Tonga, Samuel v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2023-05-08|Before: Walton J, Hamill J, James AM

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] On 14 November 2022, the applicant was sentenced for one offence of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm, under s 35(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and a further minor offence of failing to disclose the identity of the driver and other passenger in a car in which he had been travelling. The applicant and his brother had assaulted the victim in a "road rage" incident. During the assault, the applicant had struck the victim on the head twice with a crowbar. The victim sustained a deep skull fracture (which required a craniectomy, craniotomy and titanium cranioplasty) and two other more minor wounds. The applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for 22 months, with a non-parole period of 13 months. The primary judge declined to order that the sentence be served by way of an intensive correction order under s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (Sentencing Act). The applicant sought leave to appeal the decision not to grant an ICO. The three issues raised on the application were whether the sentencing judge erred: (i) in failing to find that the applicant was unlikely to reoffend; (ii) in categorising the grant of ICO as an "act of leniency"; and (iii) applying the requirements of s 66 of the Sentencing Act. The Court (Basten AJA and Walton J and Hamill J agreeing) held, granting leave to appeal but dismissing the appeal: As to issue (i) - failing to find that the applicant was unlikely to reoffend 1 The finding and the evidence which supported it, primarily being the evidence in the Sentencing Assessment Report, did not dictate a conclusion that the applicant was unlikely to reoffend. Nor was this finding critical to the decision as to whether to impose an ICO: [18] (Basten AJA); [54] (Walton J); [58] (Hamill J). As to issue (ii) - ICO as an act of leniency 2 Were an ICO not seen as a more lenient sentence than the same period served in custody, there would have been no application for leave to appeal; the proposed supervision plan was vastly less intrusive than a fulltime deprivation of liberty: [20]. This description has been adopted by the Court on numerous occasions: [21] (Basten AJA); [54] (Walton J); [58] (Hamill J). Zheng v R [2023] NSWCCA 64; R v Cahill [2015] NSWCCA 53, referred to As to issue (iii) - the operation of s 66 3 The sentencing judge did not fail to apply the three-stage process in considering whether a sentence of imprisonment of two years or less should be served by way of an ICO: [38]. The primary judge considered the propensity to violence to be the primary risk to community safety and expressly identified community safety as the paramount consideration, as required under s 66(2): [47] (Basten AJA), [55]-[56] (Walton J), [59] (Hamill J). Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2023) 97 ALJR 107; [2023] HCA 3; Zheng v R [2023] NSWCCA 64; Mandranis v R [2021] NSWCCA 97; (2021) 289 A Crim R 260; R v Fangaloka [2019] NSWCCA 173, applied 4 The sentencing judge found the s 66(2) comparison to be neutral, or unable to be resolved on the evidence, in finding that serving the sentence in the full-time custody was "not more likely to address his reoffending" than an ICO: [39]-[41], [44]. Section 66(2) does not exclude other aspects of sentencing which may affect community safety. It was not an error for the primary judge to take general deterrence into account, as permitted by s 66(3): [50] (Basten AJA), [55]-[57] (Walton J), [61] (Hamill J).

JUDGMENT

BASTEN AJA: On 14 November 2022, the applicant, Samuel Tonga, was sentenced for one offence of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm, with a further minor offence of failing to disclose the identities of the driver and other passenger in a car in which he had been travelling. The applicant entered a timely plea of guilty to the substantive offence and was sentenced to imprisonment for 22 months, with a non-parole period of 13 months. There are four proposed grounds of appeal: each is directed to the refusal of the trial judge to order that the sentence be served by way of an intensive correction order pursuant to s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (Sentencing Act).
It is appropriate that there be a grant of leave to appeal against sentence in this matter, but for the reasons set out below, the appeal should be dismissed.

