Turner v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2020-10-07|Before: Payne JA, Davies J, Garling J

Judgment

PAYNE JA: I agree with Garling J.
DAVIES J: I agree with Garling J.
GARLING J: Cheree Louise Turner ("the applicant") pleaded guilty on 11 July 2019 to eight blackmail offences. Seven of the offences were contrary to s 249K(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900, for which there is a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. One offence was contrary to s 249K(2) of the Crimes Act, for which there is a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. In respect of that offence, the applicant asked that seven further offences contrary to s 249K(1)(a) be taken into account on a Form 1.
On 7 August 2019, the applicant was sentenced by Bright DCJ, the sentencing Judge, to an aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment with a 6 year 6 month non‑parole period. The sentence commenced on 7 August 2019, because the applicant had been on bail prior to that time. Bright DCJ allowed a discount of 40% on each indicative sentence to reflect the applicant's early pleas and the assistance she provided to the police: R v Turner [2019] NSWDC 618.
The individual indicative sentences and available maximum penalties together with the sequence numbers are most conveniently to be found in the table at [18] below.

Relevant Facts

The facts upon which the applicant was sentenced were agreed and set out at length in her Honour's careful and detailed Remarks on Sentence.
The victim of each offence was the same. He was the principal of an accountancy practice carried out on the Central Coast, and which employed a number of staff.
The applicant and the victim established contact, initially via a Facebook group. This contact resulted in the victim donating a number of items of children's clothing and toys to the applicant. The applicant and victim met to exchange the goods and had no further contact for some months.
About three or four months later, the applicant contacted the victim and established an ongoing, but wholly online, relationship which involved the exchange of sexually explicit photographs. During the course of this period, the victim voluntarily paid some small amounts of money ($200 to $400) to the applicant.
It was in this context that the applicant then commenced to commit the offences to which she pleaded guilty. These offences were committed together with her co-offender, Mr Robert Pughe, with whom she was then living and with whom she had been in a de facto relationship for about 11 or 12 years.
The first offence in point of time was for demanding money with menaces by accusing the victim of a serious indictable offence, contrary to s 249K(2). The Agreed Facts with respect to this offence reveal it was committed in circumstances where the applicant sent a text message to the victim informing him that he was required to loan her $10,000 and "… if you don't I will plaster information on Facebook and Instagram and do anything to destroy your business".
In the course of a telephone conversation which followed shortly after that text message was sent, the applicant informed the victim that she was going to accuse him of raping her and sleeping around.
At a meeting which occurred later that evening, the applicant handed a statement which she had signed to the victim, the effect of which was that if the victim provided her with $10,000, the whole matter would be at an end and there would not be any further contact. That document read in part: "I [the applicant] agree to never uploading or telling anyone about conversations, texts, pictures or anything ever discussed between myself and [the victim] also to anyone or on social media platform, also deleting texts, pictures and Facebook messages. Never to be brought up again after receiving four payments of $2,500 made to my bank account … And never anything more and also losing all contact with each other. I also agree that I or anyone known to me will never approach [the victim] or his business to cause harm or grief."
Consequence upon these events, the victim transferred a total of $10,000 to the applicant over the next week.
However, despite the agreement to not do so, the applicant continued to threaten and extort the victim beyond this first offence. The applicant's conduct occurred over 15 months and extorted the victim out of approximately $993,845.00 (although the charges only concern a sum of $573,955.00).
