The Estate of Kata Sutic [2021] NSWSC 905

Dismissal of Ljiljana's Proceedings on her Cross Claim

1. The Plaintiffs seek to have the proceedings on the Amended Cross Claim dismissed pursuant to 12.7 of the UCPR, which provides: "12.7 Dismissal of proceedings etc for want of due despatch (1) If a plaintiff does not prosecute the proceedings with due despatch, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed or make such other order as the court thinks fit. (2) If the defendant does not conduct the defence with due despatch, the court may strike out the defence, either in whole or in part, or make such other order as the court thinks fit."
2. If the Amended Cross Claim is dismissed, there being no defence to the ASTOCL, the Plaintiffs would, barring some obvious defect in their claim, be entitled to the relief sought by them.
3. The Plaintiffs submit the essential criterion for the exercise of the power of the Court is whether or not, in all the circumstances, justice requires that the proceedings should be dismissed or the defence struck out. On this point, Mr Bartos, in the Plaintiffs' written submissions of 8 June 2021 ("PWS"), relied on Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 529, Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749, Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 491 and Hartigan v International Krishna Consciousness Inc [1999] NSWSC 57. Some of the factors that may be considered have been set out by Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Hoser v Hartcher [1999] NSWSC 527, which Mr Bartos summarised at paragraph 18 of the PWS: "(1) The ultimate question is whether, on balancing the prejudice to the respective parties by making or not making an order, justice demands that the action be dismissed. (2) The discretion should be exercised only in a clear case where it is manifestly warranted, each case depends upon its own facts. Rigid formulae should not be applied to the exercise of the discretion. (3) Any explanation offered by the plaintiff for the delay in proceeding must be considered. (4) Personal blamelessness on the part of a plaintiff (as distinct from any tardiness or other fault on the part of his/her/its legal representative) is relevant. (5) Delay by the defendant in bringing the application. (6) Delay between the date the cause of action arose and the commencement of the proceedings. (7) Prejudice to the defendant. (8) Prejudice to a defendant caused by delay versus prejudice to a plaintiff deprived of an otherwise valid claim. (9) What the defendant has (or has not) done by way of preparation for trial. (10) The plaintiff's prospects of success. (11) Strike out should not incorporate any element of punishing a tardy plaintiff, or of excluding one who may appear to have some unworthy characteristics."
4. Mr Bartos refers also to Morris-Harris-Keith v Hughes [2019] NSWSC 665 in which Hoser is approved and in which Davies J (at [33]) pointed out that: "[The] stringency of the principle that a court should be reluctant to exercise the power of summary dismissal without a hearing on the merits has been diminished by reason of ss 56-60 of the Civil Procedure Act: State of New South Wales v Plaintiff A [2012] NSWCA 248 at [17]."
5. The Plaintiffs submit the cross claim should be dismissed because: 1. Ljiljana has taken no part in the proceedings since the breakdown of negotiations following receipt of Ms Holt's report in July 2020 and the Notice of Intention of Ceasing to Act filed by her solicitor on 18 November 2020. The Plaintiffs submit she has effectively abandoned her claim; 2. there has been no delay by the Plaintiffs in bringing this application; 3. the Plaintiffs are prejudiced by Ljiljana's delay, noting that it is more than eight years since Kata's death, there is no indication that Ljiljana is willing to prosecute her cross claim, and that Radunka and Kana are respectively 82 and 77 years old; 4. the Plaintiffs have filed all their evidence in respect of the cross claim; 5. the facts, as they stand, "point overwhelmingly to the lack of credibility of the claim" by Ljiljana: see paragraph 26 of the PWS; and 6. Ljiljana's prospects of succeeding on the Amended Cross Claim are "negligible": see paragraph 30 of the PWS;
6. The Plaintiffs have previously served Ljiljana with a copy of the ASTOCL and advised her of the orders made by the Court: 1. Ms Mijatovich emailed Ljiljana on 15 January 2021 (CB 156) attaching a copy of the ASTOCL, a sealed copy of the Court Orders of 18 December 2020 made by his Honour Hallen J, and the affidavits of Radunka and Tania filed 15 December 2020. 2. On 27 January 2021 Ms Cekerevac arranged to serve Ljiljana by return registered post with a copy of the ASTOCL, a sealed copy of the Court Orders of 18 December 2020, and the affidavits of Radunka and Tania filed 15 December 2020 (see CB 165). 3. The Plaintiffs have filed evidence that Ljiljana was served on 18 March 2021 with a copy of the ASTOCL, a copy of the Notice of Motion filed 10 March 2021, and a copy of the affidavit of Ms Mijatovich filed 10 March 2021. Ms Cekerevac, in her affidavit of 30 March 2021 at paragraph 10 (CB 105), deposes that service by return registered post was effected and that this is "the usual and acceptable method of service used for Court matters in Serbia." 4. I have referred earlier to notification of the listing being sent to Ljiljana by my Associate on 16 June 2021.