Background

The following facts are derived from a statement of agreed facts on sentence (not all of which were in fact agreed) and a viewing of a video taken on a dashboard camera (dash cam) mounted on the vehicle immediately behind the victim's vehicle.
In short, the Tonga brothers (Samuel and Thomas) were travelling in a dark grey BMW driven by a third person on Luxford Road at Hassall Grove. The victim was driving in the same direction, in a black Ford Territory. Each vehicle "cut in" in front of the other and a verbal disagreement was exchanged between the victim and the offenders. A short distance later, the vehicle driven by the victim stopped in the righthand lane at a traffic signal. The vehicle containing the Tonga brothers stopped slightly behind the victim's vehicle and in the lefthand lane. Viewed on the dash cam footage, Thomas Tonga was the first to get out of the BMW, from a passenger side door. At the same time, the victim got out of his vehicle and made his way to the rear of the vehicle. Thomas Tonga then moved to the front of the victim's vehicle and approached the victim from the driver's side. The victim opened the boot and grabbed a broom handle. Samuel Tonga then approached the victim from behind and tackled him from the lefthand side, punching him several times. The victim grabbed a crowbar from the boot of his car and swung it at the applicant, but missed. The co-offender then ran around the front of the victim's vehicle and approached the victim and the applicant. Both the applicant and the co-offender punched the victim and wrestled him, throwing him to the ground. The co-offender punched and kicked the victim in the head while he was on the ground. The applicant grabbed the crowbar and struck the victim twice to the head. Both offenders then returned to the BMW and drove away.
As a result of the assault, the victim sustained the following injuries: 1. open deep skull fracture, displaced medially by approximately 10mm which required a craniectomy and titanium cranioplasty; a craniotomy was also performed to remove deep skull fragments in the fracture; 2. a 7cm horizontal wound above the right ear; and 3. a 15mm vertical wound in the middle of his forehead.
The offence under s 35(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment, with a standard non-parole period of five years. While it is established that the standard non-parole period does not operate with respect to a sentence following a plea of guilty (even with respect to the undiscounted sentence) it is clear that the judge understood that, or he would have commenced with a sentence significantly in excess of that with which he did commence (prior to discount) of two years and six months.

Findings of trial judge

At the completion of the hearing on Wednesday, 9 November, the sentencing judge, Buscombe DJC, stood the matter over to the following Monday at 3pm for sentencing. The judge dealt separately in his reasons with each of the co-offenders. [1] The judge's reasons in relation to the applicant were only challenged in limited respects, and are noted below so far as necessary to address the specific challenges and the failure to impose an ICO.

Relevant findings

After describing the circumstances of the offence described above, the sentencing judge noted that the victim had suffered extensive injuries. [2] He further described the applicant's involvement in the offence as "impulsive" and as involving, "what is often classified as a road rage offence, something that happens far too frequently in our community. While the offence was of short duration, some 45 seconds, the offence was a particularly violent one. In my opinion, the principles associated with sentencing someone involved in a joint criminal enterprise are applicable here, each offender is therefore responsible for the overall offence, but is primarily to be sentenced for what he did during the joint criminal enterprise". [3]
In relation to the assessment of objective seriousness, the judge concluded: [4] "Given the ferocity of the violence, the fact this was a road rage incident, and the injuries suffered by the victim, I consider the objective seriousness of this offence to be a little below a notional midrange offence."
As to the personal circumstances of the applicant, the judge found: (a) The offender has a relatively limited criminal history, with no prior offences of violence as an adult; (b) He was of general good character prior to the commission of the offence; (c) He had taken steps to address drug taking and possible issues of anger management; [5] (d) He had a two-year old child with a partner who was expecting to give birth to a second child; [6] (e) Although text messages sent immediately after the incident suggested a lack of remorse or regard for the health and safety of the victim, [7] the judge discounted those comments as a result of the immaturity of the applicant, and accepted expressions of remorse and later statements demonstrating "some understanding of the impact on the victim of the offence"; [8] (f) Further, he accepted an assessment of the community corrections officer that the applicant had demonstrated "a plausible degree of insight into his offending", and "had some genuine remorse for his offending". [9]
Given the complaint as to the unwillingness of the judge to make a finding as to likelihood of reoffending, it is convenient to set out separately the findings in that regard. First, the judge dealt with the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation, which he assessed as "good". The judge stated: [10] "He has a limited criminal history and a supportive family. He has engaged in a number of rehabilitative programmes to address his anger management issues and his drug use issues."
Later, the judge repeated this assessment, stating: [11] "The offender is relatively young and I am satisfied on the evidence that the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation and has commenced his rehabilitation, although it is not yet complete. His prospects of rehabilitation will be assisted if he has a longer period on parole. For those reasons, I will make a finding of special circumstances when fixing the non-parole period."
Despite the finding with respect to "prospects of rehabilitation", a phrase which looks to the future, the judge made a separate finding as to the risk of reoffending, in the following passages: [12] "Given the serious nature of the violence involved in this offence and his assessed risk of reoffending, I am not able to make a finding that he is unlikely to reoffend."
The judge returned to that issue when considering a direction in relation to service of the proposed sentence of imprisonment by way of an intensive correction order.

