44 In my view, there is a respectable argument that when the legislature used the phrase "things that bodies corporate generally may, by law, do" in the Act, it did not have it in mind to limit the phrase "by law" so as to exclude the application, if appropriate, of the modern doctrine of capacity and power reflected in the Corporations Law. The doctrine of ultra vires has also changed dramatically. As I have already said, the legislature must be taken to have been aware of these developments. The predecessor to the Act, the Strata Titles Act 1966, contained no equivalent to s32(3)(d). Instead, s 13(3) of the 1966 version had sub-sections to the same effect as s 32(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act but nothing that equates to s 32(3)(d). That being so, there could be very little argument that, under the 1966 Act, capacity fell to be determined by the common law because "what the statute does not expressly authorise is to be taken to be prohibited". But the legislature must be taken to have intended something by the introduction of s 32(3)(d). I can see no warrant for a construction that requires the sub-section to be read down so that the phrase "bodies corporate generally" does not include companies registered under the Companies (Western Australia) Code (now the Corporations Law) and that the phrase "by law" does not include modern statutory law.