The State of New South Wales v Kay

The statutory scheme

1. There was thus no issue between the parties that Mr Kay is a "sex offender" as defined in s 4 of the Act, that being a person over the age of 18 years who has at any time been sentenced to imprisonment following his or her conviction of a "serious sex offence".
2. That term is defined in s 5(1) of the Act. There is no issue that Mr Kay has been convicted of offences of the most serious kind, which fall within that definition. They include four counts of aggravated sexual assault in contravention of s 61J of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which each attracted maximum penalties of 20 years imprisonment, for which Mr Kay was sentenced in July 2000 by Hulme J to a total sentence of 20 years imprisonment, commencing on 18 February 1997 and expiring on 17 February 2017, with a non-parole period of 16 years.
3. An appeal against that sentence was dismissed in Regina v Kay (2002) 132 A Crim R 72; [2002] NSWCCA 286.
4. There is also no issue firstly, that Mr Kay comes within the provision made in s 5B of the Act, where the term "high risk sex offender" is defined and secondly, that he was given the required notices of this application under the Act.
5. Section s 5B provides: "5B High risk sex offender (1) An offender can be made the subject of a high risk sex offender extended supervision order or a high risk sex offender continuing detention order as provided for by this Act if and only if the offender is a high risk sex offender. (2) An offender is a high risk sex offender if the offender is a sex offender and the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision. (3) The Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of a person committing a serious sex offence is more likely than not in order to determine that the person poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence."
6. The term "a high degree of probability" is not defined in the Act. In Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 its meaning (in predecessor legislation) was said (at [21]) to be: "… something "beyond more probably than not"; so that the existence of the risk, that is the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the risk or likelihood itself does not have to be a probability to the civil standard of proof, but rather a sufficiently substantial probability to satisfy the criterion "likely" as explained in TSL"
7. The term "unacceptable risk" is also not defined. Consideration of the risk which Mr Kay poses involves an evaluative judgment, which must be undertaken in light of all of the evidence. As discussed in Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57 at [50] - [51] and [55]: "50 As the respondent pointed out in its submissions, by reference to dictionary definitions, the word "unacceptable" requires context in which, or parameters against which, the "unacceptable" risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is "so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed". The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym "acceptable". Something is "acceptable" if it is "tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters". 51 What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the "risk" that the offender poses "of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision". The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made. .. 55 This Act provides, as stated in its Long Title, for the extended supervision or continued detention of high risk offenders. The purpose of the legislation, as the primary object of the legislation states, is to "ensure the safety and protection of the community". The evaluation of whether an offender is a "high risk violent offender" has to be undertaken in that context. The further context in which that evaluation is undertaken is provided by s 5E(2) itself, namely, whether the offender poses an "unacceptable risk" of committing a serious violence offence, when regard is had to the safety and protection of the community, unless the person is kept under supervision, either by way of making an extended supervision order or an extended detention order. As this Court pointed out in State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24], a finding that a person poses an "unacceptable risk" within the meaning of s 5E(2): "… is the gateway to the power to make an order under s 5F or s 5G … and applies to an assessment of likelihood ('unacceptable risk') in the absence of any supervision." (original emphasis)"
8. Mr Kay was released to parole on 20 February 2015 and is now residing in the community under supervision, working in a job which requires a 2am start and to which he travels from his home using public transport, without any reported parole breaches, although it is relevant to note that he has been subject to electronic monitoring since his release. There is thus also no issue that he is a "supervised sex offender" as defined in s 5I(2), in respect of whom an application for extended supervision may be made under the Act.
9. There is also no issue that the application complies with the requirements of s 6 of the Act.
10. While it was contended in written submissions that Ms Giurastante's affidavits had not been served within a reasonable time, as Rule 10.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) requires, that difficulty provided no impediment to the orderly conduct of the hearing.
11. Section 10A permits the Court to make an order for the interim supervision of an offender if, it appears to the Court: "(a) that the offender's current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and (b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of a high risk sex offender extended supervision order."
12. The matters which the Court must consider on an application such as this include those specified in s 9(3). They are: "(a) the safety of the community, (b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender's participation in any such examination, (c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further relevant offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender's participation in any such assessment, (d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further relevant offence, (d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community, (e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender's participation in any such programs, (f) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order, (g) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004, (h) the offender's criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history, (h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender, (i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will in future commit offences of a sexual nature (in the case of an application for a high risk sex offender extended supervision order) or serious violence offences (in the case of an application for a high risk violent offender extended supervision order)."