It is convenient to deal with each of the other offences, whether on a Form 1 or as charged, by reference to the table set out below summarising the details of each offence. Each of these further offences was contrary to the same provision of the Crimes Act and carrying the same maximum penalty. What differed was the sum of money demanded, and the way in which it was demanded.
Below is a table which summarises the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty, and the offences which were taken into account on a Form 1: Sequence No. Date Conduct Charge Max Penalty Indicative term Sequence 2 29 July 2016 to 5 August 2016 Applicant threatened to accuse victim of 'raping her' unless he transferred her $10,000. He transferred the money. Demand with menaces by accusation that person has committed serious indictable offence [s 249K(2) Crimes Act] 14 years 4 years 2 months Sequence 4 19 September 2016 to 21 September 2016 Applicant turned up at the office of the victim and demanded $20,000 in exchange for deleting all materials concerning victim from her phone. The victim transferred $25,000. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 6 14 November 2016 to 18 November 2016 Victim transferred $30,000 to the bank account of the applicant's partner Pughe (and co-accused). Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 8 24 February 2017 to 28 February 2017 Victim threatened by Pughe that he would burn the victim's house down if he didn't pay. Victim transferred $18,000. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 10 24 May 2017 Victim was threatened by Pughe that if he didn't transfer money to cover Pughe's dentist bill (as well as further money) he would burn his office to the ground. Victim transferred $4,115. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 11 25 May 2017 to 16 June 2017 Victim transferred $37,700 over this time in response to threats from the applicant and Pughe. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 13 7 September 2017 to 15 September 2017 Victim transferred $39,900 in response to threats from the applicant. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 16 27 October 2017 The applicant sent multiple threatening emails to the victim, and Pughe called his office to demand money. It is not known if any money was transferred at that time. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain (Form 1 offence) 10 years Attached to Sequence 2 (Form 1) Sequence 3 25 August 2016 Victim was contacted by applicant with a threat that the applicant would ruin his reputation and his business unless he paid $25,000. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain [s 249K(1)(a) Crimes Act] 10 years 1 year 9 months Sequence 5 October 2016 The applicant sent an email to the victim's work email requesting money. The victim transferred $64,000 over the month of October. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 1 year 9 months Sequence 7 19 December 2016 to 22 December 2016 In response to a threatening email from the applicant, the victim transferred $50,000 over this time period. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 1 year 9 months Sequence 9 24 March 2017 to 31 March 2017 Victim told by Pughe that the applicant had 'mates' watching him and that the 'Rebels' would assault him if he didn't pay. Victim transferred $2,000 to Pughe and $16,240 to the applicant. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 1 year 9 months Sequence 12 27 June 2017 to 25 August 2017 The applicant and Pughe attended the victim's office and threatened to have a gang 'tear him to shreds' if he didn't transfer them money. Over this period he transferred $243,000. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 2 years 4 months Sequence 14 18 October 2017 The applicant received a number of threatening emails from the applicant asking for money. He did not comply and attended her house with friends to request she stopped contacting him. The applicant sent another threatening email later that evening. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 1 year 9 months Sequence 15 20 October 2017 The applicant sent threatening emails to the victim from multiple accounts, where she implied she would harm the victim's mother. The victim transferred the applicant $16,000. Demand with menaces to obtain a gain 10 years 1 year 9 months

