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[2001] NSWSC 239
Supreme Court of NSW
2001-04-05
Echo Publications P, Kirby J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CITATION : Tucker v Echo Publications P/L [2001] NSWSC 239 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division Defamation List FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 20472/00 HEARING DATE(S) : 30/03/2001 JUDGMENT DATE : 5 April 2001
Ross Tucker (1st Pl) PARTIES : Harold Ross (2nd Pl) Echo Publications Pty Limited (1st Def) Fast Buck$ (aka John Anderson) (2nd Def) JUDGMENT OF : Kirby J
M White (Pls) COUNSEL : B Connell (1st Def) K P Smark (2nd Def) SOLICITORS : Elliot & Sochacki (Pls) Bush Burke & Company (Defs) CATCHWORDS : DEFAMATION - Capacity of publication to give rise to imputations - Whether imputations differ in substance Bishop v Latimer (1861) 4 LT(NS) 775 CASES CITED : Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (unreported, 20.2.80) Morosi v Mirror Newspapers Limited (1977) 2 NSWLC 749 DECISION : Ref para 24
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION DEFAMATION LIST
20472/00 - Ross Tucker & Anor -v- Echo Publications Pty Limited ACN 004.000.239 & Anor
1 HIS HONOUR: Mr Ross Tucker (the first plaintiff) and Mr Harold Ross (the second plaintiff) are directors of Comptran Pty Limited, the publishers of The Saturday Star. Mr Tucker is also an elected Councillor of the Byron Shire Council. 2 On 7 December 1999, Fast Buck$ (the second defendant) published a paid advertisement in The Byron Shire Echo, a newspaper published by the first defendant (Echo Publications Pty Limited). The advertisement was in these terms: "Advertisement 'The ethics of journalism by Fast Buck $'
Imputation (i) 5 Imputation (i) is in these terms: "(i) that the plaintiffs as proprietors of The Saturday Star caused to be published defamatory misrepresentations about Mr Tom Wilson such that the plaintiffs had to pay Mr Wilson $10,000 in damages;" 6 The second defendant objected to the words "in damages" (which differ from the words in the article, "in settlement"). During the course of argument, the plaintiff agreed to delete the words "in damages". The plaintiff has liberty to re-plead. The imputation, as re-pleaded, should go to the jury.
Imputation (j) 7 Imputation (j) is as follows: "(j) that the first plaintiff is a domineering employer in that he abuses employees by belittling them and shouting at them using obscene language;" 8 The defendants object to the concluding words, "using obscene language". They assert that such an imputation is incapable of arising. The article (para 6) describes one instance where obscene language was said to have been used by Mr Tucker ("I don't give a f*** about you and your kids!"). One instance cannot, on the defendants' argument, give rise to a general imputation (Bishop v Latimer (1861) 4 LT(NS) 775). Referring to that case, Hunt J in Singleton v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (unreported, 20 February 1980), said this: (at p6) "The heading to the defendant's report was in the terms: 'How Lawyer Bishop treats his clients'. Proof that the plaintiff had treated one client badly in one particular case was held to be an insufficient justification of the heading, which implied that he so treated his clients generally (at 775)." 9 His Honour added: (at p7) "In many cases, the allegation in the matter complained of that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct on a particular occasion will not support an imputation alleged in general terms." 10 The plaintiffs responded by pointing to the text of the publication, para 6, and the opening words of para 7. A picture is painted of Mr Tucker. He is described as domineering and belittling. He bangs the desk. He has been involved in "unseemly confrontations", "shouting", according to the article, the obscenity attributed to him. The behaviour was said to have led to the "acrimonious departure" of Mrs Potts. The plaintiffs, in these circumstances, made the following submission: "7. An ordinary reasonable reader reading paragraph 6 could reasonably take away from it the meaning that the first plaintiff used obscene language in the course of his domineering and belittling conduct." 11 I believe imputation (j) is capable of arising. It should go to the jury.
