Consideration
10 In Kandola v Google LLC [2021] FCA 1262, Cheeseman J at [6] referred to the requirements that need to be satisfied before orders of the kind presently sought can be made, adopting the principles articulated in Lin v Google LLC [2021] FCA 1113 at [11]-[12] (Wigney J):
In Lin v Google LLC [2021] FCA 1113, Wigney J set out the principles applicable in the present context when considering a similar application for service outside Australia in proceedings involving a preliminary discovery application against Google with a view to a potential future defamation action in respect of anonymised negative business reviews (at [11]-[12]):
11 Rule 10.42 of the Rules provides that, "[s]ubject to rule 10.43, an originating application, or an application under Part 7 of these Rules, may be served on a person in a foreign country in a proceeding that consists of, or includes, any one or more of the kinds of proceeding mentioned in the following table" (emphasis added). An application for preliminary discovery pursuant to r 7.22 of the Rules is an application under Pt 7 of the Rules to which r 10.42 may apply.
12 When rr 10.42 and 10.43 are read together, the result is that Mr Lin must satisfy five requirements for him to be granted leave to serve his originating application on Google in the USA. Those requirements are: first, that his application consists of, or includes, one or more of the kinds of proceedings mentioned in the table in r 10.42 (rr 10.42 and 10.43(4)(b) of the Rules); second, that the means by which he proposes to serve Google in the USA is in accordance with a convention, the Hague Convention or the law of the USA (r 10.43(2) of the Rules); third, his application is accompanied by an affidavit stating the name of the foreign country where Google is to be served and that the proposed method of service is in accordance with a convention, the Hague Convention or the law of the foreign country (r 10.43(3) of the Rules); fourth, the Court has jurisdiction in the proceeding (r 10.43(4)(a) of the Rules); and fifth, he has a prima facie case for all or any of the relief claimed in the proceeding (r 10.43(4)(c) of the Rules).
11 For the following reasons I am satisfied that each of the conditions, concisely stated by Wigney J in Lin, is satisfied in this case:
(1) The application consists of or includes one or more of the kinds of proceedings mentioned in items 1, 4 and 5 of the table to r 10.42, specifically rr 10.42 and 10.43(4)(b) of the Rules. While none of the proceedings listed in the table in r 10.42 align with an application for preliminary discovery, as explained in Lin, an application for preliminary discovery "can be fairly characterised as an action "based" on the tort of defamation committed in Australia, notwithstanding that the application is not itself that cause of action". This is because the "claim to be entitled to preliminary discovery is based, at least in part, on the fact that the prospective applicants may have a right to obtain relief, including damages, from someone else (the prospective respondent) for defamation": see Kandola at [8] citing Lin at [14]-[15].
(2) The application is accompanied by the necessary accompanying affidavits which includes that Google is based in the USA and that the USA is a party to the Hague Convention. Accordingly the application can be served in the United States by registered post in accordance with the Hague Convention: see Lin at [18] and Kabbabe v Google LLC [2020] FCA 126 at [9].
(3) The Court has jurisdiction in the proceedings consistent with r 10.43(4)(a) of the Rules: Kandola at [11] citing Lin at [20].
12 I am also satisfied that the Prospective Applicant has a prima facie case in respect of the application for preliminary discovery pursuant to r 7.22 of the Rules. In Kabbabe, Murphy J at [14] set out the following three requirements that a prospective applicant must satisfy in order to obtain preliminary discovery:
(1) there may be a right for the prospective applicant to obtain relief against a prospective respondent; and
(2) the prospective applicant is unable, notwithstanding having made reasonable enquiries and taken any other steps reasonably required in the circumstances, to ascertain a description of the prospective respondent; and
(3) another person, the respondent to the application for preliminary discovery, knows or is likely to know that description, or has or was likely to have had, control of a document that would help ascertain that description.
13 The Prospective Applicant has demonstrated that there may be a right for which they can obtain relief against the anonymous reviewers, namely, by way of a proceeding seeking relief for defamation and / or misleading and deceptive conduct. Having regard to the affidavit of Mr Stanarevic, the Google reviews, and that the Prospective Applicant need only establish that he or she "may" have a right to obtain relief, I am satisfied that the relevant threshold is met: Kabbabe at [15] (Murphy J).
14 Further, there is evidence that the Prospective Applicant made reasonable enquiries to ascertain the identities of the anonymous reviewers, including by searching their client database to see if they could identify either of the reviewers, enquiring as to whether Google provides this information voluntarily and contacting a solicitor who is experienced in this area to enquire how to obtain this information. I am also satisfied that Google is likely to have the requisite control of its data such that it would be of assistance to the Prospective Applicant in identifying the anonymous reviewers.