Remarks on Sentence

The sentencing Judge set out, in some detail, the entirety of the Agreed Facts. At [79] her Honour recorded this: "The offences outlined above represent specific incidents which took place between 25 August 2016 and 27 October 2017 (being a total sum of $573,955.00). During this period the victim … was extorted by the offender for a total of $993,845.00."
This paragraph reflected paragraph 72 of the Statement of Agreed Facts.
In the course of the submissions on sentence, the Crown addressed the sentencing Judge on the issue of objective seriousness. The Crown submitted that the offences against s 249K(1)(a) of the Crimes Act were: "… certainly substantially above the mid-range given the amounts of money, given the serious nature of the threats and the amount of threats, and also noting as, in the last paragraph of the Agreed Facts, that the offences to which the offender has pleaded guilty are essentially representative counts in relation to a total sum extorted from the victim of almost a million dollars over the 15 month period."
Counsel for the applicant did not make any submission at all in reply to this submission. He did not submit that the sentence according to this submission would be erroneous. Counsel had earlier submitted that the offences individually fell below the mid-range of objective seriousness. The applicant's submissions had distinguished the nature of these offences from frauds against Centrelink, or larceny by a servant or where someone was in a position of trust.
However, there were no detailed submissions to the sentencing Judge of any real substance on the objective seriousness of the offences, by either the Crown or the applicant. No submissions were made which differentiated the seriousness of the s 249(1)(a) offences by reference to the individual facts and circumstances.
Neither counsel took her Honour to any authorities on the way in which representative counts ought properly to be dealt with when considering the application of sentencing principles. Neither counsel drew her Honour's attention to the authorities which discuss the issue of the way in which "uncharged" acts can be considered on sentencing.
Her Honour addressed her assessment of objective seriousness at some length. At [80] of her Remarks, the sentencing Judge noted that the Agreed Facts "… clearly disclose very serious objective criminality". Her Honour noted that the offences constituted a "… sustained and vicious campaign against the victim lasting 15 months which had very significant detrimental consequences to his life".
Her Honour drew attention to the authorities dealing with the question of blackmail offences generally and, in particular, the importance of general deterrence for such offences.
Her Honour then turned to consider the objective seriousness of the offence against s 249K(2) of the Crimes Act. She set out three factors which she regarded as particularly relevant. Then, having regard to the nature of the offence, and of those factors, her Honour assessed the objective seriousness of that offence as being in the middle of the range.
Her Honour then turned to consider the objective seriousness of each of the other offences contrary to s 249K(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. At [86] her Honour set out five factors which she took into account as being relevant to that assessment: 1. first, that the nature of the demands and the menaces which included threats towards the victim's business, threats to harm his children and his mother; 2. second, that the sums of money which had been obtained by each offence; 3. third, that the conduct was planned and organised; 4. fourth, that the charges were representative counts; and 5. finally, that the offending conduct only ceased because one of the victim's employees reported the matter to police.
Her Honour assessed six of the seven sequences as being in the middle of the range of objective seriousness. She assessed the remaining sequence, being Sequence 12, as being above the middle of the range.
Her Honour then turned to consider the contents of the Victim Impact Statement. She did so in an entirely conventional way.
The sentencing Judge considered the subjective circumstances of the applicant. Her Honour noted that the applicant was 29 years old at the time of sentencing, and that she had had a criminal history of a kind which disentitled her to any leniency when compared with a person with no prior convictions.
Her Honour took into account the applicant's background and a psychiatric assessment which had been conducted upon her. Her Honour noted that the applicant was separated from her partner, who was her co-offender, and that she was the mother of five children under the age of 10 years - all of whom had been living with her up until the time of sentencing.
Her Honour noted the abusive background of the applicant and the fact that she had reported a history of excessive gambling, at times losing as much as $5,000 a day. Her Honour carefully considered the applicant's mental health and its effect on sentence. Her Honour was satisfied that some moderation of an otherwise appropriate sentence was appropriate in circumstances where the applicant suffered trauma and deprivation during her earlier years.
Her Honour then turned to consider the provisions of s 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Her Honour allowed a total discount on sentence of 40%. No complaint is made about this.
Her Honour was persuaded that the applicant had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and was satisfied that she was unlikely to reoffend.
Her Honour considered the application of the principle of totality. She drew attention, correctly, to that principle. She recorded that partial accumulation was required to reflect the total criminality. She noted that the total criminality occurred over a period of 15 months. She then said at [146]: "However, there will be a large degree of concurrency in circumstances where the offender is to be sentenced for a significant number of offences arising from the one episode of criminality."
Her Honour then indicated the sentences which would have been imposed for each offence had separate sentences been imposed. They are recorded in the table at [18] above. Having considered all of those matters, her Honour then proceeded to impose the aggregate sentence which is subject to this application for leave to appeal.

Grounds 1 and 1A

It is convenient consider these grounds together.
The grounds allege that the sentencing Judge erroneously took into account the fact that the charged offences upon which the applicant was to be sentenced were "representative counts" when considering the objective gravity of the offending and, further, that the sentencing Judge erred by failing to provide reasons as to how the "uncharged conduct" impacted upon the objective gravity of the charged offences.