Specific challenges

Apart from the failure to order that the sentence be served by way of an ICO, the only challenge to the inferences drawn by the sentencing judge as to the characteristics of the applicant was a statement by the judge that he was "not able to make a finding that he is unlikely to reoffend": ground 2. Ground 2 also alleged that the finding that the only appropriate sentence was one of imprisonment was not reasonably open. However, that challenge was not pressed at the hearing of the appeal.
With respect to the risk of reoffending, the judge adopted the finding in a Sentencing Assessment Report, prepared by a community corrections officer, that: "Mr Tonga has been assessed at a Medium to Low risk of reoffending according to the Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R)."
Following that indication of "risk assessment", the officer stated in the Report: "Supervision plan Due to Mr Tonga's T2 Medium-Low risk of reoffending, if the court makes a supervised order, Community Corrections will monitor him for any indicators of increased risk. Mr Tonga will be required to advise of any changes to his address or contact details, and any significant changes to his circumstances. Community Corrections will receive an automatic notification if he has contact with the NSW Police Force or enters a NSW Correctional Centre. Mr Tonga will not be required to participate in face-to-face reporting with a Community Corrections Officer …. Mr Tonga should telephone the Mount Druitt Community Corrections Office within 7 days to receive instructions about his obligations."
The applicant contended that the negative finding was "not reasonably open" and was "contrary to the evidence". [13] The submissions for the applicant focused on the affirmative findings that he had good prospects of rehabilitation and a medium to low risk of reoffending. But these findings (and the evidence in support of them) did not dictate a conclusion that the applicant was unlikely to reoffend. Nor was this finding critical to the decision as to whether to impose an ICO.
It may be inferred that the judge, in not being satisfied that the applicant was "unlikely to reoffend", was not satisfied as to the mitigating factor identified in those terms in s 21A(3)(g) of the Sentencing Act. This was an evaluative finding, based on imprecise criteria. There was no basis for this Court to interfere with such an assessment.
Ground 3 alleged that the judge erred in law in categorising the grant of an ICO as an "act of leniency". There are two responses to that submission. The first is that, were an ICO not seen as a more lenient sentence than the same period served in custody, there would be no application for leave to appeal. Secondly, whether or not one thinks that the proposed supervision plan amounts to "intensive correction", it would have been vastly less intrusive than a fulltime deprivation of liberty.
This description has been adopted by this Court on numerous occasions. As Johnson J stated in R v Cahill, [14] "[t]his Court has emphasised the significant degree of leniency involved in the use of an ICO as a sentence". To similar effect Gleeson JA held in Zheng v R: [15] "296 Accepting that the imposition of an ICO represents some degree of leniency, I am satisfied that in this case it still incorporates a substantial degree of punishment having regard to the length of the ICO and the obligations which attach to the mandatory conditions in s 73(2) of the Sentencing Act, as prescribed by the regulations, specifically the supervision condition under reg 187 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2014 (NSW)."
The criticism of the sentencing judge's use of the word "leniency" in describing the effect of an ICO as a form of imprisonment is without substance.