Mr Kay's offending

1. Mr Kay's record of sexual offending was described in Hulme J's judgment in considerable detail. The judgment reveals that Mr Kay was apprehended as the result of a police operation directed to his identification. He came to be suspected and was subjected to surveillance during which, over the course of a number of days, he was observed to be driving around looking for females and following them, before driving on. In the result, Hulme J concluded that his eight attacks were not chance happenings committed on the spur of the moment, after he sighted his victims, but premeditated and planned.
2. Mr Kay gave evidence on sentence, but then said that he could not explain his behaviour. While he referred to having consumed alcohol on one occasion, he denied being intoxicated or unable to drive. His Honour concluded that he was inclined to down-play his premeditation and criminality and that he was not significantly remorseful for what he had done.
3. The submission advanced on sentence, that the sexual abuse Mr Kay had himself suffered; the stress of the finality of his marriage breakdown; and problems with his children and work caused his offending, was also not accepted. His Honour also did not accept that Mr Kay had been frank and accurate in his reports to the psychiatrists who had examined him.
4. His Honour explained the circumstances in which Mr Kay's late pleas of guilty were entered and the efforts he had made to participate in a sex offenders program and to apologise to the victims, with the result that he concluded that some limited remorse had manifested itself, since his arrest.
5. It was Mr Kay's arrest which brought the crime spree he was then still obviously pursuing to an end. Hulme J found that prior to his arrest, it must have been very apparent to Mr Kay, given his prior record of offending and advice that he had earlier received from psychiatrists who had examined him, that he needed to seek treatment, but he did not do so and instead, pursued the predatory course of conduct which his Honour explained.
6. Mr Kay's first offence occurred in December 1995, when he approached from behind a 25 year old woman walking down the driveway of a block of units. He placed a hand over her mouth and a scalpel, or what he described to be a "works knife", to her neck. He threatened to cut her and demanded money. He stuffed what appeared to be a sock into her mouth, fondled one of her breasts, rubbed her labia and then inserted his finger into her vagina. After further touching her vaginal area, he also attempted, but failed, to insert his penis into her vagina, and then walked away. This victim also suffered a light cut to her throat, as well as cuts and bruising to her mouth.
7. Mr Kay could give no explanation for this offence, beyond saying that he had lost control.
8. In March 1996, Mr Kay committed another sexual assault on a 17 year old girl, who he followed from a train station to some units; grabbed and asked for money; shoved a sock or piece of rag into her mouth; and when it fell out, threatened to kill her if it happened again. He pulled down her pants and with a knife which she described to be like a hunting knife with a jagged edge on the blade held at her throat, which she could feel being pushed deeper with every move she made, he then rubbed around her labia and inserted fingers into her vagina. After threatening her further when she removed the sock, he inserted either his fingers or penis into her vagina. He also threated to return to kill her, if he she told anyone.
9. In evidence Mr Kay agreed that it was possible that on this occasion, he had spent some hours in the vicinity, looking for a victim.
10. Mr Kay committed another aggravated sexual assault in May 1996, when he followed another 18 year old woman from a railway station, came up behind her, put a hand over her mouth and demanded money. He also forced a sock or other material into her mouth, squeezed her breasts, pushed the blade of a knife which the victim described as looking like a fishing knife, into her back and shoved her down a driveway into some shrubs. He became more aggressive when she started to scream. After picking up the knife he had dropped and holding it against her again, he felt and penetrated her genitalia, before running off, after threatening to hurt her if she told police.
11. Hulme J did not accept Mr Kay's evidence that while he could not clearly recall this incident, he denied sitting at the railway station looking for potential victims.
12. In May 1996, Mr Kay committed an offence of threat to inflict actual body harm by means of an offensive weapon with intent to have sexual intercourse, when he attacked a 39 year old woman, putting his hand over her mouth as she opened the door to the foyer of her unit block. He again had a knife and started to drag her towards some stairs leading down to the garage, but ran off after the woman managed to kick the door of a unit and call for help and he heard the unit door being unlatched. This victim was cut and bruised.
13. Mr Kay's evidence was that he had seen the victim, parked and followed her. Hulme J did not accept his evidence that he had desisted, because he realised what he had done. He concluded that it was the imminent intervention of another person which was the major contributing factor to Mr Kay desisting.
14. There was a similar attack on 30 May 1996 on a 24 year old woman walking home from a railway station, when Mr Kay went up behind her, put his hand over her mouth and demanded money. He put a glove in her mouth and a knife to her neck, but ran off when he heard a voice.
15. In September 1996, Mr Kay attacked a 23 year old woman, after she had withdrawn money from an ATM machine, after getting off a train. Coming up behind her, he demanded money. She screamed for help and he grabbed her, threatening to use his knife. Holding the knife to her throat after she had given him the money, credit cards and her license, he fondled her breasts and pulled her into a dark pedestrian tunnel, while she pleaded with him not to rape her. He tied her up, touched her vagina and inserted his finger, before inserting his penis into her vagina more than once. He also threatened to get her at her home, if she told anybody. He then untied her and ran off. It was on sentence for this offence that three of Mr Kay's other offences were taken into account on a Form 1.
16. In October 1996, Mr Kay followed a 22 year old woman from a railway station and attacked her at the entrance to a block of units. As she put the key in the door he approached from behind, put a knife to her neck and a cloth in her mouth, and demanded her credit cards. He then forced her to a secluded area nearby, where he touched her breasts, inserted his fingers roughly into her vagina, and with a knife at her throat offered her the choice of being raped or giving him a head job. He then forced his penis repeatedly into her mouth, before withdrawing and ejaculating. After taking $10, he threatened to return to kill her if she told anyone, and walked off.
17. In December 1996, Mr Kay grabbed a 16 year old girl from behind after she got off a bus. She collapsed to the ground when Mr Kay demanded money. He told her he had a knife and pushed her into the driveway of a nearby school, put a gag into her mouth, forced her hands behind her back and tied her up. He fondled her breasts and inserted a finger into her vagina, pulled down her pants and forced her to bend at the waist, then again inserted a finger or fingers into her vagina. She managed to scream and he forcefully applied the knife to her throat. She managed to scream again and he pushed the knife into her throat, but then untied her and ran off.
18. In his judgment, Hulme J also described what police had observed him do, after he came under surveillance, as well as evidence of a woman who recounted having been watched and followed by Mr Kay on two occasions in 1996 and again in January 1997. In January and February 1997, Mr Kay was observed driving around, watching various females and on occasions following them in his car. All of this evidence led his Honour to conclude at [50] that the eight offences for which Mr Kay was being sentenced were: "not chance happenings occurring on the spur of the moment, or perhaps more accurately, after he sighted his victims, but premeditated and planned events."
19. Mr Kay also gave evidence that he had placed himself and his car in the vicinity of railway stations at a time when people were walking home from work and had followed one or more in whom he took interest. He said that he could not explain his behaviour, or what had triggered it and that (at [53]): "The first instance I had been drinking. It had been a Christmas function. I hadn't had that much drink that I was intoxicated or couldn't drive, but there was alcohol involved and I think I somewhat put it down to maybe that was a weakness, part caused, or added to it, or whatever, and I thought that I would be in control. Why it got to the stage of being in those places or putting myself in that position, I can offer no excuse or no reason. I would like to find out why. I don't know whether it is subconscious or what. I honestly cannot answer."
20. His Honour did not find beyond reasonable doubt that there was planning prior to Mr Kay's first and second offences, but by the time of the sixth, in September 1996 and later, he found that Mr Kay was adopting a practice of actively looking for victims and locating himself where they were likely to be and even beforehand, by 30 May 1996 when Mr Kay committed his fifth offence, his interest in the commission of such offences "was clearly whetted". His Honour also did not accept Mr Kay's evidence "to the effect that, presumably on happening to see his victims, he went out of control" (at [55]).
21. In the result his Honour concluded at [59] that "[t]he argument that at the time of his offences, society needed protection from him is compelling".
22. Before this offending Mr Kay also has a record of prior sexual and violent offending, which began with an assault charge in 1971, and included other sexual offending in 1974, 1983 and 1987, as well as a breach of a domestic violence order in 1994 in respect of his ex-wife. That earlier offending, Hulme J found, could not have left him in any reasonable doubt that he had a significant problem, given the psychiatrists who had assessed him at the time of sentencing for those offences and still when he began offending again, he was not motivated to pursue the counselling or treatment which he had been advised to pursue (see at [83]).

