REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR:
1 The substantial issue in these proceedings arises from the lies on oath told by a process server, one Hogan, who falsely swore in an affidavit that he had personally served the applicants with bankruptcy notices. Those notices founded alleged acts of bankruptcy that resulted in sequestration orders being made against each of the applicants. The process server's fraud has been well established in criminal proceedings and is accepted by the respondents.
2 The argument of the Official Trustee is that the appropriate remedy is to annul the bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankrupcty Act 1966 (Cth) ('the Act') on the basis that a sequestration order ought not to have been made. The advantage of that would be that the position of the creditors would be saved under s 154 and the Official Trustee's costs and expenses would also be attended to by operation of law and in the Official Trustee's favour.
3 The position of the applicants is that the sequestration order should be set aside notwithstanding the provisions of s 37(2) of the Act which says:
'The court does not have power to rescind or discharge...a sequestration order...'
because the applicants have been the victims of fraud. It is essentially that fraud which is responsible for the Official Trustee's costs and expenses. The injustice and ignominy of ever having been declared bankrupt should be expunged as fully as the processes of the Court will allow. Reasonable provision for the position of the creditors, notwithstanding matters such as limitation periods which are very operative in this case, can be made by undertakings to the Court. It is accepted by the parties that, despite the terms of s 37(2), there is authority in this Court binding on me, and also persuasive authority, that the law would indeed permit the setting aside of a sequestration order, at least one made by a Registrar which has been fraudulently procured, even when the fraud was not that of the petitioning creditor personally.
4 The Official Trustee also argued that there was some evidence from which it could be inferred that the bankruptcy notices had in fact come to the attention of the applicants in a timely way; that the point as to the absence of personal service was not made earlier on every occasion when it might have been raised, and that the Court could relax procedural requirements under s 306 of the Act so as to dispense with the formal requirements for service. The applicants are elderly and frail and, even when the sequestration order was made some years ago, their age and general capacities had advanced to the point where one of their sons, Wolodymyr, acted on their behalf for much of the time under a power of attorney. In my opinion, this would not be a case where, had the matter of the process server's fraud been proven to the Court earlier, the Court would have exercised a discretion against the applicants under s 306, nor do I think that that is the correct thing to do now.
5 In my opinion it is of great importance, in order to deter any other process server who might be tempted to cut corners, to indicate that the courts will do everything they can fully to restore a party who has suffered a process server's fraud to the position that he or she would have been in had that fraud not occurred. Substantially, I agree with the position taken by counsel for the applicants in relation to this matter.
6 I do not overlook that the records show that the applicants were less than fully cooperative with the Official Trustee in that, for example, neither of them actually filed a Statement of Affairs, as was their legal obligation. However, the facts show that their son Wolodymyr, was conducting all proceedings with the Official Trustee on their behalf, that he was not dilatory in being in touch with the Official Trustee and that, concurrently with trying to deal with the requirements (quite reasonable, I may say) of the Official Trustee, he was also trying to track down and establish incontrovertibly, by contact with the police, the fact of the process server's false swearing.
7 Neither party is to blame for the mess and expense caused by the errant process server. The Official Trustee is, however, in a better position than the applicant, should circumstances warrant it, to seek ex gratia assistance from the Government in relation to the matter, or to pursue any further legal action which might be advised against the process server or, if the circumstances warrant it, the employer of that person. It is a somewhat narrow contest, but I think that the interests of justice are better served by permitting the Official Trustee's loss to rest with him rather than adopting a procedure which would cast it onto the applicants.
8 I do not seek to enunciate any general principle in this regard. Of course, each case depends on its own facts and one can well imagine a more alert and more capable person made bankrupt by fraud of a process server who might not be able to put a similarly effective story before the Court.
9 It was not until the proceedings were under way and I indicated a preliminary view, that the applicants made it clear that they were prepared to give undertakings which, in my opinion, give reasonable protection to the creditors, so far as they are known and as far as I can see. In the absence of those creditors from the Court room, I have indicated the orders that I will make, which will completely undo the bankruptcy upon certain undertakings being given. The proposed orders also deal with various other matters. I will leave it to the parties to bring in short orders to give effect to these reasons and the other matters discussed and decided in transcript.
I certify that the preceding nine (9) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Madgwick