44 It is clear that the plaintiff was having difficulty coming to terms with a number of things in respect of his health from 1999 through to 2001. Indeed there is a report from a psychologist, Bronwyn Sargeant, that is relied upon by the defendant as supporting a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent failure to disclose the plaintiff's condition.
45 The defendant claims that Section 14 in the Application Form dealing with the knee (extracted above) was filled out fraudulently by the plaintiff, albeit that Mr Scruton wrote the answers given by the plaintiff. The defendant submits that the plaintiff did not tell Mr Scruton about the swelling of the knee. Mr Scruton was cross-examined by Mr Cavanagh for the defendant and he denied that the plaintiff told him that he had swelling if he got a bump at football. There is a factual conflict which has to be determined: Is it more probable than not that the plaintiff did tell Mr Scruton about the swelling of the knee?
46 Both Mr Lovas, who appears for the plaintiff, and Mr Cavanagh, relied on the same authorities in respect of the test to be applied in this matter. A statement is made fraudulently if it is made with knowledge of its falsity or without belief in its truth or recklessly not caring whether it is true or false. Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374; Pendlebury v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society (1912) 13 CLR 676 at 680. A fraudulent misrepresentation is a representation which is false and which is made either knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly not caring whether it be true or false with the intention that it should be acted on by the insurer. Plasteel Windows Australia Pty Limited v CE Heath Underwriting Agencies Pty Limited (1989) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-926 at 75-951; Von Braun v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Limited (1998) 135 ACTR 1 at 11-12. See also Tyndall Life Insurance Co Limited v Chisholm [1999] SASC 445 at [68].
47 It is accepted that the burden is to the Briginshaw standard. There has to be a comfortable satisfaction in the Court that the failure to disclose or the misrepresentation was not made innocently or negligently, but knowingly, lacking an honest belief in its truth, with the moral turpitude that accompanies an intention to deceive.
48 The defendant relies upon the plaintiff's background employment with FAI. There is no doubt that the plaintiff knew the importance of disclosing matters to the insurer and that he was an experienced underwriter. He was well aware of the function of the proposal, of its importance, and of the requirement to give honest and complete answers. He agreed that the insurer had specifically drafted the questions to obtain specific answers and that the information that he provided would be relied upon by the insurer in deciding whether to accept the risk. He also agreed in cross-examination that he was aware that he was required to disclose all matters which would be relevant to the decision of the insurer as to whether to accept the risk in response to these answers.
49 The first portion of the proposal relied upon by the defendant is question Q under section 13 in which the answer "No" was given to the question of whether, in the last five years, the plaintiff had any medical examination, advice, treatment or had been in hospital. It is alleged that that is patently false and that he must have known it was false because he had been to see Dr Boyce only two months prior to the proposal, and he had also been to see Dr Boyce in 1994.