Legal principles

The power to make an intensive correction order is contained in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, which relevantly provides: 7 Intensive correction orders (1) A court that has sentenced an offender to imprisonment in respect of 1 or more offences may make an intensive correction order directing that the sentence or sentences be served by way of intensive correction in the community. (2) If the court makes an intensive correction order directing that a sentence of imprisonment be served by way of intensive correction in the community, the court is not to set a non-parole period for the sentence. (3) This section does not apply to an offender who is under the age of 18 years. (4) This section is subject to the provisions of Part 5. Note - Among other matters, Part 5 provides that a single offence cannot be the subject of an intensive correction order if the imprisonment imposed exceeds 2 years, and that multiple offences cannot be the subject of an intensive correction order or orders if the imprisonment imposed exceeds 3 years.
The focus of the applicant's submissions was on the requirements of s 66 (in Pt 5, Div 2) which provides: 66 Community safety and other considerations (1) Community safety must be the paramount consideration when the sentencing court is deciding whether to make an intensive correction order in relation to an offender. (2) When considering community safety, the sentencing court is to assess whether making the order or serving the sentence by way of full-time detention is more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending. (3) When deciding whether to make an intensive correction order, the sentencing court must also consider the provisions of section 3A (Purposes of sentencing) and any relevant common law sentencing principles, and may consider any other matters that the court thinks relevant.
There is, as this Court explained in R v Fangaloka, [16] and as accepted by the High Court in Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), [17] a three-stage process resulting from the combined operation of ss 7 and 66, namely: 1. the court must first be satisfied that, having considered all possible alternatives, no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate; [18] 2. if a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate, the court must determine the length of the sentence, without regard to how it is to be served; and 3. if the sentence imposed is less than two years, and not for an offence for which an ICO is not available (see s 67), the court must then consider whether an ICO should be imposed.
The operation of s 66 was the subject of the High Court's consideration in Stanley, the question being whether a District Court judge had so misconceived the operation of s 66 that she had failed to exercise her sentencing function.
The nature of an "intensive correction order" is explained by three aspects of the statutory scheme. First, the sentence of imprisonment is to be served "by way of intensive correction in the community", rather than in custody: see s 7(1). Secondly, it follows that no purpose is served by a non-parole order which limits the period of a sentence of imprisonment which must be served in custody before release into the community, and one is not to be fixed: see s 7(2).
Thirdly, the nature of the "intensive correction" which the offender is to undergo turns on the conditions under which he or she is released into the community. As provided by s 72, there are "standard conditions", "additional conditions" and "further conditions". The standard conditions, identified in s 73 are as follows: 73 Standard conditions (1) The sentencing court must at the time of sentence impose on an intensive correction order the standard conditions of an intensive correction order. (2) The standard conditions of an intensive correction order are the following - (a) a condition that the offender must not commit any offence, (b) a condition that the offender must submit to supervision by a community corrections officer. Note - Regulations may be made under the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 to prescribe the offender's obligations under a standard condition of an intensive correction order.
As provided in the note to s 73, the obligations imposed by the standard conditions are set out in the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2014 (NSW), Pt 10, Div 2. The general supervision condition is identified in cl 187 in the following terms: 187 Obligations under supervision condition (ICO) (1) For the purposes of section 82 of the Act, an offender who is subject to a supervision condition of an intensive correction order has the following obligations - (a) to report to a community corrections officer - (i) on the day the order is made, if the order has a home detention condition or electronic monitoring condition, or (ii) as soon as practicable after (but not later than 7 days after) the order is made, if the order does not have a home detention condition or electronic monitoring condition, (b) to report to a community corrections officer at the times and places directed by the officer, (c) to comply with all reasonable directions of a community corrections officer relating to any of the following - (i) the place in which the offender is to reside, (ii) participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities, (iii) without limiting subparagraph (ii), participating in employment, education, training or other related activities, (iv) not undertaking specified employment, education, training, volunteer, leisure or other activities, (v) not associating with a specified person, (vi) not frequenting or visiting a specified place or area, (vii) ceasing drug use, (viii) ceasing or reducing alcohol use, (ix) drug and alcohol testing, (x) requirements for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the order, (xi) giving consent to third parties providing information to a community corrections officer about the offender's compliance with the order, (d) to comply with any other reasonable directions of a community corrections officer, (e) to permit a community corrections officer to visit the offender at the offender's place of residence at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises, (f) to notify a community corrections officer of any change to the offender's place of residence, contact details or employment - (i) if practicable, before the change occurs, or (ii) if that is not practicable, within 7 days of the change occurring, (g) not to leave New South Wales without the permission of a community corrections manager, (h) not to leave Australia without the permission of the Parole Authority. (2) A community corrections officer may vary or waive the obligation to report to a community corrections officer under subclause (1)(a). (3) Supervision of an offender who is subject to a supervision condition is to be carried out by a community corrections officer.
The Regulation also provides for an obligation under a home detention condition (cl 189), an electronic monitoring condition (cl 189A), a curfew condition (cl 189B), a community service work condition (cl 189C) and a rehabilitation or treatment condition (cl 189D). There are also requirements in respect of less intrusive obligations. It may be seen that the substantive restrictions are to be found in subcl (1)(c) and are limited to certain reasonable directions of a community corrections officer. (There may be an issue as to whether a direction which might fall within an additional condition set out in s 73A(2) of the Sentencing Act, which has not been imposed by the Court, can be the subject of direction by a community correction officer as a "standard condition" of "supervision".)
