"It is said that this provision operates to confer a Federal jurisdiction on the State Courts in relation to Federal offences coextensive with their State jurisdiction in relation to State offences and, thus, that, as the Supreme Court received under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 of New South Wales the jurisdiction of a Court of Criminal Appeal over State offences, it automatically obtained the same jurisdiction over Federal offences. Section 39(2) does confer upon State Courts Federal jurisdiction coextensive with their State jurisdiction in respect of matters which are, or may be placed, within the original jurisdiction of this High Court: but something further appears to be required to make the State Criminal Appeal Act apply to Federal prosecutions. It has not, so far, been decided that s 39(2) can operate to increase or vary the subject matter of the jurisdiction. In the present instance, the subject matter is confined to appeals against convictions upon indictment preferred under State law. It may well be that s 39(2) cannot convert the jurisdiction over that subject matter into a Federal jurisdiction over a different subject matter, viz, appeals against convictions upon indictment preferred pursuant to s 69 of the [Federal Act]. But in any case we think we ought not to construe s 39(2) as operating to give by reference to State law another and different jurisdiction over the very same subject as the [Federal Act] itself specially provides for, viz, appeal from conviction. That s 39(2) was not intended to introduce such a jurisdiction by way of appeal is made clear by the presence in the Act of special provisions expressly conferring a right of appeal against such convictions, although a limited right of appeal. Sections 72 to 77 of the [Federal Act] are headed 'Appeal,' and contain a code of procedure for an appeal by way of case stated upon a point of law raised at the trial. These special provisions confer a different and narrower right of appeal and different but perhaps wider remedies. We think that we ought not to construe the general words of s 39(2) as capable of importing a new jurisdiction by way of appeal from conviction upon indictment which, in effect, would supersede these provisions."