The risk assessment report

1. Mr Ardasinski, a forensic psychologist and Ms Cieplucha, the Acting Chief Psychologist Risk Management Programs, prepared this report in June 2016. From that report, the following appears.
2. Mr Kay, now aged 64, was not initially released to parole when eligible, but that decision was reversed after he sought judicial review of the refusal. He has obtained employment since release and has moved out of the Nunyara Community Offender Support Program Centre in mid-2015, in order to live closer to his work.
3. Mr Kay had been assessed as falling in the moderate risk range for future sexual violence, despite his completion of a high intensity sex offender program (CUBIT) before his release into the community, following which he engaged in further maintenance sessions for nine months, and also engaged with the Department's community based maintenance provider for a year, while on day leave from prison. He had also participated in further group and individual sessions for the 15 months after release on parole. In that time he had maintained a stable and pro-social lifestyle and had not presented signs of return to problematic behaviour.
4. It was considered, however, that Mr Kay's risk would increase if he experienced a significant destabilising life event, within the context of a collapse of the prison community support he currently enjoys. It would also increase if he encountered a potential target victim, in which his self-restraint may suffer and a serious offence might be committed. It was considered that even then, given his development of more effective internal risk management strategies, than he has ever held previously, he could avoid further offending.
5. There had in the past been significant gaps in his offending, however, and so a lengthier period under supervision was considered to be warranted, to further mitigate the future risk Mr Kay presented, which would be enhanced by ongoing community supervision and support.
6. Mr Kay has been psychiatrically assessed on a number of occasions, but has not been identified as suffering any mental health issues. It was noted that in 1999, Dr Westmore did not consider that his offending arose from a personality disorder of any type.
7. The sex offender programs Mr Kay has undertaken were also explained in the report. His participation was regarded as having been more than satisfactory, and there were notes that he has developed potentially meaningful self-management plans to assist him, should problematic behaviour arise in the future. He then continued to attend weekly maintenance sessions despite them not being mandated. Since 2014, he had attended almost 100 group sessions.
8. An identified concern in June 2016 was that Mr Kay then appeared to be too dependent on the maintenance program he was attending, given that he then had only nine months left on parole. There was also a concern as to institutionalisation and dependence on the Department, which required gradual reduction in servicing. It was, however, noted that he expresses an aim not to offend again.
9. The limitations of risk assessment were also described in the report, given its actuarial approach and the need to assess individual dynamic factors which contribute to offending, which can change over time. Both LSI-R and Static-99R risk assessment instruments have been utilised to assess Mr Kay's risk in the past, as well as his current risks.
10. Risk assessments utilising the LSI-R instrument for the risk of general and violent recidivism were conducted in 2011, 2014 and 2016. In April 2016, Mr Kay fell within the low-moderate range using the OIMS offender assessment screens. In June 2011 he fell into the Moderate-High risk category on the Static-99R instrument, used to assess the risk of sexual recidivism.
11. The limitations of this tool for assessment of individual offenders were explained in the report.
12. Recent risk assessments were conducted using a third tool for assessing the risk of sexual re-offending, Stable-2007. Mr Kay was then assessed as posing a moderate risk relative to other male sexual offenders and combining the Stable-2007 and Static-99R scores, to generate an "overall risk level", Mr Kay was found to pose a moderate-high overall risk. Using another tool, the RSVP protocol, he was assessed as posing a moderate risk of committing further sexual violence, although it was noted that "his risks appear able to be managed using routine risk management processes (ie he does not appear to require a high level of service or supervision to contain his risk)".
13. The factors which were identified as posting risks of re-offending in Mr Kay's circumstances were also discussed in the report. The risk issues identified as then remaining were: 1. poor work-life balance; 2. impulsivity; 3. relationships and excitement within intimate settings; 4. fantasising about risky sex; and 5. to a lesser extent, identified stereotypical attitudes to women, lacking insight; problems with stress or coping; problems from childhood abuse; possible preference for coercive sex; and need for power and control; emotional loneliness and social isolation (withdrawing and return to alcohol abuse).
14. The risks involved in these various factors were also discussed in the report, in detail which it is not necessary to outline, but includes Mr Kay having an ongoing high libido and not having a good sense of what his current risk factors are.
