Tramanco Pty Ltd v BPW Transpec Pty Ltd

The Specification 181 The patent specification in suit (the Specification) refers to various disadvantages associated with methods for testing suspension in the prior art. Some of the prior art methods involve removing components (ie. shock absorbers) from the vehicle. The Specification suggests that the testing of such components after removal from the vehicle is unsatisfactory because, among other things, it leads to increased vehicle downtime. 182 The Specification makes reference to the standards relating to the performance of suspension and suspension components with which haulage or freight trucks may be called upon to comply. The requirements of VBS-11 are referred to specifically. The Specification states that, in order to be considered road friendly, suspension must have a damping ratio of greater than 20% and a frequency oscillation of less than 2 Hz. This is followed at page 2, line 33 - page 3, line 9, by a discussion of compliance testing in the context of the "road friendliness" of the suspension: This compliance testing may test one or more parameters of the suspension which determine the "road friendliness" of the suspension. A "road friendly suspension" may be one which functions within predetermined limits for one or more of the parameters, and attaining or complying with "road friendliness" may provide advantages for the owner/operator of the vehicle such as the ability to carry heavier loads or access to roads which noncompliant vehicles may be restricted from using. As well, the road friendly performance of the suspension/s will affect the working life of the road itself with attendant reduction in maintenance costs and increased safety to all road users, with the economic benefits of such savings flowing on to the general community. According to the Specification at page 3, lines 12-17: It is therefore desirable to provide for an accurate test procedure for testing the performance of suspension components on a vehicle to determine whether the suspension is functioning properly and within legally acceptable limits while the vehicle is in use and without requiring the removal of the vehicle from service. In addition, it is desirable to provide for a test procedure for testing vehicle suspension components that does not require subjective interpretation by a technician. 183 The Specification states that the invention is directed to a method for logging the performance of a vehicle suspension system which may overcome the disadvantages of the testing methods that form part of the prior art. This statement is followed by a consistory clause which mirrors the language of claim 1. 184 According to the Specification, the method described in the consistory clause is one which is preferably used to test the road friendliness of a suspension system. At page 4, lines 1-9, the Specification states: The method given above is preferably used to test the "road friendliness" of a suspension of vehicles. "Road friendliness" is assessed by the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC), and once a road friendly standard has been attained, the vehicle is generally allowed increased mass limits. The road friendliness of a suspension or suspension group, that is two or more axles connected together for load sharing as defined in the guidelines of the Higher Mass Limits (HML), is generally assessed under the current Higher Mass Limits (HML), currently in force, according to two criteria, namely the damping ratio of the suspension and the frequency of oscillation of suspension in response to an impulsive load. 185 The Specification then describes how an electronic weighing system mounted on board the vehicle may be used to measure or collect data that may be used to calculate the damping ratio and frequency of oscillation. The Specification explains that a global positioning system (GPS) device, or other locating means, might also be utilised to collect information as to the location of the vehicle. 186 The Specification also explains how the electronic weighing system mounted on the vehicle may be used to log the performance of the vehicle suspension system. The Specification indicates that this can be done in a number of different ways using a number of different tests. There are four such tests described in the Specification which are referred to as the "axle test", "bump test", "road test" and "trip test". 187 It is common ground that none of the four tests discussed in the Specification permit the measurement of the load or force experienced by the vehicle at the tyre/road interface. 188 The "road test" is significant because it is said by the appellant to support its contention that the third parameter referred to in claim 1 is not concerned with the load or force at the tyre/road interface, but with the load or force in the suspension. The road test is described in the Specification at page 7, lines 3-9 as follows: A third test which may be performed may be a road test. According to this test, the variation in the mass signal may be recorded as the combination test rig vehicle travels along a normal, uneven road at speed. The speed may be up to 60km/h or may be higher or lower if required. The GPS location device may be linked to the data collected, to precisely locate the portion of road upon which the test was conducted for future comparison of the test conditions as well as the road condition to determine the degradation in either or both. 189 The road test involves the establishment of a performance benchmark against which variations in the performance of the vehicle may be measured based upon variations in the mass signal. The "mass signal" in this context refers to variations in mass induced by dynamic loads or forces in the suspension measured at high frequency using the electronic weighing system. The appellant says that this mass signal constitutes, or records, the "impact loading of the vehicle" as that phrase is used in claim 1. 