Turning to the authorities, it should be noted that the judgment of the High Court in Stanley post-dated the sentencing in the District Court, as did the reasoning of this Court in Zheng. It followed that the assistance of passages in the reasoning in Stanley and Zheng was not available to the sentencing judge. On the other hand, the judge was taken to the reasoning of this Court in Casella v R [19] and in Mandranis v R. [20] On this appeal, the applicant did not submit that the reasoning in those decisions misconstrued s 66. As the submissions pointed out, Simpson AJA (consistently with Stanley) had explained in Mandranis that the paramount consideration identified in s 66(1) was not overridden by what appeared to be a subordinate principle set out in s 66(2), nor was an ICO excluded, unless a favourable opinion were reached in accordance with s 66(2). [21]
In a passage from Casella, cited in written submissions to the sentencing judge, Beech-Jones J stated (Bathurst CJ and N Adams J agreeing): "108 … On its face, s 66(2) only requires an assessment of whether making the order or serving the sentence by way of full‑time detention is more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending. It does not appear to necessarily preclude the imposition of an ICO if, say, the outcome of the assessment is neutral because the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation and does not represent a danger to the community, irrespective of whether he or she is incarcerated or subject to an ICO. The imposition of an ICO in such a case would still be consistent with community safety."
That approach was important in this case because the sentencing judge (as explained below) appears to have found the s 66(2) comparison to be neutral, or unable to be resolved on the evidence, but did not treat s 66(1) as therefore inapplicable.
Further in Mandranis, Simpson AJA stated: "50 Like Harrison J, I consider that s 66(1) subordinates (but does not exclude) other considerations to community safety. That is the inescapable consequence of declaring community safety to be "the paramount consideration". It is important to note, however, that is so only at the point when consideration is being given to whether to make an ICO. Thus, rehabilitation (s 3A (d)) will give way to community safety where appropriate; in an appropriate case, accountability and denunciation may be given less weight than they otherwise would. In this respect, it is not to be overlooked that the s 3A purposes have already been taken into account in the selection of the term of the sentence. By s 66(3), they are again to be taken into account in relation to the specific question whether the sentence is to be served by way of ICO. It is only in this context that they may be said to be "subordinate". That does not diminish their importance at the earlier point of the sentencing determination. This is what I think Harrison J had in mind in [86] of Pullen. [22] 51 Primacy must be given to the clear language of s 66(1) which, in terms, places community safety as the paramount consideration. Which of the two modes of serving the sentence is more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending is one of the factors relevant to the assessment of community safety, which, as Harrison J observed in Pullen, may best be served, in different cases, in different ways. The better way of addressing an offender's risk of reoffending is but one of the considerations that contribute to the s 66(1) assessment."
The analysis of s 66 in the joint reasons of the majority in Stanley appears at [71]-[77]. The Court agreed with the subordination of other considerations to "community safety" in deciding whether to impose an ICO, [23] approving the analysis in Mandranis set out above. Turning to the operation of s 66(2), the joint reasons continued: "74 … Section 66(2) is premised upon the view that an offender's risk of reoffending may be different depending upon how their sentence of imprisonment is served, and implicitly rejects any assumption that full-time detention of the offender will most effectively promote community safety. Thus, s 66(2) requires the sentencing court to look forward to the future possible impacts of the sentence of imprisonment, depending upon whether the sentence is served by way of full-time detention or by way of intensive correction in the community." This passage did not raise any particular issue in the present case. The applicant relied on the following passages: [24] "75 The assessment required by s 66(2) is not determinative of whether an ICO may or should be made. To the contrary, as is plain from s 66(3), the assessment is required for the purpose of addressing community safety as the paramount, but not the sole, consideration in deciding whether or not to make an ICO. Thus, the power to make an ICO requires an evaluative exercise that treats community safety as the paramount consideration, with the benefit of the assessment mandated by s 66(2). In that respect, the nature and content of the conditions that might be imposed by an ICO will be important in measuring the risk of reoffending. 76 That said, community safety will usually have a decisive effect on the decision to make, or refuse to make, an ICO, unless the relevant evidence is inconclusive. There may be cases where a court cannot be satisfied whether serving a sentence by way of intensive correction in the community or serving a sentence in full-time custody would be more likely to address reoffending. In those cases, other factors will assume significance and will be determinative. On the other hand, there will be cases where a court concludes that serving the sentence by way of intensive correction in the community is more likely to address reoffending. 77 While aspects of community safety underpin some of the general purposes of sentencing, such as specific and general deterrence and protection of the community from the offender, those aspects will have been considered in deciding whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment (ie, before considering an ICO). Community safety is required to be considered again and in a different manner under s 66 when considering whether to make an ICO. At this third step, community safety in s 66(1) is given its principal content by s 66(2), namely, the safety of the community from harms that might result if the offender reoffends, whether while serving the term of imprisonment that has been imposed or after serving that term of imprisonment."
Finally, the applicant took the Court to the succinct statement of the effect of Stanley in Zheng: "281 Five points emerge from the joint judgment in Stanley. 282 First, the power to make an ICO requires an evaluative exercise that treats community safety as the paramount consideration, with the benefit of the assessment mandated by s 66(2). The issue is not merely the offender's risk of reoffending, but the narrower risk of reoffending in a manner that may affect community safety: at [72], [75]. 283 Second, s 66(2) is premised upon the view that an offender's risk of reoffending may be different depending upon how their sentence of imprisonment is served, and implicitly rejects any assumption that full-time detention of the offender will most effectively promote community safety: at [74]. 284 Third, the nature and content of the conditions that might be imposed by an ICO will be important in measuring the risk of reoffending: at [75]. 285 Fourth, the consideration of community safety required by s 66(2) is to be undertaken in a forward-looking manner having regard to the offender's risk of reoffending: at [74]. 286 Fifth, while community safety is not the sole consideration in the decision to make, or refuse to make, an ICO, it will usually have a decisive effect unless the evidence is inconclusive: at [76]."
With the possible addition of a reference to Stanley at [77], this summary should be accepted. The critical question is whether, and if so in what degree, the sentencing judge departed from this prescription.

