The Owners Strata Plan 16878 v Sydney City Council

The Owners Strata Plan 16878 v Sydney City Council - [2009] NSWLEC 1137 - NSWLEC 2009 case summary — Zoe

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4.2.5 Proposed fire safety measures The major proposed fire safety measures after upgrading are listed within Table 5. This is not intended to provide a full list of essential services. Fire safety measures Proposed upgraded standard of performance Automatic fire detection and alarm BCA E2.2, NSW specification E2.2a and AS 1670.1-2004 Automatic fire suppression system CA16-1962 (basement only) Automatic air pressurisation system (fire-isolated stairway) BCA E2.2, specification E2.2a and AS/NZS 1668.1-1998 Automatic exit doors (main entrance) BCA D2.19, D2.21 Building occupant warning system BCAE2.2, clause 6 of specification E2.2a Sound system and intercom systems for emergency purposes (EWIS) BCA E4.9 and AS 1670.4-2004 Electromagnetic door holders (basement) BCA C3.8 Emergency lifts BCA E3.4 and AS 1735.2-2001 Emergency lighting BCA E4.2, E4.4 and AS/NZS 2293.1-2005 Emergency signs BCA E4.5, E4.6, E4.7 (class 2 and 3), E4.8 and AS/NZS 2293.1-2005 Fire alarm monitoring BCA clause 7 of specification E2.2a and AS 1670.3-1997 Fire control centres and rooms (>0.3m above street level) BCA E1.8 and specification E1.8 Fire brigade booster assembly (on York street) AS 2419.1-2005 Fire doors BCA Section C and AS1905.1-1997 Fire extinguishers (portable) AS2444-1990 Fire hose reel system BCA E1.4 and AS 2441-2005 Fire hydrants BCA E1.3 and AS 2419.1-2005 Fire seals (protecting openings in fire resisting components of the building) BCA Section C3, AS 1530.4-2005 and AS 4072.1-2005 Re-entry from fire-isolated exit BCA D2.22 Maintenance plan and emergency evacuation plan AS 3745-2002

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Table 5 Main fire safety measures provided within building 25 This risk assessment solution is based on the reasonableness of requiring sprinklers within the subject building, in the context of the level of risk to society present within other office buildings. The other comparable and BCA complying buildings (DTS) are: o DTS 1; being 8 storeys with floor area of 1000 sq m and 1 fire-isolated stair. o DTS 2; being 16 storeys with floor area of 2000sq m and 2 fire-isolated stairs. 26 Mr Lundqvist initially identified a number of limitations for this approach, which include: Limitations o The assessment is limited to ground floor - level 14 of the building, ie the sprinkler protected printing basement tenancy and the plant room levels are excluded. As the existing basement tenancy is sprinkler protected and the number of occupants is low this floor has been excluded from the study. Similarly the plant room level and lift room level have been excluded from the study. o The assessment is based upon both Australian and international data for general office buildings. This is likely to include a large proportion of low-rise buildings with large floor plates and multiple fire stairs being different from the assessed high-rise building with a small floor plate and single fire stair, however for the purpose of this assessment the statistical data is considered appropriate. o The fire scenarios and occupant response scenarios assessed within this report are considered reasonable for typical office occupancies. o This report considers single point arson as a source of ignition. Arson involving accelerants or multiple ignition sources is not considered in this assessment as it is outside the scope of the BCA. As such the data used within this report excludes data from terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 event in New York, US. For the purpose of this assessment this is consider appropriate. o A detailed assessment of other non-compliances associated with the building has not been undertaken. This may impact on areas such as expected damage to the building and fire brigade intervention. o If there are building alterations or additions, a change in use or changes to the fire safety systems in the future, a reassessment will be needed to verify consistency with the assessment in this report. o The data, methodologies, calculations and conclusions documented within this report specifically relate to the building and must not be used for any other purpose. o The documentation that forms the basis for this report is listed within Appendix A. o This report has been prepared based upon information provided by others. Defire has not verified the accuracy and/or completeness of this information and shall not be responsible for any errors or omissions which may be incorporated into this report as a result. 27 The risk assessment approach also relies on some assumptions which include: Assumptions o For the purpose of this assessment it is assumed that with the exception of the sprinkler system all fire safety measures required by the fire safety order issued by City of Sydney will be installed within the building. o The existing building complies with the applicable building standard at the time of construction and there are no other significant deficiencies in the fire safety systems and design of the building impacting upon the risk to life due to fire. o For a satisfactory level of fire safety to be achieved, regular testing and maintenance of all fire safety systems and measures, including management-in-use systems, is essential and is assumed in the conclusion of this assessment. o The proposed fire safety schedule must be maintained and certified in accordance with the EP & A Regulations 2000 and relevant Australian standards. 28 Based on the upgrading schedule, 3 levels of assessment were undertaken. Firstly, a qualitative absolute assessment using deterministic smoke and evacuation modelling for the floor of origin - to assess the risk of occupants being exposed to untenable smoke within the fire affected compartment and to assess the time to evacuate the whole building compared to that of a similar DTS complying building.

