The Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Franklin

Judgment 1BEAZLEY P: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of Meagher JA. I agree with his Honour's reasons and the orders he proposes. 2MEAGHER JA: The applicant Bar Council seeks an order that the respondent's name be removed from the roll of persons admitted as lawyers that is maintained by the Supreme Court pursuant to s 32 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (the 2004 Act). It also seeks declarations that the respondent is not of good fame and character, that he is guilty of professional misconduct and that he is not a fit and proper person to remain on that roll.

The respondent's application to adjourn the hearing 3At the commencement of the hearing on 27 November 2014 there was no appearance by or on behalf of the respondent. There was evidence that he had been served with the summons and the affidavit material relied on by the Bar Council. On about 25 November the Registrar received a notice of motion signed on behalf of the respondent and dated 20 November 2014. That motion sought an order that the hearing of the proceeding be adjourned for six months. Accompanying the motion was a one page document apparently signed by the respondent and headed "Respondent". That document stated: "1. I am innocent and have been wrongfully convicted. 2. I am self represented in this matter. 3. I am currently medically unfit to defend this application. 4. I have annexed medical certificate of Dr Peta Harrision [sic] dated 15/09/2014. 5. I move the Court to adjourn this matter for six months so that my medical condition may improve." 4Attached to that document was a Centrelink form of Medical Certificate completed by Dr Harrison and dated 15 September 2014. It stated, in the boxes provided in that form: that the respondent had been a patient since 4 July 2014; that his diagnosis was "depression and anxiety"; that his current symptoms are "social anxiety, social withdrawal, low mood, lack of motivation"; and that he "is/has been unfit for work/study" from 4 October 2014 to 16 January 2015. It did not disclose what the relevant work or study was and asserted that the respondent could not currently undertake that "work/study" and was unable to do any other work for eight hours or more per week. It also stated that the respondent's current symptoms were likely to affect his "capacity to work or study" for "3-12 months". 5The evidence before this Court shows that the hearing date was fixed at a directions hearing on 29 September 2014; that the respondent was given notice of that directions hearing by letter sent by registered post to his address given on that medical certificate; that on 1 October 2014 the respondent was advised that the hearing date was 27 November 2014; that on 15 October 2014 the respondent was provided with a copy of a draft agreed statement of the facts for which the Bar Council contends; and that on 22 October 2014 he was personally served with copies of the three volume application book relied on by the Bar Council together with its detailed outline of written submissions. 6In exercising the power to adjourn the hearing of the Bar Council's summons, the Court is to strive to produce an outcome which facilitates the "just, quick and cheap resolution" of the issues between the parties and, in seeking to do so, to act "in accordance with the dictates of justice": Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 58. Here those considerations require that the respondent's application be refused for the following reasons. First, the application is made late. There is no reason why the application now made could not have been made at or before the directions hearing in September, when the hearing date was fixed. The medical certificate now relied on bears a date before the date of that hearing. Secondly, the medical certificate as a matter of substance does not address at all the respondent's current capacity or ability to participate in, or give instructions in relation to, the defence of the proceedings which he seeks to have adjourned. In its form, the certificate is not admissible as opinion evidence as to the respondent's current fitness to attend and participate in the defence of court proceedings. It does not address that question or disclose the underlying facts, either observed or assumed, on which the proffered and irrelevant opinion as to his current and estimated future fitness for "work/study" is based. 7Thirdly, and most significantly, the material relied upon does not say that the respondent's condition will or might improve within the six months for which the adjournment is sought. The only statement which bears at all on that question suggests that he may not be fit for "work/study" for up to 12 months from September 2014 which includes a period after the six month adjournment sought. That being the position the interests of justice do not favour the granting of any adjournment. To do so would involve further delay in the determination of an application made in respect of conduct which was dealt with in the criminal courts in early 2009, the vacation of a hearing date fixed in late September and the throwing away of costs incurred by the Bar Council in preparing for that hearing. The six month adjournment sought, based on totally inadequate medical evidence, carries with it no realistic prospect that the respondent will be in any better position at that time to defend the Bar Council's application than he is at present.

