CONSIDERATION
15 There is certainly evidence that some of the conditional respondents were not personally served with the originating process.
16 There is also evidence that in a small number of cases, some conditional respondents were not served in any sense with the process in that they did not at any time receive a copy of it.
17 On the other hand, there is no evidence that any moving respondent was either unaware of the proceeding or unaware that he or she was a respondent to the proceeding. Given the substantial publicity surrounding the commencement of the proceeding and the letters referred to below (at 25) this may not be surprising. This is a significant issue in light of the approach taken by the courts as to what will be personal service.
18 For the conditional respondents, it is argued that the applicants chose to join some 1500 respondents and must be taken to have been aware from the inception of the proceeding that the originating process was required to be served personally on each of them. It had been open to the applicants, on the first return date, at the hearing of the urgent application for the applicants to seek an order for substituted service. Although the applicants sought and obtained an order for substituted service in relation to the further or extended order made by the Court on 5 February 2010, that order was not stated to apply to either the order made on 28 January 2010 or to the originating process.
19 The respondents also contend that there is no adequate explanation for failure to personally serve considering that it was open to the applicants to serve the conditional respondents personally at work. However this argument overlooks the fact that the conditional respondents were allegedly not attending work which was the very reason for the commencement of the proceeding and for the alternative measures taken to attempt to effect service.
20 For the respondents, it is argued that the applicants have failed to adduce any evidence regarding:
(a) the steps that they have taken to serve each of the respondents 'personally'; or
(b) why it is or was 'impractical' to serve the respondents personally with the application - see O 7 r 9(1) and Porter v Freudenberg (1915) 1 KB 857 at 888-889.
21 At a technical level while there is some force in these submissions, I do not accept that they are entirely correct. The applicants have relied on affidavits of Mr Jack Peter Lee, Mr Rodney Charles Burnby and Mr Adie Rama Kadir which all relate to the steps taken to achieve service.
22 Mr Kadir is engaged with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA (CCIWA) and is an Employee Relations Advisor. He says that after the originating application and orders were made, he assisted in relation to the instruction of the Karratha bailiff and the Dampier bailiff regarding serving the originating process and the order on each of the respondents.
23 Mr Kadir asked each of the applicants to send a letter to the home addresses of each of the respondents whom they employed advising them of the originating application and the orders made by this Court. Each of the applicants posted the letter to their respective employees at their home address. He received and annexed to his affidavit written confirmation that the applicants had posted a copy of the letter to each respondent they employed. None of the employees responded to the correspondence seeking a further copy of the originating application or orders.
24 That original letter which was sent to each employee says:
We write to advise that on 27 January 2010, the Federal Court of Australia granted an interlocutory injunction restraining certain employees (including you) from continuing to take unprotected and unlawful industrial action on the Pluto LNG Project.
The interlocutory injunction will remain in force until 5.00 pm on 5 February 2010.
On or about Thursday, 28 January 2010, personal service of the following documents was effected on you in your accommodation on site:
· Federal Court Application for Interlocutory Injunction; and
· Federal Court Order of Justice McKerracher granting the Interlocutory Injunction (Order).
If you have not received copies of these documents, please contact [insert person] as soon as possible.
Please be aware that if you:
· refuse or neglect to do any act within the time specified in the Order for the doing of the act; or
· disobey the Order by doing an act which the order requires you to abstain from doing,
you will be liable to imprisonment, sequestration of property or other punishment.
Any other person who knows of the Order and does anything which helps or permits you to breach the terms of the Order will be similarly punished.
Yours faithfully
…
25 Mr Lee and Mr Burnby in their affidavits, swore that they served personally as many of the respondents as they were able to find at home and for those they could not find at home, they left the originating process at the address of each of the respondents in a variety of ways.
26 The position as to whether the respondents actually received the originating process is not clear but it must be said that at the commencement of this proceeding a great deal of publicity occurred as disclosed on affidavit evidence. That publicity taken together with the personal letters would explain why there is no evidence that any respondent, especially any conditional respondent, did not become aware that he or she was a party to the proceeding in the manner described in the letter forwarded by the applicants to all respondents at or about the date of the various letters.
27 Without the letter, it must be said that simply knowing of the proceeding does not mean that one knows that one is a party to the proceeding, let alone the precise cause of action being pursued. But the letter does at least deal with the important issue of knowledge of those matters.
