Applicable principles
27 In circumstances where USG requested examination of the Patent Application before 15 April 2013, the legislative amendments to ss 40(3) and 102(1) of the Patents Act brought about by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) do not apply to the application to amend the Patent Application: see s 3 and Sch 1, items 9, 29, 55(1) and 55(9) of that Act. Reference will therefore be made to the relevant provisions as they stood immediately before that Act came into operation.
28 At all relevant times, s 104 of the Patents Act has provided:
104 Amendments by applicants and patentees
(1) An applicant for a patent or a patentee, may, subject to this Act, and subject to and in accordance with the regulations, ask the Commissioner for leave to amend the relevant patent request or complete specification, or any other filed document, for any purpose including either or both of the following:
(a) removing a lawful ground of objection to the request or specification, whether that objection is raised in the course of an examination or re-examination or otherwise;
(b) correcting a clerical error or an obvious mistake.
(2) Where an applicant or patentee asks for leave to amend a patent request or complete specification, or any other filed document, the Commissioner must consider and deal with the request in accordance with the regulations.
(4) The Minister or any other person may, subject to and in accordance with the regulations, oppose allowing an amendment.
(5) The Commissioner must not allow an amendment that is not allowable under section 102.
(6) On the allowance of an amendment, the amendment is to be taken to have been made.
(7) An appeal lies to the Federal Court, against a decision of the Commissioner allowing, or refusing to allow, a requested amendment, other than a prescribed decision.
29 An appeal under s 104(7) is not an exercise of appellate jurisdiction; it is an exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Court exercising for the first time the judicial power of the Commonwealth: New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman-La Roche AG (2004) 141 FCR 1 at [23], [44] per Kiefel, Allsop and Crennan JJ. The Court approaches the matter for the first time, not in order to decide whether the executive decision-maker was right or wrong, or otherwise to correct error in the executive decision, but to deal with a subject matter, a controversy, for the first time: New England Biolabs at [44]; see also, in the context of s 60(4), Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394 at [18] per Heerey, Kenny and Middleton JJ.
30 As applicable to the present case, s 102 of the Patents Act relevantly provided:
102 What amendments are not allowable?
Amendment of complete specification not allowable if amended specification would claim matter not in substance disclosed in the filed specification
(1) An amendment of a complete specification is not allowable if, as a result of the amendment, the specification would claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed.
Certain amendments of complete specification are not allowable after relevant time
(2) An amendment of a complete specification is not allowable after the relevant time if, as a result of the amendment:
(a) a claim of the specification would not in substance fall within the scope of the claims of the specification before amendment; or
(b) the specification would not comply with subsection 40(2) or (3).
(Emphasis added.)
31 The parts of the Decision adverse to USG turned on ss 102(1), 102(2)(b) and 40(3).
32 As applicable to the present case, s 40(3) provided:
The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification.
33 In the discussion that follows, it will be convenient to refer in the present tense to the relevant provisions as they stood prior to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act.
34 The language used by the Patents Act directs attention to the effect of the amendment being considered. Thus, it has been said that the application of s 102(1) involves a two stage process. In RGC Mineral Sands Pty Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd (1998) 89 FCR 458, the Full Court of this Court (Burchett, Carr and Goldberg JJ) said at 466:
That subsection requires one first to identify precisely what is the amendment. In this case that is done by identifying the difference between the specification as accepted (and as it stood at the hearing of the motion at first instance) on the one hand and, on the other hand, as the specification would read if amended in the manner sought. Then one reads the specification as a whole (as so amended in the manner sought) to see whether as a result of the amendments sought (which must mean by reason of the amendment sought) the specification would claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed. The subsection focuses on the amendment proposed and it must be that amendment which has the result of pushing the claimed matter over the line defined by the expression "matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed". The key point to keep in mind is, as counsel for the respondent contended (in our view correctly), that the words "as a result of the amendment" are not to be confused with the expression "after the amendment".
(Emphasis in original.)
35 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2010) 87 IPR 516 at [38], Yates J reiterated that the analysis undertaken pursuant to s 102(1) must be confined to a consideration of the result of the proposed amendments:
[T]he key point is that the words "as a result of the amendment" in s 102(1) are not to be confused with the expression "after the amendment". The amendment is identified by considering the specification as it stands with how it would stand after the proposed amendment. It is only by that step that one can determine what matter results from the amendment. Once that is determined, the next step is to read the specification as a whole (that is, amended in the manner proposed) and to compare it with what is "in substance disclosed" in the specification as filed. If by reason of the amendment proposed, and for no other reason, the specification would then claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed, the amendment would not be allowable.