The circumstances in which the application to remove is made 8In October 2002, the respondent was admitted to the roll of legal practitioners kept in accordance with s 4 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW). He was issued with a practising certificate by the Bar Council under s 27 of that Act in May 2005. From that time, he practised as a barrister from chambers in Sydney until 28 December 2008 when the Bar Council resolved to suspend his practising certificate on the basis of the conduct which is the subject of this application. On 26 March 2009 the Bar Council resolved to cancel that practising certificate pursuant to s 61(2) of the 2004 Act. 9As the respondent was admitted as a legal practitioner before 1 October 2005, the commencement date of the 2004 Act, he is taken for the purposes of that Act to have been admitted as a lawyer in June 2005: 2004 Act, Sch 9, cl 6. As such he is a "local lawyer" within s 5(b) and, by s 33(1), an officer of the Supreme Court. 10The Court's power to admit a person as a lawyer under s 31 may only be exercised if the Legal Profession Admission Board (which is constituted under Chapter 7 of the 2004 Act) advises the Court that it considers the applicant to be "a fit and proper person to be admitted" as well as a person "eligible for admission". In deciding whether an applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted, that Board must consider the "suitability matters" described in s 9 as well as any other matters it considers relevant to the question: s 25(1). Those "suitability" matters include whether the person is "currently of good fame and character" and whether the person has been convicted of an offence in Australia: s 9(1)(a) and (c). 11The circumstances giving rise to the grounds relied upon by the Bar Council are not directly concerned with the respondent's practice as a barrister. Rather, they occurred in the context of the respondent's personal relationship with TM. That relationship commenced in April 2003. The provisions of s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) prevent TM, the complainant in criminal proceedings against the respondent, from being identified. Over the period from April 2003 the respondent and TM shared accommodation in what was subsequently described by the sentencing judge as an "on again off again" relationship. In Easter 2007 they took a weekend car trip from Sydney to the Canberra region. During the course of that weekend the respondent, who had never been in trouble with the law before, committed four criminal acts on TM. It will be necessary later in these reasons to make findings as to the conduct which constituted the commission of those four offences. 12On 10 July 2008 the respondent pleaded guilty to a charge that on 9 April 2007 he assaulted TM causing her actual bodily harm. On 17 February 2009, following a trial in the District Court, he was convicted of three further offences, each also taking place on 9 April 2007. Those offences were common assault (count 1), taking and detaining the complainant without her consent and with the intent of obtaining an advantage, namely, sexual gratification (count 2) and sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation, namely, the occasioning of actual bodily harm immediately before the commission of the offence (count 3). 13On 18 September 2009 the respondent was sentenced to terms of imprisonment, the latest of which expires on 17 March 2017 and had a minimum term which expired on 17 March 2014. As a result the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum term of four and a half years. He was released from custody on parole on about 24 June 2014.

The basis of the application to remove 14The basis of the application to have the respondent's name removed from the roll of is that he is "not a fit and proper person" to remain on that roll. The particular matters relied upon are described in the affidavit of the executive director of the Bar Association, Mr Selth. The convictions referred to are those described above: "(a) The convictions; (b) The sentences; (c) The conduct underlying the convictions; (d) In addition to (c), in relation to which the evidence of "TM" is relied upon, the admissions by the respondent that he slapped and punched "TM" up to 15 times occasioning actual bodily harm (e) The lack of candour of the respondent by failing to acknowledge the full extent of his offending conduct and the respondent giving knowingly false evidence on oath in his trial proceedings denying the conduct underlying the convictions on Counts 1 - 3, intending to procure his acquittal on those counts; or alternatively, intending to pervert the course of justice; (f) The lack of candour of the respondent by failing to acknowledge the full extent of his offending conduct and the respondent giving knowingly false evidence on oath in his sentencing proceedings by continuing to deny the conduct underlying the convictions on Counts 1 - 3; and (g) The humiliating and demeaning verbal abuse and conduct accompanying the conduct underlying the conviction[s];" 15In oral argument before this Court, the Bar Council abandoned reliance upon para (g) above to the extent that it describes conduct going beyond the conduct constituting the commission of the offences charged and found.