Sentencing judge's reasons with respect to s 66

The sentencing judge correctly undertook the three-step process, first concluding that the only appropriate sentence was one of imprisonment, [25] then determining the length of the sentence, [26] and then proceeding to consider an ICO. [27] It is appropriate to set out the reasoning at the third step in full: "As the sentence is under two years' imprisonment, I have to consider whether I should extend to this offender the leniency of allowing him to serve the sentence in the community by way of an intensive correction order. In considering whether to impose a sentence by way of an intensive correction order, I am to consider, as the paramount consideration, community safety. I am to assess whether the making of such an order or serving the sentence by way of full-time detention is more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending. I am also to consider the objects of sentencing in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The level of violence involved in this offence was very high, and the offender is assessed as having a medium to loss risk of reoffending. He had a further offence of violence on this juvenile record, which occurred approximately five years prior to the offence I am to sentence him for. I have considered those matters in considering the issue of community safety. I accept that it would appear that making the offender serve the sentence in full-time custody is not more likely to address his risk of reoffending. However, the prevalence of road rage type offences in our community involving very significant violence is such that, in my opinion, the weight to be given to general deterrence here requires that the sentence by served by way of full-time custody."

Did the trial judge err in this analysis?

Apart from the categorisation of an ICO as an element of "leniency", which has been addressed above, the applicant focused his submissions on the appeal on two aspects of this reasoning. The first was the finding that serving the sentence in full-time custody "is not more likely to address his risk of reoffending". That was in substance an inconclusive finding as to the factor identified in s 66(2), determining, in effect, that the comparative process could not be resolved on the evidence. What the judge did not say expressly was that serving the sentence in the community would be more likely to address his risk of reoffending. However, having correctly identified the matter to be addressed under s 66(2) as "whether the making of such an order or serving the sentence by way of full-time detention is more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending" (emphasis added), the neutral finding should be understood as leaving the weighing process unresolved. Such an outcome was expressly envisaged by Stanley at [76]. Although it may be implicit in Stanley that such an outcome will be the exception rather than the rule, the assessment will often be highly speculative. In this case no sufficient basis has been established to overturn that finding.
By way of an aside, it may be noted that the joint reasons in Stanley also observed that "[t]he issue is not merely the offender's risk of reoffending, but the narrower risk of reoffending in a manner that may adversely affect community safety". [28] The applicant did not rely on that matter because he emphasised what he identified as an over-reliance by the judge on the violence involved in the attack. There is no doubt that that was the relevant risk to community safety.
As Stanley explained, the s 66(2) evaluation is not decisive and was not treated by the sentencing judge as decisive, or as the end of the process. Consistently with Mandranis (and Stanley), had the judge considered that serving a sentence in full-time custody was more likely to benefit community safety than serving the sentence in the community, that finding would not have foreclosed the possibility of an ICO. However, because it was not made, that issue did not arise. On the other hand, if the judge had been satisfied of a contrary position, namely that serving a sentence by way of an ICO was more likely to address the risk of reoffending, that would have been a powerful consideration in favour of an ICO. However, as that finding was not made either, any further question which would have flowed from that finding did not arise.
The applicant's written submissions suggested, or at least implied, that the fact that there was a "medium to low risk of reoffending", and other factors supporting his prospects of rehabilitation, that there was error in adopting this approach. To achieve that conclusion, having identified the neutral assessment as to the risk of reoffending, the submissions continued: [29] "Having regard to what the majority said in Stanley at [76] that '… community safety will usually have a decisive effect on the decision to make, or refuse to make, an ICO, unless the relevant evidence is inconclusive' and at [73] '… [w]hen the court is deciding the discrete question whether or not to make an ICO, community safety is the consideration to which other considerations are to be subordinated, although other considerations must or may be taken into account as prescribed by s 66(3),' this was a case in which it was appropriate to impose an ICO."