28 Importantly given that the conditional respondents each instructed the solicitors concerned to enter conditional appearances, it must be inferred that the originating process came to their notice.
29 In Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie [No 2] (1996) 41 NSWLR 542 (at 544) Young J said observed:
… personal service merely means that the document in question must come to the notice of the person for whom it is intended. The means by which that person obtains the document are usually immaterial. This is clear in cases that have been considered good law over the centuries, including Hope v Hope (1854) 4 De GM & G 328 at 341-345; 43 ER 534 at 539-540; R v Heron; Ex parte Mulder (1884) 10 VLR 314 at 315; Pino v Prosser [1967] VR 835 at 838. Some of those cases were complicated by the requirement in the former statutes that a person serving initiating process had to
endorse the initiating process, but the principle is clear from them.
If this were not so, one would get the absurd situation referred to by McInerney J in Pino v Prosser (at 837), that the conclusion would be one which is:
"... remarkable to the point of seeming absurdity, in that the defendant who, on his own affidavit admits that he received the writ ... should be held not to have been served."
30 Recently in Metacorp Pty Ltd v Andeco Construction Group Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 199 Vickery J said (footnotes omitted):
84 As was pointed out by the Lord Chancellor in Hope v Hope:
The object of all service is of course only to give notice to the party to whom it is made, so that he may be made aware of and may be able to resist that which is sought against him; and when that has been substantially done, so that the court may feel perfectly confident that service has reached him, everything has been done as required.
85 To like effect were the observations of Holroyd J in Rudd v John Griffiths Cycle Co Ltd where his Honour, in the course of delivering a dissenting judgment of the Full Court, after referring to the common law history of personal service, went on to say:
Before the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, 15 and 16 Vict., c. 76, came into operation the Courts of England were in general very strict in their interpretation of what constituted personal service, but still on several occasions they declined to set aside the service where the copy of the writ had been delivered at the party's residence to a servant or relative of his and from the facts the Judge thought it fair to infer that it came into his hands or to his knowledge so that he did or could, if he pleased, become acquainted with its contents.
86 These passages were cited with approval by McInerney J in Pino v Prosser who observed that it would be:
... remarkable to the point of seeming absurdity, in that the defendant who, on his own affidavit admits that he received the writ ... should be held not to have been served.
87 The general principle enunciated in Hope v Hope and Rudd v John Griffiths Cycle Co Ltd, was applied by McInerney J in Pino v Prosser to the following circumstances: the relevant document, a copy writ, although left with the defendant's wife, who was a person not capable of accepting personal service on behalf of her husband, came into the possession of the defendant on the same day when, later that night after returning from work, the defendant was handed the copy of the writ by his wife. Receipt by this means was held by the Court to be sufficient to constitute good personal service.
31 As indicated at the outset, there is no doubt that conventional personal service has not been achieved for all of the conditional respondents. Moreover the applicants appear not to be able to say which respondent was 'served' in which manner, if at all.
32 Nevertheless it must be inferred that all of the conditional respondents are well aware that he or she is a party to the proceeding having instructed solicitors and counsel. This is far from a situation of 'the bailiff' appearing on the door step for the first time to effect execution of a judgment or order. To the extent it is relevant, which may be minimal, the proceedings are not far advanced at all. No defences have been filed for example.
33 Although it is possible that there may be some respondents who were unaware of the very substantial publicity surrounding the commencement of this litigation and the real possibility that as an employee, he or she was a party to it, there is no evidence that any of the conditional respondents were in that position.
34 The point that no substituted service order was sought at the outset is both correct and reasonable. However given the urgency of the situation in this unusual litigation, especially the very substantial sums at risk on a daily basis, it is understandable with hindsight that not every difficulty could be foreseen. There were concentrated service attempts which were reasonable in the circumstances. The personal letter to all employees of the applicants was another means of bringing the proceedings to their attention. When the difficulties became known, an application for substituted service was pursued.
35 For others not represented, the problem has not yet arisen but could reasonably be cured with an order under r 10 if that were appropriate which does not fall for consideration at present.
36 In my view the declarations sought should not be made as it is clear that all of the conditional respondents have the necessary notice of the originating process. Although they have not all been personally served in the conventional sense under the rules, the cases show that the purpose of the rules as to service has been achieved.