15. At [48] of the report, an opinion is expressed that Mr Kay's past sexual violence has occurred "opportunistically", when sexually preoccupied, sexually frustrated, feels powerless or controlled (perhaps within the context of a poor work life balance), and experiencing other stressors. It was considered that treatment had, however, mitigated his risk of sexual recidivism by modifying his attitudes and behaviours.
16. It is necessary to deal at this point, with the considerable reservations which I have with this aspect of the report, which I raised at the hearing.
17. Those reservations arose because, contrary to the submission then advanced by Mr Scragg, the opinion that the authors of this report reached about the circumstances in which Mr Kay offended, is completely at odds with the conclusions which Hulme J reached about the nature of Mr Kay's offending.
18. Those who authored the report had access to Hulme J's sentencing remarks; Mr Kay's criminal record; his case management file; CUBIT treatment reports; verbal consultations with a psychologist and case manager; as well as an interview with Mr Kay. What they did not have was the advantage which Hulme J had, having sentenced Mr Kay on all of the evidence received at the sentence hearing, including that which Mr Kay had himself given.
19. As I have earlier explained, Hulme J did not accept that Mr Kay's offending was opportunistic. On the evidence, including what the police investigation revealed as to the course he was continuing to pursue even after his December 1996 offence, and the evidence of the woman who had plainly been repeatedly stalked by Mr Kay in 1996 and 1997, his Honour concluded that by 30 May 1996 when Mr Kay committed his fifth offence, his interest in the commission of such offences "was clearly whetted". That was an interest which he continued to pursue, by 30 September having adopted a practice of actively looking for victims and locating himself where they were likely to be. Contrary to his evidence, Mr Kay on happening to see his victims, did not go "out of control", but having looked for and identified them carefully, grabbed them from behind and then, using implements he had with him, committed the offences he had planned.
20. In the result, in so far as the risks Mr Kay has been identified as posing rests on the opinion that the offending for which he was sentenced by Hulme J was "opportunistic" in the way discussed in the report, I am satisfied that the report does not form a reliable basis on which conclusions as to the nature of the risks which Mr Kay now poses can rest. On the evidence those risks may well be considerably greater than the authors of the report have concluded that he poses.
21. In 1995, 1996 and up until his arrest in 1997, Mr Kay was not an opportunistic offender. He was rather a deliberate and determined sexual predator. He armed himself with what seems on the evidence to have been a number of different knives or similar weapons, gloves, socks or cloths, as well as the materials he used to tie up certain of his victims. He then went in search of suitable victims in his car, having prepared himself to be able to grab, sexually assault and make credible threats against those he selected. He also succeeded, in the various ways I have described, in committing the offences he had so planned, against six different victims.
22. In the report, it was considered to be positive that since released to strict supervision on parole, Mr Kay has not offended and has not been identified as posing significant risks of re-offending. However, it was also considered that he had received significant support during this time, which had helped his decision-making in circumstances where his potential for sexual violence appeared to be chronic. Given his long history of offending each decade prior to his current sentence, with long gaps between offending, there was also recognised to be the possibility that his positive participation in intervention had moderated his risk of sexual violence to a significant degree.
23. Mr Kay's age was also considered to be a positive factor, empirical literature suggesting that men in their sixties are likely to desist from offending.
24. The level of supervision Mr Kay has been receiving on parole was considered to equate to that which he would receive if under extended supervision. What would be involved in such supervision was explained in detail in the report, as was the reliance he had come to place on his current support structure and steps which would need to be taken to secure such support from external providers, once his parole ends, including for accommodation.
25. While it was considered that there was potential for Mr Kay to exist in the community without resorting to further sexual violence, it was considered that there was also the potential that he would revert to the "faulty thinking" which preceded his serious sexual offending in the 1990s, if his situation destabilised and he did not have the requisite support to manage his risk factors. This scenario was considered, however, to be unlikely, albeit possible.
26. I also have reservations about these conclusions. I do not consider it possible on the evidence I have discussed to conclude that Mr Kay's offending was the result of mere "faulty thinking".
27. The evidence establishes that the risk which Mr Kay poses is that he will revert to making deliberate decisions to commit serious sexual offences against women to whom he is attracted, having rendered them helpless by using knives to threaten them. What the interim order and the conditions thereby imposed on Mr Kay must seek to do, is to manage that risk, while he continues to live in the community.