190 The "trip test" is said to allow for the collection of information as to road conditions. At page 7, lines 17-26, the Specification states: The trip test may preferably allow data to be collected about the condition of the roads which a test vehicle travels over whilst gathering data in the form of the axle test for analysis, at the same time. Each trip test may be expanded into a series of axle tests for such purposes. For example, an impulsive load may be imposed on the suspension if the test vehicle drives over a pothole in the road. If a test vehicle uses the same route, it would generally traverse the same pothole on different trips. By assessing the performance of the suspension in response to the impulsive load applied to the suspension on different trips, a user may determine whether the pothole is getting larger or deeper or whether it has been repaired or not. 191 Claim 21 (which, together with other relevant claims, is reproduced in the Chief Justice's reasons) is for a method that "allow[s] data to be collected about the condition of the roads which a test vehicle travels over." The significance of the description of the "trip test" upon which claim 21 is based is that the invention is said to enable the user to monitor changes in road conditions, not by measuring such changes at the tyre/road interface, but by assessing the performance of the suspension in response to impulsive loads applied to the suspension. 192 The general description of the invention appearing in the Specification concludes with the following observations at page 8, lines 1-7: Suitably, the method of the present invention may be utilised to collect and analyse data in order to log the performance of the suspension of a vehicle. Individual components of the suspension may be tested or groups of components may be tested. The system allows the logging of information relating to the dynamic effect of impulsive loads applied to suspensions and the compliance of the suspension to parameters adapted to ascertain the effectiveness of the suspension in dampening the impulsive load applied. 193 It is convenient at this point to note that the appellant's counsel submitted that the primary judge failed to grasp the true nature of the advance made by the inventor over the prior art. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the inventive step in this case consisted of the idea of using an on-board electronic weighing machine to capture the "mass signal" or "excursions in mass" by taking measurements at high frequency of the dynamic loads on the suspension of the vehicle from which conclusions could be drawn as to the performance of the suspension. 194 The characterisation of the invention was said by counsel for the appellant to be particularly important to the construction question because a skilled addressee who read the Specification would understand that the inventor was not claiming to have invented a method for measuring a load or force at the tyre/road interface. Rather, the skilled addressee would understand the invention to involve a new method of measuring the performance of suspension by logging at high frequency variations in the load or force in suspension using an on-board electronic weighing system. 195 The general description of the invention is followed by a more detailed description of a preferred embodiment of the invention by reference to drawings (Figs 1-9). Importantly, the detailed description commences at page 9, lines 3-5 as follows: According to an aspect of the invention, a method for logging the performance of a vehicle suspension system in reaction to impulsive loads applied thereto is provided. This statement is clearly referring to the performance of the suspension in reaction to the impulsive loads applied to the suspension. 196 The detailed description of the invention is provided in the context of, and with reference to, the use of the invention on a truck and trailer combination equipped with air suspension. A road test of the rig is described in which the variation in mass signal was recorded as the rig travelled along normal, uneven roads at speeds of up to 60 kph. A sample of data from the road test is presented in the Specification in hexadecimal form and with the whole data set plotted in Fig 6. Figure 6 consists of a plot of the mass signal. 197 According to the Specification at page 16, line 19 - page 17, line 7: By subjecting the data from the on road test to Fourier analysis, the system is able to determine the trailer's body-to-axle-group frequencies induced by the dynamic forces on the combination. For this analysis, it was assumed that the signal derived from driving the vehicle on normal roads approximated to a random signal. Fourier analysis of an output, or derived, signal after it has been generated from a random input signal of uniform amplitude to any system allows determination of the transfer function of the system as expressed by the frequencies present in the output signal. The plot illustrated in Figure 6 is a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) that is, by definition, lumpy and does not yield pure and clean plots on the magnitude axis. Even allowing for the overall noise created by the FFT process, it can be seen that the greatest frequency magnitude 46 present in the FFT of the on-road signal is that of 1.5 Hz - 2 Hz. Given that the EU standard for body bounce is > 2.0 Hz [sic: < 2.0 Hz], it is statistically probable that this parameter is met by the suspension tested and reflected on this plot. (footnote omitted) A fast Fourier transfer (FFT) is a mathematical process used in data analysis which may assist in identifying cyclic patterns, or oscillations, in a data series where it may be difficult to do so using a simple time series plot. The Specification thus indicates that a FFT may be used to determine whether or not it is statistically probable that the EU Standard for "body bounce" is met by the suspension tested.

