This is an appeal from Ewing J., who set aside a decision of magistrates convicting the respondent of an offence under sec. 137 (iv.) of the Police Act 1905, which runs as follows: "No person shall, in any public place, or within the hearing of any person passing therein ... (iv.) Use any threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour with intent or calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned." The prosecution was based on that portion of the sub-section which forbids the use of insulting words calculated to provoke a breach of the peace. The portion of the sub-section relating to intent and the portion relating to the actual occurrence of a breach of the peace were not in question. It is important to make this distinction, because the case of R v. Justices of Clifton; Ex parte McGovern[1], on which Ewing J. relied and from which he in effect quoted, was confined to the effect of the third part of the sub-section, and therefore has no relevancy to the present case. With regard to Sellers' Case[2], it has relevance to the phrase "insulting words," but it affords no assistance in the present instance. "Insulting" is a very large term, and in a statement of this kind is generally understood to be a word not cramped within narrow limits. In the Oxford Dictionary under the word "insult," we find it means in a transitive sense "to assail with offensively dishonouring or contemptuous speech or action; to treat with scornful abuse or offensive disrespect; to offer indignity to; to affront, outrage." We find in the same dictionary: "Hence insulted, treated with contemptuous abuse, outraged." There is, therefore, in this case no warrant for saying that the words complained of and found to have been used were not legally capable of being regarded as insulting words.