Ground 1

The applicant submitted that, having regard to the Agreed Fact set out above at [21]ff concerning the "representative counts", it is difficult to discern the precise nature of the uncharged conduct to which the applicant was admitting. Therefore, the applicant submitted it is difficult to appreciate what, if any, significance the "representative counts" had in the imposition of sentence upon the applicant by the sentencing Judge. The applicant submitted that the sentencing Judge did not set out in any way the manner by which the representative nature of the conduct aggravated the seriousness of each of the individual offences, other than recording the fact of the representative counts and noting that she was taking them into account on the issue of objective seriousness.
Finally, the applicant submitted that it was contrary to principle for the sentencing Judge to have taken into account, as a matter elevating the objective gravity of the offences, that the applicant was being sentenced for representative counts. The applicant submitted this is because the fact that the charged conduct was representative was not capable of aggravating the gravity of the charge offences.
In The Queen v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383, Gibbs CJ observed at p.389 that "No one should be punished for an offence of which he has not been convicted". That is a fundamental principle of the criminal law.
This Court considered this principle again recently. In LN v R [2020] NSWCCA 131, Hamill J noted that an offender is not to be punished for offences on which they do not stand to be sentenced or with which they are not charged: at [113].
In LN, Basten JA (with whom RA Hulme J agreed) said: "40. It would, of course, be an error to sentence the person for an uncharged offence, but it does not follow that conduct which might constitute an uncharged offence cannot be taken into account in sentencing for a more serious offence. Indeed, evidence of conduct which might be relevant to sentence might be irrelevant to the elements of the offence; it is provable on sentence as with any other (non-criminal) conduct. … 41 Evidence of earlier events is not relied upon by the prosecutor to demonstrate that other offences being had been committed; it is relied upon (in relation sentencing) to demonstrate the objective seriousness, for example, of the charged offence. Where the effect is adverse to the interests of the offender, it is true that the conduct must be established beyond reasonable doubt …. This is but one of many different situations in which the law allows a court or tribunal to rely upon conduct which may constitute a criminal offence, without the need to determine that an offence has been committed."
Hamill J in LN, although dissenting on the application of the principle to the facts, said at [152]: "… In some cases, the other uncharged offences or a course of conduct may be relevant to particular aspects of the objective criminality of the charged offence. In such cases, if admitted or proved, the uncharged offence (s) may play a role in the assessment of the gravity of the charged offence and the moral culpability of the offender. It is not possible to identify all of the circumstances in which this may occur, and not useful to attempt to predict the myriad of factual circumstances that may arise. …"
It is to be observed that the existence of other uncharged conduct, acknowledged by the Agreed Facts to which reference is made at [21] above, was a matter agreed to by the applicant. Further, it is clear that the Crown submitted to the sentencing Judge that, in the circumstances of this case, the uncharged conduct was a factor relevant to assessing the objective seriousness of the offences with which the applicant was charged. Clearly that was so. It provided a context which was relevant to whether or not the offences were isolated or out of the ordinary occurrences, or whether they were part of a sustained course of criminality. They were also relevant to establish the extent of the vulnerability of the victim.
The approach of the Crown accorded with principle. The lack of any submissions opposing that approach should be taken as an indication that counsel for the applicant recognised that the Crown's submission accorded with principle and that it would not be an error for the sentencing Judge to take the matter into account in determining the objective seriousness of the charges.
The sentencing Judge did so and, in my view did so, in this matter, correctly.
The applicant has failed to satisfy me that there is any merit in a contention that the sentencing Judge erred in taking into account that the charged offences were representative offences in the terms agreed to by the parties.