Consideration 198 The phrase "impact loading of the vehicle" is not defined in the body of the Specification. It appears in the consistory clause and claim 1 but is not used in any other part of the Specification. The phrase does not have any accepted technical meaning. Neither party suggested that the language was clear or unambiguous and both parties accepted that the phrase is capable of conveying either of the two different meanings to which I have referred. However, the appellant submitted that when claim 1 is read in the context of the Specification as a whole, the construction which it propounds is clearly preferable to that adopted by the primary judge. 199 The Specification does not provide any clear indication of what is intended by the use of the phrase "impact loading of the vehicle" as it appears in claim 1. It is true, as the respondent submitted, that if the phrase was intended to refer to "impact loading of the vehicle on the suspension" then the patentee could easily have said so in terms. But it is equally true that the claim might have been drafted so as to refer to "the impact loading of the vehicle at the tyre/road interface" or, perhaps, the "dynamic load co-efficient" (a technical expression referring to the load or force at the tyre/road interface). In the present case, however, semantic arguments of this kind, while recognising that the claim could have been drafted so as to avoid the relevant ambiguity, are of little assistance when it comes to ascertaining the meaning of the claim. 200 It is necessary to construe the language of claim 1 in light of the Specification as a whole and in light of the common general knowledge that the skilled addressee would consider relevant when seeking to understand the document. The skilled addressee would be aware that there was no simple way of measuring the impact loading of a vehicle at the tyre/road interface. The skilled addressee would also understand that the Specification does not purport to describe any means by which the impact loading of the vehicle could be measured at the tyre/road interface. 201 In my view, the skilled addressee would understand the description of the invention to relate to the measurement of loads or forces at the suspension, and would apply that understanding to his or her reading of claim 1. In cross-examination Dr Blanksby gave evidence which indicates that he approached the claim in precisely this way, that is to say, having read the Specification as a whole, he formed the view that it was "not the intention of the patent" to measure loads or forces at the tyre/road interface. I think Dr Blanksby's reading of the claim is fully borne out by the description of the invention in the Specification. 202 The support that the respondent seeks to draw from the Specification for its construction of claim 1 is said to be found in the references to "road-friendliness". It is true that the concept of road-friendliness is very much focused upon the impact that heavy vehicles have on roads and the affect that this may have on road maintenance costs and road safety. However, the standards referred to in the Specification are concerned with the road-friendliness of suspensions in heavy vehicles. Each of the compliance tests specified in these standards assess road-friendliness by reference to the performance of the suspension. None of them involve the measurement of loads or forces at the tyre/road interface. I do not see references to "road-friendliness" in the Specification as providing any support for the respondent's construction of claim 1. 203 The principal arguments in favour of the respondent's construction of claim 1 are referred to in the Chief Justice's reasons for judgment. They are essentially based upon a close textual analysis of claim 1. If claim 1 is read in isolation then these are powerful arguments. However, they lose much of their force when claim 1 is read in light of the Specification as a whole and, in particular, the complete absence from the description of any suggestion that the invention involves the ascertainment of loads or forces at the tyre/road interface.