This was an example of selective quotation. The last sentence in [76] in Stanley contrasted the situation with that which exists where the Court cannot be satisfied as to which course will be more significant, and continued: "On the other hand, there will be cases where a court concludes that serving the sentence by way of intensive correction in the community is more likely to address reoffending."
What followed was not [73] (as quoted), which had come earlier, but an entirely separate consideration of aspects of community safety which underpin general purposes of sentencing. The submission, in the terms put forward, should not be accepted. There was no error in the approach adopted by the sentencing judge in this regard.
One factor which was not addressed by the judge in this context was the nature of the conditions which might be imposed on the applicant under an ICO. Although the community corrections officer assessed the applicant as "suitable to undertake community service work", no specific recommendation was made as to such a condition. The officer did, however, recommend a condition that the applicant "undertake and complete the 'Community of Inquiry into Pacific & Maori Family Matters' program". It was, of course, open to the judge to impose other conditions, but, while the applicant accepted before the sentencing judge that "stringent conditions" were possible, [30] apart from the Family Matters program and willingness to undertake community work, no specific condition was proposed; the prosecutor submitted that an appropriate sentence would exceed two years and hence an ICO would not be available.
It is clear from the reasoning of the sentencing judge that close attention had been paid to the Sentencing Assessment Report. [31] The judge expressly noted the steps that had already been taken with respect to programmes in relation to anger management, mental health and drug use, and the applicant's family and community connections. There was, however, no evidence as to the extent to which programmes might be available in the community under an ICO which could not be replicated in prison.
What is clear, however, is that the sentencing judge was focused upon the significant level of violence involved in the offence. It is clear that he considered the propensity to violence to be the primary risk to community safety. He expressly identified community safety as the paramount consideration. [32] At its best, the respondent submitted, the applicant sought to identify error in the following statement in the judge's reasons: [33] "However, the prevalence of road rage type offences in our community involving very significant violence is such that, in my opinion, the weight to be given to general deterrence here requires that the sentence be served by way of full-time custody." (Emphasis added.)
The applicant's submission was, in substance, that if general deterrence "required" that outcome, then community safety had not been given paramount consideration. Senior counsel for the applicant denied that the case turned on a single word or phrase, noting that throughout his reasons, the judge had overtly given weight to general deterrence. Thus, in determining that the only appropriate sentence was one of imprisonment, the judge had stated: [34] "… offences of violence in road rage incidents are far too prevalent in our community and the courts must send a message to the community that such violence will be met with significant sentences."
Accepting that the judge did indeed give weight to general deterrence in declining to impose an ICO, the applicant's submission seeks to draw a bright line between community safety and other purposes of criminal sentencing. Of the seven purposes identified in s 3A of the Sentencing Act, there may be tensions between some, or between some in some circumstances, but often they will militate in favour of the same outcome. While it is true that s 66(2) addresses that element of community safety which concerns the individual offender's risk of reoffending (in a particular way), as Stanley recognised, that is not to exclude other aspects of sentencing which may affect community safety, nor purposes such as general deterrence which do not focus upon the individual but may tend to protect community safety. It was not an error to take general deterrence into account: s 66(3) permitted that course. The decision as to whether or not to impose an ICO is not to be determined solely by reference to an assessment of the course more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending; and when that course cannot be identified, other mandatory considerations will become significant and possibly decisive.
To reiterate what was said in Stanley at [76]: "There may be cases where a court cannot be satisfied whether serving a sentence by way of intensive correction in the community or serving a sentence in full-time custody would be more likely to address reoffending. In those cases, other factors will assume significance and will be determinative." That was what occurred in the present case: the judge did not err in identifying general deterrence as ultimately the determinative factor.

