I am of the same opinion, and have not much to add to what has been already said. In my opinion the appeal must be allowed on two grounds. First, because according to the proper construction of secs. 208 and 209 of the Instruments Act 1890 there was no document evidencing the contract signed either by the party to be charged, or by his agent thereunto lawfully authorized in writing. The signatures to the various documents are written in different forms, but all were written in the following manner. The appellant employed an amanuensis to write each of the letters and requested him to sign it for her, and each was signed by the amanuensis for her in her presence. There can be no ground for the contention that there was any authorization of any agent to sign these documents upon the appellant's behalf, and, as I follow Mr. Davis's argument, he did not contest that position, but he urged in the course of a very ingenious argument that the signing of the appellant's name by the person whom she employed to write the letter was a signing by herself which was good under sec. 208. A number of cases were cited to the Court dealing with Statutes which required the signatures of the parties to documents, but it is not necessary for me to do more than mention two of them. In Hyde v. Johnson[13] the words to be construed were "signed by the party chargeable thereby." In that case, for reasons to which the learned Chief Justice has referred, it was held that a letter written by a man's wife and signed by her on his behalf was not signed by the party chargeable thereby, although the wife was requested by him to sign in very much the same way as Toohey was requested by the appellant in this case to sign. In that case it was held that that was not a compliance with the Statute. The other case to which I shall refer is illustrative of the other class of cases cited. It is In re Whitley Partners Ltd.[14]. There the question was whether the memorandum of association of a company had been signed so as to bind a shareholder. The Companies Act 1862, by sec. 6, provides that "any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose may by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and otherwise complying with the requisitions of this Act in respect of registration, form an incorporated company, with or without limited liability." Sec. 11 provides that "the memorandum of association ... shall be signed by each subscriber in the presence of, and be attested by, one witness at least." It was held that it was sufficient if a subscriber's name was written by someone who had the subscriber's authority to write it, though it did not purport to be written by that person as agent. There is one consideration which reconciles these apparently conflicting lines of cases, and it is this: A Statute may sometimes use language which, strictly read, would require a personal signature, yet the whole of the provisions of the Statute taken together may make it apparent that the Statute does not require a personal signature. That was held to be the case in In re Whitley Partners Ltd.[15], and that was the reason for the decision. The principle upon which the Court proceeded is very well stated by Bowen L.J. as follows[16]: - "In every case where an Act requires a signature it is a pure question of construction on the terms of the particular Act whether its words are satisfied by signature by an agent. In some cases on some Acts the Courts have come to the conclusion that personal signature was required. In other cases on other Acts they have held that signature by an agent was sufficient. The law on the subject is thus summed up by Blackburn J. in Reg. v. Justices of Kent1L.R. 8 Q.B., 305, at p. 307.: No doubt at common law, where a person authorizes another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorizing it; nevertheless there may be cases in which a Statute may require personal signature. Quain J. then says, We ought not to restrict the common law rule, qui facit per alium facit per se, unless the Statute makes a personal signature indispensable." Applying the principle there laid down to the interpretation of the Instruments Act 1890, it appears to me impossible to escape from the conclusion that sec. 208 of the Statute - which is really sec. 4 of the Statute of Frauds - does require a personal signature of the party to be charged. I think that is demonstrated by an examination of the different sections of the Act, a course which was taken by Tindal C.J. in Hyde v. Johnston[18], as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice. I therefore am of opinion that the only way in which secs. 208 and 209 can be interpreted so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature is to hold that a personal signature of the party to be charged, or a signature by his agent authorized in writing, is necessary. There cannot to my mind be a confusing of the distinction between the person who signs, whether in his own handwriting or as a marksman, and the person who requests someone to sign for him. I think in all cases there must be a personal signature by the party to be charged.