7. Ljiljana did not appear at the hearing on 21 June 2021 and she: 1. is currently unrepresented, and has not engaged any local legal representation since Ms Borak, Ljiljana's then solicitor, filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act on 7 December 2020. As I have noted earlier, Ljiljana does not speak English making the absence of representation even more significant; 2. has not appeared at (nor arranged for legal representation to appear on her behalf) at the directions hearings on 18 December 2020, 22 February 2021, 6 April 2021 or 13 April 2021 (see paragraph 6 of the PWS). On 6 April 2021 the Plaintiffs were directed by Hallen J to inform the Defendant that the matter had been adjourned to 13 April 2021 by no later than 7 April 2021. Mr Sutton, solicitor for the Plaintiffs, complied with these orders; he emailed Ljiljana advising her that the matter would be listed on 13 April 2021 and that on this occasion a hearing date would be allocated: see CB 236. Ljiljana did not appear before the Court by audio-visual link on 13 April 2021; and 3. no further evidence has been filed on behalf of Ljiljana in compliance with his Honour Hallen J's orders. Whilst failure to file further evidence is not of itself a default, Ljiljana has given no indication that she does not intend to file any further evidence in the proceedings and she has not responded to the Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion with such an assertion.
8. There was yet a further development in this sorry saga. On 11 March 2021, Ms Mijatovich received an email from one Mr Danijel Maksimovic ("Danijel"), who is the son of Ljiljana's de facto husband, Mr Radoslav Maksimovic. The email (see Ms Mijatovich's affidavit of 17 June 2021 at Annexure C) annexed a document in Serbo-Croatian described as being from Mr Kostic. Mr Kostic is a solicitor in Serbia and his email address was the address given for Ljiljana by Ms Borak when she ceased to act. There is nothing in the annexure to Danijel's email which confirms that the document was in fact written by Mr Kostic, and there are three reasons to suggest that it was not. First, it was not sent by Mr Kostic using his own email address. Second, if Mr Kostic was retained by Ljiljana it would be expected that he would have sent a communication either directly to the Court or more appropriately by utilising the services of an Australian lawyer. Finally, the document is not in a form that would be expected from a lawyer. I note too that this is not the first occasion in the history of this matter that someone has purported to be a solicitor acting on behalf of Ljiljana: see CB 574-571.
9. The attachment to the email from Danijel is of significance because it asserts that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter, and it challenges the legitimacy of the forensic examination of the 2011 Will. Those challenges are remarkable given that: 1. it was Ljiljana's agents (Mr Stefanovic and Mr Matic) who sought Letters of Administration in this Court based on the Second Version of the LMA; 2. it was Ljiljana who by her lawyer Mr Fitzpatrick filed a Statement of Claim dated 30 June 2017 seeking revocation of the grant of Letters of Administration to Mr Stefanovic; 3. after the Letters of Administration were revoked, Ljiljana filed a Cross Claim in these proceedings seeking provision pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act; 4. Ljiljana filed an Amended Cross Claim seeking Letters of Administration based on the 2011 Will; and 5. Ljiljana by her legal representative, Ms Borak, agreed to the examination of the 2011 Will by Ms Holt.
10. Mr Bartos submitted that the email sent by Danijel is evidence that Ljiljana has abandoned her Cross Claim since she asserts through Mr Kostic (or her de facto husband's son) that the Court has no jurisdiction.
11. The following matters are, in my view, of significance: 1. Kana passed away in April 2013, more than eight years ago. 2. Radunka is 82 years of age. Her sister Kana is 77 years of age. 3. Ljiljana has had two solicitors represent her in these proceedings who have ceased to act. The last solicitor filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act in December 2020. She has taken no part in the proceedings since November 2020. 