36 The phrase "if, as a result of amendment" has the same meaning when used in s 102(2). In this respect, it has been observed in Bodkin C, Patent Law in Australia (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2014) at [13230] that:
The expression "as a result of the amendment" has the same meaning in the context of s 102(2) as it does in the context of s 102(1) (see [13220]); that is, in s 102(2)(b) the appropriate question is whether any failure to comply with s 40(2) or (3) would arise because of an amendment that is proposed, and did not exist before.
(Footnote omitted.)
37 It has been held that the requirement of "in substance disclosed" in s 102(1) is at least very similar to, and has a close relationship with, the test for fair basis: see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd at [39]; Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 321 at [18] per Burchett, Heerey and Lehane JJ; ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v Lubrizol Corporation Inc (2000) 106 FCR 214 at [118] per Lee, Heerey and Lehane JJ. Indeed, the Full Court of this Court has expressed the view that it will "be a rare case indeed where a claim which claims matter in substance disclosed in the specification as filed is not, equally, fairly based on the matter described in the specification (and vice versa)": ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v Lubrizol Corporation Inc at [118].
38 It is "a well settled approach that the requirements of s 102 should generally be given a liberal construction": Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 625 at [25] per Tamberlin J. The phrase "not in substance disclosed" should be interpreted in "a broad common sense way": Ethyl Corporation's Patent [1972] RPC 169, applied in Gambro at [25]. It has also been said that a liberal approach should be adopted "so as to permit any fair amendment which had previously been disclosed": Gambro at [25], citing Ethyl Corporation's Patent.
39 It has been held that the disclosure in an unamended specification of an optional feature of the claimed invention is sufficient for that feature to have been in substance disclosed within the meaning of s 102(1): see RGC Mineral Sands Pty Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd at 468 per Burchett, Carr and Goldberg JJ.
40 This is consistent with the principle expressed by Fullagar J in Société des Usines Chimiques Rhône-Poulenc v Commissioner of Patents (1958) 100 CLR 5 at 11, that fair basis "cannot be limited to cases where the subject matter of the later application has been made the subject of a specific claim in the earlier application".
41 In Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 274, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, relying on the judgment of Fullagar J in Société des Usines Chimiques Rhône-Poulenc v Commissioner of Patents, stated:
68 … The comparison which s 40(3) calls for is not analogous to that between a claim and an alleged anticipation or infringement. It is wrong to employ "an over meticulous verbal analysis". It is wrong to seek to isolate in the body of the specification "essential integers" or "essential features" of an alleged invention and to ask whether they correspond with the essential integers of the claim in question.
69 … Section 40(3) requires, in Fullagar J's words, "a real and reasonably clear disclosure". But those words, when used in connection with s 40(3), do not limit disclosures to preferred embodiments.
"The circumstance that something is a requirement for the best method of performing an invention does not make it necessarily a requirement for all claims; likewise, the circumstance that material is part of the description of the invention does not mean that it must be included as an integer of each claim. Rather, the question is whether there is a real and reasonably clear disclosure in the body of the specification of what is then claimed, so that the alleged invention as claimed is broadly, that is to say in a general sense, described in the body of the specification."
Fullagar J's phrase serves the function of compelling attention to the construction of the specification as a whole, putting aside particular parts which, although in isolation they might appear to point against the "real" disclosure, are in truth only loose or stray remarks.
(Footnotes omitted.)
42 In Lockwood v Doric, the High Court (at [57]) approved the following observations of Barwick CJ in Olin Corporation v Super Cartridge Co Pty Ltd (1977) 180 CLR 236 (at 240):
The question whether the claim is fairly based is not to be resolved … by considering whether a monopoly in the product would be an undue reward for the disclosure. Rather, the question is a narrow one, namely whether the claim to the product being new, useful, and inventive, that is to say, the claim as expressed, travels beyond the matter disclosed in the specification.
43 In applying s 102(1) with principles concerning fair basis in mind, it has been held to be appropriate to have regard to the "travelling beyond" notion of Olin and Lockwood v Doric and to ask "would the matter claimed by the specification as a result of the amendment travel beyond matter in substance disclosed in the specification as filed?": Emperor Sports Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (2005) 146 FCR 159 at [82] per Lindgren J.
