17 If a distribution is made in conformity with a judicial advice under Trustee Act s 63, it affords complete protection to the executor. If a Court order does not provide for retention of any sums, the executor does not need to look to any retention for protection.
18 The principles identified by Lindsay J in York's case were applied by Austin J in Estate L H Hall [1999] NSWSC 1297, another case dealing with the distribution of the estate of the name at Lloyd's. There his Honour explained that both the substantive law and the procedural mechanisms for granting approval for executors' distributions are analogous in Australia to those identified in York's case. Austin J referred to Re Gross (1949) SASR 55; Pinnock v Hull (1876) 2 VLR (E) 18 at 24-25; Chisholm v Gilcrest (1902) 2 SR (NSW) Eq 84; and GB Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1991) 24 NSWLR 674 at pg 677E-F. These cases are consistent with Lindsay J's reasons and conclusions. In GB Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1991) 24 NSWLR 674 at 677E-F McClelland J (as his Honour then was) said that if the Court directed an official administrator who had made full disclosure of material facts, the official administrator might act in accordance with a direction without thereby incurring personal liability to any person in whose interests the administration was being conducted, for example creditors or beneficiaries of a deceased estate. His Honour however pointed out that the protection of the official administrator acting under the direction of the Court, from personal liability would not however affect the rights of creditors and beneficiaries as between themselves: Ministry of Health v Simpson (Diplock's case) [1951] AC 251 at 268.
19 The immediate dilemma in this case is this. Because Mr Gamble was a name at Lloyd's, there is still no complete certainty, despite the special measures now taken for the restructuring of Lloyd's that an actual claim may not mature and ultimately be made against Mr Gamble's estate. The choice faced by the trustees here is similar to the stark choice faced by the executors in Re York (deceased); Stone and Another v Chataway and Another (1997) 4 All ER 907, at 915, between retaining the entire estate indefinitely which would be unfair to the beneficiaries or distributing on the basis that the creditors have no right to expect the trustees to make such an indefinite retention when the creditors have protection which has been assessed to be commercially appropriate. But for the reasons, which I will explain below, the possibility of a future claim by a Lloyd's policyholder in a relevant syndicate year against Mr Gamble's estate must be seen as extremely remote; and so remote indeed as not to prevent a distribution.
20 The present position may best be understood by briefly looking at the history of the Lloyd's restructuring and the way that it has been dealt with firstly, in the cases since, and in the most recent reconstruction of July 2009. The purpose and effect of the restructuring of Lloyd's syndicates has been to provide more protection to former Lloyd's names and their estates against the possibility of claims by policyholders during the years up to and including 1992, the subject of restructuring.
21 The position of Lloyd's names before 1992 is in most respects similar but in some respects different. The position of Lloyd's names for that period is in common, in that common measures were taken to secure all Lloyd's names against the disastrous financial circumstances of syndicates for the period up to 1992. But the position of individual Lloyd's names is also different. It is different in the sense that: each name was involved in different syndicates; and each name had the option whether or not to take up the security arrangements provided by the restructuring.
22 The liabilities of Mr Gamble's state should first be dealt with on the basis of the common Lloyd's restructuring arrangements as they affect Mr Gamble's estate. Then Mr Gamble's individual situation must be considered. That is the structure that I will pursue in this judgment. The liabilities of Mr Gamble's estate in respect of his participation in syndicates during the 1993, 1994 years, which were not the subject of any common restructuring, will also be considered.
23 As with other Australian cases about distributions from the estates of Lloyd's names (such as the decision of Austin J in Estate L H Hall [1999] NSWSC 1297) the common arrangements for the restructuring of the financial position of Lloyd's names is not the subject of direct evidence in these proceedings. But the case law is sufficient to make what has occurred since 1996 a matter of public record.
24 Stability of Lloyd's was achieved in mid 1996 when arrangements were made for Lloyd's names involved pre-1992 syndicates, which syndicates could not otherwise obtain reinsurance so as to allow the syndicates to be finalised, to be reinsured by the Equitas Group. The Equitas Group was a special purpose vehicle set up to supply this reinsurance, which could not be found elsewhere by individual syndicates. A detailed description of how that restructuring occurred and affected each Lloyd's member in a syndicate, is conveniently set out in the judgment of Lindsay J in York's case (at 911-913), which description also appears in Austin J's judgment in Hall at [9]:
"As to the position of names, I have received evidence, none of which has been challenged, from Mr William David Robson, a director and the chairman of Anton Jardine Members Agency Ltd, a leading Lloyd's members' agent; he has been involved in the Lloyd's market since 1963. He is chairman of the Lloyd's Underwriting Agents' Association. He explains that each individual member of a syndicate, names such as Mr Yorke, agrees to assume a proportion of the risks underwritten by that syndicate. The liability of an individual for that agreed part is unlimited, but there is no liability upon him for the failure of any fellow member of the syndicate to bear that other's proportion.
From 1927 there was a central fund, a principal function of which has been to assume responsibility for claims where the members concerned have failed to meet their liabilities. On becoming a name each individual signs a general undertaking to the effect that he and his personal representatives shall be bound by the rules of Lloyd's. Each syndicate is, in a sense, an annual venture; it exist for a year of account but syndicates are accounted for under a three-year accounting system. A syndicate's profit or loss is calculated only at the end of three years. However, at the end of any three years there are nowadays very likely still to be unsettled claims and the possibility of future ones. In order to achieve finality in respect of any accounting period of three years there is what is called 'reinsurance to close' (RITC). Members of a syndicate for a year which is to become a 'closed year' pay a premium to and assign their rights in relation to the 'closed year' to members of a syndicate for a later year who, in return, assume the liability of the members for the 'closed year' for all the known and unknown liabilities attributable to the 'closed year'. Until the year of account is closed by RITC it remains an 'open year', but once closed it is not reopened. By way of successive assignments by which syndicates for later years have year after year thus assumed responsibility for the risks of earlier years, any given syndicate which has become a reinsurer by way of RITC may find itself liable for late emerging or late-settled claims in respect of risks run many years before. In 1992, for example, there were still risks covered in respect of policies written before the 1939-45 war. The representative creditor, Mr G N Clarke, a past or present name, has the RITC for one of his years insured by a syndicate which included Mr Yorke; it is in that way in which he comes to be a possible future creditor of the estate.
If there is in respect of a given year, a material degree of uncertainty about the appropriate figure to be fixed for its RITC, the syndicate's accounts will remain open; the syndicate is then in 'run-off'. The syndicate itself continues to pay claims and to debit its members until its present and future liabilities are felt to be sufficiently quantifiable to make a closure by RITC equitable as between the syndicate for the closing year and that of the year which proposes to take over the risk by becoming the reinsurer under the RITC.