4. Ljiljana sought and obtained Letters of Administration in this Court based on what she later accepted was a forged document, i.e. the Second Version of the LMA. Ljiljana claims that she was not a party to that deception. It is unclear how, if she was not involved, the Second Version of the LMA came into existence and into the hands of Mr Fitzpatrick and, as I have noted, Ljiljana had both versions by the time of her application in June 2017. In his affidavit of 6 November 2018 at paragraph 32, Mr Fitzpatrick asserts that he was instructed in 2017 by Ljiljana that she was entitled to both the Shalvey Property and the Glebe Property. There is also an affidavit (with appropriate endorsements of translation) purportedly of Ljiljana's dated 27 April 2016 (at CB 701-708, and see [14(10)] above) that supports the claim that she was actively involved in the deception and in which Ljiljana (purportedly) deposes to the fact that Kata "had no other relatives living at the time of her death" (see paragraph 13), but there is evidence that indicates that the affidavit was not interpreted by Ms Ivana Ivanovic, lawyer, as the document purportedly shows: see CB 573 and 577. Ms Ivanovic also stated that she had never signed a letter dated 27 April 2016 giving expert evidence concerning Serbian proceedings in relation to Life Maintenance Contracts: see CB 574-577. What is clear is that the administration of the Estate commenced, and was permitted by Ljiljana and her agents to continue until September 2019, on the basis of the Second Version of the LMA, i.e. the forged document. 5. Ljiljana sought to have the Glebe Property sold in 2012 and 2013 and again in July 2014 and in 2015 and did so on the basis of the Second Version of the LMA: see the affidavit of Mr Sutton of 30 May 2019 at paragraphs 10 to 13 at CB 542 and in particular CB 565-567 and see CB 693-694; see also Mr Fitzpatrick's affidavit of 6 November 2018 at paragraph 13. 6. I have referred to the fact that the joint forensic expert has concluded that there is moderate support for the contention that the 2011 Will is not genuine. There are a number of important facts which lend considerable support for the case that the 2011 Will is in fact a forgery: 1. The 2011 Will which Ljiljana propounds was first identified in connection with these proceedings in 2017 (at the earliest) and yet Ljiljana claims that she was present when the will was executed. Her agent, Mr Stefanovic in his affidavit of 20 August 2015, deposed that he believed that Kata did not leave a will or testamentary document other than the Second Version of the LMA: see paragraph 2. By her original cross claim (filed 14 December 2018), Ljiljana sought a provision under s 59 of the Succession Act and did not advance a case based on the 2011 Will. 2. Ljiljana did not put the 2011 Will forward in the probate proceedings in Serbia. 3. In criminal proceedings in Serbia, Ljiljana said that she makes no claim to what is not covered by the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement (see CB 520). 4. Ljiljana now relies on the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement and a variation dated 26 September 2012 which relevantly left the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement unaffected so far as the Glebe Property (and monies held by Kata) were concerned: see CB 686-692 and particularly CB 688, but in 2017 through her Statement of Claim against Mr Stefanovic she was relying on the Second Version of the LMA. 5. Ljiljana did not notify Radunka or Tanja of the 2011 Will until 25 June 2018 in a letter from Ljiljana's former solicitor Mr Fitzpatrick: see paragraph 42 of Mr Fitzpatrick's affidavit of 6 November 2018 and see CB 731-732. 1. The failure of Ljiljana to produce the 2011 Will at the Probate proceedings in Serbia not only affects the credibility of her case in the sense of impugning its genuineness but even if it were genuine, according to the evidence of Ms Cekerevac of 5 June 2020 (paragraphs 20-27 and 41-42) Ljiljana cannot rely on it anyway. 2. Ljiljana has offered no explanation for her failure to attend Court on 18 December 2020, 22 February 2021, 6 April 2021 and 13 April 2021 - all of which were by audio-visual link, or her failure to comply with orders made by the Court. 3. I have referred to the original cross claim of Ljiljana which sought a provision made in her favour pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act, but which made no reference to the 2011 Will. She has filed no evidence in support of that claim, but in any event it would have a negligible prospect of success given that on the partial intestacy Radunka and Kana obtain the Glebe Property (now the proceeds of sale of that property) but Ljiljana will have received the Shalvey Property and one year of rent from the Glebe Property and a property in Paraćin, and because the history of this matter would be very relevant in determining whether any provision ought be made. Any monies which Ljiljana has received beyond her entitlement based on the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement would have to be repaid by her to the Estate. 4. I think that on all the evidence that Ljiljana has abandoned her claims, but the matters in (6), (7) and (9) above demonstrate that Ljiljana's claims, even if not abandoned, are weak and I take that into account in determining that her Cross Claim should be dismissed.
12. I am of the view that, based on the matters to which I have referred in [27] above, Ljiljana's Cross Claim should be dismissed.

