In the present case it is necessary to consider a set of legislative provisions which are substantially different from the Closer Settlement Acts of New South Wales. The present plaintiffs complain of an acquisition made by the Government of Victoria. The defendants say that the acquisition is authorized by the powers conferred upon that Government by the Soldier Settlement Act 1945, as amended, of Victoria. The amending Acts were passed in 1946 and 1949. Section 27 of the principal Act confers power upon the Governor in Council to acquire compulsorily any land which the Soldier Settlement Commission, a body constituted under the Act, has recommended for acquisition "for the purpose of Soldier Settlement pursuant to the Act or any amendment thereof". Section 22 gives power to the Commission to recommend land to the Governor in Council for acquisition for that purpose. The principal Act ratified the execution of the War Service Land Settlement Agreement by the Executive Government of the State and approved of the Agreement. The Soldier Settlement Acts, however, do not merely provide for carrying out the Agreement or acquiring land for the purposes of the Agreement. It is equally true that the Closer Settlement Acts of New South Wales were not passed to provide for either of those purposes. The bases of the decision in Magennis' Case [1] is that the Government of New South Wales applied the Closer Settlement Acts to effectuate the purposes of the Agreement. They were passed to make provisions for the broad purpose of closer settlement within the State; the Victorian Soldier Settlement Acts provide for carrying out the more special but analogous purpose of soldier settlement upon the lands of that State. It has been shown that this special purpose is "soldier-settlement" pursuant to the Acts themselves. The references in the Acts to the War Service Land Settlement Agreement make the terms of the Agreement relevant to the construction of the Acts and qualify the purposes for which the Government may exercise its statutory powers of taking land. The Acts, however, embody a scheme of "soldier-settlement" which is the creation of the State legislature. It has not merely adopted the scheme embodied in the Agreement. The Soldier Settlement Acts authorize the compulsory acquisition of land only for the purpose of "soldier-settlement" pursuant to these Acts. The validity of these powers of acquisition is not affected by the invalidity of the War Service Land Settlement Agreement. In the present case the Government of Victoria exercised these powers in order to acquire the plaintiffs' land and the Government acquired the land for the purposes of "soldier-settlement" pursuant to these Acts. In Magennis' Case [1] the Government of New South Wales intended, according to the allegations in the statement of claim, to resume land for the purposes of the Agreement and not for closer settlement pursuant to the Closer Settlement Acts of New South Wales. There is a substantial distinction between the purpose of the acquisition in the present case and the accepted purpose of the threatened acquisition in Magennis' Case [1] . The purpose in the present case is lawful and clearly within the constitutional powers of the State of Victoria. The purpose in Magennis' Case [1] was, according to the decision in the case, unlawful, beyond the constitutional powers of the State of New South Wales and outside the ambit of the Closer Settlement Acts of that State. In my opinion it is not possible to invalidate the acquisition of the plaintiffs' lands by applying Magennis' Case [1] . Apart from that decision, the validity of the acquisition could not be in doubt.