The disciplinary jurisdiction 16The application to have the respondent's name removed from the roll is made to this Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in connection with the discipline and control of its officers who include persons admitted as lawyers under the 2004 Act. That jurisdiction is protective and directed to maintaining and encouraging appropriate standards of professional behaviour: NSW Bar Association v Hamman [1999] NSWCA 404; 217 ALR 553 at [77], citing Law Society of New South Wales v Bannister (1993) 4 LPDR 24. 17It is expressly preserved by s 590 of the 2004 Act. Where, as here, an order for removal is sought, the ultimate issue is as the Court (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ) said in A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of NSW [2004] HCA 1; 216 CLR 253 at [15]: "whether the practitioner is shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court upon whose roll the practitioner's name presently appears." 18The grounds relied upon by the Bar Council include the conduct underlying the convictions. That makes the present case one in which the observation of Jordan CJ in In re A Solicitor (John Royston Wishart); Ex parte the Incorporated Law Institute of NSW (Full Court of the Supreme Court (NSW), 4 September 1941, unrep), which is cited by Fullagar J in Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; 97 CLR 279 at 289, is apposite: "It must be remembered that in the present proceedings there is no question of punishing the respondent. He has been convicted, and what was regarded as the appropriate punishment has already been inflicted. The question for this Court is whether he is fit to remain on the Roll of Solicitors. The fact that he has been convicted is of secondary importance. We are more concerned with the facts of the particular case."

Relevant findings of fact 19The applicant sought but has not obtained the respondent's agreement to those underlying facts. Accordingly, it is necessary for this Court to make findings as to them on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding and the gravity of the matters alleged: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 140; Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336. The Court does so to indicate the basis of its orders and to record them, in part because the findings may be relevant to future proceedings for removal or re-admission of the respondent: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society at [15]; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power [2008] NSWCA 135; 71 NSWLR 451 at [10].

The evidence before this Court 20On 10 July 2008 the respondent pleaded guilty to a single charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act. The facts of that offence were the subject of admissions made by the respondent in a record of interview conducted on 9 April 2007 that was tendered in evidence in this Court. They were also the subject of evidence given by the respondent in the criminal proceedings. The transcript of the respondent's evidence, as well as the transcript of the complainant's evidence in chief and re-examination at the trial, was admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the facts asserted in it. That was done following an earlier ruling of this Court that the hearsay rule did not apply to the tender of that transcript or the transcript of the examination and re-examination of the other witnesses called in the Crown case: The Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329. In relation to the remaining three offences the respondent's conviction is proved by a certificate of conviction given under s 178 of the Evidence Act. The facts of those three offences have been identified by reference to the complainant's evidence as presented to the jury in the trial judge's summing up of the Crown case. 21On the basis of the complainant's evidence concerning the three charged offences and her evidence in relation to the offence to which the respondent pleaded guilty and also taking into account the respondent's own evidence with respect to the commission of that offence, the following findings are made as to the conduct constituting the commission of the four offences. These facts are established to the Briginshaw standard accepting, as one must, that the jury's verdict of guilty in relation to each of the three offences necessarily involved its acceptance of the substance of the complainant's version of events and the rejection of that of the respondent.

Common assault in the early hours of 9 April 2007 (count 1) 22On the evening of 8 April 2007 the complainant and respondent stayed at a resort hotel near Canberra. TM went to bed at about 11 pm. The respondent stayed up until sometime between 12.30 and 1 am on 9 April. The respondent then went to bed and made physical approaches to TM indicating a desire for sexual activity. She responded "no". There were abusive exchanges between them. TM left the bedroom and went to the sofa bed in the lounge room. The respondent followed. There were further exchanges between them. They both then went outside and argued further. The respondent went back into the apartment. TM followed shortly afterwards, returning to the sofa bed. The respondent came to the sofa bed saying further offensive things. He then started to slap her in the area of the face and head. He slapped her several times, she pushed him in the chest causing him to nearly lose balance. The respondent began to leave but returned and hit the complainant again with an open hand. This episode lasted approximately three minutes. At the time the respondent was very much affected by alcohol.