Imputation (k) 12 Imputation (k) is as follows: "(k) that the first plaintiff is an employer who discriminates against female employees;" 13 For the purposes of dealing with the defendants' argument, it is convenient to also set out imputation (l). It is as follows: "(l) that the first plaintiff as an employer has a discriminatory attitude towards female employees;" 14 No objection is taken to imputation (l). It seems to me to certainly arise. Mr Tucker, as described by the article, manifested a discriminatory attitude towards female employees. The article attributed to him the words: "We need less skirts around here and more pants." He is described as having treated Mrs Potts in a discriminatory way, allegedly shouting, "I don't give a f*** about your kids". However, is the article capable of suggesting discrimination against female employees, plural? I see nothing which suggests that the first plaintiff actually discriminated against female employees, other than Mrs Potts. I do not believe, therefore, that the imputation arises. The first plaintiff has liberty to re-plead (confining the imputation to Mrs Potts) if so advised.
Imputation (m) 15 Imputation (m) is as follows: "(m) that the first plaintiff is a bully" 16 The defendants faintly argued that the imputation did not arise. However, I believe that it does clearly arise. The article (para 19) says, in terms, that "Ross Tucker (is) … the Shire's biggest bully". The comment is not confined (unlike other imputations) to the conduct or attitude of the first plaintiff towards Mrs Potts. I further believe that it is permissible, in the circumstances, to use the words of the article. The word "bully", although arguably slang, is well understood. It appears in both the Macquarie Dictionary and the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Imputation (m) should go to the jury.
Imputations said not to differ in substance. 17 The defendants submitted that imputations (a), (c), (d) and (g) did not differ in substance. They essentially were saying the same thing, and were simply examples of bullying conduct (cf imputation (m)). 18 The use of the word "improperly" in imputations (a) and (d), was debated in the course of submissions. The plaintiff had incorporated that word, narrowing its meaning by identifying the particular aspect of the conduct said to be improper. The defendants, as I understand their position, do not particularly object to the inclusion of the word "improperly". It was suggested, however, that the plaintiff should amend the imputations to put the meaning beyond doubt. The wording suggested (which the plaintiff accepted) for each imputation was as follows: "(a) that the plaintiffs, being in control of the content of The Saturday Star , improperly used their power of publication, in that they published material in order to intimidate a former employee with whom they were in dispute; … (d) that the plaintiffs, being in control of the content of The Saturday Star , acted improperly in that they threatened to publish matter derogatory of a former employee for the purpose of putting pressure on her to compromise or give up her entitlement to compensation as awarded by a court;" 19 Notwithstanding these amendments, however, the defendants assert that such imputations do not differ in substance. Each was essentially asserting that the plaintiffs had abused the power of publication to intimidate Mrs Potts. The same suggestion was also made in imputation (c), which was as follows: "(c) that the plaintiffs, being in control of the content of The Saturday Star , published false statements about a former employee for the purpose of putting pressure on her to compromise or give up her entitlement to compensation as awarded by a court;" 20 The defendants further complained that imputation (g) did not differ in substance from these imputations. Imputation (g) was in these terms: "(g) that the plaintiffs are cowards in that they deliberately chose to use their power of publication as proprietors of a newspaper to intimidate someone they perceived to be much less able than others to defend herself;" 21 The defendants suggested that bullying behaviour, intimidating Mrs Potts through the power of publication, was essentially cowardly. Any imputation pleaded must be taken to include all other imputations which do not differ in substance (Morosi v Mirror Newspapers Limited (1977) 2 NSWLC 749 at 771). 22 However, I believe the imputations do differ in substance. Imputation (a) differs from the remaining imputations. It asserts an abuse of power to resolve a dispute. Imputation (c) is concerned with the publication of false statements as a means of putting pressure on a former employee. It is a particular form of abuse. Imputation (d) is concerned with the threat of publication of derogatory matter. I assume the source of that imputation is para 16, where the plaintiff is accused of having "threatened to do a further story" on Mrs Potts unless she compromised her claim. It is reasonable to infer that the threatened story would be derogatory. Imputation (g) asserts cowardly behaviour, arising from the course of conduct of the newspaper proprietors towards Mrs Potts. 23 Each imputation should go to the jury. The plaintiff should have leave to amend imputations (a) and (d) to incorporate words which further define the sense in which "improperly" is used. 24 Orders
Last Modified: 04/05/2001 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Tucker
Echo Publications P/L