Ground 1A

The next ground of appeal is that the trial Judge failed to provide adequate reasons as to how the uncharged conduct impacted upon her assessment of the objective gravity of the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty.
In Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146 at [50], Johnson J (with the agreement of Beazley P and Kirby J) said that an assessment of objective seriousness for the purpose of sentence did not require "an elaborate verbal formula".
In Paxton v R [2011] NSWCCA 242 at [125]-[126], Johnson J (with the agreement of Tobias AJA and Hall J) said that in considering a ground of appeal such as this it was necessary for this Court to read fairly, the entirety of the sentencing Judge's remarks on sentence. In so doing, a practical approach should be taken by this Court in assessing such remarks with an emphasis upon substance (and the resulting sentence) and not just matters of form.
His Honour then said at [126] this: "In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that the characterisation of the degree of objective seriousness of an offence is classically within the role of the sentencing Judge in performing the task of finding facts, and drawing inferences from those facts, so that this Court is very slow to determine such matters for itself or to set aside the judgement made by a first instance Judge exercising a broadly-based discretion: …. The question is whether the particular characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offence was open to the sentencing Judge."
I note that the ultimate characterisation of the objective seriousness found by the sentencing Judge was only attacked for error as set out in the earlier submissions relating to Ground 1. It was not said that, absent such error, the finding of objective seriousness was not open to the sentencing Judge. Plainly, on the Agreed Facts, the findings were well open.
In my view the remarks on sentence on the issue of objective seriousness were apt to be described as being concisely made, but it is clearly apparent from the sentencing Judge's remarks what the basis of her findings were. No further elaboration was necessary. Her Honour did not fail to give adequate reasons for her findings. If anything, the sentencing Judge's remarks here compare favourably with those the subject of a similar ground of appeal in Burr v R [2020] NSWCCA 282 - which the Court held were adequate.
I am not persuaded that error has been shown in either Ground 1 or Ground 1A of the Amended Notice of Appeal.

Ground 2

This ground complains the sentencing Judge failed to comply with the provisions of s 53A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act by not assessing individually the criminality involved in the offences against s 249K(1)(a), when indicating the sentences which otherwise might be imposed.
Section 53A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act is in the following form: "53A Aggregate sentences of imprisonment (1) A court may, in sentencing an offender for more than one offence, impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment with respect to all or any 2 or more of those offences instead of imposing a separate sentence of imprisonment for each. (2) A court that imposes an aggregate sentence of imprisonment under this section on an offender must indicate to the offender, and make a written record of, the following-- (a) the fact that an aggregate sentence is being imposed, (b) the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence (after taking into account such matters as are relevant under Part 3 or any other provision of this Act) had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence. (3) ... (4) ... (5) An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not invalidated by a failure to comply with this section."
The mere fact that the same indicative sentences were enunciated by the sentencing Judge does not of itself and without more indicate an impermissible approach to determining the objective seriousness of the offence. This is particularly so in circumstances where, as is the case in this matter, each of the offences were contrary to the same section of the Crimes Act and each was committed during a single sustained course of offending over a lengthy period of time.
As the indicative sentence for sequence 12 demonstrates, the sentencing Judge regarded that offence as meriting a longer indicative sentence than the other offences. The similarities in the other offences, including the sums of money sought and the surrounding circumstances of those offences, suggest that this was a particular case in which the coincidence of the imposition of the same indicative sentences for six of the offences does not indicate that the trial Judge engaged in a blanket assessment in a way which offends against what this Court said in JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [39] (by RA Hulme J with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Adamson J agreed).
I am unpersuaded that this Ground should be upheld.

