The decision in Peabody Pastoral Holdings Pty Limited v Mid-Western Regional Council [2013] NSWLEC 86
13The three reclassification challenges by Peabody Pastoral Holdings Pty Limited were, as a group, to have been heard by Preston CJ. Before the hearing, these matters were settled and consent orders proposed. However, in addition to the consent orders that settled the substantive contested issues in each matter, Peabody Pastoral Holdings Pty Limited also applied for orders that the Council pay the costs that this company had incurred in challenging the reclassifications.
14The costs application was heard by Preston CJ with judgment delivered on 5 June (Peabody Pastoral Holdings Pty Limited v Mid-Western Regional Council [2013] NSWLEC 86 (Peabody).
15Although the decision in Peabody is a costs decision and does not, perhaps, strictly give rise to matters of comity in my consideration of the issues in these proceedings, the Chief Judge undertook a comprehensive analysis not only of the particular processes undertaken by the Council in reclassifying the land owned by Peabody Holdings Pty Limited but also of the interpretation of and proper approach to the application of the various elements that arise in consideration of s 517 of the Act. Whilst the manner in which the provision is to be applied to the factual circumstances in each of these nine sets of proceedings is different, the framework within which those facts are to be analysed is, self-evidently, the same.
16In my consideration of how I should proceed to assess the classification in each of these nine proceedings, I have, obviously, closely considered the analysis undertaken by the Chief Judge in paras 59 to 91 of his decision in Peabody. In addition to my consideration of the terms of that decision in the Chief Judge's reasoning on and conclusions about the requirements for undertaking the relevant classification process, I also invited the parties to make submissions to me concerning the decision in Peabody and how that should impact, if I were to adopt it, on the classification process I was obliged to undertake. I have had the advantage of written submissions by Ms Duggan SC and Mr Galasso SC, senior counsel for the Council and the applicant respectively and shorter submissions in reply to each other's initial comments.
17In each instance, those submissions dealt with the broad matters of principle arising from the decision in Peabody as well as specific submissions as to how application of the process set out by the Chief Judge would, in the opinion of the applicant or the Council alter (if at all) the position originally advanced with respect to each of the nine parcels of land involved.
18I should now indicate that not only am I grateful to the Chief Judge for his analysis of how a classification process concerning land potentially subject to a mining classification pursuant to s 517 should be undertaken but that the various propositions set out by the Chief Judge are entirely in accord with the conclusions that I have, independently, reached on these matters of interpretation.
19As a consequence, I am grateful to the Chief Judge not only for the clarity of his exposition but also for the fact that his having done so saves me the necessity of an articulation of the relevant matters for myself. It is, therefore, appropriate, in my adoption of and agreement with what his Honour wrote that I should, for understanding the analysis that I subsequently undertake concerning each of the nine parcels of land in these proceedings, reproduce in their entirety the relevant paragraphs of his Honour's judgment:
20The relevant portions of the decision in Peabody are set out in full below:
59 This material reveals that the Council's reasons for categorising Peabody's parcels of land as mining are fivefold:
(a)the land is affected by noise from the Wilpinjong Coal Project mine;
(b)the noise affected land is owned by Peabody which is a mining company or a subsidiary of a mining company;
(c)the purpose for which Peabody acquired the land concerned the noise affectation by the mine;
(d)conditions of the project approval for the mine required Peabody to acquire land affected by noise exceeding specified criteria if requested by the noise affected landowner;
(e)even if the land was not used for a mining purpose, it was held for a mining purpose.
60 In my view, none of the reasons supported categorisation of Peabody's three properties as mining under s 517 of the LG Act.
Mere noise affectation by mine insufficient to constitute use for mine
61 The three properties the subject of the appeals were not physically used by Peabody for a coal mine. The only potential use of the land for a coal mine contended for by the Council was as a sensitive noise receiver located in proximity to a coal mine. The Council contended that noise affectation by a proximate coal mine was a relevant factor in categorising use of the land for a coal mine because it may trigger acquisition of the land under a condition of project approval or because noise attenuation over the land amounted to its use as a buffer from the mine.