44 It follows that where the amendments would merely narrow the scope of the invention claimed, they are likely to have been in substance disclosed and fairly based: see, eg, Emperor Sports at [80], [86] per Lindgren J. In other words, a claim that is more limited in scope than the invention as described can be, and perhaps usually will be, fairly based on the description given: see Bodkin C, Patent Law in Australia (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2014) at [5840].
45 Ultimately, the question under both ss 102(1) and 40(3) is, effectively, whether there is "a real and reasonably clear disclosure" in the relevant specification of what is claimed in the amended claim, such that "the alleged invention as claimed is broadly, that is to say in a general sense, described in the body of the specification": Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems (International) Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 79 at 95 per Gummow J.
46 A helpful understanding of the appropriate level of generality sufficient to make out an in substance disclosure is provided by reference to the 'Mond Nickel questions'. In F Hoffman-La Roche & Co Aktiengesellschaft v Commissioner of Patents (1971) 123 CLR 529 at 538-539, Gibbs J cited the three questions posed by Lloyd-Jacob J in Re Mond Nickel Company Ltd's Application for a Patent [1956] RPC 189 at 194, as a guide to determining whether a claimed invention is "fairly based on matter disclosed" in a specification:
(1) Is the alleged invention as claimed broadly (i.e. in a general sense) described in the basic application?
(2) Is there anything in the basic application which is inconsistent with the alleged invention as claimed?
(3) Does the claim include as a characteristic of the invention a feature as to which the basic application is wholly silent?
47 In Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems (International) Pty Ltd, Gummow J (at 93) restated those three Mond Nickel questions as they apply to fair basing under s 40(3) as follows:
(a) Is the alleged invention as claimed broadly (ie, in a general sense) described in the body of the specification?
(b) Is there anything in the body of the specification which is inconsistent with the alleged invention as claimed?
(c) Does the claim include as a characteristic of the invention a feature as to which the body of the specification is wholly silent?
48 In CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260 at 280, the Full Court (Spender, Gummow and Heerey JJ) cautioned that the use of the term "inconsistent" in the second Mond Nickel question above is "somewhat unfortunate" insofar as it might encourage an over meticulous verbal analysis or discourage reference to drawings in addition to verbal descriptions.
49 USG submits that the rule against making a 'mosaic', applicable in the contexts of determining whether a claim lacks novelty and identifying the common general knowledge for the purposes of determining whether a claim lacks an inventive step, has no application to the determination of fair basis and whether claimed matter has been "in substance disclosed" in a specification. USG relies on Lockwood v Doric, in which Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated at [68]-[69] that the comparison which s 40(3) calls for is not analogous to that between a claim and an alleged anticipation and that one must consider the specification as a whole.
50 USG submits that the case law provides numerous examples where this Court has found in substance disclosure of a claimed invention from different parts of a specification. USG relies on the following examples:
(a) In Leonardis v Sartas No 1 Pty Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 126 (at 134, 138, 144), Burchett, Hill and Tamberlin JJ held that each of two claims was "fairly based on matter disclosed" in two separate provisional specifications when read together.
(b) In Novartis AG v Bausch & Lomb (Australia) Pty Ltd (2004) 62 IPR 71 (at [47], [60]-[61]), the proposed amendments sought to include a particular ion permeability value being taken from Tables E and F in the specification. Merkel J found that the amendment was allowable because there was a disclosure of this particular value in the specification, even though elsewhere in the specification different ranges described for this value might cause some confusion for a person skilled in the art.
(c) In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd, Yates J held that an amendment would be permissible which involved a consolidation of certain seemingly redundant claims into one claim. The key claim (claim 12) was formed by combining original claims 12, 14, 16, 17 and 18, which were all independent claims defining the same product (Anhydrous Aripiprazole Crystals B) in different ways. The new claim 12 required the product to exhibit each of the features of previous claims 12, 14, 16, 17 and 18.
51 It may be accepted that the applicable principles relating to fair basis and determination of whether claimed matter has been "in substance disclosed" in a specification do not specifically encompass the rule against making a mosaic as it applies in the contexts of issues of novelty and inventive step. Nevertheless, as the above description of the applicable principles indicates, it is necessary to consider whether there has been "a real and reasonably clear disclosure" in the specification of what is claimed in the amended claim.