friend, that she knew of the relationship between them and that both were intending to stay with her in Australia. The witness was however unable to explain the absence of any reference to these matters in her report and when she was asked to comment on the applicant's suggestion that she had failed to give the applicant any indication at all that her visa was in jeopardy the witness disagreed. The following exchange between counsel for the respondent and Ms Cooper appears at pp 79-80 of the transcript:
MR KEELY: It is suggested that you have failed to give her any indication at all that her visa is in jeopardy or was in jeopardy at the time. What do you say as to that?
THE WITNESS: I disagree with that, your Honour.
MR KEELY: But what indication did you give her?
THE WITNESS: I advised the couple together or Ms Chiorny that I intended to cancel her visa and asked her if there was anything that she wanted to say or anything that I should take into consideration before or any reason why I shouldn't proceed with that course of action, your Honour.
MR KEELY: And was there any response forthcoming?
THE WITNESS: No, no reasons were provided why I shouldn't continue with that course of action.
It is clear from the evidence that Ms Cooper does not assert that in the process of considering whether to cancel the applicant's visa she notified the applicant that there appeared to be grounds for cancellation nor did she at that stage give particulars of those grounds and of the information because of which the grounds appeared to exist; further, it necessarily follows that the applicant was not invited to make any response during the process of consideration. Ms Cooper's evidence both in her report and in Court, is that after she had advised the applicant that she intended to cancel the visa, the applicant was given the opportunity to provide any reason why the visa should not be cancelled. There was clearly no compliance with s 119(1). Furthermore, to advise a visa holder that the visa was to be cancelled because "the circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer exist" is not, in my opinion, sufficient to comply with the requirement that the visa holder be given the particulars required to be given under ss 119(1)(a) and 120.
The provisions of ss 119 and 120 are not difficult to follow. They set out clearly the steps required to be taken when consideration is being given to the cancellation of a visa. The Act makes provision for review of such a decision in circumstances where there has been a failure to observe procedures that are required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision. This case is clearly such a case. I find as a fact that the Minister's delegate Ms Cooper when considering cancelling the applicant's visa did not comply with the procedures required by ss 119 and 120 to be observed. At its highest Ms Cooper's evidence suggests only that any token compliance with s 119(1) occurred after the decision to cancel was made. Further, the relevance of the information obtained from Ablim and his sister was never explained (s 120(2)(c)). The primary ground of relief is established on the evidence of the respondent's own witness.
In the circumstances it is unnecessary to make any definitive findings as to matters in respect of which there is a conflict between the evidence of the applicant and Ms Cooper. One can however readily understand that a non-English speaking foreign national upon being confronted by the circumstances which have been related shortly after her arrival in this country may not necessarily recall every detail of what occurred and what was said. It seems highly likely that the provisions of ss 119 and 120 have been crafted for the specific purpose of ensuring that in such circumstances the visa holder is accorded fair treatment and that no decision is made in the Minister's name until the matters in issue have been fairly put to and understood by the visa holder. The Immigration officer conducting the interview is in a dominant position and it is a matter of serious concern that a proper record was not kept of everything that was said at the time. It should not be beyond the wit of those charged with the administration of the Act to devise a system whereby a record is made of such interviews either by audio or video recording or in writing so that not only the affected parties but also the Court can with some confidence know precisely what has occurred. In the present case the Immigration officer's record was less than satisfactory.
As the application clearly succeeds on the first ground pleaded in the application it is not strictly necessary to deal with the other grounds raised by the applicant, but I will nevertheless add these observations. In this case where there has been a failure to observe provisions of the Act which must be observed before the power to cancel can be exercised, it must follow that the decision to cancel the visa is an improper exercise of the power to cancel conferred by the Act (ground 2) and accordingly, cannot be a decision authorised by the Act or regulations (ground 4). The decision-maker found that the applicant had been living in a de facto relationship with Ablim in Israel and that she intended to continue in that relationship in Australia. From those facts she inferred that the applicant was not a genuine visitor. Such an inference was at least open in a case where there had clearly been a deliberate attempt by the two persons in question to conceal from the authorities their true relationship. If this was in fact the reasoning which Ms Cooper applied then all of those matters should have been explained to the applicant in detail as required by ss 119 and 120.