62 I do not agree that affectation of land by adverse impacts such as noise from land on which a coal mine is operated causes the affected land to be used for the purpose of a coal mine.
63 Virtually all uses of land have external impacts to varying degrees. Use of land for farmland, residential, mining or business can each cause pollution (air, water, land, noise, light or visual), traffic and parking problems, or biodiversity impacts external to the site of the farmland, residential, mining or business use. Such externalities do not result in the land subject to the externalities being used for the purpose of the activity that causes the externalities. The residence affected by air pollution from an adjoining factory is not thereby used for the purpose of factory. A wetland affected by water pollution from an upstream farm is not thereby used for the purpose of a farm. So too land that is affected adversely, such as from noise impacts, by an open cut coal mine is not thereby used for the purpose of a coal mine. Affectation of land is to be distinguished from use of land.
Change in ownership of noise affected land does not change use of land
64 In submissions, the Council accepted the above proposition that mere affectation of land by a coal mine does not cause the affected land to be used for a coal mine. The Council contended, however, that affectation of land by a coal mine can result in the use of the land for coal mine if the affected land is in the same ownership as the affecting land. Hence, the statement in the report to the Council's meeting on 16 May 2012 that the settlement date of purchase or lease of land by a coal mining company is the trigger for a consideration of re-categorisation.
65 For example, the Council accepted that when the land at 3 Barnett Street, Wollar, which was used for residential accommodation, was owned by someone other than Peabody, the land should not be categorised as any category other than residential, notwithstanding that it was noise affected by the nearby coal mine. However, upon transfer of ownership to Peabody, the Council contended that the use transmogrified to be for a coal mine, notwithstanding that there was no change in actual use of the land for residential accommodation.
66 The Council's contention is unsupportable. A change in ownership by itself cannot cause a change in the purpose for which land is used for categorisation under s 517 of the LG Act.
Purpose of acquisition does not cause a change in use
67 The Council also contended that the purpose for which the land was acquired was a relevant factor in determining the use to which the land is put. The Council contended that acquisition by Peabody of the parcels of rateable land because they were affected by noise from the coal mine causes those lands to be used for the coal mine. In submissions, the Council relied on the statement in Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1957) 96 CLR 493 at 515 that use of land (for the purpose of determining whether the land was exempt from rates under the then s 132(1)(d) of the Local Government Act 1919) "will vary with the purpose for which it has been acquired and to which it has been devoted".
68 The Council submitted that the purpose for which land was acquired might be evidenced by the acquisition under a condition of project approval for the mine. In its decisions to re-categorise the properties as mining and to decline to change the category from mining, the Council relied on the existence of conditions of the project approval for the Wilpinjong Coal Project mine that entitled an owner of land affected by noise exceeding certain criteria to request acquisition of the noise affected land by the mine operator. The Council contended that the existence or activation of such conditions caused the noise affected land to be used for the coal mine.
69 As Peabody submitted, however, there was no evidence that any of the three properties the subject of these appeals were acquired by Peabody under the conditions of the project approval on the request of the landowner.
70 In oral submissions, the Council put its argument a different way. The Council submitted that the conditions of the project approval for the Wilpinjong Coal Project dealing with noise apply only to "privately-owned land". "Privately-owned land" is defined to not include land owned by a mining company or its subsidiary. Hence, upon Peabody acquiring land affected by noise from the coal mine, the condition of the project approval requiring the mine operator to ensure that the noise generated by the mine not exceed specified criteria would cease to apply. By this mechanism, the mine operator could be relieved from having to take action at the noise source (the coal mine) to reduce the noise that would be received on other land to a level that complied with the criteria in the condition.
71 The Council submitted that acquisition of noise affected land by Peabody for this purpose caused the acquired land to be used for the coal mine.
72 I do not consider that the purpose for which land has been acquired, by itself, is imprinted on the use of the land upon acquisition. First, a mere intention to use land that is to be acquired for a purpose that is different to the purpose for which the land is currently being used is not sufficient to effect a change of use of the land for that purpose upon acquisition. Only when the acquired land is devoted to use for the different purpose for which it was acquired can there be a change in the purpose of the use. The intended purpose of the use of the land must be manifested by the commencement of some activity on the land: Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [2003] NSWLEC 309 at [22] and Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWSC 867; (2010) 79 NSWLR 724 at [59]-[60].