Ground 3 - The Aggregate Sentence is Manifestly Excessive

The legal principles applicable to a ground of appeal in which it is alleged that a sentence is manifestly excessive are well known and have been regularly restated: see Obeid v R [2017] NSWCCA 221; (2017) 96 NSWLR 155 at 443; Goodbun v R [2020] NSWCCA 77 at [254]. Relevantly for the consideration of this ground of appeal, I note that those principles required to the applicant to establish that the sentence which was imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust. Intervention by this Court is only warranted where the Court concludes that, although it is not apparent there must have been some misapplication of principle, or alternatively whether the sentence imposed is so far outside the range of sentences available that must have been error.
The applicant contends that it can be seen that the sentencing Judge's discretion miscarried by an examination of two separate aspects of the aggregate sentence. The first is whether the discount of 40% applied by her Honour to each indicative term was reflected in the aggregate sentence imposed, to use the words of the applicant's submission "… such that an appreciable difference (shorter total head sentence) in the final outcome materialised, and secondly whether the degree of notional accumulation overstated the totally of the criminality".
Ultimately it was submitted in writing by the applicant that when the maximum penalties for each offence are considered along with the circumstances of the offending, and that those factors are balanced with the applicant's favourable subjective case, "… no reasonable exercise of discretion could have led to an aggregate sentence of 10 years".
Although the submissions for the applicant contained, in part, an analysis of degrees of notional accumulation, this is an unhelpful approach. N Adams J in Kliendienst v R [2020] NSWCCA 98 said this at [85]: "85. A common complaint to this Court when alleging manifest excess (or manifest inadequacy) of an aggregate sentence is to contend that the sentencing judge has erred in the degree of accumulation and concurrence. Such a complaint will be upheld in obvious cases, such as when the aggregate sentence is the same length as one of a number of indicative sentences showing there was no accumulation (as occurred in Rae cited above). But the failure to properly apply the totality principle must be able to be gleaned from the indicative sentences when compared with the aggregate sentence. That will often not be the case. This Court will not intervene where the failure to apply the totality principle is not apparent, nor when there is a complaint that the judge has failed to specifically state the degree of accumulation and concurrence. … ." (emphasis in original)
Properly analysed the substance of this ground of appeal is that, by reference to the principal of manifest excess, the length of the sentence of 10 years is such as to demonstrate that it was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
In considering such a question this Court needs to keep in mind that there is no single correct sentence and sentencing Judges are allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with the application of principle. Whether this Court may have imposed a less severe sentence is not, at least at this stage of the consideration of the appeal, relevant.
The starting point of the analysis as to whether this sentence is manifestly excessive is to identify the nature of the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty. These offences are blackmail offences. Courts have always regarded blackmail offences, by reason of their nature and kind, as being offences which are serious and which require emphasis in sentencing on general deterrence. As well, courts have been astute by imposing sentences for this kind of offending which ensures that the community is protected from such offending.
Her Honour assessed one of the offences (Sequence 12) as being above the middle of the range of seriousness. She assessed all others as being in the middle of the range. This assessment, leaving aside the earlier grounds of appeal of which I have not been persuaded, is not otherwise attacked.
The threats used by the applicant included threats to his business, threat of harm to his family members, threats that he would be publicly accused of rape, threats of extreme violence to his property, and threats that he would be sexually assaulted. The threats were accompanied by calls to the victim's business which disrupted the operation of that business. The offences only ceased because one of the victim's employees reported the matter to police.
The period of time during which the offences occurred commenced in 28 July 2016 and continued through to 27 October 2017. Her Honour, in addition to imposing sentence for eight offences was asked to take a further seven offences into account on a Form 1.
The course of time over which the offences lasted was significant. Moreover, all of these offences for which sentence was to be pronounced were objectively serious, were accompanied by threats of personal violence to property and violence to the victim's family and were seeking significant sums of money. The total sum of money gained from the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty over the full course of offending was a very large sum of money indeed.
It can be accepted, as the trial Judge did, that the applicant had a number of favourable subjective factors. Her Honour found that the applicant was a single mother of five children under the age of 10 years; she had a limited criminal history; a diagnosis of a psychiatric condition (namely a generalised anxiety disorder) which would have the result that her time in custody would weigh more heavily upon her; a traumatic and deprived early childhood which warranted moderation of the sentence; reasonable prospects of rehabilitation; and that she was unlikely to reoffend. Making full allowance for each of those factors, I am unable to conclude that the aggregate sentence imposed on the applicant is manifestly excessive.
The maximum sentence for the most serious offence was 14 years imprisonment. The maximum sentence for each of the other seven offences was 10 years imprisonment. The indicative sentences nominated by her Honour, even allowing for a notional adjustment to consider the sentence prior to the discount for the early plea and the giving of assistance to authorities, did not exceed one half of the maximum for each offence. The discount of 40% which was then applied to them, was an appropriate one in all the circumstances.
Her Honour's aggregate sentence was one which she needed to formulate by reference to the principle of totality.
There is no suggestion that her Honour did not consider that matter. She did so explicitly. The complaint is that the result of her Honour's approach to the aggregate sentence was demonstrative of legal error.
I am simply unable to agree.
In my view the aggregate sentence imposed was well within her Honour's sentencing discretion and no error of law has been established. I am not satisfied that the aggregate sentence which was imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
I would reject this ground.

Orders

I propose the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal dismissed.

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