judicial review in this court
39 In his application filed 9 May 2017, the applicant states the following grounds for judicial review:
1. Not enough consideration given to the rights of a child (child support assessment act 1989)
2. Not enough consideration given to my ties in Australia
3. The lack of assessment made for my mental stability in the future if deported.
40 The applicant's accompanying affidavit, also filed on 9 May 2017, attached a "Notice of Intention to Remove from Australia" letter from the Australian Border Force and a "Notice in Respect of Removal Costs" from the Department dated 2 May 2017.
41 On 4 September 2017, I made orders programming dates for any amended application and affidavits to be filed. No amended application or affidavits have been filed. I also issued a pro bono certificate to facilitate legal representation by the applicant, if required and available.
42 The applicant did not file an outline of written submissions in the matter.
43 As it transpires, the applicant did not obtain legal representation and appears at all material times to have remained self-represented.
44 When the application was called on for hearing at 11.30am on 1 March 2018, the hearing to be by telephone from the Christmas Island detention facility, he did not appear. The Court was advised by an officer at the detention facility that the applicant had earlier indicated a lack of interest in attending the hearing. At that point, the Court adjourned the hearing to 2.15pm on 1 March 2018 and asked the officer to indicate to the applicant that if he wished, he could appear at the hearing either by video conference or telephone.
45 Prior to 2.15pm the Court was advised that the applicant had been under some confusion as to the nature of the hearing and that he would appear by telephone at 2.15pm.
46 The applicant duly appeared by telephone when the hearing was resumed at 2.15pm.
47 The applicant, at the invitation of the Court, orally addressed the three grounds of his application, as set out above. He also confirmed he did not have a lawyer but would like to and indicated that he would like an adjournment in that regard. In the course of the applicant making submissions he also indicated that he had spoken with at least one lawyer, but that he could not afford the lawyer's fees, or that the lawyer, or another lawyer, was too busy to consider his materials.
48 As a matter of fact, following the issue of a pro bono certificate by the Court on 4 September 2017, enquiries were made to ascertain if legal representation on a pro bono basis was available for the applicant. The Court was advised that enquiries had not been successful.
49 On 27 October 2017, an email was sent by the Court to the applicant at haydntimu@hotmail.com (being the email address the applicant provided with his application to the Court) and copied to the solicitors for the Minister advising:
Dear Sir
I refer to the Pro Bono referral made by Justice Barker on 4 September 2017 referring the matter to a lawyer on the pro bono scheme for legal assistance.
In accordance with the rules attempts have been made to arrange for a legal practitioner on the Pro Bono scheme to provide you with legal assistance in this matter. However, all attempts to obtain such legal assistance have been unsuccessful. Accordingly, I am unable to arrange for a legal practitioner to assist you under the Court's Pro Bono scheme. Therefore you may wish to make your own arrangements for legal representation.
50 When this was brought to the applicant's attention at the hearing, he said it was the first he had heard of that communication and suggested he had experienced some difficulties with emails at the detention facility.
51 In response to the applicant's application for an adjournment, counsel on behalf of the Minister opposed the adjournment, essentially on two grounds. First, that attempts had been made to obtain pro bono assistance, without success. Secondly, that the merits of the application were so lacking that there would be no point in granting an adjournment.
52 To the latter submission, the applicant, in reply, in effect submitted that if he were able to obtain legal assistance it might be that a lawyer would find additional grounds on which the application could proceed.
53 Counsel for the Minister then briefly made oral submissions that addressed the written submissions of the Minister.
54 The Minister filed written submissions on 22 February 2018.
55 With respect to the three grounds of judicial review, the Minister submits that the grounds impermissibly seek to attack the merits of the decision and do not assert or establish jurisdictional error, noting the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to engage in merits review. See NADR v Minister of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); [1996] HCA 6.
56 In relation to ground 1, the Minister argues that clear consideration was given to the best interests of affected children as a primary consideration, consistent with Art 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Opened for signature 20 November 1989. 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990). However, the Minister noted that the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), which the applicant referred to, was not a relevant consideration the Assistant Minister was bound to take into account.
57 With regard to ground 2, the Minister states consideration was given to the strength, nature and duration of the applicant's ties to Australia and the hardship the applicant would likely face if removed to New Zealand.
58 In addressing ground 3, the Minister submits the Assistant Minister noted the applicant had been diagnosed with a "schizophrenic disorder" and accepted that he could face hardship if new medical practitioners did not have access to his records, but noted the health system in New Zealand, to which the applicant would have the same access as other New Zealand citizens, was comparable to Australia.
59 Similarly, the Minister contends that the Assistant Minister had found the applicant would experience significant emotional hardship which was likely to be exacerbated by the applicant's mental health issues, but such hardship was not insurmountable due to New Zealand's similar culture, language and health system standards.
60 In submitting that the application should be dismissed with costs, the Minister contends, at [31] to [33] of his submissions:
31. Notwithstanding his findings regarding the best interests of minor children, the strength, nature and duration of the applicant's ties to Australia and the extent of impediments if removed to New Zealand, the Assistant Minister concluded that the applicant represented an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed those other considerations: [91].
32. It was open to the Assistant Minister, for the reasons that he gave, to conclude that he was not satisfied, for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act, that there was another reason why the original decision to cancel the applicant's visa should be revoked.
33. The Assistant Minister's conclusions were not irrational or unreasonable and have an 'evident, transparent and intelligible' justification, and were within his 'area of decisional freedom': Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [28], [66], [76] and [105]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44]-[45].