73 Secondly, the grant of approval for a mine with a condition entitling noise affected landowners to require acquisition of their land if the noise exceeds certain criteria does not effect any change in the purpose of the use of the land subject to the condition. The affected land is not part of the development site the subject of the project approval. The owners of the affected land may be given entitlements under, but they and their land are not bound by, the project approval.
74 Thirdly, any subsequent acquisition of noise affected land pursuant to such a condition also would not, by itself, cause a change in the purpose of the use of the land acquired - it simply causes a change in ownership. The reason why the land is so acquired does not affect the use of the land. The mine operator is required to acquire the land in these circumstances, because that is what the condition of approval for the mine requires the mine operator to do. The mine operator is required by law to carry out the activity of the coal mine in accordance with the conditions of the project approval. One of these conditions is to acquire land affected by noise exceeding specified criteria on request by the owner of the noise affected land. If the mine operator is so required to acquire, and does acquire, noise affected land, the mine operator complies with the law. But such compliance with the law is with respect to carrying out of the activity on the mine site that is the subject of the approval. It does not result in a use of the acquired noise affected land for the coal mine. Acquisition of noise affected land does not expand the boundaries of the mine site on which the coal mine is approved to be carried out.
75 Fourthly, any acquisition of noise affected land in order to secure the benefit of not having to comply with conditions of a project approval requiring that the noise generated by the mine not exceed certain criteria for that land also does not thereby affect the use of the acquired land. As was said by Fullager J in Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1957) 96 CLR 493 at 506, "[t]he root of the fallacy lies in the assumption that deriving an advantage from the ownership of land is the same thing as using the land." This observation was approved by the High Court in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v NSW Aboriginal Land Council [2008] HCA 48; (2008) 237 CLR 285 at [75] to which they added:
That is, while it is probably true to say that a person who uses land derives an advantage from it, the converse proposition, that deriving an advantage from ownership of the land is using the land, is false.
76 In this case, the mine operator may derive an advantage from owning, or having a subsidiary own, land that is noise affected by the mine because such ownership causes the land to no longer be privately-owned land to which the noise conditions of the project approval apply. But the deriving of that advantage from ownership of the land is not using that land. Indeed, on the Council's argument, the only land on which there is a change in the activities by reason of the acquisition of the noise affected land is the mine site. If the noise conditions no longer apply, the mine operator would not have to curtail the nature, extent or other features of the coal mine to reduce the noise generated from the mine to comply with the criteria in the noise conditions and indeed might even be able to increase the noise without breaching the noise conditions. Hence, it is the use of the mine site, not of the acquired land, that could be altered by the change in ownership of the noise affected land.
Mere holding of land for mining purposes not a use for a mine
77 The Council contended that the definition of "mine" in the Dictionary of the LG Act extends the concept of the use of land to include the holding of land for a mining purpose. My view is that this is incorrect.
78 I do not consider that the word "mine" where twice occurring in s 517(1) of the LG Act is used with the meaning defined in the Dictionary to the LG Act. There are at least four indicators.
79 First, the word "mine" in the Dictionary and in s 517(1) are directed to different concepts. The defined word "mine" concerns land: it defines what particular types of land will be a mine. Land will be a mine if it is "land, on or below the surface or partly on or partly below the surface, used or held for any mining purpose." The definition incorporates the purpose for which land is used or held.
80 Section 517(1) does not use the word "mine" to refer to a particular type of land. Rather the word "mine" is concerned with the purpose of the use of the land. The purpose is the end to which the use of the land is seen to serve. It describes the character which is imparted to the land at which the use is pursued: Shire of Perth v O'Keefe (1964) 110 CLR 529 at 534; Chamwell Pty Ltd v Strathfield Council [2007] NSWLEC 114; (2007) 151 LGERA 400 at [27].
