Ground 1A: did the Tribunal consider something irrelevant?
- Mr Tran first maintains that the Tribunal fell into error insofar as it was moved to consider that his having remained unlawfully in Australia fell within what cl 8.1(1) of Direction 99 describes as "other serious conduct". Simply put, Mr Tran maintains that his continued presence in Australia following the cancellation of his previous (student) visa (and prior to his being granted the Visa) was not conduct that was apt to be considered pursuant to cl 8.1.
- The proposition upon which that submission is advanced is difficult to reconcile with what was said on Mr Tran's behalf before the Tribunal (above, [30]). Perhaps it might not be thought that Mr Poynder agreed that Mr Tran's continued presence in Australia was "other serious conduct" for the purposes of cl 8.1 of Direction 99; but that does appear to be the context in which the query arose and there was no suggestion then that the consideration was irrelevant to that inquiry.
- Regardless, in order that the Tribunal's Decision to take account of that consideration might bespeak jurisdictional error as alleged, it is necessary that Mr Tran should show that it was irrelevant in the sense that Mason J recognised in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 40. That invites some analysis as to whether there is something about the subject matter, scope or purpose of the Act that precluded the Tribunal, in the present matter, from bringing Mr Tran's unlawful presence in Australia to bear upon its consideration of cl 8.1 of Direction 99.
- Clause 8.1 of Direction 99 required the Tribunal, in the course of considering the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, to reflect upon "the nature and seriousness" of Mr Tran's conduct: Direction 99, cl 8.1(2)(a). In considering the nature and seriousness of that conduct, cl 8.1.1(1) of Direction 99 required that it have regard to the non-exhaustive list of "types of crimes or conduct" that "the Australian Government and the Australian community" view as "serious".
- There is nothing about the subject matter, scope or purpose of those provisions or the statutory authority that underpins them that required the Tribunal here, when assessing the nature and seriousness of his conduct to date, not to take account of Mr Tran's having remained and worked unlawfully in Australia. Buntin v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1055 (Meagher J), which Mr Tran advanced in support of that very proposition, is in fact no such authority.
- On the contrary, in assessing the nature and seriousness of Mr Tran's conduct to date, the Tribunal was entitled to take account of anything that rationally bore upon that assessment. So long as it was made with appropriate compliance with the instruction conveyed by cl 8.1.1, the Tribunal's assessment in that regard was not otherwise constrained.
- But even were it otherwise - that is to say, even if cl 8.1.1(1) of Direction 99 precluded the Tribunal, when considering the nature and seriousness of Mr Tran's conduct to date, from having regard to conduct that was not at the same level of seriousness as the species listed in subparagraph (b) - it does not follow that what the Tribunal did in the present matter involved consideration of an irrelevant matter. It is not in controversy that, during the period spanning the cancellation of his previous visa through to the granting of the one that he now wants back, Mr Tran remained in Australia unlawfully. He was not entitled to live or work here and yet he did both. He apparently received payments in cash, which was not declared for income tax purposes. It is not necessary that the court now should conclude that his conduct was relevantly criminal. It suffices to observe that it was open to the Tribunal to consider that it was serious; and, in particular, of an equivalent seriousness to the other species of conduct listed in cl 8.1.1(1)(b) of Direction 99.
- Clause 8.1(1) of Direction 99 required that decision makers "…should have particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they [amongst other things] will respect important institutions". There is no reason to doubt that the regulatory framework that governs Australia's immigration policy should qualify as one such institution.
- It follows that the Tribunal's Decision here to take account of Mr Tran's unlawful presence in Australia after the cancellation of his previous visa - and to factor it into its assessment under cl 8.1.1 of Direction 99 of the nature and seriousness of his conduct to date - does not bespeak any error of law on the Tribunal's part. On the contrary (and with respect), the Tribunal was entitled to reason as it did.