3.2 Should the application for judicial review be upheld?
27 In his affidavit in support of his application made on 2 June 2020, Mr Tran alleges that the Tribunal's decision is invalid on the following grounds:
(1) the decision was unreasonable;
(2) the Tribunal did not properly apply, or properly exercise its discretion under, ss 501CA and 501CA(4) of the Migration Act;
(3) the Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account;
(4) there was insufficient or no evidence to support the Tribunal's findings;
(5) the decision involved an error of law; and/or
(6) the Tribunal failed to comply with the rules of procedural fairness.
28 In principle, as the Minister accepted at the hearing, each of these grounds is capable of giving rise to an error of a jurisdictional kind and therefore providing a ground on which the Tribunal's decision must be set aside. However, they are expressed at such a high level of generality that it is not possible to discern the nature of any error complained of by Mr Tran. Nor did Mr Tran file written submissions which might have assisted in identifying any specific error. In so saying, I am not intending to be critical of Mr Tran. Given that he was unrepresented, in immigration detention, and does not speak English, the failure to file written submissions to elaborate upon his grounds of review is entirely understandable.
29 At the hearing, Mr Tran submitted that:
(1) he was not advised that he would be returned if he committed crimes; and
(2) while he was given a number of warnings, the warning letters advised that his visa was liable to cancellation only if he served a sentence for criminal sentencing for more than 12 months in prison but since the warning, he had not served a prison sentence exceeding one year for any criminal offences.
30 Neither of these grounds, however, can succeed.
31 First, as earlier mentioned, Mr Tran received three warnings from the Department, as the Tribunal found at [8] to [10] of its reasons. The first warning in July 2005 advised in bold type that while a delegate had decided not to cancel his visa, "conviction for ANY further offences will result in a fresh assessment being made to again consider cancellation of your visa" (CB 152) (emphasis in the original). Mr Tran received a further warning from the Department on 26 October 2007 (CB 165). That letter gave a "formal warning" in bold in the following terms:
Please note that visa refusal or cancellation may be reconsidered if fresh information comes to notice or if you incur a liability on new grounds. Disregard of this warning will weigh heavily against you if your case is reconsidered.
32 A third warning was given on 2 October 2012 (CB 169) which advised that:
… any further criminal convictions, or any other conduct on your behalf that comes within the scope of subsection 501(6), could result in consideration of the cancellation of your visa. The consequences of visa cancellation under section 501 of the Act include removal of the former visa holder from Australia and, in certain cases, bars on re-entering Australia
(emphasis in the original).
33 A copy of s 501 was attached to this letter. Mr Tran also, as requested in the letter, signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the warning letter (CB 171).
34 None of these warnings advised that Mr Tran's visa could be cancelled only if he served a sentence for further offending of more than 12 months. To the contrary, in each case the advice was that any further criminal conduct could result in a reconsideration of the question of whether his visa should be cancelled. Furthermore, the last of these warning expressly advised that Mr Tran could be removed from Australia if his visa was cancelled on character grounds.
35 It is true that none of the letters warned that Mr Tran's visa would be cancelled automatically under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act and it may be that this perceived omission lies at the heart of Mr Tran's complaint. However, this is because s 501(3A) was enacted after the last of the warnings by the Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Act 2014 (Cth), which came into force on 11 December 2014. There was no obligation in law for the Minister to advise Mr Tran that that amendment had been made to the Migration Act.
36 Secondly, Mr Tran's submission that the Tribunal had not reinstated his visa merely because of his driving offences is, with respect, incorrect. The Tribunal considered the totality of his offending, as it was required to do under Direction 79 in order to have regard in particular to Primary Considerations A and C.
37 Thirdly, Mr Tran submitted that the Court should exercise compassion and permit him to stay in Australia given that his family lives in Australia. It is understandable that a lay-person in Mr Tran's circumstances would seek leniency from the Court and assume that the Court could overturn the Tribunal's decision. However, for the reasons I have earlier explained, the Court does not have the power to decide whether or not to revoke the visa cancellation on compassionate or any other grounds. It is limited to considering whether or not the Tribunal made a lawful decision under the Migration Act.
38 Fourthly, the Minister's counsel properly drew the Court's attention to two errors in the Tribunal's reasons. At [12] and [13], the Tribunal identified the issue as whether or not it should exercise its "discretion" to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Mr Tran's visa under s 501(1). However, the question for the Tribunal was relevantly whether or not the Tribunal was satisfied that "there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked" under s 501CA(4). If satisfied that there was another reason, the Tribunal was required to revoke the cancellation decision: AIJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2205 at [16] (Perry J). While unfortunate, on a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons as a whole, it is apparent that the Tribunal in fact applied the correct test under s 501CA(4). The Tribunal cited the correct provision at [4] of its reasons in referring to the decision of the delegate under review and cited Part C of Direction 79 at [26] and [29] which relates to a consideration of the power under s 501CA(4). The Tribunal then in fact weighed the Primary and Other Considerations in the manner required by Direction 79 in order to decide whether another reason existed to revoke the cancellation decision. In this regard, Colvin J explained in Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594 with respect to the process of weighing the Primary and Other Considerations, that Direction 65 (which is relevantly the same as Direction 79):
23. … makes clear that an evaluation is required in each case as to the weight to be given to the 'other considerations' … It requires both primary and other considerations to be given 'appropriate weight'. Direction 65 does provide that, generally, primary considerations should be given greater weight. They are primary in the sense that absent some factor that takes the case out of that which pertains 'generally' they are to be given greater weight.
39 Finally, I have carefully considered the Tribunal's decision and, in particular, whether any of the general grounds of review alleged in the application might have merit. However, I was unable to discern any errors of the general kind alleged.