81 Hence, it is not possible to substitute the definition of "mine" from the Dictionary, which is concerned with a particular type of land, for the word "mine" in s 517(1) which is concerned with a particular purpose for which land is used.
82Secondly, the word "mine" in s 517(1) is qualified by the adjectives "coal" or "metalliferous". The Dictionary definition of "mine" has no such qualification.
83 As a consequence of these two differences, substitution of the defined term for "mine" for the word "mine" where twice occurring in s 517(1) would lead to a nonsensical statutory provision, as the following shows:
Land is to be categorised as "mining" if ... its dominant use is for a coal 'land, on or below the surface or partly on or partly below the surface, used or held for any mining purpose' or metalliferous 'land, on or below the surface or partly on or partly below the surface, used or held for any mining purpose'".
This cannot have been the legislative intention.
84 Thirdly, s 517(1) is only concerned with whether the dominant "use" is for a coal mine, while the defined word "mine" in the Dictionary is concerned with the use of land for mining purposes as well as the holding of land for mining purposes. The concepts of the use of land and the holding of land are different. The legislature defined "mine" in the Dictionary using both the concepts of use and holding of land but, by contrast, only identified in s 517(1) the criterion of use, not holding, of land for a coal mine or metalliferous mine. This must been seen to be deliberate. This deliberate decision to limit categorisation of land as mining only on the basis of use of land and not holding for a mine would be undermined if the word "mine" in s 517(1) had the meaning defined in the Dictionary of including not only use but also holding for any mining purpose.
85 Fourthly, the adjective "dominant" that qualifies "use" in s 517(1) cannot sensibly be applied to a holding of land. The adjective "dominant" that qualifies "use" in s 517(1) makes sense where land is used for a coal mine or metalliferous mine but not where land is merely held and not used for a coal mine or metalliferous mine. Land cannot have "its dominant use" for a coal mine or metalliferous mine if it is not used, but is only held, for a coal mine or metalliferous mine. This is a further indicator that land held for a coal mine is not within the ambit of the concept of dominant use of land for a coal mine in s 517(1).
86 Hence, in my view, the Council was in error in this case in considering that the mere holding by Peabody of the properties in question was sufficient to enable categorisation of the properties as mining under s 517 of the LG Act.
87 The Council also submitted that mere holding of land for a mining purpose could amount to a use for a mining purpose. It relied on the dicta of Bignold J in Ulan Coal Mines Ltd v Mudgee Shire Council (unreported, 11 January 1988) at p 17, relying on the Newcastle Hospital case (concerning exemption of land from rates), that "the non-use of land to provide an environmental buffer for mining operations may constitute a use of that land for mining purposes".
88 My view is that this statement is too dogmatic. The question of whether land is used for a particular purpose is a question of fact and degree in each case. The approach to categorisation of use also depends on the statutory provision under which categorisation is required. The statutory provisions governing categorisation for the purposes of planning law or for determining whether land is exempt from rates are different to those governing the categorisation of rateable land for rating purposes. Hence, care needs to be taken in applying dicta in cases dealing with what constitutes a use of land under other statutory provisions in determining the use of land for rating categorisation purposes.
89 In any event, however, the dicta in Ulan Coal Mines Limited v Mudgee Shire Council relied on by the Council was followed by the statement that where "there is an actual use of those lands for grazing purposes, it cannot be concluded that there is a concurrent 'mining purpose' use of the buffer lands based upon their non-use. The fact of actual use necessarily excludes the fact of non-use" (at p 17).
90 Applying this statement to the facts of the present appeals would mean that the actual use of Peabody's lands for residential or farming purposes would exclude any "non-use" of the lands as a buffer to attenuate noise from the coal mine. Hence, even if Peabody could be said to hold the lands for a mining purpose (being for attenuation of noise from the coal mine), the actual use of the lands for residential or farming has the consequence of precluding a use of the lands for a coal mine.
91 In summary, I am of the view that the Council was incorrect in its construction of s 517, read with the definition of "mine" in the Dictionary, and in its application of those statutory provisions to the facts of these three properties owned by Peabody.