13 In this case Mr Parvez did not dispute that the speed limit at the place of the alleged offences with which he was charged, a school zone, was 40 kilometres per hour and that he was driving in excess of that speed. It is apparent on the approach in both Hugh and Lian, with which I respectfully agree, and, consistently with the requirements of the Australian Road Rules, that in the case of these offences, the prosecutor did establish the essential elements of the offences with which Mr Parvez had been charged. In fact, they were conceded.
14 The 40 kilometre speed limit notified to drivers at the commencement of the school zone applied to the length of road after the sign, until the speed limit was thereafter changed, by an end school zone sign, or a speed limit sign with a different number, or a dead end, as Rule 21(2) contemplated. In terms of the offence created by Rule 20, what had to be proven was that Mr Parvez exceeded the speed limit applicable to the length of road at which the offence was alleged to have occurred. That the speed limit later changed, when the school zone ended, was irrelevant to the question of whether an offence had been committed at the point of the road to which these charges related.
15 The speed limit which applied to Mr Parvez for the length of road where he was driving, was not in question. There was evidence of the signage, as well as evidence of what the speed camera had captured. Mr Parvez did not challenge the prosecutor's case that the applicable limit was 40 kilometres per hour, or that he was driving in excess of that speed. The dismissal of each charge flowed from his Honour's view that the prosecutor also had to establish where the speed limit later changed, when the school zone ended. That was not an element of the offence charged and was not otherwise required to be proven by Rules 21 and 23 of the Australian Road Rules, or otherwise.
16 As I earlier indicated, I have considered the written submissions filed by Mr Parvez. They do not raise matters which go to the questions raised by the appeal, other than in relation to the costs of the appeal, to which I will return, but rather raise matters relevant to be considered by the Local Court, which must consider the charges further. I note that at the hearing the Court was also advised that Mr Parvez has made representations to the plaintiff in similar terms, which are presently being considered by the plaintiff. Those matters do not arise for this Court's determination.
17 It follows that His Honour misconstrued the relevant provisions of the Australian Road Rules. On the evidence there is no question that the offences charged were proven. The appeal must be upheld and the matter be returned to the Local Court for further hearing.
18 As to costs, Mr Parvez's case was that he could not afford to pay the costs of the appeal, which would give rise to substantial hardship for he and his family. That situation will be accommodated by the appellant's submission that an order should be made in favour of Mr Parvez, under the Suitors Fund Act 1951.
19 Consistent with the appellant's submissions, I am satisfied that this case is an appropriate one for orders contemplated by s 6 of the Suitors Fund Act to be made in favour of Mr Parvez. (See the discussion of Hall J in Burringbar Real Estate Centre Pty Limited v Anthony John Ryder & Ors [2008] NSWSC 891.)