Taking and detaining without consent with the intent of obtaining an advantage, namely sexual gratification (count 2) 23At TM's behest she and the respondent left the resort hotel in her car between about 5 and 5.30am on the morning of 9 April 2007. They travelled along the Federal Highway towards Sydney. They had not travelled far when the respondent directed TM to turn off the highway and park the vehicle. TM did so. The respondent then asked her to get into the back seat. She did not do so. Instead she took the keys from the ignition, got out of the car and started running towards the highway. After she had gone about 15 to 20 metres the respondent grabbed her, turned her around and pulled her back towards the car. When they reached the car, he pushed her towards the driver's side rear door and said "get in". TM did so. The respondent then slammed the door behind her and got into the car through the passenger side rear door. As some point before he pushed TM into the back seat of the car the respondent had formed the intent to have TM perform oral sex on him and forced her into the back seat for that purpose.

Sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation, namely the occasioning of actual bodily harm immediately before the commission of the offence (count 3) 24As the respondent got into the back seat of the car he commenced punching the complainant's face and head with a closed fist. She sought to protect her face and head with her arms and hands. At some point the complainant noticed her nose was bleeding. The respondent then demanded that she perform oral sex on him. He told TM to suck his penis. She said she could not because she did not have any saliva. The respondent then gave her water from a bottle. TM performed oral sex. He pushed the back of her head onto his penis. She gagged and had difficulty breathing. She lifted her head up and he pushed it back down. He told her to remove her hands. The respondent again forcibly pushed her head back down on his penis. She could not breathe. The respondent then returned to the front passenger seat and asked the complainant to get into the driver's seat.

Assault on 9 April 2007 causing actual bodily harm (guilty plea) 25TM drove the vehicle along the Federal Highway and stopped at the Charles Anderson VC Reserve, which is before Goulburn, to obtain some water. Whilst the complainant and the respondent sat in the parked car there was verbal abuse. The respondent punched or slapped the complainant a number of times including with a closed fist. After a further period of time, they continued on the road towards Sydney and stopped at McDonald's near Goulburn.

The giving of knowingly false evidence at the trial and sentencing proceeding 26In his evidence at the trial the respondent denied the complainant's version of events in relation to count 1. He denied that he hit her at all whilst she was lying on the sofa bed or that he had any argument with her in the early hours of the morning. He also denied that on the journey back to Sydney the vehicle had stopped shortly after they had left the hotel. The respondent said that neither of the two offences alleged to have occurred at that time (counts 2 and 3) happened at all. That evidence was given by the respondent in February 2009. 27At his sentencing hearing in June 2009 the respondent adhered to the evidence that he had given at his trial in relation to counts 1, 2 and 3. Again he denied the assault in the hotel room and denied that the vehicle had stopped along the road from the motel. 28Finally, it is relevant to record that in the signed document submitted to the Court with his application for an adjournment the respondent stated: "I am innocent and have been wrongfully convicted." 29In the face of the jury's verdicts on each of the three charged offences, this evidence of the respondent must be taken to have been rejected. The only reasonable inference available in the face of that rejection is that the respondent's evidence was false and known to be false when given. Accordingly, I find that the respondent gave knowingly false evidence as to the subject matter of counts 1, 2 and 3 at his trial and at his sentencing hearing. I also find, as is demonstrated by his continued assertion that he is innocent and was wrongly convicted, that the respondent has not acknowledged that he gave that false evidence.