Summary Judgment Application

1. I should note that this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the assets of a deceased person who did not reside in Australia, if the deceased had assets within the jurisdiction: s 40 of the Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW). I should also draw attention to r 11.4 of the UCPR and Schedule 6 to the UCPR which by (e) and (k) are relevant to jurisdiction - Ljiljana has submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Defence on 16 October 2018, a Cross Claim on 14 December 2018, and an Amended Cross Claim on 4 October 2019.
2. I am also persuaded for the following reasons that there should be judgment for the Plaintiffs on their ASTOCL: 1. The evidence supports the conclusion that Kata did not leave a will dealing with the Glebe Property or the rent from that property from one year after her death, or her Australian bank account balance. 2. Under Australian law Radunka and Kana are entitled to those assets by reason of s 106 of the Succession Act, Kata having had no children, no spouse at the time of her death and Radunka and Kana being her surviving sisters. 3. The Serbian Court has, it appears, already come to the conclusion that Radunka and Kana are the rightful heirs of Kata: see [15(4)] above. 4. The evidence supports the claim that Ljiljana has obtained all of the funds from the Shalvey Property, the funds in the CBA accounts, the rent from the Glebe Property beyond the one year allocated to her by the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement, and has received amounts that did not involve a deduction for tax and capital gains: see the affidavit of Ljiljana filed on 16 August 2019, the affidavit of Mr Jackson of 18 February 2021 at CB 245 and the calculation of Mr Bartos in his submissions of 17 June 2021 by which he has endeavoured to calculate, on a generous basis to Ljiljana, the assessment to which she was entitled from the Glebe Property. He has used, for example, the gross sum for one years rent rather than the net sum.
3. There being no defence to the ASTOCL and the Cross Claim having been dismissed, it is appropriate to regard the allegations of fact asserted in the ASTOCL as having been made out: see Quality Bakers Australia Pty Ltd v Yassin Modern Bakery Pty Ltd t/as Yassin Lebanese Bakery [2007] NSWSC 804 Brereton J (as his Honour then was); and see also MacDonald v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) [2007] NSWCA 304; (2007) 73 NSWLR 612 per Mason P at [49], with whom Giles JA agreed at [77], but in any event, there is evidence to support what is alleged by the Plaintiffs in the ASTOCL.