It follows from the conclusion I have reached that the decision to cancel the applicant's class 676 visa on 29 September 1996 should be set aside. The Minister concedes that the applicant has remained in Australia lawfully since 29 September 1996. There is no need to make any further order concerning the decision. The Minister has sufficient statutory powers to deal with the situation as it has now developed.
The Minister must pay the applicant's costs including any reserved costs but not including the costs of the proposed witness Peter Bruce to whom I make reference in the following addendum to these reasons.
ADDENDUM
On 14 February 1997 the applicant's solicitors caused a subpoena to be issued requiring the attendance of Mr Peter Bruce to give evidence at the hearing of the application.
Mr Bruce is a member of the Immigration Review Tribunal (IRT) and was involved in that capacity in an application made to the IRT by the applicant on 30 September 1996. That application, which sought the review of the decision to cancel the applicant's visa, was clearly misconceived as the decision was not one capable of being reviewed by the IRT.
In opening the applicant's case counsel indicated that it was her intention to call Mr Bruce to give evidence as to what had occurred at a preliminary hearing which he convened in the IRT. The thrust of the proposed evidence seems to be that the interpreter Mr Hintze, who incidentally was engaged to interpret at the preliminary hearing, said something at that hearing about the events on the night of 28-29 September 1996 which counsel foreshadowed he could no longer recall.
In the course of the hearing on 20 September 1996, Mr N. Styant-Browne, a solicitor acting for Mr Bruce and the IRT, appeared by leave and moved that the subpoena served on Mr Bruce be set aside. After hearing submissions I ordered that the subpoena be set aside and that the applicant pay the costs of Mr Bruce's attendance at Court. I indicated that I would give written reasons in due course.
Section 373(1) of the Migration Act 1958 provides that a member of the IRT has, in the performance of his or her duties as a member, the same protection and immunity as a member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Section 60(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provides that a member of the AAT has, in the performance of his duties as a member, the same protection and immunity as a Justice of the High Court. It follows therefore that a member of the IRT has, in the performance of his duties as a member, the same protection and immunity as a Justice of the High Court. I was referred in argument to the statement in 17 Halbury's Laws of England (4th Ed) at para 236 that "a judge of the Superior Courts may refuse to give evidence as to judicial proceedings which have taken place before him", which is the basis for the proposition that as a Justice of the High Court could not be compelled to give evidence concerning a judicial proceeding before that Justice the same immunity would be enjoyed by an IRT member in relation to the performance of his function as such a member. I was not, however, referred to s 16(2) of the Evidence Act (Cth) 1905 which provides that a person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding unless the court gives leave. Having regard to the provisions of s 373(1) of the Migration Act 1958, it is my opinion that an IRT member is not compellable to give evidence in this Court about a proceeding before the member in the IRT without the Court's leave. It necessarily follows that such a member is compellable with the leave of the Court. In the present case no such leave was specifically sought although had the issue been raised I have no doubt that counsel for the applicant would have sought leave. In the circumstances my decision to set aside the subpoena, insofar as it was based on the broad statement from Halsbury was unsound. Had an application for leave been made I would have been required to consider the
matter on its merits. As this was not done my decision should not be regarded as having any weight.
It was also submitted that s 377 of the Migration Act 1958 precludes an IRT member from giving evidence concerning information obtained by the member in the performance of his functions or the exercise of his powers.
The relevant parts of s 377 are:
377 (1) This section applies to a person who is or has been:
(a) a member of the Tribunal;
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) ...
(2) This section applies to information or a document if the information or document concerns a person and is obtained by a person to whom this section applies in the course of performing functions or duties or exercising powers under this Act.
...
(5) A person to whom this section applies shall not be required:
(a) to produce in a court any document to which this section applies; or
(b) to divulge or communicate to any court any information to which this section applies;
except where it is necessary to do so for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.
It is clear that in the case of an application to review an IRT decision under s 476 it would be necessary for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act for an IRT member to disclose to the Court information to which
s 377 applies. Without such information the review process would be entirely frustrated. But it seems to me that the policy considerations evidenced by the overall provisions of
s 377 indicate that proceedings in the IRT should as a general rule remain confidential. In my opinion it was not necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act in relation to the present application for Mr Bruce to divulge to this Court information disclosed to him in the exercise of his functions in relation to the applicant's abortive application to the IRT.
I certify that this and the preceding 20 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Olney