21. But, apart from such considerations, I am unable to understand why any differentiation in the application of the qualifying words should have been intended. It seems to me that the Full Court rightly apprehended that the appellant was alleging a cause of action in defamation. It resolved, and again, in my opinion, rightly, that the use of the various publications, other than the three upon which suit was allowed to be brought, as prologomena to the statement of the causes of action was impermissible in point of pleading, whether or not in combination those publications were castigated as a campaign or described as a discussion. But their attempted use as facts which might aid the identification of the appellant as the person to whom the words sued upon referred, or as indicating or assisting to indicate the sense in which those words should be understood, is quite another matter. Even if one concluded, and I can well appreciate that it may be concluded, that the publications other than those sued upon, whether or not seen as an organized and integrated endeavour, could not possibly assist to establish either identification or innuendo, there would be no warrant for denying the appellant the ability to include these publications and their content as part of his particulars of defamation. On the construction of the condition favoured in the Supreme Court, it is clearly recognized that these publications can be included in the particulars. I see no reason why a reference to the nature and circumstances of these publications should be in any different case. A particular not expressed in an objectionable way cannot be struck out under the rules, in my opinion, simply because it can be seen that it does not particularize the cause of action or some material part of it. In an action for defamation the plaintiff is not required to include his particulars in and as part of his statement of his cause of action. But, where the defamatory words do not identify the plaintiff as their object, extrinsic facts may be used to make that identification. Again, where the plaintiff desires to claim a meaning for the words which of their nature they do not obviously bear, he may rely on facts extrinsic to the publication to show the meaning the words bear in the circumstances. In each instance he must particularize the extrinsic facts. It is for him to decide how he will endeavour to establish the identification and the innuendoes. His particulars, though included in the pleading so far as to enable objectionable matter in them to be struck out under O. 19, r. 27, are not to be pleaded to: it is, in my opinion, bad pleading to do so. The defendant by not canvassing the particulars does not admit them, nor does he admit their relevance to the establishment of the cause of action or any part of it. (at p80)