SUFFICIENCY 204 The respondent contended that even if the appellant's construction of claim 1 was correct, then claim 1 and each of the dependent claims that are alleged to be infringed are invalid because, contrary to s 40(2)(a) of the Act, the Specification does not describe the invention fully. 205 The test for sufficiency under s 40(2)(a) (as s 40 stood prior to recent amendments) was formulated by the High Court in Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Limited v Arico Trading International Pty Limited (2001) 207 CLR 1 (Kimberly-Clark) at [25] as follows: The question is, will the disclosure enable the addressee of the specification to produce something within each claim without new inventions or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting initial difficulty? The disclosure, or rather, the "enabling" disclosure, is the consideration that the patentee gives for the grant of a monopoly for the term of the patent: see the observations of Romer LJ in No-Fume Ltd v Frank Pitchford & Co Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231 at 243, cited with approval in Kimberly-Clark at [25]. 206 In Lockwood Security Products Pty Limited v Doric Products Pty Limited (2004) 217 CLR 274 (Doric) the High Court said at [60]: For the purposes of s 40(2)(a), it is not necessary for the inventor to disclose all the alternative means; it is enough that there is disclosure in the sense of enabling the addressee of the specification to produce something within each claim without new inventions or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting additional difficulty. 207 In Kimberly-Clark and Doric the High Court was concerned with various product claims each of which consisted of a number of features all of which were essential (in the sense of non-optional) integers of the claim. However, there are some types of claim that may need to be approached slightly differently including, in particular, claims to methods for producing one or more specified results. For example, a claim for a method of producing one or more of outcomes A, B or C might be infringed if the alleged infringer uses the method to produce outcome A, but not outcome B or C. Whether there is infringement in such a case will depend upon (inter alia) the proper construction of the claim and, in particular, whether it requires the use of the method to produce only one or more of outcomes A, B or C, as opposed to all three of them. Assuming the former construction (in the present case it appears to have been assumed by both parties at the trial and on appeal that claim 1 is to be construed in this way), it would seem to me to be wrong in principle to hold that the description of the invention is sufficient if the specification enables the use of the method to achieve outcome A, but not outcomes B or C. It would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act to confer a monopoly on a patentee for a method of producing any of outcomes A, B or C, if the patentee's disclosure only enabled the use of the method to produce some of those outcomes. 208 On this view of s 40(2)(a), the concession made by the appellant that claim 1 was invalid for insufficiency of description if the respondent's construction of claim 1 was accepted was properly made. However, this concession still leaves open the question whether claim 1 is invalid for insufficiency on the appellant's construction of claim 1. This is a question of fact that was not the subject of a finding by the primary judge. 209 The respondent's submissions on this question were brief. In its written submissions the respondent stated that "the patent remains in breach of section 40 even under Tramanco's interpretation, as the specification does not say how the variations in mass that Tramanco identifies are derived". A footnote to this submission stated that the Specification (at page 12, lines 25-32) asserts "the proportionality of air pressure and mass but do[es] not disclose how the conversion is made." The same footnote includes a reference to the evidence of Mr Di Cristoforo discussed below. 210 At para [29] of the appellant's written submissions in reply the appellant responded as follows: BPW correctly notes that Tramanco does not dispute the finding of insufficiency of claim 1 if impact loading has the meaning set out in the reasons. However, it now contends that the patent remains in breach of section 40 even on Tramanco's interpretation "as the specification does not say how the variations in mass that Tramanco identifies are derived". We find this submission difficult to understand. What is required in the body is a real and reasonably clear disclosure of what is claimed. The determinations of mass are made by using an EWS. As described in the patent specification this comprises, for example, APTs, smart amplifiers and a computer. There is no doubt that it was part of the common general knowledge that on-board electronic weighing systems use various sensors and then perform calculations to arrive at a mass or weight measurement, for example in kilograms. The invention was to use this dynamically. (footnotes omitted) 211 This passage of the appellant's submissions elides the distinction between grounds of invalidity arising under s 40(2)(1)(a) (sufficiency) and s 40(3) (fair basis). Leaving that aside, the substance of the respondent's submission that the Specification does not enable the skilled addressee to derive a mass signal from air pressure was left unanswered by the appellant in both its written and oral submissions. 