The risk management report

1. This report revealed that Mr Kay had initially been refused parole because of the need to complete a psychological risk assessment report and to participate in the external leave program. Approval to participate in that program was given in April 2013 and he then participated in the CUBIT program from 21 January 2014, until released on parole.
2. Mr Kay was at first unable to secure external employment, with the result that he was initially employed as head clerk of the Technology Unit at the Dawn De Loas Correctional Centre. He now has other employment which he attends regularly and is considered to be hard working and valued. He lives in the community, having contact with his two children and sister.
3. Mr Kay's progress permitted weekly schedules of his movements no longer to be required, but concerns then arose as to his dependence on contact with Community Corrections, and a letter which he sent in October 2016, raised fears that he might be at heightened risk of re-offending. The steps taken to deal with these concerns were outlined in the report.
4. The risk management plan developed to deal with the risks identified in the risk assessment report earlier discussed, were also identified, and the limitations of those strategies explained.

The supplementary risk assessment report

1. A supplementary report of 5 December 2016 considered the concerns which had arisen from the October incident, identified in the risk management report.
2. The report records that Mr Kay had perceived that he had been "rejected" by his Forensic Psychology Services Therapist, when told he could not continue individual sessions with her, as well as his group sessions being reduced from weekly to fortnightly. Mr Kay formed the impression that the therapist had formed an inappropriate relationship with another participant, who she continued to see more often than him. Jealousy was identified to be a risk issue for Mr Kay.
3. Mr Kay then wrote to the other participant, also a sex offender, in October, seeking to have him implicate the therapist in the perceived liaison. That letter was disclosed, with the result that a curfew and weekly schedules were reimposed on Mr Kay, but he was approved to continue his employment, which required him to travel by public transport at night to travel to work.
4. The report confirmed the view earlier reached, that reducing the regularity of Mr Kay's therapy had to be pursued. In June, Mr Kay had raised his anxiety about any reduction with the therapist and then twice raised his need to be referred to a community based therapist. His last weekly group session was due on 6 September. On 7 September he was advised that his individual session with the therapist would not continue. He attended group sessions on 20 and 27 September and was then told he could only attend fortnightly. On 14 October he was advised he needed to seek new social networks, but he was not provided with specific assistance to source additional support structures outside the Department. On 28 October and 8 November he again asked for a referral to a community based psychologist.
5. It was concluded that Mr Kay would have benefited from the referral being made. It was recommended that it now be made, his situation highlighting his need for ongoing treatment and risk management, even after expiry of his supervision. The reintroduction of a curfew and schedules of movements was considered to be potentially counterproductive.
6. It was concluded at [13] that: "The reality of the current situation is that Mr Kay appears to have found himself in a distressing situation, and he engaged in a poor choice of coping behaviours to manage it. He did not, however, commit a new serious sexual offence, despite his having ample opportunity to do so on his nightly commute to and from work."
7. One obvious explanation was, of course, the continued monitoring to which Mr Kay was then subject under the conditions of his parole.
8. In the result, however, the conclusions reached in the first report as to the risk which Mr Kay poses were not altered. For the reasons I have explained, I also have reservations about these conclusions.

Earlier reports

1. In the 1999 report of the psychiatrist Dr Wong, an account given by Mr Kay about his offending appears. That account included that Mr Kay had not planned his various offences, but had committed them on the spur of the moment, having been sexually aroused and looking for a victim. That version of his offending was not accepted by Hulme J, as I have explained. Mr Kay also reported having been sexually aroused when he thought about his offences a couple of times afterwards.
2. That report recorded a history of Mr Kay having been sexually abused by an older cousin in childhood, but not ever having suffered any psychiatric condition, drug or alcohol abuse. He otherwise had a stable background, education and good employment record, but his marriage had ended in divorce, after he had pursued an affair, resulting in considerable acrimony and an AVO, which he breached.
3. The report recorded Mr Kay's denial of any deep-seated problem; he described his offending as "lapses", which he attributed to extrinsic causes such as his diet. There was also an unwillingness to pursue counselling which had been recommended in respect of his earlier, less serious offending. The increasing severity of his offending, which had followed a set pattern which Dr Wong considered suggested a degree of deliberation, without significant predicating circumstances being able to be identified, was not considered to be a positive prognostic indicator of the risk of him offending further.
4. Dr Westmore, a forensic psychiatrist, also provided a report. In his interview Mr Kay gave a similar history, but professed remorse for his offending and a desire to understand why he had behaved as he had, having always tried to maintain a high moral standard, but at times having had "these lapses".
5. Dr Westmore also found no evidence of a personality disorder and considered Mr Kay's offending behaviour to be "somewhat of an enigma". While professing to have an aversion to physical violence, he professed to have only recently come to appreciate that the violence he had perpetrated against his victims was considerable. Dr Westmore considered this lack of understanding to be hard to explain, given that he was a man of some intelligence, with capacity to see things at a psychological level. He considered that if Mr Kay's verbal and emotional responses were accepted as reflections of genuine insight, they were positive prognostic factors, although similar conclusions had been reached in past psychiatric assessments, after earlier offending.
6. What predicated the offending was unclear, none of the stressors then identified appearing to Dr Westmore to be of a nature which might have precipitated the offending behaviour. Therapy was recommended.