Rent and Other Funds

1. The Plaintiffs seek orders concerning not only intestacy, and the appointment of Mr Jackson, but they also a claim that Ljiljana has obtained funds out of the Estate to which she is not entitled, namely: 1. $73,260.00 that Kata had in her CBA deposit accounts; 2. rental from the Glebe Property for a period in excess of one year (as per the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement); 3. sale proceeds from the Shalvey Property which did not take into account the capital gains tax due in respect of that property; and 4. funds that were received did not take account of income tax that was payable by the Estate in respect of the Glebe Property and the Shalvey Property - see paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Mr Jackson of 18 February 2021.
2. Normally, where an executor or administrator has been appointed that person is the appropriate person to bring proceedings on behalf of the estate, and a beneficiary will not normally be permitted to do so: see Estate of Maria Zbrozek; Katarzyna (aka Kasia) Duszyk v Charles Emmanuel Morgan - Interim Administrator of the Estate of the late Maria Zbrozek [2020] NSWSC 1591 at [60]-[61]; and see Middleton v O'Neill (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 178 at 186 per Jordan CJ, with whom Davidson J agreed, and I was initially inclined to the view that the claim advanced against Ljiljana in respect of the funds that she has received over and above her entitlement by virtue of the Lifelong Maintenance Agreement ought not be adjudicated upon at this stage.
3. There are, however, exceptions to the general principle (see, e.g., Ramage v Waclaw (1988) 12 NSWLR 84) and, on reflection, I am of the view that this is a case in which the claims against Ljiljana for recovery of the funds which she has received and to which she was not entitled should be determined. My reasons are: 1. There has been no executor or administrator to pursue the claims against Ljiljana. The Letters of Administration given to Mr Matic (on behalf of Ljiljana) were revoked in December 2018 and he, as Ljiljana's agent, was not an appropriate person to bring proceedings against his principal. Although Mr Jackson was appointed to manage the remaining assets in NSW, his appointment was a very limited one. 2. Radunka as one of the two beneficiaries of Kata's NSW Estate as a result of the partial intestacy has a very significant interest in ensuring the recovery of those monies. 3. Neither Radunka nor Tanja seek an order that the repayment be made to themselves but rather, seek an order that the monies be repaid to the Estate. 4. Radunka and Tanja have presented the evidence that supports the claim that Ljiljana has obtained overpayment to herself of monies in the Estate. It would impose an unnecessary burden on the Estate to require Mr Jackson on his appointment to bring proceedings against Ljiljana. I should note that whether there is any utility in pursuing Ljiljana in Serbia to recover the funds which she will be ordered to repay is a very different question to whether this Court should order her to repay those monies. Mr Jackson has indicated that he would need to seek the views of Radunka and Kana in relation to any steps against Ljiljana in Serbia since they are the sole beneficiaries and any unrecovered expense incurred will reduce what they are to receive from the Estate. Consideration may also need to be given by Mr Jackson and by those advising the Plaintiffs as to whether Mr Stefanovic, Mr Matic and Mr Fitzpatrick have any liability to the Estate by reason of the steps taken (or not taken) by them in the course of these proceedings and the earlier administration of the Estate.
4. The Plaintiffs have established that Ljiljana has received monies to which she is not entitled and I am persuaded that Ljiljana should be ordered to repay to the Estate the amounts claimed by the Plaintiffs on behalf of the Estate, namely: 1. $73,260.00. The total of the two amounts held by Kata with the CBA in the List of Property attached to the Letters of Administration dated March 2017 at CB 290 adds up to $74,074.37, but I will use the lower figure of $73,260.00 claimed by the Plaintiffs; 2. $65,243.35 overpayment of rent from the Glebe Property based on a net rent of $22,914.00 for 12 months: see Mr Jackson's affidavit of 18 February 2021 at CB 244-266 and particularly CB 259, and a total payment to Ljiljana or her agents of $88,157.94 for the Glebe Property allowing a pro rata deduction of the Commission of the NSW Trustee & Guardian: see Mr Bartos' submissions of 17 June 2021, but noting that he has incorrectly treated the gross rental figure as the net rental figure; and 3. $65,204.59 being the capital gains tax calculated as referable to the Shalvey Property and not deducted from the monies paid to Ljiljana: see paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Mr Jackson of 18 February 2021.
5. The Plaintiffs seek an order that Mr Jackson be appointed as administrator of Kata's Estate. Mr Jackson is willing to take on that role and it is appropriate that he be appointed so that the Estate's affairs can be finalised.