212 In his report dated 18 March 2011 at para 3.5, page 5, Mr Di Cristoforo said: … [T]he patent describes the operation of a standard on-board mass measurement system based on air pressure readings as I described in Section 2.5 of my report dated 8 June 2010. The patent is unclear as to whether the method is intended to operate from a single airbag pressure reading or from multiple readings in several airbags. In my experience, while the precise setup, accuracy and format of the display on on-board mass measurement systems available in August 2003 varied depending on the manufacturer, such systems require only one air pressure transducer per axle group. Therefore I believe that for the purpose of vehicle weighing an on-board electronic weighing system requires only one air pressure transducer per axle group. For some of the features of the patented method it may be necessary to obtain more measurements. The on-board electronic weighing system described in the patent is stated to be designed to report mass in "40 kg increments," which I interpret to mean to a resolution of 40 kg, or to the nearest multiple of 40 kg. The last part of the passage describes how the system determines the mass on the steer axle (the front axle of the prime mover) when it only measures the air pressure in the airbags of the drive axles (rear axles of the prime mover) and the trailer axles. For a given prime mover and semi-trailer combination, the loads on the steer axle and on the drive axles increase and decrease according to the load imposed on the prime mover by the trailer, and the steer axle load is related to the drive axle load by a simple formula that may be calculated theoretically, or determined by experiment when the system is calibrated. Such systems determine the mass of the vehicle when stationary. If a vehicle is moving then the air pressure reading will vary substantially and will not correlate to the mass of the vehicle. One of the claims of the patent (Claim 19) claims that the "variation in a mass signal" is recorded. The term "mass signal" is not defined clearly in the patent … [T]he phrase "Air pressure is converted to a mass signal by a mass measurement system ..." suggests to me that at some point in the system one of its components converts the pressure in the airbags to a signal indicating mass. It is not clear whether this is a reference to the signal transmitted by the pressure transducers, the signal transmitted by the smart amplifiers, or something else. This raises the question of the difference between a mass signal and a pressure signal. Although the "mass signal" is claimed as being recorded the patent suggests that the pressure signal is what is captured by the APT [air pressure transducer]. How such a pressure signal is converted to a mass signal is not disclosed in the patent. 213 Counsel for the respondent submitted that this evidence shows that Mr Di Cristoforo was of the opinion that the Specification does not disclose how a pressure signal is converted to a mass signal. I accept this submission. However, I do not think this takes the matter far enough. To succeed on sufficiency it is necessary for the respondent to establish that the disclosure did not enable the skilled addressee to perform the method referred to in claim 1 "without new inventions or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting initial difficulty": Kimberly-Clark at [25]. It is possible that Mr Di Cristoforo would have said, if asked, that the skilled addressee would not know how to convert a pressure signal into a mass signal or, at least, that he or she would not be able to perform that task without considerable difficulty. However, none of the evidence to which we were referred suggests that he was asked that question and, in my opinion, the evidence to which we were taken does not answer it. 214 Counsel for the respondent also referred to evidence of Dr Gilmore given during cross-examination in which he agreed that there was nothing in the Specification to identify how the impact loading of the vehicle is to be determined. Counsel for the respondent submitted that subsequent cross-examination clearly showed that Dr Gilmore's concession related to "the impact loading of the vehicle" as the phrase was interpreted by the appellant. However, the subsequent evidence referred to by counsel for the respondent is to the opposite effect. It shows quite clearly that Dr Gilmore was referring to the absence of any disclosure enabling the determination of impact loading at the tyre/road interface. 215 In my opinion, the evidence relied upon by the respondent does not establish that claim 1 (or any of its dependent claims) is invalid for insufficiency due to the lack of an enabling disclosure with respect to the determination of the impact loading of the vehicle at the suspension. 216 The primary judge found at [235] of his reasons that claim 21 was invalid for insufficiency (s 40(2)(a)) and lack of fair basis (s 40(3)). So far as s 40(2)(a) is concerned, his Honour found, in substance, that claim 21 was not supported by an enabling disclosure. In my opinion, this finding was open on the evidence. 217 In its written submissions the appellant submitted that the Specification indicates that a GPS, or other locating means, such as a trip meter, may be used according to the invention, and that the discussion of "road test" and "trip test" in the Specification includes a clear description of the use of such locating means, including a GPS, to locate the position of the vehicle when a test is undertaken. The road test, as described in the Specification, is said to permit the collection of data which may be used for the purpose of drawing comparisons from which conclusions may be drawn as to road conditions. The trip test, as described in the Specification, is said to enable a user to determine whether a pothole is getting larger or deeper, or whether it has been repaired. 218 However, the Specification does not explain how variations in mass signal "allow data to be collected about the condition of the roads which a test vehicle travels over" as required by claim 21. It is clear that variations in the mass signal may be attributable to a variety of causes including a deterioration in the effectiveness of a vehicle's suspension. Variations in mass signal tell the user nothing about the condition of the road upon which the vehicle has travelled unless he or she can exclude the possibility that one or more other potential causes, including a deterioration in the effectiveness of the vehicle's suspension, produced such variations. I therefore agree that claims 21-23 (claims 22-23 are dependent on claim 21) are invalid because, in this particular respect, they are not supported by an enabling disclosure.