Mr Kay's case

1. In written submissions, complaint was made for Mr Kay that while the risk assessment report of 6 June 2016 was favourable, it took almost another six months for these proceedings to be commenced.
2. Under s 6(2) the application could not be made, however, until "the last 6 months of the offender's current custody or supervision". Mr Kay is due to be released on 17 February, so the application in his case could not be made until August. It was made in November, after finalisation of the risk management report, which dealt with developments which had heightened concerns over the risk which Mr Kay posed.
3. It was on 6 September that Mr Kay was due to attend his last weekly group session, and on 7 September he was told by his therapist that he would no longer be seen individually. On his case, since then he has not been given the assistance he required in obtaining a referral to a community based provider.
4. Those developments appear to have had adverse consequences, as was envisaged by the first risk assessment report, to be possible.
5. Mr Kay admits that in October he wrote an inappropriate letter about his therapist to a fellow maintenance participant, which was disclosed. This no doubt helps explain why Mr Kay initially did not oppose the appointment of two psychiatrists to examine him, but submitted that the decision on the interim supervision order should await the receipt of those reports. Because that could not occur before the expiry of his parole, Mr Kay consented to the making of the interim order.
6. It was not conceded, however, that at a final hearing it would be established that he is a high risk sex offender and that he should be subjected to an extended supervision order.

Interim order

1. Contrary to counsel's submissions, the evidence I have discussed well explains Mr Kay's concession that an interim order should be made. On that evidence I am satisfied that the matters I have discussed would, if proved, justify the making of a high risk sex offender extended supervision order
2. The June 2016 risk assessment report was certainly relatively positive as to the materialisation of the risks it was identified Mr Kay posed, but as I have discussed, that report suffers from serious limitations.
3. The report identified factors which it was considered could increase the risks of re-offending which Mr Kay was then considered to pose.
4. From the November risk management report; the supplementary risk assessment report; and Mr Kay's own concession and submissions, it appears that some of those negative factors have, in fact, materialised. That explains his complaint about the failure to assist him to find ongoing support which he requires from community based organisations and the acceptance that the letter he wrote in October to his therapist, was inappropriate. It is not in evidence.
5. On the evidence of Mr Kay's past record of intermittent sexual offending, offending which significantly increased in frequency and seriousness before he was apprehended in 1997, as the result of the successful police operation discussed in Hulme J's judgment; Mr Kay's recent account of still having a significant libido; and the absence of any reliable explanation for his pursuit of the deliberate, premeditated and serious offending, I have discussed, there is no question that Mr Kay now still poses a real risk of committing a serious sex offence in the future, notwithstanding his age.
6. It is not possible to accurately predict, of course, whether in the future he will again commit such an offence. That there is a very significant risk that he will do so, notwithstanding the courses he has completed in custody, must be accepted.
7. When this is considered together with the evidence as to his recent conduct, following the materialisation of circumstances which were identified in the June risk assessment report as potentially increasing the risk that Mr Kay will not be able to continue managing his ongoing risks of re-offending, when the support he has until recently received during his probation decreased, the conclusion that the interim order must be made is inescapable.
8. That conclusion has been driven by my consideration of the factors identified in s 9(3), in light of the evidence I have discussed.
9. On the evidence, Mr Kay's offending in the 1990s was not driven by alcohol, drug abuse, or any identified psychiatric difficulty. While Mr Kay is now aged in his sixties and has successfully undertaken various courses, the risk of him again deciding to pursue further offending is still obviously significant, given his inability to account for the behaviour he chose repeatedly to pursue in 1995 and 1996.
10. When all of that is considered in the light of his ongoing high libido; and the expressed concern not only that he has become institutionalised, but as to his reliance on the considerable support he has received since his release into the community on parole and his negative responses, once that support diminished and he was not provided with replacement support from community based providers, I am satisfied that it must be concluded that the requirements of s 10A have been satisfied and the interim orders sought must be made.

Conditions

1. An amended schedule of conditions which reflected both agreements reached during the course of the hearing and conditions which were still pressed, over Mr Kay's objections, were provided after the hearing.
2. I am satisfied that the conditions pressed must be imposed.

Conditions 6-9

1. Mr Kay's general position was that he did not object to conditions which replicated those to which he was presently subject while on parole. Still he objected to conditions 6 - 9, which provide: "Schedule of Movements 6. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start. 7. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period 8. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency. 9. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing."
2. It was accepted that during his parole, at times Mr Kay has been required to provide schedules of movements and that over time that requirement had been relaxed and re-imposed, as had a curfew. It was also accepted that this had resulted from condition 4 of his parole, which provides: "The offender must, until the order ceases to have effect or for a period of 3 years from the date of release (whichever is the lesser), submit to the supervision and guidance of the Community Corrections Officer' (hereafter referred to as "the Officer") assigned to the supervision of the offender for the time being and obey all reasonable directions of that Officer."
3. I am satisfied on the evidence which I have discussed that conditions 6 - 9 should be imposed.
4. It was common ground that those who had responsibility for supervising Mr Kay on parole will also have responsibility for supervising him while subject to the interim order. Conditions 6 - 9 do not depart in a material way from how the matters the subject of these conditions have been dealt with while he has been on parole. There does not seem to be any likelihood that the approach adopted to this aspect of his supervision would alter as the result of their imposition, nor do there appear to have been any adverse consequence for Mr Kay from past imposition of the requirements dealt with in these conditions.
5. On the evidence, I have discussed those conditions are necessary and appropriate, in all of Mr Kay's circumstances.