Costs

1. The Plaintiffs seek an order that Ljiljana pay their costs of the proceedings and on an indemnity basis: see paragraph 2(e) of the Notice of Motion filed 10 March 2021. In my view, having been successful on their motion and on their claim, the Plaintiffs are entitled to an order that Ljiljana pay their costs.
2. An order for indemnity costs can be made where the conduct of the party against whom the order is sought has engaged in conduct (of the litigation) "deserving criticism" (see Re Smith; Ex parte Rundle (No 2) (1991) 6 WAR 299 per Malcolm CJ, and Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225) and as a means whereby the Court indicates its disapproval of the conduct of that party: see G.E. Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2013) at [16.45]. In Colgate-Palmolive Sheppard J gave a non-exhaustive list of the type of conduct which can lead to an indemnity costs order.
3. I take the following matters into account in concluding that an order for indemnity costs in this case is appropriate: 1. Ljiljana obtained Letters of Administration in this Court based on a forged document. I do not need to determine whether the forgery was created by Ljiljana, it is enough that her agent advanced her application on the basis of a document which was later admitted to be forged. There was also advanced an affidavit purportedly of Kana that on Kana's evidence was not a genuine affidavit of hers. 2. Ljiljana has not only obtained Letters of Administration in favour of agents Mr Stefanovic and then Mr Matic, but she has, as a result of the orders she obtained, been able to receive the monies to which she was not entitled, as I have detailed above. 3. When in 2017 Ljiljana was seeking to have Mr Stefanovic removed as administrator she seemed, by her Statement of Claim, to assert that Mr Stefanovic was promoting the falsehood that Kata had no relatives other than Ljiljana: see paragraphs 27-30. By that Statement of Claim Ljiljana continued to place reliance on the Second Version of the LMA and indeed by her Statement of Claim she asserted that she was the owner of both the Glebe and Shalvey Properties: see paragraphs 13 and 18 and see paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Mr Fitzpatrick of 6 November 2018. The Court was not informed that there were other relatives other than Ljiljana or that there were proceedings on foot in Serbia in relation to Kata's Estate. Ljiljana supported the continuation of Letters of Administration (to Mr Matic in lieu of Mr Stefanovic) and resisted the Plaintiffs' attempts to have them revoked, notwithstanding that those had been obtained on the basis of the Second Version of the LMA, which was later agreed to be a forgery. 4. The 2011 Will which she has advanced in these proceedings was not the basis of her application for Probate in 2013 (see CB 494-495) and that document was not brought to the Serbian Court's attention. The handwriting expert has expressed a view which provides some support based on examination of the document that it is a forgery. For the reasons which I have mentioned in [27(6)] there are further reasons to doubt the authenticity of the 2011 Will and now Ljiljana has by her actions abandoned her claim based on that will. 5. Ljiljana has not contested the claim for indemnity costs.

Orders

1. I propose to make the following orders and declarations: "The Court: 1. Orders that the Amended Statement of Cross Claim filed on 4 October 2019 be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) for want of prosecution with due despatch. 2. Declares that the First Plaintiff (Radunka Rakic) and Kana Andjelkovic are, pursuant to s 129 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), entitled to the whole of the intestate estate of the Late Kata Sutic ("Deceased") located in Australian and being: (a) The proceeds of sale of 11 York Street, Glebe ("the Glebe Property"); (b) The rental from the Glebe Property from the period after the 12 months from the death of the Deceased; and (c) The amount of $73,260.00 representing two deposits held by the Deceased with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, namely Term Deposit 2172-50056354 and Savings account 2172-121847. 3. Orders Pursuant to s 40 of the Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) that a grant of Letters of Administration, be made to David Arthur Jackson. 4. Orders that the Defendant (Ljiljana Bogic) repay the following amounts (exclusive of interest) within 56 days of the making of these orders to Mr Jackson in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of the Late Kata Sutic (a) $73,260.00; (b) $65,243.35; and (c) $65,204.59. 5. Orders the Defendant pay those costs of the proceedings, including the cross claim and that the costs be paid on an indemnity basis."
2. In relation to the amounts referred to in Order 4, it is appropriate that Ljiljana be required to pay interest on the monies at the rate specified in s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from the date that the proceeds were paid to Ljiljana or her agents. In this connection, I will direct the Plaintiffs' legal advisers to prepare a calculation of the interest payable on the excess monies received by Ljiljana (from the date on which she or her agent received those monies) and to provide a copy of the calculation to my Associate on or before 2:00pm on 23 August 2021. That calculation is to be provided to Ljiljana on or before 2:00pm on 23 August 2021 by email both to her personal email account and to the email address of Mr Kostic.
3. I note that the Plaintiffs have filed a Notice of Motion on 21 June 2021 which has been listed for directions on 25 August 2021 by which they seek a gross sum costs order. That Notice of Motion should be served on Ljiljana by email both to her personal email account and to the email address of Mr Kostic.

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