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42 The detailed checking process allowed Dr Foley to draw a number of conclusions, including the following: o The comparison of sprinkler activation time v time to evacuate (RSET) indicates that the sprinklers offer no benefit to the occupants of the floor in terms of completing their evacuation in tenable conditions. o The analysis demonstrates that the subject building, when upgraded in accordance with the Defire (Lundqvist) report, achieves a level of risk that is within the bounds of risk given by BCA deemed to satisfy office buildings. Whilst it is acknowledged that fire fighting is a greater challenge in buildings over 25m and that sprinklers would provide a reduced level of risk it is considered that the analysis does demonstrate that the risk within the building falls within an acceptable range. o With regard to the risk assessment, a literature review of international data revealed a range in the values of a statistical life in the order of US$0.5 - $21M. Consequently, by assuming the costing of the proposed sprinkler system is accurate, the cost per life saved for installation of the sprinkler system exceeds the researched value of a statistical life (US based), and values in other industries and as such may be considered unreasonable. 43 This approach is in stark contrast to that presented by Superintendent Jurgeit, who has extensive fire-fighting experience with the NSWFB. He regularly reviews alternate solution assessments and is required to take into account: o That one of the primary aims is provide safe buildings for the community and for firefighters tasked with combating incidents in those buildings. o Section 6 of the Fire Brigades Act 1979 regulates that it is the duty of the Commissioner of Fire Brigades to take all practical measures to prevent and extinguish fires and protecting and saving property in the case of fire. o Section 7 of the FBA 1979, which gives authority to the Commissioner to take measures in NSW for protecting persons from injury or death and property from damage. 44 Accordingly, he acknowledges that the building upgrade does not have to comply with the BCA, but he initially identified the following features of concerns; there is only a single fire isolated stair instead of 2, no zone smoke control system, no grade 1 water supply for hydrant system and non compliant hydrant booster valve set.

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45 Superintendent Jurgeit's opinion is that fire service intervention in the subject building would prove more difficult than in a BCA compliant building for the following reasons: 17. In my opinion from my experience, no two fires are the same and therefore the manner of dealing with them is different in most cases. Initial actions of fire officers are dependant upon the circumstances that they are presented with at any given time. An officer might appraise a situation differently to a colleague. Similarly, afire officer might appraise a situation differently at different times. 18. In my opinion fire service intervention in the subject building without sprinkler suppression would prove more difficult than in a BCA compliant building for the following reasons: a. Fire crews would need to make their way to a fire affected level via a single fire stair with no other choice of ingress into the building. b. Fire crews would need to work through the stair to the fire floor against the flow of egressing building occupants. c. Fire crews would not be afforded a choice of hydrants since there is only one per level. d. Fire crews may need to travel to the uppermost levels of the building via the fire stair noting that the physiological effects of this operation would be increasingly more difficult with every level of ascension. e. Any occupants that required removal from the building because of smoke inhalation would require additional resources. f. The functionality of the stair pressurisation system would be compromised as doors were opened thus further exacerbating the spread of smoke. g. Without sprinkler suppression, firefighters would be faced with a situation of uncertainty in terms of fire growth and smoke development. It is highly probable that without sprinkler suppression the fire would be of far greater size, therefore also developing more smoke. h. Movement of smoke travel in a non-sprinkler controlled environment would be increased, thus presenting hazardous and even dangerous conditions to floors away from the point of origin of fire. i. Aerial fire appliances are effective only to certain heights and only operate within certain parameters. An aerial attack on the subject building would not be effective since the height of the building exceeds the capability of the NSWFB's highest appliance. The highest elevation that any NSWFB aerial appliance can attain under ideal conditions is 37 metres from the.ground. Depending on site circumstances, maximum elevation could be substantially less. j. Notwithstanding height, an aerial appliance would have difficulty in successfully rescuing trapped persons due to time delays in locating the appliance and getting it `to work'. Any aerial operations could only be effected from the front of the building in York Street. k. Locating the aerial in York Lane is inappropriate: and would not be achieved due to the narrow carriageway. I. External fire attack would not be a recommended option since this tactic tends to drive fire and smoke back into the building thus affecting fire crews tasked with search and rescue, or extinguishment. m. Sustained fireground operations would mean that significantly more water would be used than if the fire had been controlled by a sprinkler system, n: A higher weight of fire attack would be necessarily. This means that resources are taken away from other surrounding areas, diminishing the protection normally offered to those areas. o. Additional smoke would affect the environment. p. Additional water usage would mean that contaminated water would need to be dealt with before it entered drains. q. Sustained and uncontrolled fire, as commonly found in unsprinklered buildings would be likely to have an impact on the structural stability of the building and may also affect the adjoining buildings. 19. It should be noted that stair pressurisation and occupant warning are only effective following activation of either the sprinkler or the smoke detector. When comparing the efficacy of sprinklers v smoke detection in alerting occupants and notifying the fire service, I understand that sprinklers offer approximately 98% reliability whereas smoke detection offers approximately 75%.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (57 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (3)