Van Eeden v R
[2012] NSWCCA 18
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
Decision date
2012-02-08
Before
Basten JA, Hulme J, Schmidt J, Spigelman CJ, McHugh J
Catchwords
- (2001) 204 CLR 290 R v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231 R v Hinton [2002] NSWCCA 405
- [2002] 134 A Crim R 286 R v Matthews (1996) 130 FLR 230 R v Ryan (2001) 206 CLR 267 R v Togias [2001] NSWCCA 522
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
Judgment 1BASTEN JA : I agree with Schmidt J that the application for leave to appeal against sentence in this matter should be refused. I also agree with her reasons, but would add the following. 2Ground 3 complained that the sentencing judge had undervalued the adverse effect of the sentence on the applicant's life in Australia following his arrest. That ground did not in terms identify any challenge based on failure to take into account the effect on his family or dependants, as required s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Nevertheless, that provision was relied upon by the applicant in submissions. 3As explained by Spigelman CJ in Togias , this provision has long been construed as precluding a sentencing judge from giving "substantial" weight to such considerations, absent exceptional circumstances: Togias [2001] NSWCCA 522; 127 A Crim R 23 at [13]-[16]. Some of the authorities referred to in Togias date from a period when courts were more willing than is the case today to assume that legislation was not intended to depart from general law principles: Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton [2001] HCA 14; 204 CLR 290 at [27]-[30] (McHugh J). Nevertheless, as Spigelman CJ also noted, it is not for this Court now to depart from a position adopted by appellate courts in most States: see also R v Matthews (1996) 130 FLR 230 at 233-234 (Phillips CJ, Southwell and Hampel AJJA agreeing). 4That is not to say that the legislative direction is to be flouted by ignoring the consideration in cases lacking exceptional circumstances: it merely means that the accepted sentencing range for a particular offence is likely to have incorporated the usual expected consequences for dependants and that the effect of any unusual consequences, shown to be probable, will depend on all the other circumstances, including the seriousness of the offence. 5A typical case in which the effect on dependants may be given significant weight is one in which the offender is a mother with a baby or young child in her care. In the present case, the applicant's wife has no doubt lost a period of co-habitation with him and the children will have lost contact with their father who was, possibly, the principal breadwinner, for the period of his incarceration. These consequences may be accepted as probable, not because they were addressed in the evidence, but because they are the usual consequences of incarceration of a person in the position of the applicant. It follows that, in accordance with the established principles, they could not significantly affect the length of the sentence imposed. 6So far as a general complaint was made that the sentence was excessive, reliance was placed in submissions primarily on the errors, described as significant, which had already been addressed in other grounds. 7There were three factors which were potentially favourable to the applicant in respect of this ground. The first was the finding that he was to be sentenced as a courier and not as a principal, although that classification was of limited relevance in respect of an offence involving dealing in money where there is a risk that the money "will become an instrument of crime". Secondly, he entered an early plea of guilty indicating a wish to facilitate the course of justice. The sentencing judge did not indicate the extent of any diminution in the sentence which might have followed from that fact, but it can be assumed to have been significant. Thirdly, although the amount involved was a significant sum, it was in the middle of the range covered by this particular offence. 8The maximum penalty for the offence was 10 years imprisonment. In those circumstances, the sentence imposed does not itself demonstrate any manifest excess. 9RS Hulme J : I agree with Schmidt J. 10Schmidt J : The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a sentence imposed upon him by Solomon DCJ on 15 December 2010. On 1 November 2010, the applicant entered a plea to a charge brought under s 400.4(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years, 1 month to date from 15 December 2010, expiring on 14 January 2014, with a non-parole period of 1 year, 10 months. In fixing that sentence his Honour indicated that he had taken into account that the offender had spent approximately 2 months in custody. 11The charge to which the applicant entered the plea was: "On or about 12 October 2009 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales did deal with money where there was a risk that the money would become an instrument of crime and was reckless as to the fact that there was a risk that the money would become an instrument of crime and at the time of the dealing the value of the money was $100,000 or more." 12The maximum penalty for the offence, which is concerned with amounts ranging from $100,000 to $1,000,000, was 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $66,000.