NOVELTY 219 I agree with the Chief Justice's reasons for concluding that none of the US patent by Tal et al and the papers written by Dr Sweatman anticipate claim 1.

OBVIOUSNESS 220 It is common ground that the primary judge did not make a finding that any of the claims was invalid for lack of inventive step even though his Honour said in his later judgment on costs that he would almost certainly have made such a finding had it been necessary for him to do so. Hence, inventive step was an issue that arose on the respondent's notice of contention (ground 8) rather than on the appellant's notice of appeal. 221 The respondent bore the onus of establishing that the method referred to in claim 1 (and its dependent claims) would have been obvious to the hypothetical, non-inventive worker in the field equipped with the common general knowledge and any other information which satisfied the requirements of s 7(3) of the Act. 222 The primary judge dealt with the topic of common general knowledge at [150]-[166] of his reasons. His Honour made detailed findings as to the common general knowledge and the other information made relevant pursuant to s 7(3) of the Act. At [156] and [157] the primary judge enumerated specific matters which he later found were common general knowledge including VSB-11 and Dr Sweatman's 1983 and 1994 papers. His Honour also found that Dr Sweatman's papers, even if not common general knowledge, could be considered separately pursuant to s 7(3) of the Act. These findings were not challenged. However, it does not follow from these findings that the method the subject of claim 1 was obvious. 223 In Wellcome Foundation Ltd v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 262 Aickin J (with whom Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ agreed) referred to the need for a valid patent to "involve an inventive step" (language which appears in s 7(2) and s 18(1) of the Act). His Honour said at 286: The test is whether the hypothetical addressee faced with the same problem would have taken as a matter of routine whatever steps might have led from the prior art to the invention, whether they be the steps of the inventor or not. This test of obviousness was cited with approval by the majority of the High Court in Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2002) 212 CLR 411 at [50]. As to what "a matter of routine" means in this context, the majority said at [53] that the reformulation of the "Cripps question" by Graham J in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp v Biorex Laboratories Ltd [1970] RPC 157 is an approach that should be accepted. 224 Both parties accepted that the "reformulated Cripps question" should be applied in this case for the purpose of determining whether the method defined in claim 1 involved an inventive step. For the purposes of this case the question can be posed in these terms: Would the hypothetical, non-inventive worker in the field, armed with the relevant prior art (in this case the common general knowledge) directly be led as a matter of course to try a method within the scope of claim 1 in the expectation that it might well produce a useful alternative to known methods for testing the effectiveness of a vehicle's suspension system? 225 On appeal, the respondent did not undertake any analysis of the common general knowledge with a view to establishing that any of the methods described in the Specification within the scope of claim 1, or any other method within the scope of that claim, was obvious, or that the "reformulated Cripps question" should be answered in the affirmative. 226 The evidence of Dr Hart did not establish that a non-inventive worker in the field would have taken, as a matter of routine, whatever steps might have led from the relevant prior art to the invention. As the Chief Justice has observed, none of the methods described by Dr Hart in his reports involved the use of an on-board electronic weighing system. 227 Having considered the common general knowledge as found by the primary judge along with the evidence of Dr Hart, I am not persuaded that claim 1 is invalid for lack of inventive step.

INFRINGEMENT 228 I agree with what the Chief Justice has written on the issue of infringement and have nothing to add.

DISPOSITION 229 For the above reasons I would allow the appellant's appeal, in part, against the primary judge's declaration of invalidity and his Honour's order for revocation, and set aside both the declaration and the order for revocation. There should instead be a declaration that each of claims 21, 22 and 23 of the patent is invalid and an order revoking each of those claims. The application and cross-claim should otherwise be dismissed. The appeal also should be otherwise dismissed. The parties should be given an opportunity to file written submissions in relation to the question of costs with respect to the proceeding below and the appeal. To that end, each party should be required to file and serve written submissions on the issue of costs (up to 5 pages in length) within 7 days and any written submissions in reply (up to 2 pages in length) within 14 days. I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Nicholas.