Conclusion

In this matter there should be a grant of leave to appeal against sentence. Although the sentencing judge expressly identified the exercise required to be undertaken under s 66 of the Sentencing Act, the fact that the judgment was given before the High Court delivered reasons in Stanley, and before the decision of this Court in Zheng, makes it appropriate to consider whether the principles were correctly applied.
For the reasons explained above, the sentencing judge did not err in stating or applying the principles. It was not suggested that a sentence of imprisonment by way of full-time custody was manifestly excessive, but only that there had been error in applying s 66. As error in that respect was not made good, the appeal must be dismissed.
I propose the following orders: 1. Grant the applicant leave to appeal from the sentence imposed in the District Court on 14 November 2022. 2. Dismiss the appeal.
WALTON J: I have had the advantage of reading the draft judgment of Basten AJA in this matter. I agree with his Honour's reasons for judgment and proposed orders, but I wish to make some further brief observations.
The challenged phrase in the sentencing judgment (at p 26) - "the weight to be given to general deterrence here requires that the sentence be served by way of full-time custody" did not constitute, in my view, reasoning demonstrative of a failure to afford community safety the status of a paramount consideration in reaching a determination to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment.
I agree with the submission advanced by the Crown that his Honour's reasoning in that respect, if viewed in the light of the whole of the sentencing judgment, simply conveyed the weight he gave to general deterrence in the context of a violent road rage offence as part of considerations arising in s 66(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Act") and did not indicate his Honour had failed, in the exercise of his discretion in sentencing the applicant, to take into account all matters required under s 66 of the Act, including community safety as a paramount consideration (under s 66(1)).
That approach is consistent with the third step to be undertaken by a sentencing court prior to the making of a final order by which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed under the Act, as discussed by the High Court in Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2023) 97 ALJR 107; [2023] HCA 3 at [59] and [77]. In the present circumstances wherein the course more likely to address the offender's risk of reoffending could not be identified (as discussed in the judgment of Basten AJA at [49] and [50]), community safety as a paramount consideration was taken into account by the sentencing judge and other mandatory considerations then assumed real significance. No House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 error has been established by the applicant.
HAMILL J: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Basten AJA. I have also read the short concurring judgment of Walton J. I agree with the orders proposed by Basten AJA essentially for the reasons given by his Honour.
As Basten AJA notes, the sentencing Judge did not have the benefit of the High Court's decision in Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2023) 97 ALJR 107; [2023] HCA 3, or the more recent and helpful summary of that decision provided by Gleeson JA in Zheng v R [2023] NSWCCA 64, but his Honour was referred to the earlier decisions of this Court in Casella v R [2019] NSWCCA 201 and Mandranis v R (2021) 289 A Crim R 260; [2021] NSWCCA 97. As I read the judgment of Buscombe DCJ, the reasoning process his Honour undertook was in almost precise accord with the process approved by the majority in Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions and explained by Simpson AJA in Mandranis v R.
His Honour first concluded that no penalty other than a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate. His Honour then determined the length of the sentence and, having concluded that the sentence would be less than two years, considered the imposition of an intensive correction order ("ICO").
In undertaking that third step, his Honour proceeded - correctly and in accordance with s 66 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) - on the basis that community safety was the paramount consideration and, in doing so, made an evaluation of which mode of serving the sentence was more likely to address the applicant's risk of re-offending. His Honour's commendably transparent observation that "it would appear … that making the offender serve the sentence in full-time custody is not more likely to address his risk of re-offending" did not compel a conclusion that an ICO was the correct outcome. So much is clear from the majority judgment in Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions at [75]-[76]. While Buscombe DCJ made a favourable evaluation of the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation, he stated plainly that because of "the serious nature of the violence involved in this offence and his assessed risk of reoffending, I am not able to make a finding that he is unlikely to reoffend".
There was no legal error in his Honour's reasoning. It is not to the point that it was open to his Honour, in the circumstances of this finely balanced and difficult sentencing decision, to impose an ICO or that another sentencing Judge, or a Judge of this Court, may have reached a different conclusion.
As I have said, I generally agree with the reasons provided by the presiding Judge for the conclusion that leave to appeal should be granted but that each of the grounds of appeal must be rejected and the appeal dismissed.

Endnotes

With respect to the applicant, see Sentencing Judgment, pp 16-27.
Sentencing Judgment, p 19; see at [5] above.
Sentencing Judgment, p 20.
Ibid.
Sentencing Judgment, p 21-22.
Sentencing Judgment, p 22.
Sentencing Judgment, p 19.
Sentencing Judgment, p 23.
Ibid.
Sentencing Judgment, p 24.
Sentencing Judgment, p 26.
Sentencing Judgment, p 24.3.
Ground 2 and applicant's written submissions, par 49.
[2015] NSWCCA 53 at [114] (Leeming JA and Schmidt J agreeing).
[2023] NSWCCA 64 (Hamill and Ierace JJ agreeing).
[2019] NSWCCA 173 at [44]-[45].
(2023) 97 ALJR 107; [2023] HCA 3 at [59] (Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ).
Sentencing Act, s 5(1).
[2019] NSWCCA 201 (Beech-Jones J).
[2021] NSWCCA 97; 289 A Crim R 260 (Simpson AJA).
Mandranis at [49]; see also Fangaloka at [65].
[2018] NSWCCA 264; 275 A Crim R 509.
Stanley at [73].
Footnote omitted.
Sentencing judgment, p 24.6.
Sentencing judgment, p 25.4.
Sentencing judgment, p 25.5.
Stanley at [72].
Applicant's written submissions, 8 March 2023, par 61.
Defendant's written submissions, 7 November 2022, par 59.
Sentencing Judgment, pp 21-23.
Sentencing Judgment, p 25.6.
Sentencing Judgment, p 26.2.
Sentencing Judgment, p 24.4. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 May 2023

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