Part H search and seizure

1. In issue was whether the Court had power to impose these conditions, which provide: "Part H: Search and seizure 32. If the DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to f below) is necessary: a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address; b. to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or c. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence; then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to: d. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address; e. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; f. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or g. search and examination of his person. 33. For the purposes of the above condition: a. a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search. b. to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO. NOTE: "Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body. "Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched. 34. During a search carried out pursuant to condition 35 above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise: a. the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address; b. the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or c. the defendant's compliance with this order; or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence. 35. The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use. 36. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 32 to 35 above."
2. There was no objection to condition 35.
3. For Mr Kay it was contended otherwise that s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act did not permit these conditions to be imposed. The section provides: "11 Conditions that may be imposed on supervision order An extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate, including (but not limited to) directions requiring the offender: (a) to permit any corrective services officer to visit the offender at the offender's residential address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address, or (a1) to permit any corrective services officer to access any computer or related equipment that is at the offender's residential address or in the possession of the offender, or (b) to make periodic reports to a corrective services officer, or (c) to notify a corrective services officer of any change in his or her address, or (d) to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs, or (e) to wear electronic monitoring equipment, or (ea) to reside at an address approved by the Commissioner of Corrective Services, or (f) not to reside in or resort to specified locations or classes of locations, or (g) not to associate or make contact with specified persons or classes of persons, or (h) not to engage in specified conduct or classes of conduct, or (i) not to engage in specified employment or classes of employment, or (j) not to change his or her name, or (k) to report to police and provide information to police about the conditions imposed on the extended supervision order or interim supervision order and the offender's residential address, or (l) to comply with any obligation that could be imposed on the offender under Part 3 of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 if the offender were a registrable person within the meaning of that Act and were not the subject of an interim supervision order or an extended supervision order, or (m) to comply with specified requirements in connection with the offender's access to and use of the internet, or (n) to provide any corrective services officer with requested information in relation to any employment or any financial affairs of the offender."
4. The issue raises a question of statutory construction, which must be approached in light of the purpose of the Act. Its objects are specified in s 3 to be: "3 Objects of Act (1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community. (2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation."
5. For Mr Kay it was submitted that the proposed condition authorised the commission of an assault on his person and trespass to his property, compelling him to submit to a search of both his body and property. The principle of legality required that an intention to authorise such assault and/or trespass must be expressed by clear statutory language, or by necessary intendment, as discussed in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 at [29]). It is not enough that the implication be desirable, it must be necessary (see X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 at [142]).
6. Section 11 certainly contains no express power to impose conditions which permit a person to be detained and searched. The section does not, however, contain an exhaustive list of the types of conditions which may be imposed (see Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [32]).
7. It is relevant that Mr Kay did not object to, or suggest that the condition that he not carry any knife or other cutting instrument, was beyond power. That was understandable, given the nature of the offending for which he is on parole. Nor was there any objection to the condition that Mr Kay must permit those who supervise him to visit and enter the premises where he resides.
8. It is in that context that the proposed search and seizure conditions must be understood. They are clearly conditions directed to the real risk of further sexual offending of the kind which Mr Kay undoubtedly poses.
9. As discussed in Wilde, the broad power to impose conditions granted by s 11 must be exercised in light of the scope and purpose of the Act and its objects, the Court having regard to the matters specified in s 9(3) "in addition to any other matter it considers relevant". As discussed at [53] the Court "must be satisfied, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of the Act, that it is appropriate to impose a particular condition so as to address the risk of future offending of the type which was the basis of the order". Further, while it is not appropriate to impose conditions directed to general future criminal conduct, a condition does not have to have a "demonstrated" link to past offending.
10. In Mr Kay's case, the search and seizure conditions sought do have a demonstrated link to his past offending. What is proposed is that if there is a reasonable basis for the belief as to the necessity for a search, for the reasons identified, Mr Kay may be required to submit to one and must then also allow things of the kind specified in condition 34 which are found, to be seized. They would include a knife or similar weapon.
11. It is apparent from what I have earlier discussed that there is an obvious link between Mr Kay's past offending, the risks of future offending which he poses, his possession of a knife or other weapon and the proposed search and seizure conditions.
12. That the proposed conditions empower Mr Kay to be assaulted may not be accepted. Nor do they authorise trespass. Rather, what the conditions require is that Mr Kay submit to search and seizure, in the prescribed circumstances, as a condition of his interim supervision order. The conditions make no provision for either forcible search or seizure. The consequence of breach of these conditions, which Mr Kay's refusal to permit either such a search or seizure would involve, are those specified by the Act.
13. Such conditions have been repeatedly imposed in other cases. Pertinently, in State of New South Wales v John Raymond Holschier [2016] NSWSC 234, Hidden J imposed similar conditions, concluding that s 11 permitted such orders to be made and that they were appropriate to be imposed in that case.
14. I am of a similar view in Mr Kay's case.

