Assessment of penalty
19 It may be stated as uncontroversial that these proceedings, which seek the imposition of a civil penalty for breach of an industrial instrument, are not criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the courts have approached the assessment of the appropriate level of penalty in a fashion analogous to that of the imposition of a penalty in a criminal proceeding. Again, because this is an uncontroversial area, it is not necessary for me to deal in any detail with the relevant authorities. There are authorities of this Court that have adopted this approach. See, for example, Bluescope Steel v AWU (NSW) (2004) 136 IR 48 (Boland J) and Transport Workers' Union v Carey's Warehousing and Distribution Pty Ltd [2006] NSWIRComm 192 (Marks J). There were parallel provisions in the corresponding Federal legislation (I have not been referred to, nor have I checked for this purpose, the current Workchoices legislation). In the Federal context, I refer to the decision of Finkelstein J in the Federal Court of Australia in Age Co Limited v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2000) 103 IR 148 at [19] to [22] cited by Boland J in Bluescope. I refer also to the comprehensive discussion of the relevant authorities contained within the judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM in Cotis v Pow Juice Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 140. I will proceed to deal with these matters accordingly.
20 I commence by observing that industrial instruments serve an important and integral part in the orderly regulation of relationships between employers and employees and principals and independent contractors. They have the force of law and sanctions are imposed for breach. The commencement point of the determination of penalty in these proceedings is an objective assessment of the seriousness of the offences. It is quite clear from the evidence of Mr Taylor that at all times the company was aware that it had chosen to record through its sophisticated computer system the commencement time for the calculation of the daily safety net hours a point of time which did not comply exactly with that which was required under the Contract Determination. Whatever the rationalisation or justification, the conduct of the defendant cannot be characterised as something that was unintended. It took a deliberate step that it knew would not satisfy completely its obligations under the Contract Determination. In making these observations I should not, however, be seen to have concluded that the defendant had a contumelious disregard for its obligations. I would assess the defendant's conduct as one designed to secure some practical advantage in the context of its operational requirements. Nevertheless, it disregarded its obligations under the Contract Determination and thereby seriously prejudiced Mr Luna, who was underpaid a substantial amount of money over a period slightly in excess of three years. Indeed, the breach in terms of the failure to keep appropriate records involved, to adopt the prosecutor's submissions, a systemic failure.
21 In assessing penalty I shall also take into account the deterrent effect of a monetary penalty on others who engage contract carriers within the transport industry. Arguably more significant than the amount of the monetary penalty is the time, trouble and distraction that is created by an investigation and audit process undertaken by the prosecutor and by the necessity to produce, peruse and analyse a great deal of documentary material. This is in addition to an order for the payment of costs. All of these matters, in the aggregate, far outweigh the amount of any monetary penalty.
22 In terms of deterrence, it is also necessary to have regard to the specific deterrent effect of a monetary penalty on this defendant. I do not take this into account in any significant way because, firstly, the defendant has clearly taken steps to avoid breaches of this kind in the future and, secondly, any impact on a resultant monetary penalty, given the maximum which is available, will be minimal.
23 In considering the imposition of penalty, it is also necessary to have regard to the principle of totality. The prosecutor submitted that whilst it is clear that both charges arose out of the one course of conduct, the penalties should not be substantially reduced by applying the principle of totality because there was a significant time lapse between the defendant becoming aware of the failure to properly keep records in accordance with the Contract Determination and the defendant adjusting the underpayment to Mr Luna. Indeed, as at the date of hearing on 1 June 2007, the balance of the underpayment does not appear to have been made.
24 Although it is clear that the one course of conduct, namely the failure to keep proper records, has given rise to the underpayment, I accept the submissions of the prosecutor that the delay that has occurred in adjusting the underpayment from some time, which at the latest was shortly before 20 October 2006, and this date should temper the application of the totality principle, which might otherwise apply.
25 The defendant is entitled to the benefit of a number of subjective mitigating factors. It has pleaded guilty, albeit on the first day of four days of hearing set aside for that purpose, there are no prior contraventions known to the prosecutor, it has expressed contrition and remorse for what occurred, undertakings have been given with respect to future conduct and to adjust past breaches with respect to contract carriers who are currently engaged, it is otherwise a good corporate citizen, it has co-operated with the prosecutor and it has taken positive steps to improve and remedy matters of compliance with the provisions of the Contract Determination.
26 In the course of submissions, it was said on behalf of the defendant that there were difficulties in strict compliance with the provisions of the Contract Determination because of its complexity. The complexity, however, derives in a pragmatic sense from the manner in which courier and taxi truck companies operate and the necessity to deploy drivers in the most efficient and cost-effective way using such technology as is available for this purpose. I disagree that, given the sophisticated nature of the defendant's operations and given that it is clearly a substantial player in the industry, some leniency should be afforded it in this regard. Otherwise, I intend having regard to the other subjective mitigating factors to which I have referred.
27 The maximum penalty that may be imposed with respect to each breach is the sum of $10,000. Having regard to the matters to which I have referred, I intend imposing a penalty in each case of $3,250.
28 The prosecutor sought an order that any penalty paid should in turn be paid out to it under the provisions of s 403(1) of the Act. The prosecutions arose out of conduct undertaken solely by the prosecutor including an extensive investigation process. No other entity or instrumentality was involved. In these circumstances, it is appropriate, in my opinion, that the penalty be paid to the Industrial Registrar for ultimate payment to the prosecutor, being an industrial organisation of the kind referred to in s 403(1) of the Act.
29 As I have already indicated, the defendant has submitted to an order for the payment of costs and to an order for the payment of monies to Mr Luna.