THE PERTH TICKET SALE PROCEEDS
44By his Costs Agreement with Jupiters, Mr Denison undertook to pay part of the proceeds of ticket sales for The Jacksons' concerts to Jupiters to reimburse it for expenses it agreed to pay. To give effect to that undertaking, Mr Denison directed three of The Jacksons' concert venues to pay ticket sale proceeds to Jupiters. However, he had no right to deal with those proceeds. He was not the promoter of the concerts. Rather, he had been engaged by Mr Perera (and subsequently the company Mr Perera acquired, UAERJ) to act as Mr Perera/UAERJ's agent in organising The Jacksons' Tour. In so far as Mr Denison acquired any rights against The Jacksons' agent (ICM) or the concert venue operators, he plainly did so on behalf of Mr Perera/UAERJ and could not deal with those rights without Mr Perera/UAERJ's authority (I shall henceforth refer simply to UAERJ as it came to assume Mr Perera's position from November 2012).
45The primary judge found this to be the position (Judgment [115]) and the evidence to which the Court's attention was directed on appeal clearly supported the finding.
46An inevitable corollary of this finding was the primary judge's further conclusion (not challenged on appeal) that, in so far as UAERJ gave Mr Denison some authority in relation to organisation of The Jacksons' concerts, that authority did not extend to using UAERJ's money for his own benefit, for example, by directing that ticket sale proceeds for the concerts be paid to discharge Mr Denison's own debt to Jupiters (Judgment [205]).
47The primary judge however held that Jupiters had acquired a right to the Perth ticket sale proceeds for The Jacksons' concert. His Honour's reasoning was that UAERJ had, as a result of Mr Perera's conduct described in [211] to [212] of the Judgment (see [37] above), led the Perth Venue to believe that Mr Denison had authority to give the Second Perth IDP on behalf of UAERJ. That is, that UAERJ, by its conduct vis à vis the Perth Venue, had conferred ostensible authority on Mr Denison.
48As I pointed out during argument on the appeal (Transcript p 2), the conclusion that UAERJ had represented to the Perth Venue that Mr Denison had authority to give the Second Perth IDP on its behalf would have been relevant if the Perth Venue had acted upon the IDP. UAERJ could not have complained if the Perth Venue had acted upon UAERJ's representation of Mr Denison's authority by paying money to Jupiters at Mr Denison's direction.
49However, that did not occur. The funds still remain with the Perth Venue, awaiting this Court's decision. Although, on his Honour's findings, UAERJ at first communicated to the Perth Venue that Mr Denison had authority to direct application of the ticket sale proceeds, it withdrew that authority when Mr Perera contacted the Perth Venue in March 2013 following his discovery of Mr Denison's activities. As a result, the Perth Venue would no longer have been justified in acting upon the basis that Mr Denison had authority to give a direction to pay part of the ticket sale proceeds to Jupiters. Whilst the Second Perth IDP (like the others given by Mr Denison) was expressed to be irrevocable, there was no reason why UAERJ (on whose behalf his Honour concluded that the IDP was given) could not withdraw it in the absence of any contract binding it not to do so.
50No sound reason for treating the IDP as a contract was provided on the appeal. Accordingly, the IDP would in my view have operated no differently than the familiar form of authority and direction to pay given on settlement of a conveyancing transaction. In the ordinary case, there is no reason why such an authority and direction cannot be withdrawn prior to it being acted upon.
51Even if UAERJ represented to the Perth Venue that Mr Denison had authority to act on its behalf in dealings with that venue, UAERJ's giving of the IDP and the venue's agreement, noted on it, to abide by it did not give rise to a contract precluding UAERJ from withdrawing the IDP as neither party gave consideration. UAERJ agreed by the terms of the IDP to hire or continue hiring the venue, but it was already bound by the venue hiring contract of 12 December 2012 (see [17] above) to do this. Likewise, the venue was already bound by that contract to act on UAERJ's instructions as to the disposition of the net proceeds of the concert ticket sales. Furthermore, the IDP did not operate as a deed because it was not expressed to be a deed and neither party purported to seal it.
52If the facts had warranted it, Jupiters might have been able to establish that, vis à vis it (as distinct from the Perth Venue), UAERJ had conferred ostensible authority on Mr Denison and/or UAE Presents Pty Ltd. That is, hypothetically Jupiters might have attempted to establish that UAERJ, presumably through Mr Perera, had represented to Jupiters that Mr Denison had UAERJ's authority to deal with it, in reliance upon which Jupiters agreed to pay and/or paid the expenses relating to the Mariah Carey concert which Mr Denison was unable to pay. However, no doubt because it did not consider that the facts would have supported such a contention, Jupiters did not make it (Transcript pp 18, 32).
53The position is thus that Mr Denison purported to assign or charge to Jupiters the ticket sale proceeds from The Jacksons' Perth concert but had no authority from UAERJ, the true owner of them, to do so. In the absence of any case that Mr Perera or UAERJ expressly or impliedly represented to Jupiters that Mr Denison or UAE Presents Pty Ltd had such authority, Jupiters' claim to the ticket sale proceeds, however framed, must fail. Mr Denison could not assign or charge property to, or in favour of, Jupiters when he had no authority to deal with the property and the owner of the property had not represented to Jupiters that Mr Denison had any such authority.
54I add in conclusion that my view that no contract between the Perth Venue and UAERJ arose out of the Second Perth IDP must lead to the rejection of Jupiters' argument that, as a third party beneficiary of the asserted contract, it has a right to enforce it by reason of s 11 of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA).
55In these circumstances, the appeal must be allowed.