Recommendation

1. Finally, given the evidence of the serious risk which Mr Kay poses, I would add my recommendation to that made in the supplementary report, that Mr Kay be assisted by being helped to find a suitable community based therapist. That would not only be of benefit to him, but very obviously to the considerable benefit of the community who it is intended that the interim order would protect.
2. On the evidence I have discussed it is disturbing that such assistance has not been provided. Were it within my power to do so, I would order that Mr Kay be provided with that assistance.

Orders

1. In the result, for these reasons I make orders in the terms sought, namely: 1. Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ("the Act"), the Court appoints two qualified psychiatrists, Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Anthony Samuels, to conduct separate psychiatric examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports on the results of those examinations to the Court by 5.00pm on 2 February 2017. 2. The Defendant is directed to attend examinations by the above named Court appointed psychiatrists. 3. Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant is subject to a high risk sex offender interim supervision order for a period of 28 days, commencing on 17 February 2017. 4. Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, the defendant is directed to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule annexed to the orders made by the Court on 15 December 2016 for the period of the interim supervision order referred to in order 3 above. 5. The matter is listed for final hearing on 27 February 2017 at 10:00 am, with an estimate of one day. 6. The plaintiff is to file and serve any further evidence and submissions upon which it might wish to rely at the final hearing by no later than 4pm on 16 February 2017. 7. The defendant is to file and serve any evidence and written submissions upon which he might wish to rely at the final hearing by no later than 4pm on 23 February 2017. 8. The defendant is to advise the plaintiff which experts are required to attend Court to give evidence at the final hearing by no later than 4pm on 23 February 2017. 9. The parties are granted liberty to restore upon one day's notice to the Court and each other. SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION GRAHAM JAMES KAY Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations Monitoring and Reporting 1. The defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) until the end of the Order. 2. The defendant must report to the Department Supervising Officer (DSO) or any other person supervising him as directed by the DSO. 3. The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO or any other person supervising him. 4. The defendant must attend the police station nearest to his approved accommodation within 3 days of the date of this order and provide a copy of this order. Electronic Monitoring 5. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the DSO or any other person supervising him. Schedule of Movements 6. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start. 7. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period 8. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency. 9. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing. Part B: Accommodation 10. The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO. 11. If directed, the defendant must be at his approved address between 9:00 pm and 6:00 am. 12. The defendant must allow his DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address. 13. If directed, the defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of his DSO. 14. If directed, the defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO. Part C: Place and travel restrictions 15. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW. 16. The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner. 17. The defendant must not go to a place if his DSO tells him he cannot go there. 18. Without limiting condition 17 above, the defendant must not go to any: a. The Local Government Areas of North Sydney and Willoughby. Part D: Employment, finance and education 19. If the defendant is unemployed, the defendant must enter available employment if and as directed by the DSO or make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by the DSO. 20. The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO. 21. The defendant must not start any business, including forming any corporation, partnership, unincorporated association or registering any business names, without prior approval of the DSO. Part E: Non-association Associations with Others (not children) 22. The defendant must not associate with people that his DSO tells him not to. 23. If the defendant starts an intimate relationship with someone, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history. 24. The defendant must obtain written permission from the DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based social networking service. Part F: Weapons 25. The defendant must not carry on his person, at any time he has left his residence, a knife or other cutting instrument. Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication 26. The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed. 27. The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order. 28. The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by his DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet. 29. The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO. 30. The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant's possession and advise the DSO of any change to the inventory immediately. Part H: Search and seizure 31. If the DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to f below) is necessary: a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address; b. to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or c. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence; then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to: d. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address; e. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; f. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or g. search and examination of his person. 32. For the purposes of the above condition: a. a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search. b. to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO. NOTE: "Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body. "Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched. 33. During a search carried out pursuant to condition 35 above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise: a. the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address; b. the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or c. the defendant's compliance with this order; or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence. 34. The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use. 35. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 31 to 34 above. Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material 36. The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as X18+, R18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by the DSO. Part J: Personal details and appearance 37. The defendant must not change his name from Graham James Kay or use any other name without the approval of his DSO. 38. The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than Graham James Kay or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 33 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email. 39. The defendant must not change his appearance without the approval of his DSO. 40. The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him. 41. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide the DSO with such details. Part K: Medical intervention and treatment 42. The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults. 43. The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support and treatment that his DSO tells him to attend. 44. The defendant, with informed consent, must take all medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners. 45. If the defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, the defendant is to notify the DSO within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication. 46. The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with his DSO. 47. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, his DSO and CSNSW.

Amendments 31 January 2017 - Typographical errors Para 4, 5th line: "5 December" changed to "11 December 2016" Para 10, 6th line: "2000" inserted after "July" Para 51, line 3 and Para 52, line 1: LSI_R changed to LSI-R Page 19 Heading "The supplementary risk management report" changed to "The supplementary risk assessment report" Para 79, line 2 of quote: "copying" changed to "coping" Page 27 Under heading, "Note": Pat-clown search" changed to "Pat-down search" DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 April 2018