(b) that, in any event, no opportunity had been provided in accordance with the provisions of s.144(4) of the Evidence Act .
18 The substantive issue on this summons, accordingly, turned on Ground 3, namely, the contention that her Honour erred in convicting the plaintiff on both counts of intimidation and harassment of Inspector Johnson based on the same conduct.
19 The provisions of s.60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) are as follows:-
"(1) A person who assaults, stalks, harasses or intimidates a police officer while in the execution of the officer's duty, although no actual bodily harm is occasioned to the officer, is liable to imprisonment for five years."
20 The resolution of Ground 3 essentially turns upon the application of the principles as to a plea in bar which was discussed by the High Court in Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 612, in particular, at 616-617 (paragraphs [18] to [19]).
21 Mr. J. Stratton, SC. submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, where an accused is charged with both intimidating and harassing a police officer, the latter offence is necessarily subsumed in the former. Reliance was placed upon the decision of Simpson, J. in Meller v. Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517 in which her Honour adopted, at p.519, the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "intimidate" as meaning "to render timid, to inspire with fear, to overawe, to cow, or to force to or defer from some action by threats or violence or by inducing fear".
22 Mr. Stratton further submitted that a finding that an accused had harassed a police officer would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the accused had intimidated the police officer but that a finding that an accused person had intimidated a police officer would necessarily lead to the conclusion that he had harassed him or her.
23 In order to evaluate the submission, it is necessary to identify with as much precision as possible what conduct constitutes intimidation of a police officer and what conduct is embraced within the word harasses in s.60(1).