Is the respondent a fit and proper person to remain on the roll? 30The question for the Court is whether these findings justify the undoubtedly serious conclusion that the respondent presently is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll and continue as an officer of the Court. 31The grounds said to establish that unfitness are the fact of the convictions and sentences, the conduct underlying those convictions and that the respondent knowingly gave false evidence at his trial and sentencing hearing and has not acknowledged that he did so. Similar grounds were relied upon in The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341, although in that case the relevant conviction was of being knowingly concerned in the importation of a significant quantity of narcotics. 32Whether a lawyer is a fit and proper person to continue on the roll ordinarily directs attention to conduct of that person, whether personal or professional. As Fullagar J observed in Ziems v The Prothonotary at 290, generally speaking professional misconduct has a much more direct bearing on the question of a person's fitness to practise than personal misconduct. 33Because the Court is exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the definition of "professional misconduct" in s 497(1) of the 2004 Act does not apply and it is unnecessary to adhere to any distinction drawn by that definition between professional and other conduct. As the Court observed in A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society at [21]: "when the Supreme Court is exercising its inherent jurisdiction, it has the capacity to determine, and act on the basis of, unfitness, where appropriate, without any need to stretch the concept of professional misconduct beyond conduct having some real and substantial connexion with professional practice." 34Conduct may be contrary to the standard of conduct expected of members of a profession closely involved in the due administration of justice irrespective of whether it occurs in the course of professional practice. If it is contrary to that standard, it may justify an adverse conclusion as to a person's continuing fitness to practise. It may also indicate underlying qualities of character which are inconsistent with those demanded of a lawyer, and for that reason justify the same adverse conclusion: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society at [20]; In re Davis [1947] HCA 53; 75 CLR 409. 35The respondent's conduct, with the exception of that relating to the giving of knowingly false evidence, occurred over a period of 12 hours or so and in the context of a complex and troubled personal relationship. His evidence at the sentencing hearing shows that conduct to have occurred, from his perspective, against a background of alcohol dependence, anxiety and depression. The evidence on this application did not, except incidentally, explore those matters and the extent to which, if any, they mitigated against the seriousness of the respondent's conduct. They were not, it should be added, separately relied upon as relevant to the question at hand. 36The grounds relied upon by the Bar Council in my view do require that an order be made that the respondent's name be removed from the roll of lawyers because he is not a fit and proper person to continue to hold that office. Although his conduct in April 2007 did not take place in the practice of law, or directly involve any dishonesty, it included the most serious crime of sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation. That offence carried a maximum sentence of 20 years and the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for seven and a half years, with a non-parole period of four and a half years. 37The fact alone of his conviction of that offence was sufficient to justify disqualification from practice, essentially for the reasons identified by Dixon CJ in Ziems v The Prothonotary at 285-286: "If counsel is adequately to perform his functions and serve the interests of his clients, he should be able to command the confidence and respect of the court, of his fellow counsel and of his professional and lay clients. When a barrister is justly convicted of a serious crime and imprisoned the law has pronounced a judgment upon him which must ordinarily mean the loss by him of the standing before the court and the public which, as it seems to me, should belong to those to whom are entrusted the privileges, duties and responsibilities of an advocate. There may be convictions for a crime of which this is not true, but I cannot think that the present is one of them." 38This observation is directed primarily to the consequences of conviction of a serious crime for the lawyer's standing and general reputation. In the language of Kitto J in the same case at 298, the respondent's conviction of aggravated sexual assault is one which "of its own force [carries] such a stigma that judges and members of the profession may be expected to find it too much for their self-respect to share with the person convicted the kind and degree of association which membership of the Bar entails." 39It is also necessary, as the Court emphasised in A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society at [18], to examine the circumstances of the relevant offences. Here that conduct is inconsistent with the respondent's possessing qualities of integrity and willingness to comply with the law and reveals defects of character incompatible with the standards and behaviour required of a member of the legal profession. To that extent the respondent's underlying criminal conduct reflects adversely on his character and accordingly on his fitness to remain on the roll. 40That conduct occurred over seven years ago. When addressing the question of present fitness, the approach which should be taken to conduct which occurred some time ago is that stated by Walsh JA in Ex Parte Tziniolis; Re the Medical Practitioner's Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 460-461, in a passage approved in part by this Court in Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637: "Reformations of character and of behaviour can doubtless occur but their occurrence is not the usual but the exceptional thing. One cannot assume that a change has occurred merely because some years have gone by and it is not proved that anything of a discreditable kind has occurred. If a man has exhibited serious deficiencies in his standards of conduct and his attitudes, it must require clear proof to show that some years later he has established himself as a different man. The position is somewhat similar to that which exists when application is made by a barrister or a solicitor who has been found guilty of serious misconduct exhibiting a lack of proper standards, seeking reinstatement on the ground that, after a lapse of time, he has become a fit and proper person to be a member of a profession which requires qualities and standards in which he has known to have been deficient. In such cases, it has been frequently said that a heavy onus lies on the applicant - see Ex Parte Clyne [[1962] SR (NSW) 436 at 441], and cases there cited." 41In the absence of any evidence from the respondent to show that he has addressed the defects of character revealed by his criminal conduct, that conduct continues to speak as to his present unfitness to practise. 42Finally, the fact that the respondent has on two occasions given knowingly false evidence also reveals defects of character, in particular as to his honesty, that are incompatible with the standards and behaviour required of a member of the legal profession. That aspect of his conduct involved misconduct which, although not occurring in the course of his professional practice, was sufficiently connected to it to be characterised as professional misconduct: see The Prothonotary v Sukkar at [28], [43] - [44]. In the face of the respondent's continuing refusal to acknowledge that he gave false testimony (evidenced by his recent statement asserting his innocence), it should be concluded that those defects of character continue and also demonstrate a present unfitness to practise.

Proposed orders and declaration 43In addition to seeking a declaration that the respondent is not a fit and proper person, the applicant seeks declarations that the respondent is not of good fame and character and is guilty of professional misconduct. 44The reason that in a case such as this the Court makes declarations is referred to by Spigelman CJ in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284; 52 NSWLR 279 at [32]: "... it is appropriate for the Court to declare in a formal way, and not merely in reasons for decision, the basis on which [the order for removal] was made. Such a declaration serves the public interest, not least by reaffirming the high regard the Court has for the reputation and standing of the legal profession, represented before the Court by the Bar Association. A formal declaration will go some way to assuring the public that conduct of this character cannot be and is not tolerated in the profession." See also A Solicitor v The Law Society at [15], where it was said that such a declaration may be of importance for the information of others and relevant to future proceedings for removal or re-admission of the practitioner. 45In this case my reasons for concluding that the respondent is not a fit and proper person include that he is no longer of good fame and character because he engaged in the conduct described above, some of which may be characterised as professional misconduct. That conduct, including the professional misconduct, reveals deficiencies of character which demonstrate a present unfitness to practise. The criminal conduct and ensuing convictions reflect on the respondent's standing, general reputation and fame and also make him unfit to practise. 46That being the position the public interest in the Court declaring the basis upon which the order for removal is made is sufficiently addressed by the making of a declaration which identifies the underlying conduct that makes the respondent no longer a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of lawyers. 47The declaration and orders I propose are:

1. Declare that Craig Andrew Franklin: (a) having pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of four serious criminal offences, including assault occasioning actual bodily harm and aggravated sexual assault, which were committed by him on 9 April 2007, and having been sentenced to an overall term of imprisonment for seven and a half years, with a non-parole period of four and a half years, for those offences and (b) having given evidence on oath in February and June 2009 at his trial and sentencing hearings that he did not commit any of the three offences of which he was found guilty, that evidence being false to his knowledge is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of lawyers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
2. Order that the name of Craig Andrew Franklin be removed from the roll of lawyers of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
3. Order that the respondent pay the applicant Bar Council's costs of these proceedings. 48LEEMING JA: I agree with Meagher JA.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 December 2014